BA762 report released (cowl doors openning)
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M.Mouse, I don't disagree. However, was it really necessary to develop what have now become very expensive and complex aeroplanes? If the development had been confined to pilot displays/navigation systems and less automation we wouldn't be in the pickle that we find ourselves in today. That third pair of eyes would still be there and not leaving one crewmember on their own on the flight deck. The diagnostic process of managing system failures would have been simplified.
It then raises the question of whether or not more recent incidents and disasters might have been avoidable. IMHO many lives and millions of dollars have been lost by the advent of making airborne systems over-complex. The bean counters have, most certainly, made a significant contribution towards taking a backward step with air safety.
TCF
It then raises the question of whether or not more recent incidents and disasters might have been avoidable. IMHO many lives and millions of dollars have been lost by the advent of making airborne systems over-complex. The bean counters have, most certainly, made a significant contribution towards taking a backward step with air safety.
TCF
Controversial, moi?
I have to respectfully disagree. Air travel is statistically safer than ever before and catastrophic failures rarer than ever before.
When I first flew the B747-400 I recall flying with a senior captain who had previously flown the B747 Classic right from its introduction into British Airways. He had suffered 13 engine failures on early aircraft. He had a flight engineer and each event was handled safely.
I flew the '400 for 10 years and suffered 1 engine failure which was a failure of the FADEC we handled it safely. I think I prefer more complex but ultimately more reliable modern engineering.
There will always be human error no matter how we strive for an accident free environment. I cannot agree that less sophisticated engineering warranting a third crew member would ultimately improve safety.
When I first flew the B747-400 I recall flying with a senior captain who had previously flown the B747 Classic right from its introduction into British Airways. He had suffered 13 engine failures on early aircraft. He had a flight engineer and each event was handled safely.
I flew the '400 for 10 years and suffered 1 engine failure which was a failure of the FADEC we handled it safely. I think I prefer more complex but ultimately more reliable modern engineering.
There will always be human error no matter how we strive for an accident free environment. I cannot agree that less sophisticated engineering warranting a third crew member would ultimately improve safety.
Transplant the accident rate from the days of older technology aircraft on to today's utilization rate and there'd be a large airliner at the bottom of a smoking hole every three days. That would be unsustainable with the paying customer.
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"couldn't fly instruments" vs. "pilots who could really fly"
At hopefully only a bit of risk toward thread creep . . . and looking only at the lack of hand-flying skills and/or proficiency as a factor in the incident, a question, particularly directed at those who are a bit (or quite) incredulous at SOPs in question (or at the larger trend of over-reliance on automation): suppose that international standards magically were to be changed so that hand-flying proficiency became a requirement for CAAs to issue licenses for pilots. Would the standard be essentially a reiteration of the skills and proficiency required before automation became both so sophisticated and widespread? Or would your formulation of what constitutes sufficient airmanship with respect to flying the aeroplane without automation represent some later-day definition? (Of course, I did say "magically" . . . so I'm not planning on needing to deflect any broadsides about how unrealistic the premise of my question is.)
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Well, all I can say about older technology and 13,000 flying hours is that I only experienced four emergency engine shut-downs. Two (singular) on a C-130K, one on a B747-100 and one on a B747-300. The B747-200 was extremely reliable; as was the TriStar -200 and -500. The two engine shutdowns on the C-130K were both due to a hydraulic pump break-up. As for the engine failures on the B747 - one was loss of oil and the other was a turbine failure.
Until about 20 years ago the UK CAA requirement for IR renewal in the sim was: no autopilot, no autothrottle, nav by ADF/ VOR/ ILS. Use of the flight director was allowed. As a TIRE I would brief crews that although there was little relevance to everyday flight ops the exercise kept handling skills and instrument scan to a high level of competence. A by-product was maintaining pilots' confidence in their abilities. Training captains were required to fly the exercise with one engine shut down. Perhaps airline accountants and managers could be persuaded to include a similar exercise in recurrent sim checks.
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Airbus considering redesign.
Airbus examining open-cowl cockpit warning for A320neo - 7/27/2015 - Flight Global
Airbus examining open-cowl cockpit warning for A320neo - 7/27/2015 - Flight Global
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Strapping the hood to the car is all fun and dainty, but what about my earlier suggestion to use the human cognitive skills of detecting change and movement?
This way we don't try to exclude the human - rather keep the human skills very much in the loop. Isn't that what this is all about, really? Hand flying skills are also about working with the human cognitive skills of detecting change and movement. Computerising everything works against this excellent capability our ancestors evolved for us.
This way we don't try to exclude the human - rather keep the human skills very much in the loop. Isn't that what this is all about, really? Hand flying skills are also about working with the human cognitive skills of detecting change and movement. Computerising everything works against this excellent capability our ancestors evolved for us.
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Can't help thinking everyone is missing the point!
This incident happened because two experienced and qualified engineers, made an aircraft, unserviceable/unfit for flight and failed to record the fact in the tech log!
That's a pretty basic error that needs to be addressed!
This incident happened because two experienced and qualified engineers, made an aircraft, unserviceable/unfit for flight and failed to record the fact in the tech log!
That's a pretty basic error that needs to be addressed!
Actually they did record it in the tech log. After they had gone to the wrong aircraft to complete the job.
Can't help thinking everyone is missing the point!
This incident happened because two experienced and qualified engineers, made an aircraft, unserviceable/unfit for flight and failed to record the fact in the tech log!
That's a pretty basic error that needs to be addressed!
This incident happened because two experienced and qualified engineers, made an aircraft, unserviceable/unfit for flight and failed to record the fact in the tech log!
That's a pretty basic error that needs to be addressed!
Or are you saying that the AAIB got it wrong ?
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From the report it says that the latches are painted an orange colour in an attempt to make them visible when unlocked.
Would it not also be a good idea to paint the edges of the cowls that are visible when they are not fully closed in the same orange colour rather than blue to make them more visible as well?
Would it not also be a good idea to paint the edges of the cowls that are visible when they are not fully closed in the same orange colour rather than blue to make them more visible as well?
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I suspect that Epsomdog is referring to the initial error in this cascade: leaving the aircraft with the cowling doors not propped up. The report is clear that the technicians shouldn't have left them unlatched without propping them up and they should not have left the aircraft without putting a warning note on the flight deck. Either of these would have been a red flag to the flight crew the following morning.
Fair point. However, the AMM requirement is either cowls latched or open and held open on the stays. Either way, a log entry to say the IDGs required servicing would have saved the day. I'm not going to get all holier than thou over this because I dare-say, most if not all line-maintenance personnel are guilty of a similar offence on a day to day basis. Time being the driver usually.
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Sorry but that is a pretty basic error to make!
I have read the report! And that is exactly what happened. The cowls were opened and then left in an unlatched condition. No log entry was made and they left to attend another aircraft.
Sorry but that is a pretty basic error to make!
Sorry but that is a pretty basic error to make!
It certainly is.
I think we can all agree that it should not have been done. I also think we can all agree that it should have been caught prior to the aircraft departing.
There were numerous contributing factors to the incident, and appearing to single out the initial error whilst ignoring everything else in the report is disappointing, especially for someone who has 45 years in the industry as you do.
For me the 2 most interesting points of the report are the Maintenance Supervisor felt that the allocated manpower for the shift was insufficient, and that this was regarded as normal.
The fact the company subsequently employed no fewer than 26 additional staff is very revealing.
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Epsomdog
It certainly is.
I think we can all agree that it should not have been done. I also think we can all agree that it should have been caught prior to the aircraft departing.
There were numerous contributing factors to the incident, and appearing to single out the initial error whilst ignoring everything else in the report is disappointing, especially for someone who has 45 years in the industry as you do.
For me the 2 most interesting points of the report are the Maintenance Supervisor felt that the allocated manpower for the shift was insufficient, and that this was regarded as normal.
The fact the company subsequently employed no fewer than 26 additional staff is very revealing.
It certainly is.
I think we can all agree that it should not have been done. I also think we can all agree that it should have been caught prior to the aircraft departing.
There were numerous contributing factors to the incident, and appearing to single out the initial error whilst ignoring everything else in the report is disappointing, especially for someone who has 45 years in the industry as you do.
For me the 2 most interesting points of the report are the Maintenance Supervisor felt that the allocated manpower for the shift was insufficient, and that this was regarded as normal.
The fact the company subsequently employed no fewer than 26 additional staff is very revealing.
How or why did the guys make the initial mistake?
Lack of training? Lack of manpower? Workload pressure?
The log entry was later closed (P34) when the technicians wrongly concluded that the cowl doors had been subsequently closed by a third party and that the IDG oils were in fact OK.
So it's not a case of doing something and failing to record it in the Tech Log, quite the opposite.
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I've just finished a post summarising the incident. I wanted to put in so much more but I was already pushing 6,000 words. This thread got me thinking about who all could have done something differently:
- shift managers using overtime
- engineers
- mates who said "huh, weird" in staff room
- staff trainers
- painters
- first officer
- flight crew trainers
- tug driver
- (can we list the ground staff photographer? probably pushing it)
- captain
- cabin crew
- fire captain (actually no, he wasn't supposed to make the call but holding back would have been worse)
- aircraft designers