Turkish A320 accident Istanbul
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Jeez... some of you just don't seem to get it or don't look into it.
RW 35L was OPEN!
It was used for departures up until the time of the incident.
Therefore any debris would have been on RW05 after he did the hard landing (for want of a better phrase). RW 35L was clear...and Longer.
How in the hell is RW 05 optimum??? I'd love to hear your reasons AirScotia as to why a shorter runway with possible debris was more optimum than the longer runway which was clear in light wind CAVOK conditions?
You have obviously missinterpreted/misunderstood some info here.
RW 35L was OPEN!
It was used for departures up until the time of the incident.
Therefore any debris would have been on RW05 after he did the hard landing (for want of a better phrase). RW 35L was clear...and Longer.
How in the hell is RW 05 optimum??? I'd love to hear your reasons AirScotia as to why a shorter runway with possible debris was more optimum than the longer runway which was clear in light wind CAVOK conditions?
You have obviously missinterpreted/misunderstood some info here.
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Twentyyears, you're right. FR24 does indeed show that 35 was being used for departures, and continued to be used for that after 320 aborted the landing.
By 'optimum', what I meant was that 05 was the preferred runway for landing as far as ATC were concerned, before the incident occurred. It clearly wasn't optimum once it had bits of Airbus messing it up.
The playback shows that all the immediately following flights did not land, suggesting to me that ATC were alert to potential debris as soon as the landing was aborted. TK1878 looked to be turning onto the approach for 05 about 8 mins after the abort, by which time they perhaps expected the runway to have been OK-ed. It's presumably probable that ATC issued instructions to the crew about making another approach on 05, on the assumption that an inspection would show the runway to be clear. When the reports came in that there were worrying amounts of Airbus on the runway, plans perhaps had to be changed to get the a/c on the ground asap.
By 'optimum', what I meant was that 05 was the preferred runway for landing as far as ATC were concerned, before the incident occurred. It clearly wasn't optimum once it had bits of Airbus messing it up.
The playback shows that all the immediately following flights did not land, suggesting to me that ATC were alert to potential debris as soon as the landing was aborted. TK1878 looked to be turning onto the approach for 05 about 8 mins after the abort, by which time they perhaps expected the runway to have been OK-ed. It's presumably probable that ATC issued instructions to the crew about making another approach on 05, on the assumption that an inspection would show the runway to be clear. When the reports came in that there were worrying amounts of Airbus on the runway, plans perhaps had to be changed to get the a/c on the ground asap.
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Thanks AirScotia, I hear what you are saying, and I know it's easy from my desk to point out errors with Hindsight.
Personally if I am single engine, especially with more problems further complicating things, I tell ATC which runway I'm landing on, not the other way around. ATC can then organise whatever they need to in order to "clear the way" for me.
Coming back onto RW05 involves more track miles, so it wasn't used to get back on the ground quicker, hence my great interest as to why they chose their course of action.
Maybe there is a good reason, and I'm blinded by my own ideas, but I'm yet to see it.
Personally if I am single engine, especially with more problems further complicating things, I tell ATC which runway I'm landing on, not the other way around. ATC can then organise whatever they need to in order to "clear the way" for me.
Coming back onto RW05 involves more track miles, so it wasn't used to get back on the ground quicker, hence my great interest as to why they chose their course of action.
Maybe there is a good reason, and I'm blinded by my own ideas, but I'm yet to see it.
Pegase Driver
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Gee , do I love this "FR24 " based accident investigations 
Just some quotes in le last 5 posts or so :
"Maybe, with the checklists they had to run through and that kept piling up, they chose..."
" The playback shows that .......suggesting to me that ATC...."
"It's presumably probable that ATC issued instructions to the crew ..."
"plans perhaps had to be changed to get the a/c on the ground asap."
( I personally like that one
)
FR24 gives a vague idea of what the flight did, not the details ,and in Aviation , the nasty parts are always in the details.
What I would really like to know is what cause the hard landing in the first instance . That would be some news.
Just some quotes in le last 5 posts or so :
"Maybe, with the checklists they had to run through and that kept piling up, they chose..."
" The playback shows that .......suggesting to me that ATC...."
"It's presumably probable that ATC issued instructions to the crew ..."
"plans perhaps had to be changed to get the a/c on the ground asap."
( I personally like that one
)FR24 gives a vague idea of what the flight did, not the details ,and in Aviation , the nasty parts are always in the details.
What I would really like to know is what cause the hard landing in the first instance . That would be some news.
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As an aviation English teacher I am interested to see how quickly the language changed to Turkish - in fact it was ATC who initiated it. It is obiously more efficient for the two native Turkish speakers to revert to their own language in such a stressful situation, but I wonder how efficiently non-native speakers (especially different first languages) would have handled the situation. I have an English speaking friend who flies for Turkish Airlines - he would have been a bit flummoxed if he was sitting in the right hand seat and ATC switched to Turkish!
Pegase Driver
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if he was sitting in the right hand seat and ATC switched to Turkish!
Most of the non-native English speaking world works like this. Not only in TK .Not a real issue ,
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Hi Rat5, If it is a Tailwind the turbulence moves towards the Glide-slope, not away from it....
See page 4 + 5 of ....
http://www.airbus.com/fileadmin/medi..._ENV-SEQ07.pdf
See page 4 + 5 of ....
http://www.airbus.com/fileadmin/medi..._ENV-SEQ07.pdf
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Excuse me for being a bit thick here (if I am), but how long does it take to extinguish an engine fire ? I'm rather shocked at that clip of the engine clearly well ablaze for so long in flight. With the fuel shut off and both fire bottles discharged, surely it can't continue to burn like that ? What am I missing here ?
Well, since the main gear strut went though the wing, it probably ripped open the fuel tank. All this fuel was probably leaking on hot engine parts and ignited. But we will never know, since the Turkish authorities never publish reports.
Its a fair question,even with the lp valve shut (if it has indeed shut properly,sometimes they dont) there is still a surprising amount of fuel in the plumbing,also if the cowls were ruptured then discharging the extinguisher means a lot will blow out of the gaps and not be contained under the cowls,smothering the fire.
Hence why lp fuel valve ops checks and cowling fire seals are scheduled inspections.
Hence why lp fuel valve ops checks and cowling fire seals are scheduled inspections.
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I don't think this was an engine fire, just metal sparks from damaged turbine blades rubbing against each other... There is no smoke further downstream of the sparks, which would be the result if fuel was burning...
I concur. Having had a similar engine failure myself, we knew nothing about it until we shut the engine down and when it ran down to a stop in a couple of seconds. Someone showed us some video of the 'burning' engine and it had about 20ft of sparks/flames coming out the back for a long time. There were no indications on the flight deck.
I concur. Having had a similar engine failure myself, we knew nothing about it until we shut the engine down and when it ran down to a stop in a couple of seconds. Someone showed us some video of the 'burning' engine and it had about 20ft of sparks/flames coming out the back for a long time. There were no indications on the flight deck.
Power fluctuations?
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@ Dan et al
Sorry, can't resist. You had a "similar engine failure", hope you don't mean as a result of smashing it really badly onto the RWY and GA ? Seriously, I assume your remarks are in context of previous messages on fuel and hydraulic lines being cut and blablabla, and particularly the one saying its "only sparks and no smoke" (so no fire....).
Please let's not start a discussion of what constitutes an engine fire. Wing seemed (potentially) structurally damaged, engine severely bumped (think of pilon-attachment damage) and seemed to malfunction (whether defined as fire or not), all in all not very handy to keep on flying around with, certainly not in such multiple tight turns as the F/C initiated after aborting the second approach to 05 and positioning for 35L.
Please let's not start a discussion of what constitutes an engine fire. Wing seemed (potentially) structurally damaged, engine severely bumped (think of pilon-attachment damage) and seemed to malfunction (whether defined as fire or not), all in all not very handy to keep on flying around with, certainly not in such multiple tight turns as the F/C initiated after aborting the second approach to 05 and positioning for 35L.
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From what I hear it has nothing to do with wake turbulence but rather a dual input.Why did Airbus decide that a dual input that would double the input was a good idea?I have found after a number of years on the Bus that taking over whilst pressing the red thingy is not exactly instinctive.
