I asked him the "trick question," which is, "What if the captain had walked back onto the flight deck of AF447 in an aircraft that had conventional control columns, thus seeing them pulled full back?"
His response, "That difference may have very well saved the flight."
Did you then follow up with examples of stall (including Birgenair 301, AF90 and others) where the control column position was not noted?
There is absolutely nothing religious about pilots' training. Nothing is dogmatic, everything is verifiable. Warning that flight directors will lead astray if in wrong mode is included in every training, as is inculcating the habit to constantly check FMA for correct mode and selected values. It is entertaining to read the outsiders' misconception on the way airline pilots do their job but it gets a bit annoying when such notions are stubbornly touted to be true.
A peculiarity of the human (thanks to his intelligence) is that it will always be tempted to choose the easiest solution
In navy .. the simplest solution is to proceed the route (or check) by using the GPS
(can fail) The steering autopilot also use it to follow the programmed route
Nevertheless .. the only instruments is recognized as valid are the sextant .. a tide table and a stopwatch (never fail) You can (must) use them for verify if the GPS give you accurate position They are always a board Who use it today ... ??
Quote:
Look no further than 36 cases of UAS on 330/340 that ended uneventfully to see how ludicrous is to make sweeping statements based on just one case.
There were indeed 36 cases that ended uneventfully .. but in fact .. revealed (though it did not seem to matter at the time) is that the pilots did not fully determined the fault .. or had not applied the procedure .. or did not believe the alarms
Not fully investigated .. no research group on human factors .. etc. ..
AF447 has produced 228 dead and we know what followed ....
Did you then follow up with examples of stall (including Birgenair 301, AF90 and others) where the control column position was not noted?
Dozy, you might want to step back and take a deep breath. And then try reading what others wrote. You continue to argue on tangents; tangents that seem relevant but upon close inspection are nothing more than misdirections.
aTerpster stated that his AB qualified friend thought that column position might have helped the Captain determine the problem on his return. You quote accidents where both pilots were exposed to something and neither understood the problem. I agree that SS's are no more likely to be involved in one of these type accidents than control columns, but you could at least discuss aterpsters comment as it was made instead of answering the question/point you wanted to hear. Come on man.
The position of a yoke is available to both pilots. The flying pilot has both position, and feel. At the risk of diminishing the argument con, even if the stick is visible to both pilots, position does not indicate Pitch, and the flying pilot has neither position OR feel to instruct his scan...No? Accidents have happened in both formats, that provides conclusion, how?
In the 447 accident, the stick was out of sight, the two non flying pilots could not suss the stick, let alone it's position, and it is clear from the CVR. Yet you bring up other accidents? Your pitching straw, 447 clearly was affected adversely by stick visibility, yet you draw in unrelated data? You also slag a statement made that is presented sincerely as fact, with the evidence in front of everybody that supports the conclusion...frankly , the PFs statement is conclusive.
I have only flown Boeing's (all but 707, 777 and 787), so I have no knowlegde of the "laws" in the Airbus. I just don´t beleive that it is possible that two professionals with a respected airline can totally screw up. There must be something else.
If I were the captain, I would never had left the cockpit unless I trusted the other guys completely. So if the case was that the pilots were dumb, our industry wil not gain anything. Very sad. Flag carrier of France and a state of the art of an airplane.
This logging of who goes to rest and when, does nothing for safety. I rest better in my own seat than in the back where people run around and I would rather nap in the observer's seat than leaving the cockpit.
"Cruise pilots" was a bad idea from the beginning. There always has to be one captain every second of the flight. But it is cheaper with two co-pilots. So, unless otherwise convinced, the bean counters are to blame.
Svhar Agree whole heartily but you are forgetting commercial wisdom and the fact that the captain was French and his bird was down the back....French risk management!
Dozy, you might want to step back and take a deep breath. And then try reading what others wrote. You continue to argue on tangents; tangents that seem relevant but upon close inspection are nothing more than misdirections.
By misinformation and flannel, doth the truth become obscured :-). I must admit to a little disappointment at the level of discussion re AF447 and the same in the tech log thread, where one would expect at least some technical discussion about the report's recommendations. A few months ago, there were serious discussions about all kinds of issues, but now that the final report has been issued, no one seems to want to talk about it in any serious way at all.
Perhaps there are those who would prefer both threads to become trivialised, so that no external readers of influence take it too seriously, or is that too cynical ?...
Each side-stick is clearly visible from the opposite seat, therefore the excuse that the PNF was in the dark about what the PF was doing is false. They saw what the stick input was and agreed with the action taken, apparently. Not that it would have made much difference getting the nose down, even assuming the stick was held against the forward stops (which it wasn't). At an approx. -63 degree FPA ... combined with a markedly positive deck angle of 10 degrees NU or more, the THS was fully stalled (dropping at twice the rate of forward airspeed yields the -63 degree value for FPA [inverse tangent (2/1)] ).
Since the plane wasn't flying anymore, the situation was one of a mass being acted upon by three forces, gravity, drag, and thrust. The airplane naturally wants to weathervane into the oncoming wind (lowered drag), and the engine thrust was acting to prevent it. By reading these threads, it appears to me that firewall thrust is a technique used at lower altitudes. While all the attention is centered around sticks, force feedback, and design philosophy, the elephant is the room appears to go unnoticed.
Can anybody on this thread explain why BEA don't give a full record of what was on the CVR. As an example compare with the corresponding detailed record in the NTSB report on the Buffalo accident. Is BEA afraid of something?
As an example compare with the corresponding detailed record in the NTSB report on the Buffalo accident
Methink the general answer will be: The NTSB give a detailed record .. because all the CVR stances were of importance (related) to the event (or they believe it) In it's final report the BEA warn that all stances in the CVR not related to the accident (or what they believe not related) were not in the transcript It's not you or me to decide what will be published .. And like it or not is another debate .... and maybe this will be debated in the trial (the only place for if any)
How do... md80fan "While all the attention is centered around sticks, force feedback, and design philosophy, the elephant is the room appears to go unnoticed."
But nothing went wrong with the engines....
Their use was abusive, and except for being drug above their power ceiling, they did their level best to keep 447 Stalled....
Diversification CVR filtering Can anybody on this thread explain why BEA don't give a full record of what was on the CVR. As an example compare with the corresponding detailed record in the NTSB report on the Buffalo accident. Is BEA afraid of something?
In a word, of course. Well two words. They have witheld important data relevant to the crash, you can be sure. At the very least, inflection, tone, and expletives are missing. My guess is that they have released a bare minimum to prevent several things from happening.
The possibility, (surety) that another avalanche of comment will be generated.
The possibility that their clients will be angered by what they read....
Their handling of the investigation will meet with renewed anger... OR, new anger...
There is an off chance that something of great import is being forestalled by the redacted content....
They will be found to have "mishandled" and/or misrepresented some things...
ONE example, the Vs traces? Is that it CONFiture? (mode?)
Can anybody on this thread explain why BEA don't give a full record … Read ICAO Annex 13, 5.12 ‘Non-disclosure of records.’
As I have not the ICAO annex 13 directly under my eyes .. can you give the ICAO article where it's write that disclosure of CVR transcript is forbidden BEA put what they want in the transcript .. they are free ...
In the US, all government agencies are subject to formal inspection by an independent Grand Jury, who have power of subpoena, and access to all records.
Even not needed in Europe (EU) Le Quotidien - «Oh merde...» Google ... Google*Traduction The court decided yesterday to make public the cockpit recording on board, holding that the room was necessary for the discovery of truth.But the audio quality of the document is poor.However, in the room could hear a pin drop.
5.12 The State conducting the investigation of an accident or incident shall not make the following records available for purposes other than accident or incident investigation, unless the appropriate authority for the administration of justice in that State determines that their disclosure outweighs the adverse domestic and international impact such action may have on that or any future investigations:
5.12.1 These records shall be included in the final report or its appendices only when pertinent to the analysis of the accident or incident. Parts of the records not relevant to the analysis shall not be disclosed.
Also see attachment E for the legal advice.
Note the emphasis on the State. The rest of the world does not have to follow the US, open disclosure, litigious approach often used by NTSB.
