Air Asia Indonesia Lost Contact from Surabaya to Singapore
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Well manually turning off the FAC in this manner sounds like a very desperate attemtp to regain control of the aircraft... Rightly or not they muss have felt that things were completely out of hand...
From the partially leaked report should we understand that they actually managed to recover some sort of control (I.e that turning off the FAC did indeed "work") but where just to far behind the curve ?
From the partially leaked report should we understand that they actually managed to recover some sort of control (I.e that turning off the FAC did indeed "work") but where just to far behind the curve ?
If I lost control of an A320, I'm not sure unstrapping and pulling FAC CBs would be high on my list of priorities
But maybe that reflects poor tech knowledge on my part?
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Well manually turning off the FAC in this manner sounds like a very desperate attemtp to regain control of the aircraft...
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Think about this.
YOU have a computer fault in a highly computerized plane...
do you continue towards a thunderstorm
or
turn around and stay in the clear while dealing with it, improving your position with regard to your home airport?
I'd turn around, follow the checklists, STOP when the checklist said: STOP and go back and land
Futzing around with things...hoping things will get better, trying to ''fix things'' in flight...hmmm sort of sounds like an MD80 off the LA coast a number of years ago.
PROBLEMS? Control the plane and head towards a safe airport while dealing with things. Fix the problem? It still doesn't hurt to land and have it looked over.
Don't fix the problem...you are headed towards a safe airport and use your wits and get down in one piece.
YOU have a computer fault in a highly computerized plane...
do you continue towards a thunderstorm
or
turn around and stay in the clear while dealing with it, improving your position with regard to your home airport?
I'd turn around, follow the checklists, STOP when the checklist said: STOP and go back and land
Futzing around with things...hoping things will get better, trying to ''fix things'' in flight...hmmm sort of sounds like an MD80 off the LA coast a number of years ago.
PROBLEMS? Control the plane and head towards a safe airport while dealing with things. Fix the problem? It still doesn't hurt to land and have it looked over.
Don't fix the problem...you are headed towards a safe airport and use your wits and get down in one piece.
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@glendalegoon
Well said, follow the QRH checklist. I would be interested to see which QRH sections refer to touching the breakers. That would give an idea of the indications that led to the breakers. I really don't think capt would try to invent his own engineering procedure without a blessing from the ground support via satphone.
Well said, follow the QRH checklist. I would be interested to see which QRH sections refer to touching the breakers. That would give an idea of the indications that led to the breakers. I really don't think capt would try to invent his own engineering procedure without a blessing from the ground support via satphone.
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Of course this is all in the area of pure speculation in the absence of reliable facts. But I have to say this. Trying to fly an aircaft in bad weather, with all protection disabled is next to committing suicide.
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If I lost control of an A320, I'm not sure unstrapping and pulling FAC CBs would be high on my list of priorities But maybe that reflects poor tech knowledge on my part?
QRH preamble
When a digital computer behaves abnormally, as a result of an electrical transient, for example, the Operator can stop the abnormal behavior by briefly interrupting the power supply to its processor.
The flight crew can reset most of the computers in this aircraft with a normal cockpit control (selector or pushbutton). However, for some systems, the only way to cut off electrical power is to pull the associated circuit breaker.
To perform a computer reset:
Select the related normal cockpit control OFF, or pull the corresponding circuit breaker.
Wait 3 s if a normal cockpit control is used, or 5 s if a circuit breaker is used (unless a different time is indicated)
Select the related normal cockpit control ON, or push the corresponding circuit breaker
Wait 3 s for the end of the reset.
WARNING:
Do not reset more than one computer at the same time, unless instructed to do so.
Note:
In flight, before taking any action on the cockpit C/Bs, both the PF and PNF must :
Consider and fully understand the consequences of taking action
Crosscheck and ensure that the C/B label corresponds to the affected system.
The computers most prone to reset are listed in the table below, along with the associated reset procedure.
Specific reset procedures included in OEB or TDUs are not referenced in this table and, when issued, supersede this table.
On ground, almost all computers can be reset and are not limited to the ones indicated in the table.
The following computers are not allowed to be reset in specific circumstances:
ECU (Engine Control Unit on CFM engines), or EEC (Electronic Engine Control on IAE engines), and EIU (Engine Interface Unit) while the engine is running.
BSCU (Brake Steering Control Unit), if the aircraft is not stopped.
In flight, as a general rule, the crew must restrict computer resets to those listed in the table, or to those in applicable TDUs or OEBs. Before taking any action on other computers, the flight crew must consider and fully understand the consequences.
When a digital computer behaves abnormally, as a result of an electrical transient, for example, the Operator can stop the abnormal behavior by briefly interrupting the power supply to its processor.
The flight crew can reset most of the computers in this aircraft with a normal cockpit control (selector or pushbutton). However, for some systems, the only way to cut off electrical power is to pull the associated circuit breaker.
To perform a computer reset:
Select the related normal cockpit control OFF, or pull the corresponding circuit breaker.
Wait 3 s if a normal cockpit control is used, or 5 s if a circuit breaker is used (unless a different time is indicated)
Select the related normal cockpit control ON, or push the corresponding circuit breaker
Wait 3 s for the end of the reset.
WARNING:
Do not reset more than one computer at the same time, unless instructed to do so.
Note:
In flight, before taking any action on the cockpit C/Bs, both the PF and PNF must :
Consider and fully understand the consequences of taking action
Crosscheck and ensure that the C/B label corresponds to the affected system.
The computers most prone to reset are listed in the table below, along with the associated reset procedure.
Specific reset procedures included in OEB or TDUs are not referenced in this table and, when issued, supersede this table.
On ground, almost all computers can be reset and are not limited to the ones indicated in the table.
The following computers are not allowed to be reset in specific circumstances:
ECU (Engine Control Unit on CFM engines), or EEC (Electronic Engine Control on IAE engines), and EIU (Engine Interface Unit) while the engine is running.
BSCU (Brake Steering Control Unit), if the aircraft is not stopped.
In flight, as a general rule, the crew must restrict computer resets to those listed in the table, or to those in applicable TDUs or OEBs. Before taking any action on other computers, the flight crew must consider and fully understand the consequences.
From what is being leaked it seems that the circuit breaker pulling caused the subsequent loss of control. But why would he resort to such an unorthodox action if he did not believe that they were already in dire straits?
In the documented prior defects of FAC1 perhaps a previous crew used the circuit breaker to resolve a problem with some sucess, and that informed the captain's actions on the accident flight?
Getting back to flight without protections: as ManaAdaSystems alluded, most planes do that just fine every day.
In the documented prior defects of FAC1 perhaps a previous crew used the circuit breaker to resolve a problem with some sucess, and that informed the captain's actions on the accident flight?
Getting back to flight without protections: as ManaAdaSystems alluded, most planes do that just fine every day.
quidquid excusatio prandium pro
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The frozen AOA event experienced by Lufthansa recently, the one that generated the OEB to all operators, seems to indicate that in some scenarios, at least, you must think outside of the ECAM/QRH box in order to save the aircraft. And smartly, in this case, there was no time to do anything other than act, maybe **** oneself, contacting company engineering for a leisurely chat not an option.
That is contrary to everything pilots are taught with regard to the use of proper checklists, SOP, and the way things are done in the Airbus world. In creatively solving problems under pressure, the Lufthansa event has perhaps generated negative training for all of us, whilst at the same time shown us what very sharp, knowledgeable and competent crews are capable of, kudos to our German friends.
This aircraft demands an intensive and thorough knowledge of flight control laws, system architecture, reversion modes, and how to recognize each and every display associated with various component failures.
I am sensing the press leaks are designed by the big players to lay significant blame on the pilots of this accident aircraft, as one of the above posters has suggested, something that needs to be resisted until all evidence has come to light.
That is contrary to everything pilots are taught with regard to the use of proper checklists, SOP, and the way things are done in the Airbus world. In creatively solving problems under pressure, the Lufthansa event has perhaps generated negative training for all of us, whilst at the same time shown us what very sharp, knowledgeable and competent crews are capable of, kudos to our German friends.
This aircraft demands an intensive and thorough knowledge of flight control laws, system architecture, reversion modes, and how to recognize each and every display associated with various component failures.
I am sensing the press leaks are designed by the big players to lay significant blame on the pilots of this accident aircraft, as one of the above posters has suggested, something that needs to be resisted until all evidence has come to light.
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@bugg smasher
Would it make sense to have an easier way to revert to direct law without checklists/power off 2 out of 3 ADRU's. That way direct law can be entered in a safe and simple process more akin to AT and AP. The pilot then has a simplified baseline to return to in extremis when there is no time to decipher exactly which protections and control law they are in. Disabling 2 of 3 ADRUs creates a single point of failure in the last ADRU and is overkill when all that is desired is a direct law without protections. A second procedure could be followed once in direct law to stabilize a/c, configure to a safer place in the flight envelope and minimize the loads on the air frame e.g. reduce FL, set pitch and thrust. This would immediately remove overload from flight crew and put the a/c in the safest possible configuration.
Having to unstrap and leave the left seat is clearly a dangerous activity in an emergency.
Would it make sense to have an easier way to revert to direct law without checklists/power off 2 out of 3 ADRU's. That way direct law can be entered in a safe and simple process more akin to AT and AP. The pilot then has a simplified baseline to return to in extremis when there is no time to decipher exactly which protections and control law they are in. Disabling 2 of 3 ADRUs creates a single point of failure in the last ADRU and is overkill when all that is desired is a direct law without protections. A second procedure could be followed once in direct law to stabilize a/c, configure to a safer place in the flight envelope and minimize the loads on the air frame e.g. reduce FL, set pitch and thrust. This would immediately remove overload from flight crew and put the a/c in the safest possible configuration.
Having to unstrap and leave the left seat is clearly a dangerous activity in an emergency.
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don't you guys get it?
the guy was trying to fix something that should be fixed on the ground
limp home and get it fixed on the ground...don't futz with it in the sky
unless there is no hope for anything
the guy was trying to fix something that should be fixed on the ground
limp home and get it fixed on the ground...don't futz with it in the sky
unless there is no hope for anything
my QRH says that a FAC 1+2 reset should only be done on the ground. Seems pretty clear, to reset in flight with the CB's means this crew was in unknown territory and effectively became test pilots. The interesting thing will be WHY this course of action was taken, if it was the result of a 'last ditch effort' to save the plane then fair enough. If it was a non-standard reset for something minor like a WINDSHEAR detection fault then all these people have been killed for no good reason. Only the report will reveal the answer.
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@glendalegoon
I understand your allegation however do not subscribe to it.
What would be his risk vs reward? You are alleging that ground maintenance was performed in the air for the sake of expedience by the captain. I do not buy it and in any case would never tarnish a dead pilots reputation without knowing all the facts. Capt reportedly had an exemplary aviation career in military and civil - not appropriate to condemn him when he is unable to defend.
I understand your allegation however do not subscribe to it.
What would be his risk vs reward? You are alleging that ground maintenance was performed in the air for the sake of expedience by the captain. I do not buy it and in any case would never tarnish a dead pilots reputation without knowing all the facts. Capt reportedly had an exemplary aviation career in military and civil - not appropriate to condemn him when he is unable to defend.
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Does the QRH say what to do if you've reset the FAC several times and the problem keeps returning?
I'd suggest pulling the CBs did not cause the problem but was a reaction to it. I bet it was after the zoom climb. Doesn't sound like the sort of thing to do just for fun in the middle of a thunder cloud.
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Tough question xcitation. This airplane works very well when all the computers are agreeing with each other; that number, by the way, is eighty nine.
The Flight Augmentation Computers (FACs) are one of the most astonishingly high tech units on the aircrfaft, they parse instantaneous aircraft energy and vector from a variety of inputs, provide a range of protections, and represent the very core of Airbus technology. Brilliant stuff.
But when those go wrong, the system reverts to 'you have control' mode; as an old school pilot brought up on DC-8's, I don't have a problem with that.
We have a training issue here, as well as a technology issue that not only outpaces, but supersedes aforesaid training. Airbus is at fault here, they need to man up.
The Flight Augmentation Computers (FACs) are one of the most astonishingly high tech units on the aircrfaft, they parse instantaneous aircraft energy and vector from a variety of inputs, provide a range of protections, and represent the very core of Airbus technology. Brilliant stuff.
But when those go wrong, the system reverts to 'you have control' mode; as an old school pilot brought up on DC-8's, I don't have a problem with that.
We have a training issue here, as well as a technology issue that not only outpaces, but supersedes aforesaid training. Airbus is at fault here, they need to man up.
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OK...think about it x citation
the article indicates the captain was out of his chair to futz with circuit breakers
IF there was a thunderstorm ahead and there was difficulty controlling the plane , why would a 20, 000 hour ex F16 pilot be out of the seat to play with circuit breakers?
He could easily have the copilot play with the circuit breakers while having all that flying experience ready to handle anything.
It doesn't take Charles Lindbergh to pull a circuit breaker.
the article indicates the captain was out of his chair to futz with circuit breakers
IF there was a thunderstorm ahead and there was difficulty controlling the plane , why would a 20, 000 hour ex F16 pilot be out of the seat to play with circuit breakers?
He could easily have the copilot play with the circuit breakers while having all that flying experience ready to handle anything.
It doesn't take Charles Lindbergh to pull a circuit breaker.
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The thread tells us that this flight was, exceptionally carrying an engineer as part of the crew. We are also told that FAC problems had been experienced in previous flights with this aircraft, but could not be resolved on the ground.
Could it be that ground mantenance as well as flight crew planned in advance to troubleshoot on this flight?
Could it be that ground mantenance as well as flight crew planned in advance to troubleshoot on this flight?
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They were concerned about apparently significant TRWs ahead.
It defies common sense at that time either the captain or the engineer on board would have been tinkering with anything.
It defies common sense at that time either the captain or the engineer on board would have been tinkering with anything.
