...Do you believe that manufacturers intentionally attempt to design aircraft that are "simpler to fly"?
It used to be when stability was up, responsiveness was down. With the advent of computers, I believe you can have both stability and responsiveness up, which some might call "simpler to fly" and a very good thing, IMO.
Last edited by F111UPS767; 19th Aug 2012 at 20:19.
TTex600, of course the aircraft are already designed to ensure pilot workload is no greater than it needs to be and also to ensure that what the aircaft is doing can be understood as clearly as possible. What I meant is that a reduction in the level of skill in pilots is already being anticipated in the future, and the design of the next generation of aircraft will take this in to account. I am not sure what this belief in proficiency is based on, whether its analysis of worldwide aircraft incident trends, feedback from airlines on the calibre of new pilots. It may just be a judgement call based on what your average school or university graduate may be capable of in 5 or 10 years time, compared to now or say 10 years ago.
Last edited by pedrobaltic; 19th Aug 2012 at 20:23.
Reason: grammar
The NTSB also ignored all the reports of witnesses from the ground saying they saw what appeared to be missiles fired from the ground. No it was a center fuel tank spark. The A300 was an out of control FO problem. Ii would never let an FO rip the tail off, would you?
Depends if you knew that airbus had played with aileron and rudder sensitivity on that variant of 300 from initial certification, and that AA had allegedly decreased roll sensitivity in their wake turbulence upset recovery programme sim necessitating excessive rudder input to maintain roll control during simulated wake vortex upset recovery; for the best of reasons, but with tragic ultimate results.
The subsequent FDR trace of pilot rudder input can only be described as a pilot induced oscillation in yaw, due to negative transfer from a well meaning, but incorrect training programme that was designed to deal with wake vortex recovery. At least, that's what I gathered from the alpa and NTSB reports.
bubbers44 The NTSB also ignored all the reports of witnesses from the ground saying they saw what appeared to be missiles fired from the ground. No it was a center fuel tank spark. The A300 was an out of control FO problem. Ii would never let an FO rip the tail off, would you?
You are thinkin TWA, flight 800. AA587 was an A300 into Queens. No missiles, no center tank spark. Eyewitnesses described smoke from the right side of the fuselage before the handling problems....
Relative to 447, the similarities are unfamiliarities, pilot to aircraft.... 447 wanted a gentle touch, as did 587. It did not work out. another cross catastrophe might be what AB learned v/v the VS, and metal to composite joinery.
Likewise at below 250 knots, the Bus Rudder is not limited, that turned out to be lethal. What AB learned from AA, is proprietary, but one would opine it relates to lateral G and the function of the RTLU..
"Bicycling" the rudder pedals? Who would object, the recorder shows the inputs, out of phase with the "turbulence', and the Yaw responses...
One can fly without a Rudder, but not without it's Fin. A shame the Rudder hinges are stronger than the VStab saddles.
One can fly without a Rudder, but not without it's Fin. A shame the Rudder hinges are stronger than the VStab saddles.
Yes, the photos of the stab attachments/saddle remains on top of the aft fuselage were quite frightening.
I forget which thread it was on, but Dozy stated something about using rudder for roll in stall recovery. The vertical stab-less Bus out of JFK is always on my mind when I have my feet on the pedals of a Bus.....on top of being trained to leave them alone for other reasons.
I forget which thread it was on, but Dozy stated something about using rudder for roll in stall recovery.
The Ultimate design load of the AA587 vertical stab was exceeded by rapidly reversing pedal inputs at high speed in dense air. A stall condition is by its very nature low-speed.
One thing that hasn't been mentioned is that the advanced training given to that particular F/O was designed for the DC-9s and MD-80s that made up the bulk of AA's domestic fleet at the time - T-tail, rear-engined, less rudder authority required. Trying that same manouevre on any podded, low-tail design would have had the same result no matter what the particular type was.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 20th Aug 2012 at 13:07.
"Yes, the photos of the stab attachments/saddle remains on top of the aft fuselage were quite frightening."
bub...
"I wouldn't allow my FO to do that and neither would his captain. I think the NTSB has an agenda and they stick with it."
By the time the VS parted, the a/c was sideways, and had lost an engine off the wing. OFF the wing. Perfectly timed Ruddering? Maybe. I have never liked the method of attachment, VS, that is required with long distance vendoring. Add the Resin/Steel mate, and then consider the monster moment of that huge VS in extreme angle with the airstream.
Edit....587 was well under the speed 'limit'
How to acquire such an angle, and Why, in a non acro airframe? Rudder with caution, it says on the PFD. 587 is yet another case in point of utter failure brought on by lack of thinking, and lack of experience engineering/maneuvering.
And again the Investigators focus on the traditional 'culprits'.
Rooting the hoops deeply into the frames is nice, and building up the tabs onto the VS spars is likewise. Use pins that can lift a Battleship, but ignore the torsion? Intuitively obvious, but not Pre 'snap'? And resin burns, aggressively.
Engines too strong, airframes too cheap.....
Edit....587 was well under the speed 'limit'. So was the Rudder...
Edit.... Via the Doze.....
"A stall condition is by its very nature low-speed."
There are similarities and differences between naval aviation training and regular airline operation. It is very useful to recognize them properly.
Sorry, but you misunderstand. Naval aviation operations require CRM in multi-place aircraft, JUST AS regular airline operations require CRM. As I noted before, we got a lot of our material, to train our OPERATORS in CRM from the airlines. I had to be trained, and then I trained others.
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You can't do that unless you assess how well the other pilot is doing if things are not going well, or if he isn't flying right.
True but it's far from being the whole truth. Focusing on the details while ignoring the big picture can be counterproductive. -- snipped the rest--
Your response was a lot of words that added nothing. I stated very clearly what is needed, and I'll stand by my point that such is a core multi-piloted crew requirement. You can't make a decision to take the controls unless you know when it is needed. To do that, you have to have enough SA to know what the aircraft is doing. You also have to have a belief that you may some day have to take the aircraft from someone else. There are some cultural norms to be undone when one is so trained.
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I am pretty sure that you know better than that off hand remark you made, in bold, since you do multi-place aricraft flying for a living, and IIRC, are a Captain.
You shouldn't be. I don't. Why do you believe what you read in personal info?
This was also based on our discussion in one of the ATR threads, sorry to have over estimated your experience.
Or are you trying to say something else?
Regarding your wise acre response to my acknowledging a scan transition isssue: no thanks. The pitch and power chorus have been singing since long before the FDR's were raised from a watery grave. On that there is no real argument. My point is that without training (see what Tex keeps harping on) the habit pattern and scan patterns, and scan shifting patterns, can erode due to disuse. Or, in some cases, Are Never Established. (That appears to be what bubbers44 has such concerns about).
Lay on MacDuff, and all that.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 20th Aug 2012 at 20:47.
If you are at FL350 over the ocean you have no obstacle clearance so why climb at at a 5 degree deck angle because you lost airspeed. They climbed at 15 degrees for some strange reason. Why not just stay at 2.5 degrees nose up and get out the UAS check list like normal pilots do? I like to support pilots but these two don't get my support.
I still hold the position that the totality of cockpit visual displays, aural warnings, and ECAM, contributed to the crews inability to determine their true condition.
And I still hold that the totality of the BEA's final report contributed to many A PPRuNEr inability to understand fully what was written. I don't hold BEA responsible for it, though.
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Originally Posted by Lonewolf50
Sorry, but you misunderstand. Naval aviation operations require CRM in multi-place aircraft
Completely true if "multi-place" is naval equivalent of civilian "minimum crew 2 pilots" It's different kind of CRM if there are two qualified pilots flying multi-crew aeroplane (e.g Greyhound or Hawkeye) or if there are instructor and student in training vesrsion of single seater (e.g. F/A-18D).
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Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
Your response was a lot of words that added nothing. You can't make a decision to take the controls unless you know when it is needed. To do that, you have to have enough SA to know what the aircraft is doing. You also have to have a belief that you may some day have to take the aircraft from someone else.
I wrote something different? Sorry for misunderstanding, I thought you were promoting idea that in regular airline operations (once line training is completed) one pilot constantly monitors other pilots control input instead of aeroplane. My bad.
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Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
There are some cultural norms to be undone when one is so trained.
True, but it helps in such a training if it is assured that a pilot understands very well that aeroplanes have absolutely no respect for cultural norms & differences and kill everyone who insists on mishandling them with total impartiality regarding the race, hair colour, gender, sexual orientation, age, ethnicity, type of licence or hours flown.
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Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
Or are you trying to say something else?
That in AF447 threads there is abundance of argument from authority and if we want to have meaningful discussion it would be better to concentrate on whether what is written is true than who is the poster that wrote it.
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Originally Posted by Lonewolf 50
My point is that without training (see what Tex keeps harping on) the habit pattern and scan patterns, and scan shifting patterns, can erode due to disuse.
So they might be, but what has it to do with AF447? For Finnegan's sake, we have analysis of DFDR and CVR and they show nothing like the alleged "scan breakdown". Both pilots promptly recognized they have lost speed display. CM2 has quickly brought the roll oscillation under control, so he must have been looking at the EADI. CM1 realized that they climbed and advised CM2 to go back down, which he started to comply by somewhat reducing pitch but changed his mind when the stall warning went off second time. There is no trace of control reversals and aeroplane oscillation characteristic of scan breakdown. Right stick was used to fight the roll till the end and it remained nose-up almost all the time indicating at least some purpose, even if, contrary to any modern airline pilot training, it was never verbalized.
It is not they didn't see and read their instruments. Whether they did not understand what they were telling them is debatable but it is certain they had no idea what to do and eventually CM2 panicked into performing the maneuver that proved to be quickly lethal. There were other crews that were clueless but were saved by doing virtually nothing. There were those who made similar unwaranted pull-up but respected stall warning and reversed control inputs. There was many a way out of the predicament even without ever applying the UAS procedure and it is tragic that CM2 has chosen the disastrous one, while CM1 was unable to understand it would turn out to be fatal.
They climbed at 15 degrees for some strange reason. Why not just stay at 2.5 degrees nose up and get out the UAS check list like normal pilots do? I like to support pilots but these two don't get my support.
OK, since no-one has postulated any believable reason for this, I propose a brand new theory, and no, I have not run this by Bearfoil/Lyman yet:
Bonin (and possibly the whole crew) was experimenting with LSD or Mescaline for the first time. (I'll be sure to write to the BEA to apprise them of this theory.)
No it wasn't LSD, it was lack of hands on experience. They could not handfly an airplane. They both started with minimum skills and were taught automation. With the lack of pilots qualified the airlines will hire the lowest qualified pilots because of cost and that is the future.
I still hold the position that the totality of cockpit visual displays, aural warnings, and ECAM, contributed to the crews inability to determine their true condition.
And I still hold that the totality of the BEA's final report contributed to many A PPRuNEr inability to understand fully what was written. I don't hold BEA responsible for it, though.
You may be correct, but your point has nothing to do with mine.
All you have to offer is crew incompetence. You could save yourself many keystrokes by just joining Bubbers44 in his quest to damn the dead.
I have no quest to damn the dead but how would you feel if a loved one was in the back of that aircraft and because they couldn't fly without automation, killed them?
