AF 447 report out
Lyman
I don't have an axe to grind over this; I don't fly an Airbus, and I don't work for AF, but I am of the opinion that simply labelling the AF crew as "stupid" does nobody any favours. If the full evidence you suggest exists becomes available to us why wouldn't I listen?
If available to you, would you listen? Or would you cover you ears, satisfied with a 'story'...
Last edited by wiggy; 23rd Sep 2012 at 07:20.
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Question concerning RELIEF PILOT
Hello to you all,
although having read quite a few posts on AF447 I haven't been "in" here for quite some time, so please forgive me if anybody else posed this question already.
I have a problem determining, who the relief pilot finally was.
In the report pg 21 it says:
-One of the copilots was PF
-The CPT woke the second copilot and said....he's going to take my place
-The PF was sitting in the R/H seat
on pg 24 it continues:
-The copilot in the R/H seat was the relief for the captain
on pg 58 it says:
-The relief pilot enetered the cockpit at 1h59min26"
on pg 115 it says:
-He (the relief pilot) stayed in the R/H seat
So to me, the FO with approx 800hrs on type was the relief pilot, flying the plane and sitting in the R/H seat. BUT, than the statement on pg 58 cant be true.
Am I correct or am I missing something?
Thanks for clarification!
although having read quite a few posts on AF447 I haven't been "in" here for quite some time, so please forgive me if anybody else posed this question already.
I have a problem determining, who the relief pilot finally was.
In the report pg 21 it says:
-One of the copilots was PF
-The CPT woke the second copilot and said....he's going to take my place
-The PF was sitting in the R/H seat
on pg 24 it continues:
-The copilot in the R/H seat was the relief for the captain
on pg 58 it says:
-The relief pilot enetered the cockpit at 1h59min26"
on pg 115 it says:
-He (the relief pilot) stayed in the R/H seat
So to me, the FO with approx 800hrs on type was the relief pilot, flying the plane and sitting in the R/H seat. BUT, than the statement on pg 58 cant be true.
Am I correct or am I missing something?
Thanks for clarification!
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BluJet, it is clear to all who have read all these threads.
My comments added to your points;
“In the report pg 21 it says:
-One of the copilots was PF - Bonin (least experienced FO)
-The CPT (Dubois) woke the second copilot (Robert) (and said....he's going to take my place (In his, LH, seat, not as captain)
-The PF was sitting in the R/H seat - Still Bonin.
on pg 24 it continues:
-The copilot in the R/H seat was the relief for the captain (Dubois had ascertained that Bonin was qualified)
on pg 58 it says:
-The relief pilot entered the cockpit at 1h59min26" - Robert.
on pg 115 it says:
-He (the relief pilot) stayed in the R/H seat- Still Bonin.
My comments added to your points;
“In the report pg 21 it says:
-One of the copilots was PF - Bonin (least experienced FO)
-The CPT (Dubois) woke the second copilot (Robert) (and said....he's going to take my place (In his, LH, seat, not as captain)
-The PF was sitting in the R/H seat - Still Bonin.
on pg 24 it continues:
-The copilot in the R/H seat was the relief for the captain (Dubois had ascertained that Bonin was qualified)
on pg 58 it says:
-The relief pilot entered the cockpit at 1h59min26" - Robert.
on pg 115 it says:
-He (the relief pilot) stayed in the R/H seat- Still Bonin.
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Hi ChrisN
How can the relief pilot be Robert (pg 58)
and Bonin(pg115)?
on pg 58 it says:
-The relief pilot entered the cockpit at 1h59min26" - Robert.
on pg 115 it says:
-He (the relief pilot) stayed in the R/H seat- Still Bonin.
-The relief pilot entered the cockpit at 1h59min26" - Robert.
on pg 115 it says:
-He (the relief pilot) stayed in the R/H seat- Still Bonin.
and Bonin(pg115)?
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I don’t know what led the French author of the report to write in a way that the English translation contained what you quoted, but who was where and when is firmly established.
This has been gone over numerous times. It is called the oozlum bird and you are making it come round again.
This has been gone over numerous times. It is called the oozlum bird and you are making it come round again.
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Fatal Flight 447: Chaos in the Cockpit - 4oD - Channel 4
I found the program very interesting. One of the comments was that the pilots was startled by the events that started to take place.
But I found few things confusing, first, they did not show/explain all the error messages that the pilots first received that might have lead them to a state of confusion.
Furthermore to Airbus pilots, when did Unreliable Airspeed become a memory item? Was it trained in the past? Was it part of the QRH in past? When it was not a memory item?
Now in this documentary they played some of the CVR that was going on.
1.From this first the captain left his seat as he knew they was approaching a storm.
2.There was for me very poor CMR / SOP structure in the cockpit, with regarding handover of the aircraft, who had control, and who was doing what.
3. When captain finally returned there was no DODAR style revision of what had happen, what was going on.
From what I understand from the Airbus training now, it is now 5 degree pitch and CLB detent thrust, disconnect all Autos and Flight Directors.
Than PNF should find in the QRH power setting and and pitch angle!
Is this something that was implemented in the Airbus training after the AF447 accident?
What I am trying to understand is, was the AF crew victims of lack of training to handle this specific situation, or should they have been aware of these procedures.
Was also crew made aware during their training, that stall warning, would normally always be reliable vs other error messages, like overspeed?
From what the TV program showed, however much is correct there I don't know, but it does seem like the PF (RHS) locked/jammed the controls for to long time!
But if as they explained in the tv program, the pilot in the LHS was also doing inputs, after taking control, why did they not get message of dual inputs straight away?
I find the program lacking on a few important details at various times, maybe it is just oversight and lack of knowledge during the production, assuming the main facts are correct!
It is a curious case, but you have to question the crews lack of judgement overall, regardless of the faults with the aircraft.
And of course, it is so easy for us now to sit and see what they should have done, still 38.000 ft is a big fall!
I found the program very interesting. One of the comments was that the pilots was startled by the events that started to take place.
But I found few things confusing, first, they did not show/explain all the error messages that the pilots first received that might have lead them to a state of confusion.
Furthermore to Airbus pilots, when did Unreliable Airspeed become a memory item? Was it trained in the past? Was it part of the QRH in past? When it was not a memory item?
Now in this documentary they played some of the CVR that was going on.
1.From this first the captain left his seat as he knew they was approaching a storm.
2.There was for me very poor CMR / SOP structure in the cockpit, with regarding handover of the aircraft, who had control, and who was doing what.
3. When captain finally returned there was no DODAR style revision of what had happen, what was going on.
From what I understand from the Airbus training now, it is now 5 degree pitch and CLB detent thrust, disconnect all Autos and Flight Directors.
Than PNF should find in the QRH power setting and and pitch angle!
Is this something that was implemented in the Airbus training after the AF447 accident?
What I am trying to understand is, was the AF crew victims of lack of training to handle this specific situation, or should they have been aware of these procedures.
Was also crew made aware during their training, that stall warning, would normally always be reliable vs other error messages, like overspeed?
From what the TV program showed, however much is correct there I don't know, but it does seem like the PF (RHS) locked/jammed the controls for to long time!
But if as they explained in the tv program, the pilot in the LHS was also doing inputs, after taking control, why did they not get message of dual inputs straight away?
I find the program lacking on a few important details at various times, maybe it is just oversight and lack of knowledge during the production, assuming the main facts are correct!
It is a curious case, but you have to question the crews lack of judgement overall, regardless of the faults with the aircraft.
And of course, it is so easy for us now to sit and see what they should have done, still 38.000 ft is a big fall!
truckflyer:
Pursuant your last line -- 38,000 feet being a long fall -- one of the points we had discussed in this family of threads from a host of different angles was:
If your nose is up and you are still falling, as evidenced by your altimeter continually decreasing and your vertical speed indication being negative, at what point do you diagnose "we are stalled" from that evidence, even if your airspeed indications are AFU? (We'll set aside for the moment an annoying audio stall alarm that goes on and off, see the BEA final report for how that fits in ...)
This may sound simple, but you get into recency of training issues. Also training content.
Typically, airlines do not do actual stall training in the aircraft (valid risk and cost reasons), and do not have simulators that can accurately emulate a stall (lack of data points, apparently).
You then may ask: at what point has any A330 pilot been presented with the visual problem noted above, and asked to diagnose/solve it? In old school training, you could call that situation a degraded panel, or partial panel, stall in IMC conditions. (Under the bag, as it were, in training flights).
That sort of training is apparently not done.
This takes us back to the training that is done, which is stall prevention. Seems that didn't take.
Pursuant your last line -- 38,000 feet being a long fall -- one of the points we had discussed in this family of threads from a host of different angles was:
If your nose is up and you are still falling, as evidenced by your altimeter continually decreasing and your vertical speed indication being negative, at what point do you diagnose "we are stalled" from that evidence, even if your airspeed indications are AFU? (We'll set aside for the moment an annoying audio stall alarm that goes on and off, see the BEA final report for how that fits in ...)
This may sound simple, but you get into recency of training issues. Also training content.
Typically, airlines do not do actual stall training in the aircraft (valid risk and cost reasons), and do not have simulators that can accurately emulate a stall (lack of data points, apparently).
You then may ask: at what point has any A330 pilot been presented with the visual problem noted above, and asked to diagnose/solve it? In old school training, you could call that situation a degraded panel, or partial panel, stall in IMC conditions. (Under the bag, as it were, in training flights).
That sort of training is apparently not done.
This takes us back to the training that is done, which is stall prevention. Seems that didn't take.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 3rd Oct 2012 at 18:09.
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I think the reason for focusing on stall avoidance was less to do with a lack of simulator fidelity than it was the industry-wide perception that by drilling stall avoidance procedures into crews, the need for stall recognition and recovery learned at PPL level need not be revised. This turned out to be a significant mistake with hindsight.
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For IAS, the procedure was:
PITCH/THRUST:
Above THRUST RED ALT and Above FL 100 - 5deg/CLB
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...nexe.06.en.pdf
For STALL WARNING, the "phases after lift off" procedure was:
THRUST LEVERS - TOGA
PITCH ATTITUDE - REDUCE
BANK ANGLE - ROLL WINGS LEVEL
SPEEDBRAKES - CHECK RETRACTED
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...nexe.11.en.pdf
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 3rd Oct 2012 at 19:11.
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I am curious at what point did Unreliable Airspeed, become a memory item?
Was it a memory item before the AF447 crash?
From the documentary it does seem, that if they had just applied the unreliable airspeed procedure, as soon as they started to get nonsense information, the whole thing would have been a non-event!
I am sorry, as I am relative new to Airbus, and I do not know the history of Airbus training in the past.
Was Unreliable Airspeed a memory item at the time of the AF447 crash?
If it was, why did not the Air France crew apply that procedure?
Or was it not, if so, how was the issued dealt with during training?
It did seem that the crew was overly confident in the Airbus, saying, "good we flying Airbus" several during the time they entered the storm!
Did they rely to much on the machine, and not their own basic flying skills?
Was it a memory item before the AF447 crash?
From the documentary it does seem, that if they had just applied the unreliable airspeed procedure, as soon as they started to get nonsense information, the whole thing would have been a non-event!
I am sorry, as I am relative new to Airbus, and I do not know the history of Airbus training in the past.
Was Unreliable Airspeed a memory item at the time of the AF447 crash?
If it was, why did not the Air France crew apply that procedure?
Or was it not, if so, how was the issued dealt with during training?
It did seem that the crew was overly confident in the Airbus, saying, "good we flying Airbus" several during the time they entered the storm!
Did they rely to much on the machine, and not their own basic flying skills?
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You are confusing the drill for T/O with "approach to STALL".
Maintain back pressure is how the altitude is kept stable. Takeoff involves some serious NU, hence the "reduce Pitch"....
Perhaps ?
Maintain back pressure is how the altitude is kept stable. Takeoff involves some serious NU, hence the "reduce Pitch"....
Perhaps ?
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No - the PDF links contain the "at take off" and "phases after take-off" actions. It is the latter I have quoted. One does not maintain altitude by maintaining backpressure on the stick/yoke - if the aircraft is trimmed correctly then no direct input is required.
The point is at no stage do any of these procedures refer to manipulation of the stick, as you suggest. You are making stuff up again.
The point is at no stage do any of these procedures refer to manipulation of the stick, as you suggest. You are making stuff up again.
DozyWannabe
No - the PDF links contain the "at take off" and "phases after take-off" actions. It is the latter I have quoted. One does not maintain altitude by maintaining backpressure on the stick/yoke - if the aircraft is trimmed correctly then no direct input is required.
No - the PDF links contain the "at take off" and "phases after take-off" actions. It is the latter I have quoted. One does not maintain altitude by maintaining backpressure on the stick/yoke - if the aircraft is trimmed correctly then no direct input is required.
Actually i think the procedure "reduce pitch" refers better to situations, where the aircraft is not entering the stall due to decaying airspeed in straight and level flight, but due to loading the aircraft while maneuvering, like initiating a turn or a climb (we called that accelerated stall).
Reducing pitch (for avoiding stall) in straight and level flight would be better expressed by stick / SS push forward until stall warning stops and would cover the other situation as well.
Lyman has half of my point.
Last edited by RetiredF4; 3rd Oct 2012 at 21:37.
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Neither - I'm simply stating that none of the procedures refer to backpressure on the stick. Because no matter how you get into the stall warning regime, pulling back is almost exclusively the wrong thing to do.
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"DozyWannabe" - That was based on the channel 4 program.
Now I have not checked the official transcript, channel 4 translated this from French, so I do not know of the accuracy of this. I would assume they would use original transcript/translation.
Now I have not checked the official transcript, channel 4 translated this from French, so I do not know of the accuracy of this. I would assume they would use original transcript/translation.
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They used a combination of the BEA transcript and Otelli's from what I could tell. I watched it and must confess I can't remember words to that effect, but if I can find it on 4oD still, I'll have another look later in the week.
DozyWannabe
Because no matter how you get into the stall warning regime, pulling back is almost exclusively the wrong thing to do.
Because no matter how you get into the stall warning regime, pulling back is almost exclusively the wrong thing to do.
But..
One does not maintain altitude by maintaining backpressure on the stick/yoke - if the aircraft is trimmed correctly then no direct input is required.
I give you credit that it was not intended though.