The ultimate factor was a stall with a botched recovery.
While "mode confusion" may be a sound analysis, I will point out to you that, based on available evidence, there was no attempt at stall recovery, therefore one cannot have been botched. Why do I conclude that? There was, based on available evidence, not recognition of stall from which to recover, even though one was in progress.
There was a botched response to a malfunction, that led to a stall.
After that, I think you can argue that mode confusion was the modus operandi until impact with the ocean.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 31st Jul 2012 at 12:31.
Smart cows eat the grass and spit out the sticks. I have been grazing the AF447 thread long term, read the reports in detail and many of the references. I am a computer test lab rat not a pilot, This is likely sticks.
There is no human ability to mentally muti-task. The mind must move from one problem to the next, and if returning to a previous step in a long problem, must recover the previous point in progress and then advance.
My particular sicky spot is that as the airspeed data returned to a computer valid number the stall warning was activated. And that happend three times if memory serves me.
I start to correct my nose up input. I get stall warning.... and it happens three times. Has the timing and the sequence convinced me that nose down is an error no matter what else the computer is telling me?
Facing a tremendous display of data and alarms. We know the plane was not flying. It seems they never grasped that crucial single element. Their view was 'flying with problems'. What does it take to mentally unlock from 'its flying' to 'its not flying'?
Some years in the future we may see a human factors disection of the FDR and CVR data coupled to pilot grade scan and process the information speeds. (much above average street smarts) As a member of the computer programmming clan, how was it that 'its not flying' was not made obvious? And for you who sit in the seats, do you now know how to glean 'its not flying' from the data they faced?
gleaf, I do not totally agree with your analysis, though I appreciate your thought process since you have to model the behaviors in serial. (Or so it appears).
Tasks and skills unique to instrument flying are suceptible to clumping and grouping, typically in most easily clumped or grouped aggregates of 3 to 5. Once you get over five, you can typically clump or group the greater number in to 2 heirarchies of three, and so on. I'll suggest to you that it is indeed multitasking when you are actually flying. When you are watching the plane fly, maybe not so much.
That disagreement aside, you are on to something in terms of serial prioritization, which we list as the holy triumvirate in aviation:
Aviate Navigate Communicate
Inside "aviate" are a lot of sub tasks, some of which you do in parallel when flying, some in series. You can talk and fly at the same time, that need not be done in serial, and you can also navigate and fly at the same time: many of us have done so. The reason we fall back to that holy triumvirate is to make sure that as we encounter changing conditions or changing requirements, we take care of first priority when task loading increases. Malfunctions and emergencies are typically a period of increased task loading. Responses are typically organized around the prioritization logic of the holy triumvirate.
Things get a bit more complex when dealing with change while operating under instrument conditions. (It's easier to do when VFR, since you peripheral senses help you with flying references ...)
As far as multi tasking, breaking down an instrument scan would appear to be a serial exercise, as you alluded to. One typically trains an "in order" priority of condition and task decisions by going from your primary instrument, the attitude gyro/artificial horizon/whatevertheycallitnow and then cross check your various performance parameters: airspeed, altitude, vertical speed (if any), heading, power, ball in, time, fuel, etcetera. The core conditions to consider are pitch, roll, and power, by which your aircraft's performance (flying) is governed.
Ab initio instrument training typically brings you back to the vertical gyro's display between each cross checked instrument, however, there are other effective instrument scans (NASA had a circular scan that better followed muscle movement in the eyeball) that for my money is more effective.
An instrument scan is "a rinse and repeat until conditions or performance changes," repetitive task. You switch to a tailored scan pattern suited to your task should your task be other than flying straight and level: climbing turn, navigational problem, speed and heading change, configuration change, and so on.
You do this while dealing with all other matters within the aircraft in parallel, and are frequently (particularly when flying as a single pilot) multi tasking: doing several things at once.
"how was it that 'its not flying' was not made obvious?" As a computer person you will appreciate the number of if/thens required to provide a definitive 'it is not flying' to cope with all possible events and failures.
Each false or failed input that enables you normally to identify 'it is not flying' has to be 'protected' against generating a false warning on its own and in an 'and' scenario with other units. We have already seen the fallacy of the '2 out of three' sensors voting at Perpignan.
Then you must decide what to do about the situation. We are treading (some unwillingly) down the path of 'the machine will sort this out' so what will you programme to 'pick up the pieces, establish which values are right and then do ???????????? The other (my preferred) option is to ensure a basic skill set for aviators (until the perfect 'HAL' comes along) and 'drop' the misbehaving now basic a/c into the ?capable? hands of a pilot., who, while suffering the logic/thought processes you describe, has that un-progammable intuition/experience.
It may, of course, be that 'fuzzy logic' or whatever is around now will achieve your ideal.
Has the timing and the sequence convinced me that nose down is an error no matter what else the computer is telling me?
gleaf, you don't need a computer to tell you that, while flying an assigned altitude in straight and level condition in cruise at flight level 350, establishing a nose up pitch of 12-15 degrees is an error.
Returning the nose to a different pitch should help you with the altitude change, and may (depending on how you do it ) assist in your energy management and performance correction.
The altitude change tied to pitch up and airspeed loss (changing kinetic energy to potential energy) seems to have been lost track of despite, or due to, various warnings and alarms.
Pilot not flying is recorded as trying to get the pilot flying to stop climbing.
Why THAT was a failed exercise remains less than certain to me, as I am not familiar enough with climate and culture both in Air France, the company, and that particular cockpit.
Non-digital issues.
Don't disagree that while trying to catch up, any number of stimuli were present that would aid and abet in the misdiagnosis of "what's it doing now" once the crew were behind the aircraft.
BEA's discussion of that in the final report is pretty good, though some would prefer some more depth and detail.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 31st Jul 2012 at 14:53.
For someone who is not a pilot, an easier example may be driving a car. Can't you drive it and talk at the same time? Looks like multi-tasking to me.
However, your point is in fact very interesting. Apparently, human thought processes can be roughly divided in two categories, those that require logic and conscious effort and those that are performed instinctively, without actual "thinking". And the brain is capable of executing exactly one "logical" thread at a time, but many "instinctive" processes at once.
From that point we can return to the difference between "A" and "B" aircraft philosophy. The "B" aircraft provides tactile feedback (moving throttle, forces on the yoke, stick shaker, rotating trim wheel... etc.) which can be processed by instinctive threads of the human mind. The "A" only shows visual references, in the form of symbols rather than images, that require conscious effort to be processed. And there is only one thread capable of doing that, resulting in overload and confusion....
Yes you can ( and even drink .. read .. write .. see a movie ..etc .. ) ... but you are taking huge risks .. because one of the tasks may occupy your attention more than the other To put it another way .. you employ half your concentration for driving and the other half to use your mobile phone ... it is already dangerous
If your attention to the conversation is greater than that devoted to drive .. you endanger your life and that of other road users For this reason, many countries have passed legislation that prohibits the use of mobile phone while driving a vehicle ... Multitasking yes .. but take care
The problem with using mobile phone when driving, is not talking itself, but having to look at its screen and keyboard when dialing a number, therefore moving your eyes away from the road and re-focusing them to a very close distance, so that you cannot see the road even with peripheral vision. Having one hand off the steering wheel also doesn't help safety.
This is an area of research that is hot right now. You can find quite a few studies that show that we are not really capable of such. Here's a recent news article on this, but does contain a link to some of the research.
That study deals with multi-tasking between two or more complex activities, which is obviously inefficient and counter-productive. I agree that you can't solve two problems at once, or solve a problem and talk on a phone at the same time, etc. because both actions require active thinking and conscious effort. This kind of multi-tasking is not possible.
In driving (and flying, I presume), the situation is different. You perform many activities that do not require "thinking", but have to be done at the same time, in order to successfully complete the maneuver. If you want to turn the car to the left, do you have to think "I should turn the steering wheel left by 57 degrees and keep it in that position for 5 seconds, while reducing pressure on the accelerator pedal in the beginning of the turn and increasing it toward the end of the turn"? Hopefully not, you just do it based on the reflexes learned during years of driving the car. While doing the above, you keep scanning the road, listening to the engine, maybe switching gears or wipers or something, and you can still talk on the mobile phone on top of all that (which obviously distracts attention, increases reaction time and the accident chance... but the point is that you CAN do it).
So multitasking between "easy" tasks certainly exists, and it's possible and sometimes required to do several "easy" and one "difficult" task at the same time. (E.g. Aviate and Navigate, or Aviate and Communicate, etc.). But for this to be possible, the "easy" task must be performed without conscious effort. Which means that the "easy" task must contain no reading, no typing, no calculations, no interpreting text or abstract symbols, - only a visual or tactile (perhaps also aural, but it's less reliable in stressful conditions, according to the BEA report) input followed by simple control movements by the operator. This kind of activity can be multi-tasked. Reading and understanding error messages on a computer screen certainly cannot!
The coffee is not a valid example, because it forces you to type with one hand instead of two, which is obviously more difficult but has nothing to do with mental multi-tasking.
The coffee is not a valid example, because it forces you to type with one hand instead of two, which is obviously more difficult but has nothing to do with mental multi-tasking.
Organ, not buying this imprecise sort of language as being scientific. I see it as a shell game, a word play, to screw around with definitions to pretend to present knowledge. (Not your fault, I see a lot of it these days).
Multi-tasking ... "studies that show that we are not really capable of such."
Note where I put the italics.
I will step aside from the hair splitting required to make the above statement, and watch as "argument by dueling definition" proceeds unfettered.
For those who don't fly, just be aware: a pilot flying an aircraft has to do a variety of things at the same time in order to achieve his objectives.
Anecdote: when learning how to fly instruments in the Huey, back in the early 80's, and doing NDB holding in a high wind, I once described it as a bit more complex than chewing gum and walking at the same time.
I found it more like chewing gum, walking, dribbling a basketball, and fanning yourself at the same time, all while being nagged at by your wife.
If that isn't an example of multitasking, then I wonder what that word means.
PS: on the typing and drinking coffee, one can use a straw, or grip the edge of the cup in one's teeth and sip whilst typing with both hands. Alternately, one may use one hand to type for both hands, and use the other hand for the coffee. Or, one man hold the coffee cup in one's feet, sip, and type, or ... many ways to skin the cat.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 31st Jul 2012 at 19:29.
however, there are other effective instrument scans (NASA had a circular scan that better followed muscle movement in the eyeball) that for my money is more effective.
I found it more like chewing gum, walking, dribbling a basketball, and fanning yourself at the same time, all while being nagged at by your wife.
If that isn't an example of multitasking, then I wonder what that word means.
I understand what you mean ... Add to this list the sudden apparition of a poisonous sneak near your pedals .. and you will be satureted The goal is really to minimize multitasking .. to have a ready reserve for the unexpected
Hi, In fact, I agree with you that the "study" I presented wasn't especially convincing or scientific. I was lazy; couldn't find the one that I'd read about two weeks ago, much more compelling. After all, it was early in the A.M. and I was actually taking turns between the coffee cup and the keyboard. (New emoticons required to properly express)
The crux of the several such studies is not that we can't multi-task, but we do it at peril to quality results. (The really compelling one which I cannot cite now tested computer geeks.) I've been interested in the topic, since I'm really weak at doing it (except when playing my Hammond: 4 limbs, plus switching on-the-fly).
Nevertheless, I take your point that to be a decent pilot, you've gotta be able to do a bunch of things at the same time, and do them well. That's one reason that it fascinates me. If you don't, the ground's gonna get in your way!
An update to the Human Factors Design Standard, (HFDS, orig. 1996) has recently been issued by the FAA and may be of interest to some here.
From the webpage:
The Human Factors Design Standard (HFDS) is an important work in the field of human factors. It is an exhaustive compilation of human factors practices and principles integral to the procurement, design, development, and testing of FAA systems, facilities, and equipment. The purpose of the HFDS is to provide a single easy-to-use source of human factors design criteria, oriented to the needs of the FAA mission and systems. An additional goal is to facilitate use of appropriate design criteria by organizing the document so that users can easily locate the needed information.
The HFDS replaces and expands upon the Human Factors Design Guide (HFDG) published in 1996 and all HFDG chapter updates. The HFDS broadens the focus to include both air traffic and technical operations systems and has been modified into a set of standards instead of a set of guidelines, providing a common source of FAA-specific design requirements. The resulting set of standards can be tailored to meet the needs of the system or program at hand.
I was pointing out that absolutely no faults were recorded during the flight of AF447 that were not either the consequence of 1. losing the actual total pressure in pitot installation 2. loss of control.
Interim report #1, para. 1.16.2.3 discusses two ACARS messages that are not (1) or (2).
Out of twenty-six maintenance ACARS messages, 24 were related to loss of airspeed and loss of control. Two were received 3 hrs 25 minutes before the occurrence and dealt with toilet configuration.
Quote:
Originally Posted by BEA interim report 1
1.16.2.3 Maintenance messages Twenty-six maintenance messages relative to flight AF447 were received. Twenty-four of them were received on 1st June between 2 h 10 and 2 h 15.
The first two messages were received the day before at 22 h 45. These were a class 2 fault message and a related MAINTENANCE STATUS TOILET cockpit effect message. The fault message, “LAV CONFIGURATION” (ATA 383100, source VSC*, HARD) represented a toilet configuration difference.
While whatever caused LAV CONFIG had no effect to conduct of flight whatsoever, this message has some (limited) value for those seeking to influence the discussion by blowing insignificant details out of proportions and so distracting from primary issues.
You are entitled to your opinion, but it shows a level of inexperience that surprises me. Nothing is unimportant when it comes to investigating an accident.
If you cannot establish for yourself the intriguing similarities to EI-EAT, I won't bother to explain them to you, except to say that the schematic included does establish the location for you of the EEbay, and the interesting and suggestive connection to the hot cockpit of 447 .
Another poster claimed the Electrics bay was nowhere near the cockpit, so I included the reference for both of you.
I think you are likely a very competent pilot, one whose name on the roster might encourage other pilots to ask for a switch.
I was lazy; couldn't find the one that I'd read about two weeks ago, much more compelling. After all, it was early in the A.M. and I was actually taking turns between the coffee cup and the keyboard. (New emoticons required to properly express)
