This is a legitimate question. Although you show only 23 posting, you are actually credited with a total of 466. Most coming on JB, "Where in the world?"
Suggest you log on, click on your name on one of your posts and then click on "See more posts by svhar", and see for yourself. Are you the only one or is there another? Who is the real svhar?
Technically it is VERY EASY to detect and report IMMEDIATELY and PRECISELY to the crew the UAS. Airbus SAS prefer delegate it to the crew. (A paper from Airbus SAS designers, etc. shows that)
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A big part of this was the human-machine interface, which did an extremely poor job of letting the pilots know what was actually going on.
It seems Airbus SAS don't consider important the GIGO concept. The non trained crew were presented with ABSURD data mixed with consistent data.
IMO F-GZCP had a ridiculous design (WRT to Air Speed) AND An ABSURD man machine interface.
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So, from a cognitive perspective, the accident makes sense.
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This accident was "designed" by Airbus SAS. No redundancy at all (AS probing) and misleading indications presented to crew.
In earlier posts i wrote on AS ridiculous design. After final report i include ABSURD man machine interface.
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Are they entirely, or even primarily to blame? Far from it.
Most of us abandoned the concept of aviation as terminally unique ages ago. For the simple reason that those who wished high profit could claim "complexity" to hide their greed and demands for special treatment from regulators and the public.
Airbus and BEA insult all of us who are capable of understanding not only flight, but controls and failures, with this entirely unsatisfactory report.
Concierge? Thus started the patronizing and fallacious nonsense....
Turbine - I assume he/she is still going on about it. As I said, I don't see his/her posts. I did exactly what you posted a while back but could find no post where I had put 'svhar down' (oh to be a vet). I have a vague memory that some way back he/she claimed exclusive evidence that AF447 had been struck by lightning to which I replied (I think I may have mentioned the 'O' bird, but got away with it), but I assume a mod sensibly deleted the post. Hey ho. Time to move on, I think. Bigger fish to fry.
A Special Condition is a rulemaking action that is specific to an aircraft make and often concerns the use of new technology that the Code of Federal Regulations do not yet address. Special Conditions are an integral part of the Certification Basis and give the manufacturer permission to build the aircraft, engine or propeller with additional capabilities not referred to in the regulations.
Special conditions are often a precursor to later general rulemaking proposals. Although originally specific to an airplane make, other manufacturers in a similar situation may elect to use them for their projects.
Interpretative material is published by the regulatory authority to illustrate one or several ways to meet a requirement that have been found acceptable in past certifications, for example FAA Advisory Circulars or EASA ACJ/AMJ material.
I read the first line of the first paragraph of the first chapter (the introduction, actually) of the book, and it alone is such buehlchit that I went no farther. Totally misinterprets what fly-by-wire means.
I read the first line of the first paragraph of the first chapter (the introduction, actually) of the book, and it alone is such buehlchit that I went no farther. Totally misinterprets what fly-by-wire means.
You'd make a very bad literary criticism with such a method of reading
Ya think? As a literary "criticism"--which I actually do for a living, thank you, since you can read my reviews at Air & Space Smithsonian and Aviation History Magazines--it saves me a lot of time.
In the available text, (Introduction), the author seems confused and even misinformed about technical fly-by-wire control solutions, the notion of "automation" and the concept of "protections", (or as gums puts it, "limits").
I think that that is a major fault in a book claiming to present to readers an informed discussion on this accident specifically, and an explanation regarding these very different ideas generally. From the introduction alone, I couldn't take the book seriously as a technical explication.
Whether the author is able to clarify the differences between these three things for his readers in the rest of the book is unclear from what is available.
In the available text, (Introduction), the author seems confused and even misinformed about technical fly-by-wire control solutions, the notion of "automation" and the concept of "protections", (or as gums puts it, "limits").
I agree but .... If you read the article by the author (on the blog) you have to wonder if the purpose of his book is to be an explanation of what the FBW is .. or another subject
Personally I do not believe that his book have aimed to explain what is the FBW .. but rather to highlight deficiencies (from many parties) that would have made the AF447 accident happen
Except for the fact that they were flying during daylight, the pilots of the August 2008 Paris-Madagascar Airbus 340 faced identical problems to those that later confronted flight 447 to Paris. When the captain lost reliable airspeed due to pitot tube icing, he did not set power and pitch according to flight procedures or maintain level flight as prescribed by the Air France emergency procedure checklist.
OK, so both crews had trouble implementing procedures, or recognizing what the malfunction was.
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In the midst of heavy turbulence, he immediately descended 4,000 feet, ignoring both the flight director and a brief stall warning.
“Because he could see the horizon he had a major advantage over the Air France pilots who were blindsided in a storm at night,” says a technical expert who has read the investigator’s summary of the previously undisclosed Madagascar flight report.
Sorry, but I find this to be deliberate ignorance. Professional pilots know how to fly on instruments, using reference to attitude indications displayed on their primary flight instruments. You can refer to the artificial horizon and fly with reference to it, just as the captain on the other flight flew with reference to the real horizon.
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According to an online update to a book on the crash, Air France and Airbus failed to notify pilots about a crisis aboard a Paris to Madagascar flight on August 16, 2008, that bore striking resemblances to the calamities which befell flight AF447 over the south Atlantic nine months later.
The other link has the above.
Sorry, a malfunction is not by definition a crisis.
For people who write for a living, they sure go out of their way to get words and meanings wrong ... if they are selling themselves as aviation experts.
Personally I do not believe that his book have aimed to explain what is the FBW .. but rather to highlight deficiencies (from many parties) that would have made the AF447 accident happen
I read the blog. He writes inaccurately and argues poorly. His is not a work I would go to for any explanations regarding anything aviation. The credibility just isn't there. He's selling, even in his explaining and those who take this stuff seriously know the difference.
Lonewolf_50;
Good examples. The research and the writing is Reader's Digest quality.
I have read most of the posts with regard to this accident. Many people pontificating about this law or that law etc etc. Does the AB have standby instruments? If so are the crew trained to use these in times of uncertanty. If not why not? They have been a big help to me in times past. Maybe the whole accident is down to poor training.
Airline pilots are trained professionals, and the planes are safe machines. This is what is pounding in public for years .. as an advertising slogan
Is that this slogan has to undergo some corrections after the accident of AF447?
(A paper from Airbus SAS designers, etc. shows that)
