37.5 degree angle of bank, one engine out, gear down and at 500 feet
What the Atlas Blue crew had was a routine bird strike after liftoff followed by the left engine rolling back with unknown damage. That's it. Nothing more. We all train for and practice this every six months. There is even a checklist in the QRH for this very event, plus a couple of memory items that are supposed to go with it. A TSB report and (so far) a 4-page discussion of this incident exists for one reason only: Hero Captain Syndrome.
I used to teach that the first memory item on any emergency checklist was "fly the airplane", followed closely by "take a deep breath" then "wait", then "Memory Items". "Don't panic", "don't be a hero" and "don't do anything stupid" were implied. Maybe not (sigh).
I crashed landed is some trees yesterday and whilst I was driving to get a chain saw I discussed this incident with my very capable mate.
French Carrier pilot who banged out twice, flew off American carriers, won a top gun prize and flew and instructed on executive jets.
He said every pilot initially panics - I disagreed and cited a occasion when I made a mayday - but realised that he was right.
It's what you do after the bang or you realise that you might crash that is important....
Look at the BOAC 707 which crashed at LHR in the 60s where they decided to do an instant return and got the fire drill wrong.
The 777 splat at LHR where they carried out the after crash drill in the wrong sequence.fortunately there was no fire otherwise their mistake could have been disastrous.
AirFrance where the copilot was so scared he held on back stick pressure (allegedly).
In my old airline we had a captain lock himself into the loo when the destination closed in fog and there weren't a lot of alternate airfields.
Sadly none of us know what we will do when it hits the fan and most of us luckily will never have to face the mire.
What we can do is lots of professional training and that comes back down to money, professionalism and a realisation that we can all make mistakes......
Not forgetting aviation authorities doing a proper job and not looking after their mates...
French Carrier pilot who banged out twice, flew off American carriers, won a top gun prize and flew and instructed on executive jets.
He said every pilot initially panics - I disagreed and cited a occasion when I made a mayday - but realised that he was right.
It's what you do after the bang or you realise that you might crash that is important....
Look at the BOAC 707 which crashed at LHR in the 60s where they decided to do an instant return and got the fire drill wrong.
The 777 splat at LHR where they carried out the after crash drill in the wrong sequence.fortunately there was no fire otherwise their mistake could have been disastrous.
AirFrance where the copilot was so scared he held on back stick pressure (allegedly).
In my old airline we had a captain lock himself into the loo when the destination closed in fog and there weren't a lot of alternate airfields.
Sadly none of us know what we will do when it hits the fan and most of us luckily will never have to face the mire.
What we can do is lots of professional training and that comes back down to money, professionalism and a realisation that we can all make mistakes......
Not forgetting aviation authorities doing a proper job and not looking after their mates...
Bottums Up
I reckon there should be a SILENCE button that shuts down the squarking banshee, when required.
A recent failure of a PFM Box, saw 15 minutes or so of constant squarking from Mrs Douglas (CAWS voice in B717). Gees it was hard to concentrate and troubleshoot!
A recent failure of a PFM Box, saw 15 minutes or so of constant squarking from Mrs Douglas (CAWS voice in B717). Gees it was hard to concentrate and troubleshoot!
The 777 splat at LHR where they carried out the after crash drill in the wrong sequence.
Henra:
Esteemed sir
I must confess that even after almost fifty years of profession, my thirst for knowledge forces me to drink from any source in order to improve my knowledge.
However I have at least 70 textbooks in my library about aviation:
10 volumes from the basic course, and about 3 volumes per plane I've flown: MB 326, Viscount, DC8-62, DC8-43, Caravelle, DC-10, DC-9 30, MD-80, MD-83, MD, 11, B737-200, B737-230, B737-300, B737-400: 14 x 3 = 52 + 10 = 62.
Esteemed sir
I must confess that even after almost fifty years of profession, my thirst for knowledge forces me to drink from any source in order to improve my knowledge.
However I have at least 70 textbooks in my library about aviation:
10 volumes from the basic course, and about 3 volumes per plane I've flown: MB 326, Viscount, DC8-62, DC8-43, Caravelle, DC-10, DC-9 30, MD-80, MD-83, MD, 11, B737-200, B737-230, B737-300, B737-400: 14 x 3 = 52 + 10 = 62.
I do apologise if I stepped a bit harshly on your toes.
However, does any of those 70 Books (specifically those about conventional tail airliners) mention the behaviour you cited (violent pitch up upon stall)?
If so, could you maybe provide a Link ?
But why AF447 lost 38000 ft in 4 minutes?
It is pretty safe to assume that had elevator + trim been neutral the thing would have dropped the nose upon stall. More precisely without continued trim + up elevator it wouldn't have got there in the first place it would have lowered the nose prior to that. It was only elctronics that overruled the basic flight mechanics and changed the behaviour to some extent.
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Henra
You do not deserve that I ignore your intervention. I owe you an answer.
Please consider that to "mitigate" the problem of wingtip does not mean to eliminate it.
Anyway take a look at the following movie:
In any case the RAM Boeing 737-400 that on 6 June 2010 struck a flock of geese shortly after take off from Schiphol, if not in super stall, went dangerously close to a spin at a very low altitude and on a densely populated area.
I think something should be done because this does not recur, and because each of us reflect on how to avoid those mistakes in the future.
Please consider that to "mitigate" the problem of wingtip does not mean to eliminate it.
Anyway take a look at the following movie:
In any case the RAM Boeing 737-400 that on 6 June 2010 struck a flock of geese shortly after take off from Schiphol, if not in super stall, went dangerously close to a spin at a very low altitude and on a densely populated area.
I think something should be done because this does not recur, and because each of us reflect on how to avoid those mistakes in the future.
Last edited by DOVES; 7th May 2012 at 09:12.
Anyway take a look at the following movie:
Was this a a Boeing manufacturer's movie or a company movie? And why was the flight director on display when it was not needed for navigational purposes. Typical example of automation addiction maybe?
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I think the issue here is why the pilot deviated from the rational to the irrational...
I think one possible reason, something that has been touched on previously, is that he wrongly assumed his aircrafts situation was worse than it actually was.
In the heat of the moment, of a multiple heavy bird strike, he wrongly assumed that he had had a "Sully" moment. Both engines losing thrust and unlikely to get back...
His reaction appears to be one of panick. His first thought was to get back to the airport and any procedures and rational decision making went out of the window at that point.
If he had lost both engines he would not have been able to make a turn and return to the airport. His only option probably would be to attempt a crash landing on open land or water immediately ahead.
If it had been the worst case senario he probably would have had limited options... But he still made the wrong decisions; under a moment of intense pressure he lost the plot and having set out on the wrong path continued on it.
I think that the most helpfull things to be stored in the back of his mind would have been a rehearsal of a worst case scenario on take off. This is the thought process of thinking that if you cannot save the aircraft maybe you can save people on the ground or with a lot of luck make a successful crash landing. If his mind had rehearsed the worst case then maybe, and it is just a maybe , he would have been able to make more rational choices and react to facts rather than imagined circumstances.
I think that the assumption that he was a bad pilot or did not know what the correct procedure was, in all likelyhood, not the case. It appears that he made the very human error of failing, under extreme stess, to behave rationally.
Luckily for all, the outcome was a good one. We all, at some point, will likely face a s#$t has hit the fan moment...we all hope that we will deal with that moment gracefully and rationally. To think that we are above failure is foolish. Of course, in the circumstances I doubt we will ever know the pilots perspective, but I doubt that he will happy with his performance.
Simulation only goes part of the way to prepare for high stress events...
I think one possible reason, something that has been touched on previously, is that he wrongly assumed his aircrafts situation was worse than it actually was.
In the heat of the moment, of a multiple heavy bird strike, he wrongly assumed that he had had a "Sully" moment. Both engines losing thrust and unlikely to get back...
His reaction appears to be one of panick. His first thought was to get back to the airport and any procedures and rational decision making went out of the window at that point.
If he had lost both engines he would not have been able to make a turn and return to the airport. His only option probably would be to attempt a crash landing on open land or water immediately ahead.
If it had been the worst case senario he probably would have had limited options... But he still made the wrong decisions; under a moment of intense pressure he lost the plot and having set out on the wrong path continued on it.
I think that the most helpfull things to be stored in the back of his mind would have been a rehearsal of a worst case scenario on take off. This is the thought process of thinking that if you cannot save the aircraft maybe you can save people on the ground or with a lot of luck make a successful crash landing. If his mind had rehearsed the worst case then maybe, and it is just a maybe , he would have been able to make more rational choices and react to facts rather than imagined circumstances.
I think that the assumption that he was a bad pilot or did not know what the correct procedure was, in all likelyhood, not the case. It appears that he made the very human error of failing, under extreme stess, to behave rationally.
Luckily for all, the outcome was a good one. We all, at some point, will likely face a s#$t has hit the fan moment...we all hope that we will deal with that moment gracefully and rationally. To think that we are above failure is foolish. Of course, in the circumstances I doubt we will ever know the pilots perspective, but I doubt that he will happy with his performance.
Simulation only goes part of the way to prepare for high stress events...
I think I understand the decision to put the gear back down right away (though I don't think it's the first thing I would have thought of in such a scenario) and certainly appreciate that the German team cited in a similar incident used standard procedures and SOP to get their bird safely back on deck.
What I cannot get my brain around is why, with an engine failure just after lift off, the good engine wasn't at full power (this is not a propeller driven aircraft) until landing profile for whatever runway they could get to was assured. Even with the gear down, full power might have helped them get a few more feet under them as the sorted out their situation.
Once the left engine had its poultry meal, wouldn't a desire to at least get to MSA be pretty high on your list of priorities?
If yes, then why not use all of the horsepower one has to do so?
All above considered, it's hard to argue against the criticisms on training.
If SOP and Flight Manual call for a "keep it clean, climb, level off, then trouble shoot, then configure, then land" there's a training issue to address that the company ought to take a hard look at.
Another of their crews may learn the wrong thing if the "these guys made it, but there was a simpler and safer way" lessons isn't strongly emphasized.
If other crews in the airline learn the wrong lesson from this (tip cap to "hero pilot" issue) then the chance that the next unexpected poultry meal on take off ends in tears increases.
What I cannot get my brain around is why, with an engine failure just after lift off, the good engine wasn't at full power (this is not a propeller driven aircraft) until landing profile for whatever runway they could get to was assured. Even with the gear down, full power might have helped them get a few more feet under them as the sorted out their situation.
Once the left engine had its poultry meal, wouldn't a desire to at least get to MSA be pretty high on your list of priorities?
If yes, then why not use all of the horsepower one has to do so?
All above considered, it's hard to argue against the criticisms on training.
If SOP and Flight Manual call for a "keep it clean, climb, level off, then trouble shoot, then configure, then land" there's a training issue to address that the company ought to take a hard look at.
Another of their crews may learn the wrong thing if the "these guys made it, but there was a simpler and safer way" lessons isn't strongly emphasized.
If other crews in the airline learn the wrong lesson from this (tip cap to "hero pilot" issue) then the chance that the next unexpected poultry meal on take off ends in tears increases.
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I'm not defending the crew here, nor do I fly airliners or fly professionally, and have not read the whole report or all the replies. Just wanted to play devils advocate a little
:
Two ways to lower your VMC (or whatever they call it in the airline world) at full gross weight if you don't need to climb is: get the gear out (adds keeling and stability) and/or reduce thrust on good engine.
1. Maybe it's possible that the captain had another partial bird strike/or somehow other performance issue where it was safer to not add full thrust on the working engine. Or maybe the thought he did and wanted to assess.
2. Maybe he was close to entering a dangerous VMC induced spin situation and reducing the thrust was his only way to get out of it when he ran out of altitude.
3. Maybe he reduced power during final manoeuvring to position himself correctly and allow himself to bank steeper without worrying about assymetrical lift etc, especially if procedures/terrain/traffic didn't allow him to do it into the good engine.
4. Maybe he opted to prepare for an emergency landing in the flattest country on earth and extended gear for that.
5. Maybe the extended gear to add stability?
It doesn't explain all of it, but could be a possibility. I've myself had a partial engine failure in a twin and know how confusing things can get. And the one thing that will instantly solve all your problems in assymetrical flight - except the obstacle clearance one (which wasn't a factor here) - is to reduce the power on the remaining engine. That's the fix-all.
:Two ways to lower your VMC (or whatever they call it in the airline world) at full gross weight if you don't need to climb is: get the gear out (adds keeling and stability) and/or reduce thrust on good engine.
1. Maybe it's possible that the captain had another partial bird strike/or somehow other performance issue where it was safer to not add full thrust on the working engine. Or maybe the thought he did and wanted to assess.
2. Maybe he was close to entering a dangerous VMC induced spin situation and reducing the thrust was his only way to get out of it when he ran out of altitude.
3. Maybe he reduced power during final manoeuvring to position himself correctly and allow himself to bank steeper without worrying about assymetrical lift etc, especially if procedures/terrain/traffic didn't allow him to do it into the good engine.
4. Maybe he opted to prepare for an emergency landing in the flattest country on earth and extended gear for that.
5. Maybe the extended gear to add stability?
It doesn't explain all of it, but could be a possibility. I've myself had a partial engine failure in a twin and know how confusing things can get. And the one thing that will instantly solve all your problems in assymetrical flight - except the obstacle clearance one (which wasn't a factor here) - is to reduce the power on the remaining engine. That's the fix-all.
Last edited by AdamFrisch; 10th May 2012 at 00:14.
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That was my thought. But I'm thinking the captain and FO are not that smart to have even realized they were in position to land to the north at about the time they completed the turn.
No, this crew was simple stupid.
We train that ALL THE TIME.....
TOGO
PR, gear up
Fly profile
Run the checks
Delcare...
This is very puzzling.
I wonder if at ANY point in the interview with the flight crew if the question:
"...WTF were you thinking..." was asked.
If so, I'd LOVE to hear the response.
No, this crew was simple stupid.
We train that ALL THE TIME.....
TOGO
PR, gear up
Fly profile
Run the checks
Delcare...
This is very puzzling.
I wonder if at ANY point in the interview with the flight crew if the question:
"...WTF were you thinking..." was asked.
If so, I'd LOVE to hear the response.
Originally Posted by OD100
I wonder if at ANY point in the interview with the flight crew if the question:
"...WTF were you thinking..." was asked.
If so, I'd LOVE to hear the response.
"...WTF were you thinking..." was asked.
If so, I'd LOVE to hear the response.
When your child last had a prang on his bike because he was riding too fast, burnt himself on something, thumped his sister and made her cry, pranged the car in the wet after having his licence for a few months, did you ask the same question? And what was the answer?
If this does turn out to be a ballsup, the fact of the matter is that the system let these two pilots get to where they got. Short of a deliberate yahoo "I'm gunna try a low level run around town on one donk with the gear down because all that ops manual stuff is rubbish", these guys probably did what they thought was the best, using all their skills. Now if they didn't have any (or little), who's fault is that?
The irony is that these guys will probably be sledged far more, because they are alive, than the Suhkoi pilots.
They got the aeroplane back on the ground in one piece despite making life very difficult for themselves. Let's learn from it instead of asking "WTF were you thinking?".
We train that ALL THE TIME.....
TOGO
PR, gear up
Fly profile
Run the checks
Delcare...
TOGO
PR, gear up
Fly profile
Run the checks
Delcare...
If this does turn out to be a ballsup, the fact of the matter is that the system let these two pilots get to where they got.
Short of a deliberate yahoo "I'm gunna try a low level run around town on one donk with the gear down because all that ops manual stuff is rubbish"
They got the aeroplane back on the ground in one piece despite making life very difficult for themselves.
Let's learn from it instead of asking "WTF were you thinking?"
I'm in the camp that would really like to know "WTF were you thinking?" so I can avoid the trap that got them in this situation, assuming that it wasn't just blind panic, lack of knowledge, low standards, poor CRM, etc.
"WTF were you doing?". I suppose that would be the first question you guys would ask the AF 447 crew as well. And the crew of just about every other prang.
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AdamFrish:
We're not talking about a Cessna 310, or such. A Boeing transport category jet with OEI simply does not have assymetrical flight issues at, or above, V2, and with the proper use of rudder. And, putting the gear back down defies the ground-rules of flying an OEI takeoff profile. Same with reducing thrust on the remaining engine. That is out of the question at this stage of a OEI takeoff profile.
It doesn't explain all of it, but could be a possibility. I've myself had a partial engine failure in a twin and know how confusing things can get. And the one thing that will instantly solve all your problems in assymetrical flight - except the obstacle clearance one (which wasn't a factor here) - is to reduce the power on the remaining engine. That's the fix-all.
Last edited by aterpster; 11th May 2012 at 14:20.
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Well, at least they made a safe landing, errors or not, its better that everybody disembarked on their own 2 feet, albeit a bit wobbly in the knees, no doubt! Does anyone know what the outcome was for the pilots?
Last edited by aggablinky; 12th May 2012 at 02:57.