Not tricked, the automatics are not abstract and devious thinkers. But held in the dark v/v UAS, but also by AF, And Airbus...
Could you keep track of your SS in the dark, shaking like a roller coaster, assessing each bump, and response? You have no way of knowing what your commands are causing the aircraft to do... Look out? Ridiculous.? Feel the seat, dangerous....look at the panel? Vibrating numbers, very loud nose outside, airstream howling, too fast? FD gone, no cuddly line to follow, a cacophony of alarms, some important, some banal, all of them wanting attention. ECAM? Not your job, shit it looks bad....
By the way, you are not wearing your belts.....damn.....
Doze....
"PS. An "itch" too much NU? Try 10 degrees! Try attempting to hold it during the resultant zoom climb! Try attempting to hold it after stalling!"
Stop reading op's mail....
He did not get ten degrees Pitch up until eleven seconds after the SW1..... After several nose down inputs mixed with ups, and how will you remember to sum them when you cannot see the panel for its shaking?
UAS is obvious to both seats from lack of speed display on the PFDs. I know my only experience comes from the sim, but the SS response was very positive and I had no trouble determining its relative position by feel alone. Altitude loss is apparent on the PFD from the change in colour from the V/S display, as well as the altimeter itself towards the end of the sequence. If FD is gone then it's a simple matter of using the ADI to determine which direction you should be facing. Outside noise? Use the damn panel to determine what could be causing it! The only aural alarm was Stall Warning - take heed.
This wan't a crew valiantly trying to rescue a situation they were thrown into by technology - this was a crew who couldn't find their a**e from their elbow.
(which was not necessarily their fault...)
* - It doesn't matter what the PF got when - the command was way in excess of what was required from the outset. A ND input is not sufficient in isolation, it needs to be *held*. You don't need to sum them in your head, you have to follow through until the aircraft is doing what is required to recover.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 11th Aug 2012 at 01:54.
Knowing the position of the SS tells you nothing... It is the position of the a/c you need, and that is not necessarily related to the whisk in your mitt. If your scan is crap, or your instruments dancing, you are Screwed.. The stick is a small whip, limp and ineffective as to assiette suss.
And the report supports the conclusion that the aircraft position was easily discernable to the crew and that despite that fact they failed to fully appreciate just how much danger they were in until it was too late.
The DFDR trace conclusively proves that the PFD in the LHS was 100% reliable throughout the sequence and that the failure to act on what was presented lay with the PNF.
Birgenair 301 and Palm 90 prove that if a copilot is not prepared to overrule their captain and take control, yokes make no difference.
If you'd have asked any KLM pilot prior to 27/3/1977 if their chief training captain would take off without proper clearance, they'd have looked at you like you were mad. Sadly, we all learned differently.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 11th Aug 2012 at 02:18.
Seeing a yoke move back and forth meant a lot to me as captain. It told me instantly if he was putting in the right inputs. Waiting to see what the airplane does is a bit late to fix an FO FU. AB doesn't feel that way. See what happens?
If the yoke connection was reversed, you'd have been in trouble! Likewise if there'd been a failure in the artificial feel system.
UA232 highlighted the fact that even if the yokes are rendered completely useless, pilots will still try to use them. With no hydraulics, the inputs made by Capt. Haynes and F/O Records had no effect at all, yet they still held them in a death grip till the final moment. Not that this takes anything away from thir ultimate achievement (or that of the late Capt. Denny Fitch - who I hope has found the peace that it seemed eluded him).
Given that there hasn't been an upsurge in accidents on approach in FBW Airbus types due to "FO FUs", I hope you won't be offended if I suggest that it hasn't made much difference...
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 11th Aug 2012 at 02:48.
UA232 did a fine job of saving most of their passengers. They did what they thought was best. I would have done it differently but I wasn't there. They saved a lot of people by what they did. We have to make command decisions when the sh#t hits the fan.
. The Cirrus SR series, F-16, Dassault Rafale and F-22.
You're grasping at straws. 3 fighters and a light single, but true to form, you ignore what you don't want to deal with. I didn't ask about SS alone, I asked about no feel , no feedback side sticks.
How many other transport category aircraft feature a no feel, no feedback, SS? For that matter, how many other transport category aircraft feature no feel, no feedback controls regardless of where the stick is mounted?
Quote:
Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
The procedure in such a situation is to hold the sidestick override switch down, which will lock out the opposite side.
You know that I know this, so who are you trying to convince? As in the UAS recognition problem , the pilot first must know that both sticks are active, he must recognize that the other pilot made an input. But as I first wrote, those warnings are easily drowned in a cacaphony of cockpit noise and stimulation.
Further counterpoint will have to wait, but I'll end with this......there is a reason Airbus says that a crab is their recommended technique for x-wind landings. Based upon PERSONAL EXPERIENCE in the airplane, trying to hold a wing down in gusty conditions could easily result in a nacelle scrap because FBW "protected" roll control is far less powerful and responsive than rudder induced roll. IOW, rudder inputs intended to counter gusts overpower the ailerons/spoilerons and you can't raise the wing quick enough with roll control to keep from soiling your pants. That's not opinion. FWIW, crossed controls work just fine in steady x-winds.
DozyWannabe THS was at 5 degrees NU at apogee. If the crew had levelled off it would have stayed there and reoriented itself. Roll required correction from AP disengagement onwards.
What a completely wrong statement! Dozy, you would have crashed too. At the apogee the AC was above the lift- and propulsion ceiling, a level off was therefore not possible. Release the stick to acchieve one g flight, not possible, the same would have happened, the trim woIuld have followed the command 1g with SS neutral hands off, same result.
Only a definite and prolonged ND command would have prevented the THS trim to continue its NU movement and then would have moved the trim in the ND direction.
Can we somehow finally agree on that and then stopp argueing on the basis of completely false statements like yours above?
Or is again the knowledge for aerodynamic fundamentals missing like aparently with the crew of AF 447?
At the apogee the AC was above the lift- and propsion ceiling, a level off was therefore not possible.
Agreed, but you're overreacting. Apogee was at 02:11:10, 13 seconds after the airplane stalled at 02:10:57. EDIT:: Apogee, by definition, is level flight.
Last edited by HazelNuts39; 11th Aug 2012 at 08:55.
I think you guys are trying to make too much out of this. Round and round and round again, in technical circles. After flying jets for 20 years.
I'm with Studi post #746:
Quote:
..... If a simple AP disconnect and THR lock of a perfectly stable flying airplane puts the pilot into overload, it has nothing to do with the machine, but with the guys training and skill.
... as was said before, we don't know why Bonin pulled.
Sure, but there are some fairly strong indications that, from the moment the PF assumed control after A/P disconnect, his overriding concern was the avoidance of overspeed.
Section 2.1.3.3.1 of the final report deals with the PF's reaction from the triggering of the STALL 2 warning, as perceived by the HF group (I think the crucial moment is when he starts to pull just before the SW):
Quote:
Some of the PF’s actions may be interpreted as indicative of a perception of a risk or of a diagnosis of overspeed. Firstly, the PF reduced the thrust during the seconds preceding the activation of the STALL 2 warning and the onset of buffet. Secondly, 51 s after the triggering of this warning, the PF said “I have the impression we have speed” then moved the thrust levers to the IDLE detent. He reformulated his impression a few seconds later, combined with an attempt to extend the speedbrakes. Other factors which may have prompted the PF to fear an overspeed situation were:
- The display on the ECAM (max speed 330/.82) combined with the reconfiguration to alternate law which may have been read;
- The fact that, in cruise, the upper red strip on the speed tape (MMO) is about ten knots above the current speed, whereas VLS is barely visible at the bottom of the tape (thirty knots less);
- The dangers associated with overspeed situations embedded in the collective consciousness of pilots.
The next two paragraphs discuss the PF's reaction to the stall warning. I agree with the first paragraph, but the second seems to me to be somewhat in conflict with the first:
Quote:
Nevertheless, the PF was also confronted with the stall warning, which conflicted with his impression of an overspeed. The transient activations of the warning after the autopilot disconnection may have caused the crew to doubt its credibility. Furthermore, the fact that the flight director was advising a nose-up attitude may have confirmed the PF’s belief that the stall warning was not relevant. During previous events studied, crews frequently mentioned their doubts regarding the relevance of the stall warning (see 1.16.8.4).
The application of maximum thrust was probably the consequence of the perception of the stall warning. However, the PF may have assimilated the triggering of the warning as a consequence of the reduction in thrust, which he had applied four seconds earlier; he should then have applied full thrust to return to the earlier situation. A few seconds later, the PF said “I’m in TOGA, right?”. Either he was unsure whether or not he had set the thrust controls to the TOGA detent, as he intended, or he did not understand why this action was ineffective in clearing the stall warning. This second case might therefore indicate that the PF had built an erroneous mental representation of the aeroplane’s flight model, and that he had hoped that he could resolve the situation by applying TOGA thrust at high altitude and a pitch attitude oftwelve degrees, a strategy similar to that recommended at low altitudes. The fruitless result of his actions possibly heightened his mistrust of the warning.
It seems to me that, when the FD's reappeared, the PF 'remembered' the first line of the memory items: TOGA / 15° as the proper way to avoid overspeed. When the nose finally dropped below 15° with full NU sidestick, he feared that would result in overspeed, he pulled the thrust levers back and attempted to extend the speed brakes.
Just my opinion, FWIW.
Last edited by HazelNuts39; 11th Aug 2012 at 13:16.
Reason: continuity
I think you guys are trying to make too much out of this. Round and round and round again, in technical circles.
Having followed various discussions on and off from the beginning I have to agree.
What are the most important things that pilots need to do/understand to avoid similar accidents? Here are a few I can think of, in no particular order:
- Have a working knowledge of performance attitudes in all phases of flight.
- Pulling back on the controls for an extended period of time is rarely the solution to a problem.
- Crew communication/interaction is vital during an emergency in a multi-pilot aircraft.
- Know how your airframe behaves when you lose part/all of the protections/automation.
Competence in just one of those areas might have prevented the accident under discussion...
I think you guys are trying to make too much out of this. Round and round and round again, in technical circles. After flying jets for 20 years.
I'm with Studi post #746:
Quote:
:
..... If a simple AP disconnect and THR lock of a perfectly stable flying airplane puts the pilot into overload, it has nothing to do with the machine, but with the guys training and skill.
If it was as simple as a simple AP disconnect and thrust lock of a perfectly stable flying machine, I would agree.
Look. The aircraft was flying fine (attitude/thrust) when the technical problem occurred. After two minutes of pilot input, in wasn't flying. It was falling. Despite 2 wings, 2 engines, an artificial horizon, 35,000 feet of airspace and sufficient control authority.
Full wings is spot on:
Quote:
- Have a working knowledge of performance attitudes in all phases of flight.
- Pulling back on the controls for an extended period of time is rarely the solution to a problem.
- Crew communication/interaction is vital during an emergency in a multi-pilot aircraft.
- Know how your airframe behaves when you lose part/all of the protections/automation.
Please continue with the long technical discussions. I just feel we need to re-iterate, once in a while, the vital tasks of the pilots. The importance of flight path control and cockpit co-ordination in those first few critical moments of a serious non-normal. Amongst all the bells, whistles, lights, g forces, etc.
I'm not convinced the importance in which this is taught in simulator training is really hitting home.
hazelnuts Quote: At the apogee the AC was above the lift- and propsion ceiling, a level off was therefore not possible. Agreed, but you're overreacting. Apogee was at 02:11:10, 13 seconds after the airplane stalled at 02:10:57 EDIT:: Apogee, by definition, is level flight.
.
No, it is the farest point away from earth and has nothing to do with level flight. At that point level flight was not possible. Only possible thing to do was to lower the nose and align pitch angle roughly with flightpath angle. That way stall would have been broken and aircraft would have been recovered. What Dozy told and others accept without thinking "level off at apogee" was the final killer in the event.
@dozy I come back to some posts of you on monday, present no time due to driving on the road. But i would suggest, that you try to align your wordfull explanations of the event with the final report. For now, check, wether the Vs presents itself when speeds are lost, afaik no colours when no protections.
Look. The aircraft was flying fine (attitude/thrust) when the technical problem occurred. After two minutes of pilot input, in wasn't flying. It was falling. Despite 2 wings, 2 engines, an artificial horizon, 35,000 feet of airspace and sufficient control authority.
Full wings is spot on:
Quote:
Originally Posted by FullWings
- Have a working knowledge of performance attitudes in all phases of flight.
- Pulling back on the controls for an extended period of time is rarely the solution to a problem.
- Crew communication/interaction is vital during an emergency in a multi-pilot aircraft.
- Know how your airframe behaves when you lose part/all of the protections/automation.
Please continue with the long technical discussions. I just feel we need to re-iterate, once in a while, the vital tasks of the pilots. The importance of flight path control and cockpit co-ordination in those first few critical moments of a serious non-normal. Amongst all the bells, whistles, lights, g forces, etc.
I'm not convinced the importance in which this is taught in simulator training is really hitting home.
Absolutely agreed (with Full Wings and yourself Contacted ) , while making the point that their failure to recognize is key. Yes the aircraft was flying just fine before the technical problem occurred, and it is painfully obvious from CVR transcript that the crew failed to perform in a professional (or even amateurish) level; but as a pilot who observes our industry and is concerned for future generations of pilots, I feel strongly that we do everything possible to prevent another such accident. In that light, we do the dead crew and their infortunate passengers a dis-service if we ignore the role the machine played in their failure to recognize what failed and how to properly deal with that failure. .
Their machine failed them during two separate phases, first in the seconds after the A/P disconnect the displays/indicators/attention getters/attention demanders didn't give clear and pointed information, and secondly the FD inconsistency confused the PF during his attempts to control the aircraft. I say this because I believe I'm repeating what the BEA wrote in the final report. I do not place blame on the system because it offered a confusing environment, but I think that the confusion was a significant factor in their failure to recognize their true state.
