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Concorde crash: Continental Airlines cleared by France court

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Concorde crash: Continental Airlines cleared by France court

Old 9th Dec 2012, 21:35
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Originally Posted by ExSp33db1rd
I can't comment on the new/retread issue, I just don't know (...)
ExSp33db1rd, data about the wheels & tyres of F-BTSC are publicly available in the final report §1.6.2.5:
The wheels were manufactured by Dunlop, and the tyres used by Air France were manufactured by Goodyear in the United States. No retread tyres have been used since 1996.
Originally Posted by dalek
The strip of metal probably played no part in the accident. It is more likely that the damage was caused by the undercarriage disintegration??
How do you explain the clean transverse cut about 32 centimetres long in the tyre, then? (*)
How do you explain that black elastomer (whoose spectral analysis showed similar to Concorde's tyre rubber) was found in the rivets holes of the strip? (**)

(*) Final report, §1.12.1.2 (with photo):
the parts [pieces of tyre] found at Slab 152 level (a piece measuring 100 x 33 cm and weighing about 4.5 kg) and that found at Slab 180 level fitted together. Visual inspection revealed a transverse cut about 32 centimetres long.
(**) Final report, §1.16.6.4:
Black marks were noted on the outer side of the strip and black elastomer debris was found jammed in one of the rivets. The spectra of these marks and deposits are similar to the Concorde tyre.
Originally Posted by jcjeant
Justice can help aviation safety
Perhaps I'm still not interested.

May I also remind you that the BEA was in charge of the technical, not the AAIB? Hence, even with full access, the AAIB would not have conducted its own analysis to "cross-check" everything the BEA would have said. You may show little confidence about the BEA, but AAIB doesn't seem to share the extend of your concern about that. That's enough for me, I must say

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Old 9th Dec 2012, 23:45
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Quote:
"the parts [pieces of tyre] found at Slab 152 level (a piece measuring 100 x 33 cm and weighing about 4.5 kg) and that found at Slab 180 level fitted together. Visual inspection revealed a transverse cut about 32 centimetres long."

This is the maddening thing about BEA. The two pieces 'fitted' together means they were lined up manually. It does not mean that they 'fit together'. Nor does it mean the seam was such that these were two adjoining pieces of a larger section. The deficit that separates these two pieces of tyre is the length overall of the Titanium?

But then there is this:

"The spectra of these marks and deposits are similar to the Concorde tyre.".....BEA

Does that mean that the elastomeric deposits were similar also to the Goodyear tyres on the DC-10? Also similar to other Goodyear fod on the runway from neither DC-10 or Concorde? The strip is remarkably clean of deep scratches one would expect from a scraping on concrete beneath a 200 ton aircraft.....

Did the Titanium contact the Concorde's tyres only? Or both the Concorde and the Continental DC-10? Or ONLY the Douglas?

To slash the sidewall of tyre number two is counterintuitive, since it presupposes that the Titanium strip was airborne before hitting the lead tyre. More likely would be that the strip, if airborne, would have contacted a following tyre, having been launched by passage of the lead.

AZR: (thanks)

Quote:
The wheels were manufactured by Dunlop, and the tyres used by Air France were manufactured by Goodyear in the United States. No retread tyres have been used since 1996.


That's nice, but rather optimistic. Looking at the photo of Tyre 2, one notices the complete lack of siping on the tire's carcass. The other tyres have siping. Also, the failed tyre has all the tread scrubbed off to the fabric. This is notable, since it is indicative of a patent failure in a Recapped carcass, where the additive layer of elastomer is vulcanized to the remaining elastomer of the carcass. This precludes an embed in the fabric of the carcass, meaning there is no DualPhase adhesion of the additional material, something that of course makes the re-cycled tyre substandard, and a hazard.

Similarly, there is evidence in the photo of a classic separation of a recap bond on the sidewall. The tyre may indeed be an original manufacture, but the evidence is at least suspicious. Did the spectral analysis eliminate the presence of recap material, which is indeed different from OEM? Did it confirm that the material in the Titanium rivet void matches the sidewall (original) of tyre #2?

A shop that wil leave a critical component of a truck on the shop floor may well refit a retread, in a "pinch".

And a shop that will replace an ablative Aluminum strip with a haphazard Titanium lashup, the same. Neither aircraft was airworthy, by definition.

IMHO....

Last edited by Lyman; 10th Dec 2012 at 00:25.
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Old 10th Dec 2012, 00:05
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but AAIB doesn't seem to share the extend of your concern about that
Well the report is full of AAIB negative comments ...
Concerned .. but must express a diplomatic manner given the constraints of political relations between countries (not forget that the BEA is a french governement body)
It's to note that the AAIB complain (between other things) about the fact that they could see the metal strip for a very short time only .. ie .. they could not make any serious analysis of the (most important) element that ( from BEA report) triggered the accident
But "maybe" they had the right to examine at long .. other scrap metal .. etc ...
Weird ins't it ?

Did the Titanium contact the Concorde's tyres only? Or both the Concorde and the Continental DC-10? Or ONLY the Douglas?
To note that between the Continental DC-10 and the Concorde .. another plane had taking off ...

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Old 10th Dec 2012, 10:36
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Originally Posted by Lyman
This is the maddening thing about BEA. The two pieces 'fitted' together means they were lined up manually. It does not mean that they 'fit together'.
Really? You did look at the picture included in the report (as shown by another part of your post). I cannot then understand how you came to your conclusion that "It does not mean that they 'fit together'".
They fit. I see that on the pic.

Originally Posted by Lyman
Does that mean that the elastomeric deposits were similar also to the Goodyear tyres on the DC-10? Also similar to other Goodyear fod on the runway from neither DC-10 or Concorde?
Lost from the DC-10 right hand engine, I cannot imagine how the strip would have made contact with any tyre of the same DC-10. Geometry. Speed. That sort of things.

About the 747 (only aircraft on the RWY between the DC-10 and Concorde), I don't know if the spectra would have been same as Concorde or not.
What I do know, however, is that no tyre problem was reported on that aircraft.
What I do imagine is that Continental would have seeked to prove it was not Concorde rubber on the strip. I'm not aware they did that (nor try to). Are you?


Originally Posted by Lyman
To slash the sidewall of tyre number two is counterintuitive, since it presupposes that the Titanium strip was airborne before hitting the lead tyre.
Huh? Where does that come from? The transverse cut is on the tread of the tyre. The strip was not magically airborne. The tyre from wheel #2 (i.e. front right tyre of the left hand main landing gear) rolled on the strip, and was cut.
See also §1.16.5 "Tyre destruction Mechanism" with experimentations conducted (pictures provided, there too).

Originally Posted by Lyman
Looking at the photo of Tyre 2, one notices the complete lack of siping on the tire's carcass.
I fail to notice that. Quite the contrary, in fact. Tyre 2 was not new (37 cycles old). But it doesn't show a complete lack of siping either. Comparing to picture 4, page 25, or pictures 48, 49 and 50, pages 99 & 102 makes me say: "it looks normal, from the siping PoV".

Originally Posted by Lyman
A shop that wil leave a critical component of a truck on the shop floor may well refit a retread, in a "pinch".
Yeah, sure. What does that hypothesis imply? Nothing much: simply falsificate the papers about that tyre (date of purchase, date of installation on the plane), hide the invoices/workshop who did the retreading, and make false GoodYear invoices for new tyres.
Big bad Frenchies, huh?
Take care, in case AF or GoodYear decide a recent irish exemple is to be followed


Originally Posted by jcjeant
But "maybe" they had the right to examine at long .. other scrap metal .. etc ...
Weird ins't it ?
What's weird? Are you implying the BEA lied, and made falsificated material proofs? How is that even possible with the strip under the (too strict, we already covered that) control of the judicial that the AAIB, and you, and me did regret?
If you're going that way, well it's your choice. May I then adress to you the same piece of advice I just gave to Lyman?

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Old 10th Dec 2012, 12:30
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Dave Reid
Four days prior to the accident the left hand undercarriage bogie was removed for maintenance. When it was refitted a spacer was left out.
The initial accident report took great pains to say the missing spacer had absolutely no relevance to the crash.
Other experts disagree and say that the missing spacer led directly to the tyre failure.
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Old 10th Dec 2012, 13:24
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Most of the information I have on this came from a series of lectures given by an ex Concorde Flight Engineer ( perhaps he is already taking part in this discussion). According to him, one of the factors which made the possible misalignment of the bogie more critical was the ridge across the runway as it passed from the sterile runway onto the main runway. If this is true, presumably being over weight and down wind, encouraged the pilots to use this part of the runway or maybe they would have done this anyway.
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Old 10th Dec 2012, 13:55
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Other experts disagree and say that the missing spacer led directly to the tyre failure.
There is indeed disagreement. But that's rather different from your original assertion:

The strip of metal probably played no part in the accident. It is more likely that the damage was caused by the undercarriage disintegration
Where is the evidence for your "probably" and "more likely" ?
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Old 10th Dec 2012, 13:56
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Hi Dalek,

Originally Posted by dalek
The initial accident report took great pains to say the missing spacer had absolutely no relevance to the crash.
It was the final report, not an initial one. Agreed that it "took great pains" (or made a detailled analysis, as I would have written it) about that point.

Originally Posted by dalek
Other experts disagree and say that the missing spacer led directly to the tyre failure.
I've seen disagreements on that point too, and I cannot imagine the spacer having "no use at all": why was is there in the first place, then?
But, do you have a link/ref to something substantial about that?
So far, I'm "only" aware of:
- general public intented TV broadcasts, with most "experts" being not so experts in fact, and some real experts having no time to really explain their points;
- polemic blogs, usually animated/promoted by people well known to have an agenda (against AF most of the time, or against other french organisations such as DGAC, BEA...).

I'm looking for an honest and documented analysis about that point, by an expert (not only in name). Without it, we have no ground to refute the final report saying, after a detailled/pusblished analysis, that the absence of the spacer didn't change the trajectory of the plane nor the state of its tyres on july 25, 2000 (or on flights that preceded the accident (but after the bogie replacement work).

[edit] Thanks, pulse1, wrote my post before reading yours. That's a start Were there docs published after those lectures?
And I think I see who you're talking about.

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Old 10th Dec 2012, 17:51
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Shortly after the Concorde crash, there were various photographs published on websites, possibly somewhere in a thread on here, one of which showed crescent-shaped tyre marks allegedly on the runway, allegedly caused by a squittering bogie (like a supermarket trolley with a bad castor wheel). Was that indeed linked to the Concorde, or positively eliminated from any involvement?

Does anybody have a link to the picture and various comments at the time?
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Old 10th Dec 2012, 22:56
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I guess this is this ?
Does anybody have a link to the picture and various comments at the time?
Was Continental Responsible For the Concorde Crash? « Heritage Concorde

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Old 11th Dec 2012, 03:00
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What I had in mind was referred to in post 33 at:
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/2...article-2.html .

"The photographs of the tarmac clearly show that after the tyre deflated, the gear was oscillating either side of centre, which was, in my opinion, caused by the missing spacer and the (now) unbalanced bogie. I really cannot think of any other explanation as to why an aircraft with one engine out should be in danger of leaving the runway."



But the actual picture I have seen is not visible there, and embedded links no longer work.
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Old 11th Dec 2012, 04:59
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Chris
The site in jcjeant's link is very slow in delivering information. I dd see the picture of the tire marks leading to the runway light this evening.

Last edited by Machinbird; 11th Dec 2012 at 05:01.
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Old 11th Dec 2012, 08:40
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Machinbird, the pics in jcjeant's link are the same provided by the BEA in its final report.

jcjeant, thanks for the link, I read it yesterday night
I still fail to be convinded, I must say. I'm at work, will explain in details later, but mostly it is because the parts presenting "alternative" theories (relative to the official one from the BEA) seem incantatory rather than based on facts (the facts themselves, included as reported by the BEA, being sometimes - and when it matters - contradictory with said theories, whatever their logic & value).
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Old 11th Dec 2012, 12:39
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If one kowtows to the popular opinion, one would never question. Any alternate theory involves countering accepted (though perhaps questionable) conclusions.

The French treat an accident scene as a crime scene. Fine. Well then, was the Metal strip photographed in situ? What is the genesis of the convenient hook shape that allowed the strip to present in the vertical to the oncoming Goodyear? How did the offensive element migrate well left of the center line to intercept a tyre that was already left of said line? And that strip having originated on the right side of the donor aircraft? What of the telltale rubber deposits well in front of the spilled fuel? Why a triple when dual represented a preferred skid?

The last three years of my construction career was spent in working with French principals. There is a cultural flavor to the stubborn and precipitous need the French had for assigning "Blame" prior to any extensive forensics. It is obsessive, almost precognitive, and unnerving to associates.

More synthetic rubber comments to follow.
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Old 11th Dec 2012, 13:21
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Is there some way of seeing G-BOAF at Filton from the public road?

Heritage Concorde saysthat it can be viewed from a road name “Concorde Way” which is located at the rear of the Cribbs Cause Way Shopping Centre. From Google Maps it looks looks like it's close to a road but not sure if it's a public road:

Concorde Way, Bristol BS2, United Kingdom - Google Maps

I remember going to see Concorde testing at Filton when I was a kid. Would love to go back and see her now, even from a distance.
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Old 11th Dec 2012, 23:56
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Originally Posted by Lyman
Any alternate theory involves countering accepted (though perhaps questionable) conclusions.
Certainly!
Let's not extend that to the point of countering established facts, will we please? Because if facts don't matter, then we're not being serious about aviation safety, we're being serious about personnal beliefs.

Let's try, once again:

Questionable conclusions from the BEA report:
A1- the titanium strip was the only & direct root cause for the sequence of events that led to the crash;
A2- the missing spacer had no influence to the crash;
A3- the too early #2 engine shut-down had no influence;
A4- the too early rotation (as per references speeds) had no influence to the crash;
A5- the overweight had no influence to the crash;
A6- the rearwind had no influence to the crash;

All those conclusions are indeed questionable, and may be seen as aimed to protect AF from liability, indeed (at last: they had this effect).

Questionable conclusions from third parties:
B1a- the titanium strip had no influence to the crash;
(or)
B1b- the titanium strip cannot be seen as the only root cause of the crash;
B2- the missing spacer had an influence, and was a causal factor of the crash;
B3- the too early #2 engine shut-down had a direct influence to the crash;
B4- the fuel tanks were overfilled and that had an influence to the crash;

Those are questionable because they contradict the report (hence they must be fact-checked), and because they may be seen as aimed to protect a third party (namely: Continental) from liability.

Now, all those have already been discussed numerous times.
Allow me to make a résumé (in french in the text ) of my point, without being going to far sidetracked into other (interesting nonetheless) discussions.

Scenario:
  • B1a is rejected: All evidences show indeed that the #2 tyre blow up when rolling on the strip. BEA, AAIB, judicial and every informed/serious third party analysists are OK with that established fact.
  • As a first consequence, a major fuel leak occured. B4 is rejected because the overfilling of the tanks (as per procedures) concerned the tanks 1, 2, 3 and 4, but not the tank 5 which suffered the leak. This tank was not overfilled, it was filled.
  • As a second consequence, a fire started (because of an electric arc or because of reheat: there is a disagreement on the cause). Let's stick to the established fact that the fire was present, as BEA, AAIB, judicial and every informed/serious third party analysists are OK with that (not counting anyone able to look at a picture).
  • The extent of the fire had in turn two main consequences:
    • Loss of thrust on engines 1 & 2. It is unclear if the #2 would have produced any significant thrust if it had not been shut down too early, but B3 cannot be ruled out with certainty: Perhaps the #2 engine would have been able to generate useful thrust.
    • Significant damages to the left wing and left control surfaces of the aircraft. Those damages were increasing with the time. They was no way to stop them from increasing, unless being able to extinct the fire (which was not possible).
  • Those damages ultimately led - in conjonction with the too low thrust - to the loss of control of the aircraft and to its crash.

Analysis:
Now, my point is that even with the hypothesis of enough thrust being available (i.e. #2 engine not shut down and physically able to produce significant thrust despite the fire, which is far from certain and certainly not an established fact), the thing is the fire damages to the aircraft itself would have been "enough" to make the aircraft uncontrollable => loss of control => crash.
What would maybe have changed is the exact time (hence location) of the LOC, therefore the plane would have crashed elsewhere than at "La Patte d'Oie" of Gonesse. But il would have crashed anyway.
In this way, A2, B2, A5, A6 are irrelevant, whatever their reality or their importance about what they show about AF (non)adherence to procedures.

And if we were to stretch things a bit more? What if the plane had been able to reach & land - not crash, land - at Le Bourget, that was not so far away? Then I think there would have been (massive/total) casualties anyway because of weight, speed, some brake power lost (damages to the U/C), and fire engulfing the plane when it would have stopped.

Hence I don't think it would have been able to "make it" in any way once it had rolled on the strip.
A1 surely is a bit of a stretch, and aimed to protect AF, but it seems the court finally saw better and didn't forget to blame AF too. That's good. A1 is wrong.
B1b is most certainly true: the inherent fragility of Concorde to blown tyres/fuel/electrics interactions was known since a long time. With hindsight, it is now an established fact that the corrective actions that were undertaken since '79 were too feeble to protect the aircraft from that risk.

Conclusion, part 1: All parties involved in the operation and certification of Concorde (in France and UK at last, and perhaps we should add the NTSB/FAA too because of the location of Washington) can be seen as sharing (to some degree it is) the responsibility of letting Concorde fly to its fateful fate in July 2000. I'm not a lawyer, I won't try to assess the sharing of that global responsability, except to say - before being crucified - than I agree that the share/responsability of AF seems greater than the share/responsability of BA.
Conclusion, part 2: As I wrote earlier that, if a BA aircraft had rolled on the strip, it would also crashed too (even with the equation better operated=able to stay airborne longer, there is no equivalent to Le Bourget near Heathrow, I believe?).

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Old 12th Dec 2012, 01:09
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Hi AZR, and thankyou for your well reasoned posts.

Here..

"Conclusion, part 2: As I wrote earlier that, if a BA aircraft had rolled on the strip, it would also crashed too (even with the equation better operated=able to stay airborne longer, there is no equivalent to Le Bourget near Heathrow, I believe?)."

I am not so sure....at all.

You neglect one important thing. With an intact and complete undercarriage, the BA Concorde would most likely not have adventured into the weeds, wiped out a light, and caused a long tail wind driven roll to urge the Captain to rotate immediately. Captain may have rejected the TO, though that is a stretch. Had he done so, he would have decelerated straight ahead, on tarmac, with likely an overrun. Off runway, and directionally challenged, the French Captain had to launch, or face disintegration on dirt. Because he was lacking a standoff spacer.


With an intact axle, at #2 tyre rupture, the forward truck would have maintained separation of tyres 1 and 2, allowing a smooth recovery of track. On BTSC, the #2 wheel migrated left the full 16 centimeters, towards the wheel of #1. Without the spacer, the ruptured tyre would certainly drift on the axle, nothing stopping it. This would have completely altered the carriage geometry, creating an intense out of balance condition, and enormous side loads on the tyres, pulling the a/c to the left.

I say the BA Concorde survives, though perhaps not without fatalities, had there been a similar fire.
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Old 12th Dec 2012, 09:49
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Hi Lyman,

I didn't neglect anything: See my "analysis" paragraph where A2 & B2 (i.e. the missing spacer, hence the not complete U/C) are quoted. Regarding the "intact" U/C... well, one tyre blown by the strip, it's no more intact.
My point is that rolling on the strip was enough to start the leak & fire.
And the fire itself was enough to crash the plane.

The drift to the weeds, the wiped out light, and the early rotation (whatever their cause(s)) are irrelevant, here, as they would have no influence on the fire and its structural consequences:
Fire => Serious & quickly worsening damages to wing & surfaces => aircraft uncontrollable => loss of control before it had time to land anywhere => crash inevitable.
Even on a perfectly balanced airplane, taking off straight on the centerline (which a BA Concorde would not be, because part if not most/all of the drift to the left was due to loss of thrust following engine surges/FoD ingestion, spacer or not spacer - see my MP).

-----

Now, you imagine an RTO.
First, I don't think an RTO after V1 is likely to have occured at BA.
Not without hindsight, as it would have been a violation of procedures (that even AF didn't do )

But what if it did occur? BEA did the maths, for the CDG runway, I suppose the conclusions would have been roughly equivalent @ LHR or elsewhere:

§1.16.13.4 Consequences of Aborting the Takeoff
Two simulations of a possible acceleration-stop were performed, one based on the aircraft’s speed when the rotation was commenced (that is to say in fact the first moment when the crew could have been warned by unusual sensations), at 183 kt, the other at 196 kt, when the FE said what can be understood as “stop”.

The simulations were conducted with the following hypotheses:
• braking on seven wheels, to take into account the destruction of tyre No 2,
• braking torque available at nominal value until the maximum energy indicated in the Flight Manual (70 MJ), increased by 10%,
• use of thrust reversers on engines 1, 3 and 4.

With this set of hypotheses, it appears that the residual speed of the aircraft at the end of the runway would have been 74 kt for a takeoff aborted at 183 kt and 115 kt for a takeoff aborted at 196 kt.
These figures show that an aborted takeoff would have led to a runway excursion at such a speed that, taking into account the fire, the result would probably have been catastrophic for the aircraft and its occupants.
The sole difference I can see re: a BA Concorde would be thrust reversers, on 4 engines and not 3. It remains unclear if the #2 (or the #1 for that matter) would have been able to produce any significant thrust (reversed or not) particularly in a decceleration phase (more hot gases injested). Even if we imagine all 4 reversers OK, the aircraft would still overrun at significant speed (even if less than calculated by the BEA above), and the conclusion still stands: overrun + massive fire = catastrophic results.

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Old 12th Dec 2012, 10:07
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According to (many) BA FEs I've spoken to, it's extremely unlikely the tanks would have been overfilled on any BA departure, therefore there'd be some air space above the fuel to get compressed and absorb the hydraulic shock of the base of the tank being clouted by a piece of tyre, therefore no torrent of fuel pouring out the bottom of the wing, therefore a controllable 'incident' at worst, rather than a total disaster.

And that's ignoring the other AF factors (spacer, downwind, overweight, no.2, etc).

Not conclusive of course, but it is food for thought.
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Old 12th Dec 2012, 10:11
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Once again:
As a first consequence, a major fuel leak occured. B4 is rejected because the overfilling of the tanks (as per procedures) concerned the tanks 1, 2, 3 and 4, but not the tank 5 which suffered the leak. This tank was not overfilled, it was filled.
I think it was not uncommon for BA to fill (not overfill) the #5 tank.

If you have data which suggest/prove otherwise, please feel free to share them
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