Plane down near Almaty
Sigmets
FWIW; we got two Sigmets about severe icing and one about severe turbulence from ATC while inbound Almaty later that evening.
Didn't get a trace of ice on the way in though, and it was perfectly smooth all the way.
And about ALA-ATC; I fly in there regularly and find them competent and professional. Their english is among the best in the region.
The weather; lots of low visibilities, especially in the wintermonths. Fog can be moving in and out, forecasted or not.
A month ago, we could not see the ground from the flight deck when parked. That's 8 meters....
Didn't get a trace of ice on the way in though, and it was perfectly smooth all the way.
And about ALA-ATC; I fly in there regularly and find them competent and professional. Their english is among the best in the region.
The weather; lots of low visibilities, especially in the wintermonths. Fog can be moving in and out, forecasted or not.
A month ago, we could not see the ground from the flight deck when parked. That's 8 meters....
Last edited by Mariner; 8th Feb 2013 at 15:37.
Originally Posted by Ganzic
We were scheduled to fly at that time, but postponed for 3 hours, couldnīt even get 200M visibility, when we did take off, as did the Transair flight in front of us, we picked up a lot of ice, and couldnīt clear Servere Icing until FL120, then Moderate Icing until FL220. The worst bit was Grnd to 1000 ft.
The CRJ-100 & 200s are "hard-wing" aircraft - no LE devices.
Regarding icing, go-arounds and the CRJ-100 & 200, the following may be of interest:
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-re...1/a97h0011.pdf, and more generally, Bombardier CRJ200 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Last edited by PJ2; 8th Feb 2013 at 15:45.
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Data from CVR and FDR was already read and now are analysed by Kazakhstan commission, MAK and was sent to Canada. Still there is NO hypothesis i.e. from CVR and FDR is not clear what was happened. It is still little "mystery".
Today a new incident of SCAT reported - AN-24 veered RWY at ALA, landing on flight from Taraz, 20 pax aboard. Nobody hurts.
In Kazakhstan new rules are prepared for civil aviation. It is supposed that some little aircompanies end its operation. Every air pax company must have at least 3 planes, IOSA etc. Safety revolution or earthquake in 2015 :-).
Today a new incident of SCAT reported - AN-24 veered RWY at ALA, landing on flight from Taraz, 20 pax aboard. Nobody hurts.
In Kazakhstan new rules are prepared for civil aviation. It is supposed that some little aircompanies end its operation. Every air pax company must have at least 3 planes, IOSA etc. Safety revolution or earthquake in 2015 :-).
Last edited by Karel_x; 8th Feb 2013 at 20:18.
Karel_x;
Thank you very much for this information.
The key notions in the Canadian TSB Report on the Fredericton accident are:
a) icing conditions encountered during approach;
b) normal entry into the low-energy regime for landing;
b) decision to go-around followed by power application & stall of the right wing.
Thank you very much for this information.
The key notions in the Canadian TSB Report on the Fredericton accident are:
a) icing conditions encountered during approach;
b) normal entry into the low-energy regime for landing;
b) decision to go-around followed by power application & stall of the right wing.
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Group of three experts from Bombandier, leaded by very experienced investigator of Transport Safety Board of Canada, Denis Deroy, are travelling to Kazakhstan to take a part in investigation. Reportedly they supposed that the bat weather conditions are one of most probable cause of the disaster.
It is interesting that except of Moscow, Almati airport was the only one where Russian supersonic Tu-144 performed scheduled flights. The last one was in 1978.
It is interesting that except of Moscow, Almati airport was the only one where Russian supersonic Tu-144 performed scheduled flights. The last one was in 1978.
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The more likely cause is pilot error.
The Fredericton accident was due to stall in the flare during icing conditions AND retraction of flaps prematurely in a low energy state, thereby increasing the stall speed.
Pilot error.
But we'll have to wait. I'm only speculating.
The Fredericton accident was due to stall in the flare during icing conditions AND retraction of flaps prematurely in a low energy state, thereby increasing the stall speed.
Pilot error.
But we'll have to wait. I'm only speculating.
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From memory, the flap retraction at Fredericton wasn't a significant cause - the aircraft stalled before the flaps had moved significantly (if at all) from the landing position.
I can't find the full TSBC report online, will look for it later.
I can't find the full TSBC report online, will look for it later.
Originally Posted by Willie Everlearn
The Fredericton accident was due to stall in the flare during icing conditions AND retraction of flaps prematurely in a low energy state, thereby increasing the stall speed.
Pilot error.
Pilot error.
2.4.4.4 Flap Movement
The flaps had just started to move when the aircraft stalled and, although there was probably some effect on lift and drag, the overall effect on the aircraft stalling was concluded to have been minimal.
The flaps had just started to move when the aircraft stalled and, although there was probably some effect on lift and drag, the overall effect on the aircraft stalling was concluded to have been minimal.
Last edited by PJ2; 13th Feb 2013 at 16:29.
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The CRJ 200 on takeoff (at rotation) if the rotation rate is too aggressive will result in a stick shaker activation.
A CRJ 200 in a low energy go-around such as one in the flare at 10 feet and in ground effect if too aggressively pitched up toward the flight director will also initiate a stick shaker. If you retract the flaps whilst below Vref, in a low energy state while engines spool up (from flight idle to Max on the order of 5-8 seconds) you will very likely stall a wing tip which results in a roll toward the stalled wing which could result in a tip strike during that low energy state and surface friction will contribute to....
etc., etc., etc.
which was part of the YFC low energy go-around.
I believe the accident report also mentions a wing tip strike. This is my take away from what I read in the report but, I'm still only speculating which doesn't necessarily make me correct.
If an airport is reporting Cat IIIb RVRs, how does a professional airline crew not certified for Cat II or III even begin to fly an approach on a Cat I ILS?
Pilot intent or pilot error?
How does that same crew hit the ground 2 miles short of the intended landing runway?
By descending to a pseudo DH? By running out of fuel?
again, pilot intent or pilot error?
A CRJ 200 in a low energy go-around such as one in the flare at 10 feet and in ground effect if too aggressively pitched up toward the flight director will also initiate a stick shaker. If you retract the flaps whilst below Vref, in a low energy state while engines spool up (from flight idle to Max on the order of 5-8 seconds) you will very likely stall a wing tip which results in a roll toward the stalled wing which could result in a tip strike during that low energy state and surface friction will contribute to....
etc., etc., etc.
which was part of the YFC low energy go-around.
I believe the accident report also mentions a wing tip strike. This is my take away from what I read in the report but, I'm still only speculating which doesn't necessarily make me correct.
If an airport is reporting Cat IIIb RVRs, how does a professional airline crew not certified for Cat II or III even begin to fly an approach on a Cat I ILS?
Pilot intent or pilot error?
How does that same crew hit the ground 2 miles short of the intended landing runway?
By descending to a pseudo DH? By running out of fuel?
again, pilot intent or pilot error?
Last edited by Willie Everlearn; 13th Feb 2013 at 19:06.
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The problem is the safety culture in ex Soviet countries. If you want the jobs you go and do it, sometimes it makes pilots believe that a diversion not an option or they can cheat the devil.
That day the WX was really bad, RVR 125-250 all day, Severe Icing reported from ground to FL250, we flew in turbo prop and couldn't clear the cloud at FL220, icing was evident on all unprotected areas of the a/c, and the worst was during taxi... I doubt icing was a problem for CRJ, there must be more contributing factors, fuel starvation is not a problem either. Only a suicide maniac will fly to Almaty on empty. Due to the airport location in the dip and proximity to Mountains, airport is below cat1, specially in winter when nearby villages use coal for heating - the smog makes vis drop dramatically, 20km north and its CAVOK.
Looking at AN-72 crash same winter near Chymkent, one old procedure come to mind, they don't change 1013 to QNH or QFE even if they are cleared to altitude below Transition, until they reach the transition altitude often forgetting to reset altimeters... that was a primary cause of AN-72 crash.
Was it the case here, I don't remember what was the QNH on the day, possibly very low, in which case they may have passed their DH and not paid attention to Radalt.
Apologies if I am repeating myself.
That day the WX was really bad, RVR 125-250 all day, Severe Icing reported from ground to FL250, we flew in turbo prop and couldn't clear the cloud at FL220, icing was evident on all unprotected areas of the a/c, and the worst was during taxi... I doubt icing was a problem for CRJ, there must be more contributing factors, fuel starvation is not a problem either. Only a suicide maniac will fly to Almaty on empty. Due to the airport location in the dip and proximity to Mountains, airport is below cat1, specially in winter when nearby villages use coal for heating - the smog makes vis drop dramatically, 20km north and its CAVOK.
Looking at AN-72 crash same winter near Chymkent, one old procedure come to mind, they don't change 1013 to QNH or QFE even if they are cleared to altitude below Transition, until they reach the transition altitude often forgetting to reset altimeters... that was a primary cause of AN-72 crash.
Was it the case here, I don't remember what was the QNH on the day, possibly very low, in which case they may have passed their DH and not paid attention to Radalt.
Apologies if I am repeating myself.
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My attempt for transcript of CVR (I am not Russian native). From Time 28:37, after checklist. Be aware of metric units (except for one thousand). Thanks for completion or corrections.
2:25 TWR: SCAT 760, distance 13, continue approach 23R
2:21 PNF: Continue approach 23R, SCAT 760
2:08 TWR: Visibility at RWY- beginning 225, middle 250, end 250, freezing fog, vertical 40
1:49 PNF: SCAT 760 roger
1:45 PIF: Flaps 45
1:44 PNF: Flaps 45 .set
1:37 PNF: Flaps 45 indicated
1:22 PNF: Check speed
1:16 TWR: SCAT 760, Visibility at RWY 200
1:13 PNF: (Roger)
0:54 BEEP
0:51 PIF: Wing on
0:50 PNF: Wing on
0:46 ONE THOUSAND
0:44 PNF: One thousand (at the least)
0:39 PIF: (To 500 and then GA)
0:27 PIF: Ask visibility
0:26 PNF: SCAT 760, tell visibility, (report ?)
0:23 TWR: SCAT 760, visibility 200, 0.5, RWY ready
0:18 PNF: 760
0:16 PIF: Go around
0:15 PNF: Go around
0:14 BEEP 3 times
0:13 PIF: Flaps 8
0:12 PNF: Flaps 8
0:09 PNF: Flaps 8 indicated
0:08 FIVE (HUNDRED?)
0:07 PNF: 760, going around
0:06 SINK RATE!
0:06 TWR: SCAT 760 (turn to heading 128)
0:05 PULL UP! PULL UP!
0:02 PNF: 128
0:01 TERRAIN!
0:00 End of CVR file [Time 31:04]
New changes in blue
According to investigatrs, icing was not cause in this accident and they suppose human factor. In some moments, voice of PNF sounds to me a little tired. Bud I am not so good in Russian to be sure.
CRJ200 crash probe focused on go-around actions - 1/30/2014 - Flight Global
2:25 TWR: SCAT 760, distance 13, continue approach 23R
2:21 PNF: Continue approach 23R, SCAT 760
2:08 TWR: Visibility at RWY- beginning 225, middle 250, end 250, freezing fog, vertical 40
1:49 PNF: SCAT 760 roger
1:45 PIF: Flaps 45
1:44 PNF: Flaps 45 .set
1:37 PNF: Flaps 45 indicated
1:22 PNF: Check speed
1:16 TWR: SCAT 760, Visibility at RWY 200
1:13 PNF: (Roger)
0:54 BEEP
0:51 PIF: Wing on
0:50 PNF: Wing on
0:46 ONE THOUSAND
0:44 PNF: One thousand (at the least)
0:39 PIF: (To 500 and then GA)
0:27 PIF: Ask visibility
0:26 PNF: SCAT 760, tell visibility, (report ?)
0:23 TWR: SCAT 760, visibility 200, 0.5, RWY ready
0:18 PNF: 760
0:16 PIF: Go around
0:15 PNF: Go around
0:14 BEEP 3 times
0:13 PIF: Flaps 8
0:12 PNF: Flaps 8
0:09 PNF: Flaps 8 indicated
0:08 FIVE (HUNDRED?)
0:07 PNF: 760, going around
0:06 SINK RATE!
0:06 TWR: SCAT 760 (turn to heading 128)
0:05 PULL UP! PULL UP!
0:02 PNF: 128
0:01 TERRAIN!
0:00 End of CVR file [Time 31:04]
New changes in blue
According to investigatrs, icing was not cause in this accident and they suppose human factor. In some moments, voice of PNF sounds to me a little tired. Bud I am not so good in Russian to be sure.
CRJ200 crash probe focused on go-around actions - 1/30/2014 - Flight Global
Last edited by Karel_x; 17th Feb 2014 at 12:52.
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I don't know what was the need to further descend knowing visibility is below your minima, is it granted to descend even down to DH in Kazakhstan, would anyone share their rules?
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KAREL X `s cvr transcript is useful. Unless altimeter was incorrectly set, the 1000ft call at 0:46 would suggest at a 750ft.p.m. rate of descent there should have been sufficient time to execute a succesful go around at 0:16. It would be useful to know what the so called BEEP was, could this be a rad alt CHIME and whether this somehow became the cue for the PNF to announce Levers Set and make a second call of correct indication. But I would appreciate any commentary as to what is meant by LEVER SET. I would presume the word Lever means power. In which case I would assume it was the PNF who set the go around power. Is this SOP or is it another situation similar to the Cork accident.
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is it granted to descend even down to DH
Ut Sementem Feeceris
We're permitted to commence an approach regardless of the RVR. However, if any of the required RVR are below minima that approach must be discontinued no later than 1000' above threshold. If it's ok at 1000' you can continue and even if it subsequently goes below you may continue to DH.
Listening to the CVR it sounds like a request for flap 0 moments before impact... could be wrong but sobering nonetheless.
Listening to the CVR it sounds like a request for flap 0 moments before impact... could be wrong but sobering nonetheless.
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Is this SOP or is it another situation similar to the Cork accident.
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We are not cleared to descend below trans lvl if some element is below minima. Considering altimeter setting this QNH approaches in meters on aircraft having its primary altimeter readings in feet totally confusing
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We are not cleared to descend below trans lvl
Sorry, but which regulations are you talking about? In general, you can't descend below the FAF altitude if the weather is below minima, but if the RVR falls down when you're already on the glide, you may continue down to DA(DH).
If there are any local differences, they must be at least described in the approach ban chapter of your jeppesen or equivalent manual (like those 1000' in UK).
Just haven't found any similar restrictions among CIS countries.
Sorry, but which regulations are you talking about? In general, you can't descend below the FAF altitude if the weather is below minima, but if the RVR falls down when you're already on the glide, you may continue down to DA(DH).
If there are any local differences, they must be at least described in the approach ban chapter of your jeppesen or equivalent manual (like those 1000' in UK).
Just haven't found any similar restrictions among CIS countries.
Last edited by Emel.OW; 14th Feb 2014 at 13:36.
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to Chronus:
Yes, those worlds "Lever set" could be key ones, because in few seconds after we can hear SINK RATE warning. I could not decide if it is "Power set" or "Flaps set" (surely it is not "Gears up") so I write "neutral" the Lever. If it was Flaps retracting and it was done too early or too much, the wing could lost the lift. The same if the PIF action lead to high AoA. I suppose that gears were down at that moment.
If this tripple CHIME is RA (and not disengaging A/P), it may be 100m alarm. In the approach check list, after an artificial voice "RADIO ALTIMETER", we can hear PNF reporting "one zero and zero" (if not one zero one zero).
Another interesting thing is that the voice of PIF is much more quiet that the one of PNF.
I did some editions in transcript in blue. I believe that deicing was acivated (Wing on) and maybe PIF told in Russian that he is going to fly to 500 (feet) and then GA. I am not sure, the sound is very quiet.
Yes, those worlds "Lever set" could be key ones, because in few seconds after we can hear SINK RATE warning. I could not decide if it is "Power set" or "Flaps set" (surely it is not "Gears up") so I write "neutral" the Lever. If it was Flaps retracting and it was done too early or too much, the wing could lost the lift. The same if the PIF action lead to high AoA. I suppose that gears were down at that moment.
If this tripple CHIME is RA (and not disengaging A/P), it may be 100m alarm. In the approach check list, after an artificial voice "RADIO ALTIMETER", we can hear PNF reporting "one zero and zero" (if not one zero one zero).
Another interesting thing is that the voice of PIF is much more quiet that the one of PNF.
I did some editions in transcript in blue. I believe that deicing was acivated (Wing on) and maybe PIF told in Russian that he is going to fly to 500 (feet) and then GA. I am not sure, the sound is very quiet.
Last edited by Karel_x; 14th Feb 2014 at 13:37.