Charter aircraft catch fire in Turkey
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So some aircrew do not understand what "DV"stands for . That is why all initial flying training for any pilot should take place on gliders. They will learn what the DV window is,able to cope without an engine and a better appreciation of stall/spinning plus better decision making in the circuit.
SkyGod
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Then the airline has an explanatory problem, says Jo Bear Skat Violence, Head of Air Safety Committee in the Norwegian Pilots Association.
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Skat Violence!
Best translation ever.
There will be a thorough investigation on this. Always
keep an open mind especially if there are witness reports in nordic media. People tend to say just about anything they can to get their 15 minutes of fame especially in these days of smartphones and Ipads with immediate access to tabloid media.
Time will tell. Meanwhile, I´m enjoying the fact that everything went without casualties and major injuries.
Best translation ever.
There will be a thorough investigation on this. Always
keep an open mind especially if there are witness reports in nordic media. People tend to say just about anything they can to get their 15 minutes of fame especially in these days of smartphones and Ipads with immediate access to tabloid media.
Time will tell. Meanwhile, I´m enjoying the fact that everything went without casualties and major injuries.
Last edited by 4:th of july; 16th Oct 2012 at 21:15.
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'no time for flap40'??
It takes literally seconds to place the flap selector to F40 in the cockpit. Sounds a bit like panic from the flight deck and no consideration for pax.
Flap 40 would have probably saved most of the injuries of those jumping from the wings.
It takes literally seconds to place the flap selector to F40 in the cockpit. Sounds a bit like panic from the flight deck and no consideration for pax.
Flap 40 would have probably saved most of the injuries of those jumping from the wings.
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If the reoport above s correct it sounds like a big electrical fire.
The chances are that the failure of the PA resulted from this and it is likely that the oxygen mask deployment was also as a result of the electrical fire.
The chances are that the failure of the PA resulted from this and it is likely that the oxygen mask deployment was also as a result of the electrical fire.
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actually the cabin was fine nothing happend in the cabin only the smoke
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@armchairpilot94116:
Big difference is that the fire in the China 737 was in the cabin and not in the cockpit!
Once again, if you have a fire and smoke in the cockpit, you do not sit around and wait for 90 seconds! You get out via the cockpit windows or the cockpit door. Imaging the chaos in the little galley there is hardly any space for 2 or 3 crewmembers.
Furthermore, if there is a fire in the cockpit - where all the controls are- there is a big chance that a) there are no hydraulics, B) there are no electrics for the alternate flaps, c) the flap lever console interface to servos's is interrupted by the fire or shorcut citcuit. Furthermore the PA system could be u/s aswell.
Our OM-A says that only when conditions permit, the captain will leave via the rear pax door. If you had to exit trough the cockpit windows I would say this would clasify as a justification for not being able to do so...
Looking at the picture and seeing the firhehoze nozzle harpoon of the fire truck penetrating the cockpit only confirms the severe fire/smoke condition in the cockpit.
Big difference is that the fire in the China 737 was in the cabin and not in the cockpit!
Once again, if you have a fire and smoke in the cockpit, you do not sit around and wait for 90 seconds! You get out via the cockpit windows or the cockpit door. Imaging the chaos in the little galley there is hardly any space for 2 or 3 crewmembers.
Furthermore, if there is a fire in the cockpit - where all the controls are- there is a big chance that a) there are no hydraulics, B) there are no electrics for the alternate flaps, c) the flap lever console interface to servos's is interrupted by the fire or shorcut citcuit. Furthermore the PA system could be u/s aswell.
Our OM-A says that only when conditions permit, the captain will leave via the rear pax door. If you had to exit trough the cockpit windows I would say this would clasify as a justification for not being able to do so...
Looking at the picture and seeing the firhehoze nozzle harpoon of the fire truck penetrating the cockpit only confirms the severe fire/smoke condition in the cockpit.
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In amongst all this , it would be nice (for those of us spending our working days in the same type) if some info emerged as to the possible cause of the fire/smoke in the 1st instance.
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Turkish 😂😂😂
This whole sad incident seems to demonstrate and confirm the comments and in some cases speculation regarding the standards in the Turkish aviation industry.
I have been in it and it is wholly run by BOX TICKING with no selection standards and in the general no training standards as the training staff both operational and ground school have not been trained, again box ticking, and the English is level 2 at best in most cases with little or no knowledge of procedures , SOP's or technical subjects not to mention a gross lack of situational awareness CRM and crew co ordination." Capt. is boss" rules
The next incident sadly, could be far more serious, it is coming.
THY 737 nearly another Helios recently and 777 landed in ESB with 1900kg😒
Apologies but it is a disaster waiting to happen SOON!
I have been in it and it is wholly run by BOX TICKING with no selection standards and in the general no training standards as the training staff both operational and ground school have not been trained, again box ticking, and the English is level 2 at best in most cases with little or no knowledge of procedures , SOP's or technical subjects not to mention a gross lack of situational awareness CRM and crew co ordination." Capt. is boss" rules
The next incident sadly, could be far more serious, it is coming.
THY 737 nearly another Helios recently and 777 landed in ESB with 1900kg😒
Apologies but it is a disaster waiting to happen SOON!
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The big problem with the B737 is that the wing is quite high to allow pax to vacate. At the gate the flaps are up, selecting the lever to F40 uses the electric hydraulic pump to move the flaps, this takes some time. If the APU is being used to supply electrics, then one of the following items of the EVAC checklist is to pull the Fire Warning switch, thus powering down the hydraulic pump.
From memory, I think the checklist asks the crew to wait for flaps to reach 40 if possible. I think with fire/smoke. Most people would press on and get out.
Ryanair had an evac in STN many moons ago after landing and ran into the same type of problems, the fire crews actually instructed pax to go back into the cabin from the wings!! (it was bearing failure/oil fire from the engine)
From memory, I think the checklist asks the crew to wait for flaps to reach 40 if possible. I think with fire/smoke. Most people would press on and get out.
Ryanair had an evac in STN many moons ago after landing and ran into the same type of problems, the fire crews actually instructed pax to go back into the cabin from the wings!! (it was bearing failure/oil fire from the engine)
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I've worked for airlines, many years ago, where during an RTO F40 was selected to give it a good chance of having been configured before the evac. Boeing then disapproved because it could cause a reduction in braking effectiveness. We asked why not passing 60kts, but the procedure was cancelled. When RTO was memory items including selecting F40 after park breake was set, there was not problem. Now, with it being a read & do, the F40 comes late in the procedure. It is only advised to wait for F40 if possible. I wonder if they have introduced a threat to a safe evac. I can see some pax opening the overwings before the call for EVAC and before F40 is set. In a Manchester type catastrophe I would not be surprised if that happened.
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hello there
nobody didn't see anything after accident.I was there and i saw the cockpit after fire.All Technic personnel says the cost of damage to the cockpit around 15-20 million dollars.there is no cockpit there only wreck.
And yes someone from the cockpit left from the plane firstly cause engine number 2 was running and captain went to front of the engine.But all other crew left the plane last. If you have a chance to see video record one day you'll see.(or we can read accident report in the future)
All o2 masks dropped from psu its correct cause a short circuit,and evocation time was 55-60 seconds.
What was the reason for the fire i don't know but in my opinion evocation was successful.Rapid fire in the cockpit,no time for the evocation command,all electrical system gone and only 1-2 broken leg.
nobody didn't see anything after accident.I was there and i saw the cockpit after fire.All Technic personnel says the cost of damage to the cockpit around 15-20 million dollars.there is no cockpit there only wreck.
And yes someone from the cockpit left from the plane firstly cause engine number 2 was running and captain went to front of the engine.But all other crew left the plane last. If you have a chance to see video record one day you'll see.(or we can read accident report in the future)
All o2 masks dropped from psu its correct cause a short circuit,and evocation time was 55-60 seconds.
What was the reason for the fire i don't know but in my opinion evocation was successful.Rapid fire in the cockpit,no time for the evocation command,all electrical system gone and only 1-2 broken leg.
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Some Scary Info (if confirmed)
Was shown a photo of the cockpit yesterday, damn scary & do not wish to imagine the same scenario airborne.
The info I was given, by someone who knows the Capt, is that the fire was caused by electrical shorting/sparking (Gen on Bus? ) which ignited an oxygen leak from the line leading (close to or under the CB panel ) from the bottle to the Capts quick donning mask.
He further stated that Boeing have reputedly said only a few aircraft are affected, suggesting they either found out remarkably quickly, or that this was a known fault.
Anyone know of any AD's relating to this ?
The potential consequences if airborne don't bear contemplation.
The info I was given, by someone who knows the Capt, is that the fire was caused by electrical shorting/sparking (Gen on Bus? ) which ignited an oxygen leak from the line leading (close to or under the CB panel ) from the bottle to the Capts quick donning mask.
He further stated that Boeing have reputedly said only a few aircraft are affected, suggesting they either found out remarkably quickly, or that this was a known fault.
Anyone know of any AD's relating to this ?
The potential consequences if airborne don't bear contemplation.
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ok, Last I knew, oxygen itself is not flammable. so, an O2 line cannot ignite. Oxygen supports combustion, but itself is not flammable.
That story is a bit off track!
That story is a bit off track!
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Maybe, but. . . . . . . . . .
Accident: Egyptair B772 at Cairo on Jul 29th 2011, cockpit fire
By Simon Hradecky, created Thursday, Nov 29th 2012 15:27Z, last updated Thursday, Nov 29th 2012 17:01Z
Egypt's Aircraft Accident Investigation Central Directorate (EAAICD) released their final report concluding the probable causes of the accident were:
Probable causes for the accident can be reached through:
- Accurate and thorough reviewing of the factual information and the analysis sections
- Excluding the irrelevant probable causes included in the analysis section
Examination of the aircraft revealed that the fire originated near the first officer's oxygen mask supply tubing, which is located underneath the side console below the no. 3 right hand flight deck window. Oxygen from the flight crew oxygen system is suspected to have contributed to the fire's intensity and speed.
The cause of the fire could not be conclusively determined. It is not yet known whether the oxygen system breach occurred first, providing a flammable environment or whether the oxygen system breach occurred as a result of the fire.
Accident could be related to the following probable causes:
1. Electrical fault or short circuit resulted in electrical heating of flexible hoses in the flight crew oxygen system. (Electrical Short Circuits; contact between aircraft wiring and oxygen system components may be possible if multiple wire clamps are missing or fractured or if wires are incorrectly installed).
2. Exposure to Electrical Current
The captain (49, ATPL, 16,982 hours total, 5,314 hours on type) and first officer (25, ATPL, 2,247 hours total, 198 hours on type) were preparing the aircraft for departure including reading the checklists requiring the check of the flight crew oxygen system. The first officer conducted these checks and found the oxygen pressure in the normal range at 730 psi. The crew went on with the other preparation procedures, the passengers boarded, the crew was waiting for a delayed last passenger until doors could be closed and the aircraft was ready to depart.
About 30 minutes after the oxygen masks were checked the first officer heard a pop followed by a hissing sound from the right hand side of his seat, fire and smoke came out of the right hand console underneath the #3 cockpit window to the right of the first officer. The captain ordered the first officer to leave the cockpit immediately and notify cabin crew and emergency of the cockpit fire. The captain discharged the fire extinguisher available in the cockpit, however did not manage to put the fire out. The first officer in the meantime notified cabin crew of the cockpit fire prompting an immediate rapid disembarkment via the jetways, then moved on to find somebody with a radio unit, stopped a car on the service way underneath the jetway and radioed the fire department, first fire trucks arrived about 3 minutes after the fire was first observed. Rapid deplanement was completed in about 4-5 minutes. Fire fighters were able to extinguish the fire quickly, all works to extinguish and cool the aircraft were finished about 94 minutes after the onset of fire.
Seven people including passengers, Egyptair personnell and fire fighters suffered from mild asphyxia caused by smoke inhalation and were transferred to hospitals.
The aircraft received substantial damage including extensive fire and smoke damage to the cockpit, two holes were burned through the external aircraft skin at the right hand side of the cockpit, smoke damage occurred throughout the aircraft, heat damage was found on overhead structures aft of the cockpit, isolated areas of heat damage were in the electronic bay below the flight deck where molten metal had dripped down from the flight deck.
The passenger jetway suffered some damage as well including windows were broken due to heat damage, two jacks controlling the canopy at the front were bent due to heat, separation of the canopy, damage to the machine controlling the bridge entrance door due to rushed entry of fire fighters, cracks in the glass of the operator cabin. The jetway was repaired and resumed service on Aug 2nd 2011.
The EAAICD analysed that all actions by the flight crew were prompt and timely, the decision process was efficient and timely. Cabin crew deplaned the passengers efficiently and timely and thus highly contributed to the safety of passengers and crew. Ground crew acted prompt and efficiently after detecting the fire, too.
The aircraft showed no defects that could have contributed to the accident.
The investigation determined there were no fuel, hydraulic or oil lines near the cockpit area where the fire started. The investigation thus focussed on the crew oxygen system reasoning that the speed of the fire development required an accelerant.
The system's stainless steel supply tubes were found without any leakages, the stainless steel spring showed no evidence of arcing/electrical short circuit however most of the wiring was missing near the supply tube with evidence of melting.
The aircraft was found to differ from Boeing's design in that a clamp supporting the first officer's wiring to the oxygen mask light panel was missing. The wiring was not sleeved and a large loop of unsupported wire was found. The investigation determined that about 280 aircraft including all of Egyptair's Boeing 777s were delivered that way.
The flexible oxygen mask hoses were tested for conductivity, some of which were found not conductive with others found conductive.
It was found: "contact between aircraft wiring and oxygen system components may be possible if multiple wire clamps are missing or fractured or if wires are incorrectly installed."
A laboratory analysis concluded: "A short circuit from electrical wiring, which is supposed to be in contact with or routed near the stainless steel oxygen supply tubing, would be the most likely source to provide electrical energy to the spring. It is supposed that the stainless steel spring had been subjected to high energy level, which heated the internal spring until it became an ignition energy source, causing the flexible oxygen hose to ignite and sustain a fire. The time to failure, may took few seconds depending on the amount of energy supplied to the internal spring."
A similiar occurrence, also referenced by the EAAICD, had occurred on a Boeing 767-200 in San Francisco, see Accident: ABX Air Cargo B762 at San Francisco on Jun 28th 2008, on fire while parked, no arson. The EAAICD stated however that the construction of the flight crew flexible oxygen mask hoses of the B762 and B772 differed to an extent that no parallels could be drawn.
Cockpit damage (Photo: EAAICD):
Holes burnt through external skin (Photo: EAAICD):
Smoke damage in cabin (Photo: EAAICD):
Heat and smoke damage in galley (Photo: EAAICD):
By Simon Hradecky, created Friday, Jul 29th 2011 21:17Z, last updated Saturday, Jul 30th 2011 20:46Z
An Egyptair Boeing 777-200, registration SU-GBP performing flight MS-667 from Cairo (Egypt) to Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) with 291 passengers, was preparing for departure at gate F7 with the passengers already boarded when a fire erupted in the cockpit causing smoke to also enter the cabin. The crew initiated an emergency evacuation. 5 occupants received minor injuries in the evacuations. Emergency services responded and put the fire out. 2 fire fighters were taken to a hospital for smoke inhalation. The aircraft received substantial damage, the fire burned through the right hand side of the cockpit leaving a hole of about the size of the first officer's side window in the fuselage just below that window.
A replacement Boeing 777-200 registration SU-GBR reached Jeddah with a delay of 4.5 hours.
Accident: Egyptair B772 at Cairo on Jul 29th 2011, cockpit fire
By Simon Hradecky, created Thursday, Nov 29th 2012 15:27Z, last updated Thursday, Nov 29th 2012 17:01Z
Egypt's Aircraft Accident Investigation Central Directorate (EAAICD) released their final report concluding the probable causes of the accident were:
Probable causes for the accident can be reached through:
- Accurate and thorough reviewing of the factual information and the analysis sections
- Excluding the irrelevant probable causes included in the analysis section
Examination of the aircraft revealed that the fire originated near the first officer's oxygen mask supply tubing, which is located underneath the side console below the no. 3 right hand flight deck window. Oxygen from the flight crew oxygen system is suspected to have contributed to the fire's intensity and speed.
The cause of the fire could not be conclusively determined. It is not yet known whether the oxygen system breach occurred first, providing a flammable environment or whether the oxygen system breach occurred as a result of the fire.
Accident could be related to the following probable causes:
1. Electrical fault or short circuit resulted in electrical heating of flexible hoses in the flight crew oxygen system. (Electrical Short Circuits; contact between aircraft wiring and oxygen system components may be possible if multiple wire clamps are missing or fractured or if wires are incorrectly installed).
2. Exposure to Electrical Current
The captain (49, ATPL, 16,982 hours total, 5,314 hours on type) and first officer (25, ATPL, 2,247 hours total, 198 hours on type) were preparing the aircraft for departure including reading the checklists requiring the check of the flight crew oxygen system. The first officer conducted these checks and found the oxygen pressure in the normal range at 730 psi. The crew went on with the other preparation procedures, the passengers boarded, the crew was waiting for a delayed last passenger until doors could be closed and the aircraft was ready to depart.
About 30 minutes after the oxygen masks were checked the first officer heard a pop followed by a hissing sound from the right hand side of his seat, fire and smoke came out of the right hand console underneath the #3 cockpit window to the right of the first officer. The captain ordered the first officer to leave the cockpit immediately and notify cabin crew and emergency of the cockpit fire. The captain discharged the fire extinguisher available in the cockpit, however did not manage to put the fire out. The first officer in the meantime notified cabin crew of the cockpit fire prompting an immediate rapid disembarkment via the jetways, then moved on to find somebody with a radio unit, stopped a car on the service way underneath the jetway and radioed the fire department, first fire trucks arrived about 3 minutes after the fire was first observed. Rapid deplanement was completed in about 4-5 minutes. Fire fighters were able to extinguish the fire quickly, all works to extinguish and cool the aircraft were finished about 94 minutes after the onset of fire.
Seven people including passengers, Egyptair personnell and fire fighters suffered from mild asphyxia caused by smoke inhalation and were transferred to hospitals.
The aircraft received substantial damage including extensive fire and smoke damage to the cockpit, two holes were burned through the external aircraft skin at the right hand side of the cockpit, smoke damage occurred throughout the aircraft, heat damage was found on overhead structures aft of the cockpit, isolated areas of heat damage were in the electronic bay below the flight deck where molten metal had dripped down from the flight deck.
The passenger jetway suffered some damage as well including windows were broken due to heat damage, two jacks controlling the canopy at the front were bent due to heat, separation of the canopy, damage to the machine controlling the bridge entrance door due to rushed entry of fire fighters, cracks in the glass of the operator cabin. The jetway was repaired and resumed service on Aug 2nd 2011.
The EAAICD analysed that all actions by the flight crew were prompt and timely, the decision process was efficient and timely. Cabin crew deplaned the passengers efficiently and timely and thus highly contributed to the safety of passengers and crew. Ground crew acted prompt and efficiently after detecting the fire, too.
The aircraft showed no defects that could have contributed to the accident.
The investigation determined there were no fuel, hydraulic or oil lines near the cockpit area where the fire started. The investigation thus focussed on the crew oxygen system reasoning that the speed of the fire development required an accelerant.
The system's stainless steel supply tubes were found without any leakages, the stainless steel spring showed no evidence of arcing/electrical short circuit however most of the wiring was missing near the supply tube with evidence of melting.
The aircraft was found to differ from Boeing's design in that a clamp supporting the first officer's wiring to the oxygen mask light panel was missing. The wiring was not sleeved and a large loop of unsupported wire was found. The investigation determined that about 280 aircraft including all of Egyptair's Boeing 777s were delivered that way.
The flexible oxygen mask hoses were tested for conductivity, some of which were found not conductive with others found conductive.
It was found: "contact between aircraft wiring and oxygen system components may be possible if multiple wire clamps are missing or fractured or if wires are incorrectly installed."
A laboratory analysis concluded: "A short circuit from electrical wiring, which is supposed to be in contact with or routed near the stainless steel oxygen supply tubing, would be the most likely source to provide electrical energy to the spring. It is supposed that the stainless steel spring had been subjected to high energy level, which heated the internal spring until it became an ignition energy source, causing the flexible oxygen hose to ignite and sustain a fire. The time to failure, may took few seconds depending on the amount of energy supplied to the internal spring."
A similiar occurrence, also referenced by the EAAICD, had occurred on a Boeing 767-200 in San Francisco, see Accident: ABX Air Cargo B762 at San Francisco on Jun 28th 2008, on fire while parked, no arson. The EAAICD stated however that the construction of the flight crew flexible oxygen mask hoses of the B762 and B772 differed to an extent that no parallels could be drawn.
Cockpit damage (Photo: EAAICD):
Holes burnt through external skin (Photo: EAAICD):
Smoke damage in cabin (Photo: EAAICD):
Heat and smoke damage in galley (Photo: EAAICD):
By Simon Hradecky, created Friday, Jul 29th 2011 21:17Z, last updated Saturday, Jul 30th 2011 20:46Z
An Egyptair Boeing 777-200, registration SU-GBP performing flight MS-667 from Cairo (Egypt) to Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) with 291 passengers, was preparing for departure at gate F7 with the passengers already boarded when a fire erupted in the cockpit causing smoke to also enter the cabin. The crew initiated an emergency evacuation. 5 occupants received minor injuries in the evacuations. Emergency services responded and put the fire out. 2 fire fighters were taken to a hospital for smoke inhalation. The aircraft received substantial damage, the fire burned through the right hand side of the cockpit leaving a hole of about the size of the first officer's side window in the fuselage just below that window.
A replacement Boeing 777-200 registration SU-GBR reached Jeddah with a delay of 4.5 hours.
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I wonder if this highlighted section from the above report may include the subject aircraft
The aircraft was found to differ from Boeing's design in that a clamp supporting the first officer's wiring to the oxygen mask light panel was missing. The wiring was not sleeved and a large loop of unsupported wire was found. The investigation determined that about 280 aircraft including all of Egyptair's Boeing 777s were delivered that way.
Just remind me, are Boeings built in China ? or the YOU ess of A ? or possibly, in the latter, by the former ?
The aircraft was found to differ from Boeing's design in that a clamp supporting the first officer's wiring to the oxygen mask light panel was missing. The wiring was not sleeved and a large loop of unsupported wire was found. The investigation determined that about 280 aircraft including all of Egyptair's Boeing 777s were delivered that way.
Just remind me, are Boeings built in China ? or the YOU ess of A ? or possibly, in the latter, by the former ?
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What you say is scientifically correct, but because oxygen is essentially the Ur-oxidising agent, if anything in an oxygen-rich environment can burn it *will* burn much more fiercely than it would otherwise (case in point - the Velcro in the Apollo 1 Command Module).
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A Classic USN Traning Film
The Man From Lox explains in graphic terms the problems with an oxygen rich environment. (Hole in O2 line situation is one version of this) If you have never seen the movie, this will expand your horizons.
Man From LOX - YouTube
Man From LOX - YouTube
Last edited by Machinbird; 28th Dec 2012 at 02:25.
