Malaysian Airlines MH370 contact lost
Join Date: Mar 2009
Location: Perth Western Australia
Age: 57
Posts: 808
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Can any body do a map, or know where theres one, plot the last ping and its uncertinity radius. I think from the analysis we where sure where that was. Then the old search areas versus the new ones. Some data points with suppodsley sightings from the sattelittes would be good as well.
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Tewksbury Mass USA
Age: 80
Posts: 43
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Those E & E Bay Fires
Regarding Post # 8461 on Page 424, Leightman 957 says to 777fly - “the report also states that the event is far less likely in the air than on the ground. (in Sec 1.18.3).” The AAIB report in play is AAIB Report # 2/2009.
Link > http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2010/hs-l...l100318.en.pdf.
And Leightman 957 adds in post # 8445 on page 423, “There were similar incidents prior to, and after, this one. The cause was molten metal at up to 1000 deg C being released from BTB and GB contactors. The reasons why this happens is still not fully understood. An airborne failure of this kind could have left the crew with an unmanageable situation due to multiple systems failure: VHF disabled, ACARS fail, dual FMS failure, flightdeck smoke, alternate nav diversion, loss of situational awareness, oxygen depletion, unconciousness, a/c nav to incorrect lat/long entry.... “
Leightman 957 is correct about the in-flight probability and the danger of a growing fire again at post 8470.
My concerns aren’t the matches (electrical malfunctions), but rather the fuel for a fire.
From page 9 of this same report (Sec 1.6.3, Insulation blanket specification and maintenance) it also said; “The insulation blankets fitted to the fuselage structure adjacent to the P200 power panel were determined to be the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) blankets, fitted in 1997. These blankets consisted of fibreglass batting ….. covered with a polyethylene terephthalate film.”
“In 2008 the US FAA issued an Airworthiness Directive (2008-23-09) requiring the replacement of certain insulation blankets manufactured with some types of polyethylene teraphthalate film. The insulation blankets installed in N786UA were not among those whose replacement was required.”
“Contamination on insulation blankets can affect the blanket’s fire retardant capabilities. The aircraft manufacturer published a Service Letter (777‑SL‑25‑018) on 23 March 1998 which informed operators of: ‘the potential fire hazard if combustible materials (contamination) such as overspray of corrosion inhibiting compound (CIC), hydraulic fluids, oil, pesticides with flammable ‘carrier’ fluids, grease or dust buildup are allowed to accumulate on the insulation blankets outboard of the passenger/cargo compartment linings. Some types of contaminates have been found to support propagation of flame.”
This incident is among 10 other E & E bay fires at my post # 8220 on Page 411 - “Past E & E Bay Fires, FACTUAL DATA.” – as “2/26/07. United 777” , the United incident on February 26, 2007. It was posted because any arc event anywhere in any of the Boeing models is a “identified safety risk” because the installed acoustic/thermal insulation (“polyethylene teraphthalate film” or PET is flammable as seen in AD 2008-23-09 calling for removal of PET (aka Mylar-AN-26) by December 2016 in all Boeing models --------- except the 777s.
The AAIB report said “The insulation blankets installed in N786UA were not among those whose replacement was required.” was because the 777s were excluded from the 737s, 747s, 757s and 767s in this AD. I do not know why T7s were excluded but “polyethylene terephthalate” known as PET was the installed insulation.
Two other 777 E & E bay fire incidents at Post 8220 mentioned the flammability of insulation blankets when exposed to electrical arcs. Both came from NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter A-07-113-116. NTSB Letter Link > http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletter...07_113_116.pdf There, electrical arcing set adjacent insulation blankets afire.
Regarding the first, British Airways 777 on 11/15/2004 the Letter said; (Ref page 1) “Following the incident, British Airways conducted a fleetwide visual inspection on its model 777 airplanes (43 total aircraft). Fifty-five percent of the receptacles that were inspected contained contact pins that exhibited signs of overheating; 12 percent contained contact pins that were loose and had evidence of melting at the base of the pins. A secondary external power receptacle that showed signs of electrical arcing and extensive thermal damage to its protective cover was sent to Boeing for analysis.” And that; (Ref page 3) “Alternately, molten splatter could result in ignition of nearby materials such as dust, lint, or insulation blankets. Such damage could potentially compromise critical aircraft functions.”
Regarding the second, a United 777 on 7/6/2004, the Letter said; (Ref page 2) “The second reported event occurred on July 6, 2004. According to the operator, a post incident inspection performed by a maintenance technician revealed evidence of overheating on the secondary external power receptacle and thermal damage to an adjacent insulation blanket.”
My 10 incidents of E & E bay fires came from across all models mentioned in the AD.
Another 9 insulation fires in cockpit or fuselage areas were not listed because they were outside of this most critical area. All are of great concern.
In the AD discussion - a chilling read - it is made clear that any fire in any hidden or unprotected area is a most serious concern. The 777s should have been included.
See this AD at Link > http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory...2008-23-09.pdf
My thanks to Leightman 957 and others for recognizing this possibility.
Link > http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2010/hs-l...l100318.en.pdf.
And Leightman 957 adds in post # 8445 on page 423, “There were similar incidents prior to, and after, this one. The cause was molten metal at up to 1000 deg C being released from BTB and GB contactors. The reasons why this happens is still not fully understood. An airborne failure of this kind could have left the crew with an unmanageable situation due to multiple systems failure: VHF disabled, ACARS fail, dual FMS failure, flightdeck smoke, alternate nav diversion, loss of situational awareness, oxygen depletion, unconciousness, a/c nav to incorrect lat/long entry.... “
Leightman 957 is correct about the in-flight probability and the danger of a growing fire again at post 8470.
My concerns aren’t the matches (electrical malfunctions), but rather the fuel for a fire.
From page 9 of this same report (Sec 1.6.3, Insulation blanket specification and maintenance) it also said; “The insulation blankets fitted to the fuselage structure adjacent to the P200 power panel were determined to be the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) blankets, fitted in 1997. These blankets consisted of fibreglass batting ….. covered with a polyethylene terephthalate film.”
“In 2008 the US FAA issued an Airworthiness Directive (2008-23-09) requiring the replacement of certain insulation blankets manufactured with some types of polyethylene teraphthalate film. The insulation blankets installed in N786UA were not among those whose replacement was required.”
“Contamination on insulation blankets can affect the blanket’s fire retardant capabilities. The aircraft manufacturer published a Service Letter (777‑SL‑25‑018) on 23 March 1998 which informed operators of: ‘the potential fire hazard if combustible materials (contamination) such as overspray of corrosion inhibiting compound (CIC), hydraulic fluids, oil, pesticides with flammable ‘carrier’ fluids, grease or dust buildup are allowed to accumulate on the insulation blankets outboard of the passenger/cargo compartment linings. Some types of contaminates have been found to support propagation of flame.”
This incident is among 10 other E & E bay fires at my post # 8220 on Page 411 - “Past E & E Bay Fires, FACTUAL DATA.” – as “2/26/07. United 777” , the United incident on February 26, 2007. It was posted because any arc event anywhere in any of the Boeing models is a “identified safety risk” because the installed acoustic/thermal insulation (“polyethylene teraphthalate film” or PET is flammable as seen in AD 2008-23-09 calling for removal of PET (aka Mylar-AN-26) by December 2016 in all Boeing models --------- except the 777s.
The AAIB report said “The insulation blankets installed in N786UA were not among those whose replacement was required.” was because the 777s were excluded from the 737s, 747s, 757s and 767s in this AD. I do not know why T7s were excluded but “polyethylene terephthalate” known as PET was the installed insulation.
Two other 777 E & E bay fire incidents at Post 8220 mentioned the flammability of insulation blankets when exposed to electrical arcs. Both came from NTSB Safety Recommendation Letter A-07-113-116. NTSB Letter Link > http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletter...07_113_116.pdf There, electrical arcing set adjacent insulation blankets afire.
Regarding the first, British Airways 777 on 11/15/2004 the Letter said; (Ref page 1) “Following the incident, British Airways conducted a fleetwide visual inspection on its model 777 airplanes (43 total aircraft). Fifty-five percent of the receptacles that were inspected contained contact pins that exhibited signs of overheating; 12 percent contained contact pins that were loose and had evidence of melting at the base of the pins. A secondary external power receptacle that showed signs of electrical arcing and extensive thermal damage to its protective cover was sent to Boeing for analysis.” And that; (Ref page 3) “Alternately, molten splatter could result in ignition of nearby materials such as dust, lint, or insulation blankets. Such damage could potentially compromise critical aircraft functions.”
Regarding the second, a United 777 on 7/6/2004, the Letter said; (Ref page 2) “The second reported event occurred on July 6, 2004. According to the operator, a post incident inspection performed by a maintenance technician revealed evidence of overheating on the secondary external power receptacle and thermal damage to an adjacent insulation blanket.”
My 10 incidents of E & E bay fires came from across all models mentioned in the AD.
Another 9 insulation fires in cockpit or fuselage areas were not listed because they were outside of this most critical area. All are of great concern.
In the AD discussion - a chilling read - it is made clear that any fire in any hidden or unprotected area is a most serious concern. The 777s should have been included.
See this AD at Link > http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory...2008-23-09.pdf
My thanks to Leightman 957 and others for recognizing this possibility.
Join Date: Sep 2002
Location: Australia
Posts: 1,082
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Travelling at a higher speed therefore burned fuel faster?
It was still in the air for 7 + hours from last SSR contact to last ping.
Fuel burn for 7 hours endurance from that point should indicate a particular set of profiles given the fuel load was known.
Surely this would not be the "new credible information"?
It was still in the air for 7 + hours from last SSR contact to last ping.
Fuel burn for 7 hours endurance from that point should indicate a particular set of profiles given the fuel load was known.
Surely this would not be the "new credible information"?
Join Date: Oct 2007
Location: Antipodes Islands
Posts: 94
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Re: New Search Area - Map
That don't make no sense!
The new track (400 kts) is closer to Western Australia - as announced
The higher speed tracks terminate in the initial search area according to the map.
The new announcement says the aircraft was travelling faster than normal so why is the slower speed track being searched?
The new track (400 kts) is closer to Western Australia - as announced
The higher speed tracks terminate in the initial search area according to the map.
The new announcement says the aircraft was travelling faster than normal so why is the slower speed track being searched?
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: Perth - Western Australia
Age: 75
Posts: 1,805
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
There seems to be some discrepancies in what vessel is going to tow the U.S. Navy pinger locator.
Both the TPL-25 Towed Pinger Locator System and a Bluefin-21 underwater drone have been sent to Perth from the U.S. along with 10 personnel to operate the systems.
The Bluefin-21 sports a Multibeam Echosounder, Side-Scan Sonar, and a Sub-bottom Profiler. It's capable of depths of 14,700' (4500M approx).
Initially it was stated the ADV Ocean Shield was going to tow the pinger locator - however, in recent days, it's been advised that the commercially-owned DMS Maritime Seahorse Standard would be utilising both search devices.
The Seahorse Standard is on long-term charter to the RAN and operates from HMAS Stirling naval base at Garden Island, just offshore from Perth.
However, I can't see where both systems would be operated from the one ship?
I guess it's possible both devices will be taken out to the search zone by the Seahorse Standard, and one of them will transferred to the Ocean Shield upon arrival at the search zone.
It's also been stated that neither ship will leave port until there's a report of confirmed wreckage.
The Seahorse Standard is a Canadian-built vessel of 2090 gross tons, and it's pretty slow, with a 12kt maximum speed and a cruise speed of 8kts.
The much larger Ocean Shield looks like a more capable vessel to me.
It appears the Seahorse Standard carries side-scan sonar as standard equipment, and it also has ROV capabilities.
Seahorse Standard specs - http://www.dmsmaritime.com/docs/dms_...ec%20sheet.pdf
Bluefin-21 specs - http://www.phnx-international.com/sp..._Specsheet.pdf
Both the TPL-25 Towed Pinger Locator System and a Bluefin-21 underwater drone have been sent to Perth from the U.S. along with 10 personnel to operate the systems.
The Bluefin-21 sports a Multibeam Echosounder, Side-Scan Sonar, and a Sub-bottom Profiler. It's capable of depths of 14,700' (4500M approx).
Initially it was stated the ADV Ocean Shield was going to tow the pinger locator - however, in recent days, it's been advised that the commercially-owned DMS Maritime Seahorse Standard would be utilising both search devices.
The Seahorse Standard is on long-term charter to the RAN and operates from HMAS Stirling naval base at Garden Island, just offshore from Perth.
However, I can't see where both systems would be operated from the one ship?
I guess it's possible both devices will be taken out to the search zone by the Seahorse Standard, and one of them will transferred to the Ocean Shield upon arrival at the search zone.
It's also been stated that neither ship will leave port until there's a report of confirmed wreckage.
The Seahorse Standard is a Canadian-built vessel of 2090 gross tons, and it's pretty slow, with a 12kt maximum speed and a cruise speed of 8kts.
The much larger Ocean Shield looks like a more capable vessel to me.
It appears the Seahorse Standard carries side-scan sonar as standard equipment, and it also has ROV capabilities.
Seahorse Standard specs - http://www.dmsmaritime.com/docs/dms_...ec%20sheet.pdf
Bluefin-21 specs - http://www.phnx-international.com/sp..._Specsheet.pdf
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: Perth - Western Australia
Age: 75
Posts: 1,805
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The new, revised crash position is related to new calculations that revised the amount of fuel burnt during the manouevres around Malaysia, to an increased amount - thus leaving less fuel for the flight path heading South.
I think the 400kt speed path is being searched because it corresponds with the new Japanese satellite pics that are being touted as the most credible, because these pics show coloured wreckage that definitely resembles MAS colours.
The CSIRO "simulated drift" graphic shows debris travelling on more of a Northerly path and circulating in the area, rather than being driven rapidly onto the W.A. coast, as I expected it would be.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?featur...&v=oVVWrKn9Gg8
I think the 400kt speed path is being searched because it corresponds with the new Japanese satellite pics that are being touted as the most credible, because these pics show coloured wreckage that definitely resembles MAS colours.
The CSIRO "simulated drift" graphic shows debris travelling on more of a Northerly path and circulating in the area, rather than being driven rapidly onto the W.A. coast, as I expected it would be.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?featur...&v=oVVWrKn9Gg8
Last edited by onetrack; 28th Mar 2014 at 07:30.
Evertonian
I'm sorry, I really can't keep up with the pace of this thread so, I'm sorry if I'm covering old ground but...
Are the Chinese whipping their media into a frenzy to gain information on the capabilities of the satellites, rather than genuinely wanting to know? Why, if this isn't the case, would you commit a fair amount of military hardware to a search area, when you are dubious about the validity of the data?
Are the Chinese whipping their media into a frenzy to gain information on the capabilities of the satellites, rather than genuinely wanting to know? Why, if this isn't the case, would you commit a fair amount of military hardware to a search area, when you are dubious about the validity of the data?
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: Norway
Age: 57
Posts: 140
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
That don't make no sense!
The new track (400 kts) is closer to Western Australia - as announced
The higher speed tracks terminate in the initial search area according to the map.
The new announcement says the aircraft was travelling faster than normal so why is the slower speed track being searched?
The new track (400 kts) is closer to Western Australia - as announced
The higher speed tracks terminate in the initial search area according to the map.
The new announcement says the aircraft was travelling faster than normal so why is the slower speed track being searched?
Edit: The faster travel was from point of deviation from intended route until contact lost on primary radar over the Malacca strait.
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: Norway
Age: 57
Posts: 140
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The new, revised crash position is related to new calculations that revised the amount of fuel burnt during the manouevres around Malaysia, to an increased amount - thus leaving less fuel for the flight path heading South.
I think the 400kt speed path is being searched because it corresponds with the new Japanese satellite pics that are being touted as the most credible, because these pics show coloured wreckage that definitely resembles MAS colours.
The CSIRO "simulated drift" graphic shows debris travelling on more of a Northerly path and circulating in the area, rather than being driven rapidly onto the W.A. coast, as I expected it would be.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?featur...&v=oVVWrKn9Gg8
I think the 400kt speed path is being searched because it corresponds with the new Japanese satellite pics that are being touted as the most credible, because these pics show coloured wreckage that definitely resembles MAS colours.
The CSIRO "simulated drift" graphic shows debris travelling on more of a Northerly path and circulating in the area, rather than being driven rapidly onto the W.A. coast, as I expected it would be.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?featur...&v=oVVWrKn9Gg8
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: Perth - Western Australia
Age: 75
Posts: 1,805
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@SteinarN - I don't believe the Japanese sat pics have been publically released. They were handed over to the Malaysians, who then handed them on to AMSA, as they proved quite credible.
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Rockytop, Tennessee, USA
Posts: 5,898
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
On the human factors side, the MH 370 flight deck crew is portrayed in a Wall Street Journal article as having that low profile that so many of us in the business crave:
Portraits of the Lives of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370's Pilots - WSJ.com
Extensive interviews with friends, colleagues and family offer a more complete picture of the two pilots. What stands out most about Captain Zaharie Ahmad Shah and First Officer Fariq Abdul Hamid is just how ordinary their lives appeared until Flight 370 took off.
To many colleagues and classmates who knew Mr. Zaharie, he was noteworthy precisely because he didn't stand out.
"The guys who are too smart get the airplane into trouble. That's also the case for those who are dumb," said Nik Huzlan, a former Boeing 777 pilot and colleague of 30 years at the airline. Mr. Zaharie "wasn't bad and he wasn't outstanding. That's what you look for in a pilot."
...Mr. Huzlan eventually became chief pilot, a job that involved handling discipline problems. Most pilots, including Mr. Zaharie, were never a cause for concern, he said. "Zaharie is the ideal pilot, an invisible pilot," he said.
To many colleagues and classmates who knew Mr. Zaharie, he was noteworthy precisely because he didn't stand out.
"The guys who are too smart get the airplane into trouble. That's also the case for those who are dumb," said Nik Huzlan, a former Boeing 777 pilot and colleague of 30 years at the airline. Mr. Zaharie "wasn't bad and he wasn't outstanding. That's what you look for in a pilot."
...Mr. Huzlan eventually became chief pilot, a job that involved handling discipline problems. Most pilots, including Mr. Zaharie, were never a cause for concern, he said. "Zaharie is the ideal pilot, an invisible pilot," he said.
Join Date: May 2012
Location: London, UK
Posts: 63
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
This is becoming rediculous. Now the search area has moved 1000Km based on a re-evalued piece of information that was taken as 'fact' - the speed, position and timing of the flight while it was under radar observation. It calls every 'fact' we've been given into question IMO.
As for satellite photography, not only have none of the 100+ significant objects been identified as from MH370, none have been eliminated either - as AFIK, none have actually been found/seen from air or sea to be eliminated.
The position of these 'objects' when photoed must have been 'exact' and the sea currents and winds in the area must have been under unparallelled monitoring. Yet they are not found. Photo interpretation must be called into question.
If MH370 changed direction after leaving Malasian radar, it could change speed too. Therefore the 'search area' must remain totally undefined. We seem no nearer finding MH370 than 3 weeks ago.
As for satellite photography, not only have none of the 100+ significant objects been identified as from MH370, none have been eliminated either - as AFIK, none have actually been found/seen from air or sea to be eliminated.
The position of these 'objects' when photoed must have been 'exact' and the sea currents and winds in the area must have been under unparallelled monitoring. Yet they are not found. Photo interpretation must be called into question.
If MH370 changed direction after leaving Malasian radar, it could change speed too. Therefore the 'search area' must remain totally undefined. We seem no nearer finding MH370 than 3 weeks ago.
Join Date: Oct 2006
Location: Airport
Posts: 77
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
with all the technology having been put on this aircraft...radio vhf/hf, locator beacons, satcom, gps, transponder...even satellite in space dont give much info... all of these designed to locate an aircraft in flight ...not a single one of these technology is able to help pinpoint the exact location of the final resting place of this aircraft on the ground 
this tragic event has only proven one thing....aircraft technology haven't really improved much in terms of locating a lost aircraft
this tragic event has only proven one thing....aircraft technology haven't really improved much in terms of locating a lost aircraft
Join Date: Jul 2010
Location: Valencia, Spain
Age: 82
Posts: 32
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Locator Beacon (Pinger) batteries
Just a word on CVR (and FDR) locator pinger batteries. They do not have a fixed life as such and they do not shut down after 30 days. They are designed to provide optimum performance for 30 days (90 days in the case of newer style batteries which I understand this aircraft may not have had). During this time the batteries will slowly discharge and the voltage will reduce but the pinger is designed to operate normally on a reduced voltage so is initially not affected, hence the "guideline" figure of 30 (90) days. When the battery has reduced to this voltage level, where the pinger works at optimum performance, the pinger performance will start to reduce and this could take days or weeks before it dies completely. Another factor is the age of the pinger and battery, which should be replaced at regular scheduled intervals (cannot recall what it is now).
The bottom line is that when the towed array finally arrives on site they may still have several weeks rather than days to listen for it. Chance of picking it up will reduce with time but it will not just suddenly switch off at 30 days. Just like the average torch it will slowly get dimmer and dimmer until it fades to nothing.
PS: I worked on CVRs until 25 years ago and continued to sign them off until about 10 years ago. Pingers (as we called them) were not repaired but replaced with new items, complete with battery, as I recall.
The bottom line is that when the towed array finally arrives on site they may still have several weeks rather than days to listen for it. Chance of picking it up will reduce with time but it will not just suddenly switch off at 30 days. Just like the average torch it will slowly get dimmer and dimmer until it fades to nothing.
PS: I worked on CVRs until 25 years ago and continued to sign them off until about 10 years ago. Pingers (as we called them) were not repaired but replaced with new items, complete with battery, as I recall.
Last edited by Ka-2b Pilot; 28th Mar 2014 at 13:56. Reason: Clarify which pinger and added PS.
We probably can't make sense of the ping derived solutions as the complete data set has not been made available. Even the full data set produces multiple possible solutions (or if you prefer, wide confidence intervals around the average solution).
You have to admit this incident was well planned. Lots of things we do know about were too well timed to be coincidence eg the plan started at FIR boundary, late at night when military unlikely to respond in time, no moon ....
No reason to expect the bits we don't know we're not also well planned.
What sort of solution do you get if you make the flowing assumptions
1. High speed lowish level until across peninsula and out of primary radar. This is the highest risk part, so speed and low level make sense. You would not loiter while within primary radar coverage.
2. Ditch or crash at fuel exhaustion (minimal slick).
3. Assume flight ended close to TIME of last complete ping, and final incomplete ping was related to crash itself.
4. Crash WHERE it was dark or perhaps first light at time of final ping. Need some light if plan to ditch (minimal debris??), although this constraint isn't relevant for a high speed crash.
5. Close to 40 degree arc - although I don't think we don't know the rounding error associated with 40.
Does this produce any sort of coherent solution?
You have to admit this incident was well planned. Lots of things we do know about were too well timed to be coincidence eg the plan started at FIR boundary, late at night when military unlikely to respond in time, no moon ....
No reason to expect the bits we don't know we're not also well planned.
What sort of solution do you get if you make the flowing assumptions
1. High speed lowish level until across peninsula and out of primary radar. This is the highest risk part, so speed and low level make sense. You would not loiter while within primary radar coverage.
2. Ditch or crash at fuel exhaustion (minimal slick).
3. Assume flight ended close to TIME of last complete ping, and final incomplete ping was related to crash itself.
4. Crash WHERE it was dark or perhaps first light at time of final ping. Need some light if plan to ditch (minimal debris??), although this constraint isn't relevant for a high speed crash.
5. Close to 40 degree arc - although I don't think we don't know the rounding error associated with 40.
Does this produce any sort of coherent solution?
Data Guy:
I note that you share my opinion that an MEC fire is possible and might explain what happened. Boeing recommended fitment of upgraded insulation in the MEC after the ground incidents but also suggested better procedures for keeping them free of contaminants such as oil, hydraulic or deicer fluids, which degrade the protection level of the fabric. One wonders how diligently Malaysian were doing this and also if they incorporated the recommended improvements to the MEC cooling for hot region operation.
Olasek. Flash8. Porterhouse.Ian W.:
I am simply suggesting that if the crew were faced with a dual fmc failure it might explain the rather perplexing routeings after contact was lost. Since some of you seem to have no idea how alternate nav works:
A dual fmc failure followed by a 90 degree left turn to start a diversion would leave a completely black ND with no nav aids tuned or nav aids/station data etc available to display. Since nothing would be coming from the FMCs all new waypoints would have to be loaded by lat/long. Until that was done there would be NOTHING to navigate by and situational awareness could be rapidly lost. So, yes, they would have been punching in lats & longs IF there was a dual fmc failure. The quickest way to find a lat/long is to look at the chart and pick a waypoint near where you want to go, AGARI for instance. Then add a few more followed by lat/long of Penang. You are then back in LNAV with a track displayed. My supposition is that the lat/long of Penang might have been entered incorrectly as a South latitude and that after a crew incapacitation the aircraft simply navigated south to that point.
A possible flaw in this argument was that the longitude of Penang is too far east of where the search was being conducted, but the news that they are now switching the search 1000km further east tends to support my theory.
I note that you share my opinion that an MEC fire is possible and might explain what happened. Boeing recommended fitment of upgraded insulation in the MEC after the ground incidents but also suggested better procedures for keeping them free of contaminants such as oil, hydraulic or deicer fluids, which degrade the protection level of the fabric. One wonders how diligently Malaysian were doing this and also if they incorporated the recommended improvements to the MEC cooling for hot region operation.
Olasek. Flash8. Porterhouse.Ian W.:
I am simply suggesting that if the crew were faced with a dual fmc failure it might explain the rather perplexing routeings after contact was lost. Since some of you seem to have no idea how alternate nav works:
A dual fmc failure followed by a 90 degree left turn to start a diversion would leave a completely black ND with no nav aids tuned or nav aids/station data etc available to display. Since nothing would be coming from the FMCs all new waypoints would have to be loaded by lat/long. Until that was done there would be NOTHING to navigate by and situational awareness could be rapidly lost. So, yes, they would have been punching in lats & longs IF there was a dual fmc failure. The quickest way to find a lat/long is to look at the chart and pick a waypoint near where you want to go, AGARI for instance. Then add a few more followed by lat/long of Penang. You are then back in LNAV with a track displayed. My supposition is that the lat/long of Penang might have been entered incorrectly as a South latitude and that after a crew incapacitation the aircraft simply navigated south to that point.
A possible flaw in this argument was that the longitude of Penang is too far east of where the search was being conducted, but the news that they are now switching the search 1000km further east tends to support my theory.
Join Date: May 2008
Location: UK
Age: 61
Posts: 24
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Search location change ...
I mentioned the Breguet range equation in an earlier post but it got deleted .
If the flight path is known ( pings etc ) and the fuel load is known and all the other factors ( ie a/c TOW ) it could be useful . I also cannot understand satellite images of 100 , 200 , 300 objects yet no SAR aircraft or ship sightings/confirmation ?
If the flight path is known ( pings etc ) and the fuel load is known and all the other factors ( ie a/c TOW ) it could be useful . I also cannot understand satellite images of 100 , 200 , 300 objects yet no SAR aircraft or ship sightings/confirmation ?
Join Date: Nov 2013
Location: California
Posts: 154
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I have covered this twice and others too although The Malaysians have not.
The flight in Malaysian airspace after the turn back was about one hour. After a decision to scramble and the interceptor getting airborne it would have been in a tail chase. The interceptors are not long range and could not have remained there for long anyway.
The flight in Malaysian airspace after the turn back was about one hour. After a decision to scramble and the interceptor getting airborne it would have been in a tail chase. The interceptors are not long range and could not have remained there for long anyway.
Join Date: Jun 2007
Location: North of Antartica
Posts: 180
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Satelites spot hundreds but Surface craft find nothing?
I cannot believe the surface craft have not found any of the flotsam spotted by satellite. What must be happening is objects are found but are just the usual crap bobbing around in the roaring 40's. If satellite imagery actually spotted a logo or such on objects (I.E. a vertical stabiliser) would they actually tell us? or wait until it were recovered?