37.5 degree angle of bank, one engine out, gear down and at 500 feet
DOVE
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Shame!
The right turn towards north reached a maximum bank angle of 37.5° and minimum speed of 156 kt288.912 km/h 80.184 m/s IAS, just below the applicable V2 speed, and the aircraft eventually reached a height of just under 500 feet152.4 m agl. From there, a slow descent had begun which only stopped at 352 feet107.29 m following the first of many GPWS activations, in this instance Mode 3 “DON’T SINK”.
§ During the refresher training for Atlas Blue and Royal Air Maroc pilots, they were not trained to deal with multiple (??? MERE “ENG. FAIL!!!”)malfunctions during the flight.
§ Prior to every recurrent training pilots of Atlas Blue and Royal Air Maroc were taught about the specific malfunctions that would occur. This is not unusual in the context of flight training practice, but the consequence was that the pilots did not learn how to respond to unexpected effects (WHAT???).
§ Dealing with multiple malfunctions featured only in the initial training for Captains.
§ Prior to every recurrent training pilots of Atlas Blue and Royal Air Maroc were taught about the specific malfunctions that would occur. This is not unusual in the context of flight training practice, but the consequence was that the pilots did not learn how to respond to unexpected effects (WHAT???).
§ Dealing with multiple malfunctions featured only in the initial training for Captains.
Shame on those responsible.
Fly Safe
DOVES
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P.P.
You only deal with such possibilites one you have completed the OEI profile and have sufficient altitude and speed to consider returning to land. Perhaps they need to dump fuel first. (?)
I haven't read the report, but is it possible that the captain, having determined that they had taken gear damage from the strike, used an old jedi trick that we used to call airmanship, and put the dunlops back down before they uplocked?
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Despite all the criticism of the captain and the listing of his failings, one cannot fault the fact that he got the aircraft back on the ground with all onboard intact. Even if it was at some inconvenience to others, I suspect his prime aim was to achieve a landing.
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It sure as heck isn't good airmanship to lower the gear on an engine failure after t/o.
"well we hit that hill off the end of the runway cause we couldn't maintain second segment climb, but at least we had the gear down"
I'd rather meet my climb gradients with the gear stuck up and do a controlled landing gear up on the runway then hit an obstacle on climb out. Nothing in that report suggested good airmanship or decision making skills, in fact the exact opposite.
A routine failure that crews should be able to handle as a non event (see thomson bird strike at about the same spot for an example of how a professional crew might handle this) came very close to becoming a fatal accident..again due to poor crew training and or abilities.
A v1 cut is one of the most basic maneuvers trained in the sim, yet this crew was unable to complete it in a safe manner. The only reason this ended well is luck. If you think otherwise, next time you're doing a v1 cut in the sim, try reducing the thrust on the good engine, lowering your previously retracted gear and commencing a 30+ degree banked turn below 400' on departure and let me know what your instructor has to say about your good airmanship and decision making.
"well we hit that hill off the end of the runway cause we couldn't maintain second segment climb, but at least we had the gear down"
I'd rather meet my climb gradients with the gear stuck up and do a controlled landing gear up on the runway then hit an obstacle on climb out. Nothing in that report suggested good airmanship or decision making skills, in fact the exact opposite.
A routine failure that crews should be able to handle as a non event (see thomson bird strike at about the same spot for an example of how a professional crew might handle this) came very close to becoming a fatal accident..again due to poor crew training and or abilities.
A v1 cut is one of the most basic maneuvers trained in the sim, yet this crew was unable to complete it in a safe manner. The only reason this ended well is luck. If you think otherwise, next time you're doing a v1 cut in the sim, try reducing the thrust on the good engine, lowering your previously retracted gear and commencing a 30+ degree banked turn below 400' on departure and let me know what your instructor has to say about your good airmanship and decision making.
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I haven't read the report, but is it possible that the captain, having determined that they had taken gear damage from the strike, used an old jedi trick that we used to call airmanship, and put the dunlops back down before they uplocked?
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Dawdler, captain's prime aim ain't in doubt, however his actions to achieve said aim were way off the accepted mark and leaving the gear down was incomprehensible.
Purple pitot - free thinking has it's place but reducing power on the good donk!!!!!!
The guy wasn't thinking straight and somehow got away with it, the only concession I'll give you is that he did have some piloting ability which is what got the plane back in spite of his pi$$ poor decision making.
Nice whitewash by Royal Air Maroc BTW
Purple pitot - free thinking has it's place but reducing power on the good donk!!!!!!
The guy wasn't thinking straight and somehow got away with it, the only concession I'll give you is that he did have some piloting ability which is what got the plane back in spite of his pi$$ poor decision making.
Nice whitewash by Royal Air Maroc BTW
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Is that a 737 procedure only Tony? I only ask because it's certainly not the approved manner of handling engine failures on some other types, and in any event ignoring the SID could bring you a world of pain departing many airports.
It certainly is on the types that I have flown for real and in the simulator (B727,B737,B747,B767 BAC 1-11 and L1011). All the old performance A. Type A and Type B ICAO airport charts only accurately survey the splay and or designated emergency turn. If you look at any of the SID's for LHR you will see a minimum reqd climb gradient of around 800 fpm. Any transport aircraft at max regulated take off weight will probably not achieve anyway near that with an EFATO.
The Max regulated take off wieght is computed assuming you are going to carry out the procedure that you are trained to do. If you listen to the Thompson video you will hear that they went to Wallasea on an assigned heading which is designated in the emergency turn for Manchester, not the SID. ATC will expect you to carry out your procedure once the mayday call is made.
There is a great publication from Airbus called Getting to Grips with Performance. Its good reading, revision for all pilots.
Is that a 737 procedure only Tony? I only ask because it's certainly not the approved manner of handling engine failures on some other types, and in any event ignoring the SID could bring you a world of pain departing many airports.
It certainly is on the types that I have flown for real and in the simulator (B727,B737,B747,B767 BAC 1-11 and L1011). All the old performance A. Type A and Type B ICAO airport charts only accurately survey the splay and or designated emergency turn. If you look at any of the SID's for LHR you will see a minimum reqd climb gradient of around 800 fpm. Any transport aircraft at max regulated take off weight will probably not achieve anyway near that with an EFATO.
The Max regulated take off wieght is computed assuming you are going to carry out the procedure that you are trained to do. If you listen to the Thompson video you will hear that they went to Wallasea on an assigned heading which is designated in the emergency turn for Manchester, not the SID. ATC will expect you to carry out your procedure once the mayday call is made.
There is a great publication from Airbus called Getting to Grips with Performance. Its good reading, revision for all pilots.
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That's the procedure in most airline ops that i am familiar with, certainly on the Boeing's. If it's flown like Tony has stated you will clear obstacles on the flight path. If there are obstacles that you would not clear then there will be an emergency turn specified in the event of an engine failure that the crew would need to comply with.
The only difference from Tony's explanation that i have seen is the turn is complied with prior to accelerating the aircraft to single engine climb speed.
The only difference from Tony's explanation that i have seen is the turn is complied with prior to accelerating the aircraft to single engine climb speed.
One of the challenges facing modern aviation is that (mechanically speaking) things rarely fail.
Remember reading an article decades ago by an airline pilot who had grown up on aircraft such as StratoCruisers and Constellations crossing the pond. He then converted to the Boeing 707. After he had flown the B707 for circa 7 years he looked back though his logbook and realised that on said a/c he had never had an engine shutdown or any type of failure/fire etc. He went on to say that in his previous types on an atlantic crossing it was very rare not to encounter some form of engine problem (large piston engines with lots of reciprocating parts versus jets).
On older a/c with less reliable powerplants the crews routinely expected to encounter an engine malfunction and were therefore more "geared up" (sorry about the pun!) for a failure.
These days most crews hardly ever experience a real engine malfunction other than in the simulator. Throw in a bit of the "magenta line" culture and we have a potential recipe for disaster. This means that crews have to be even more disciplined and mentally alert for the events such as these. This in turn also means crews must be better trained in all respects.
It was purely fortuitous, I would suggest, that this was an incident and not a major accident - a very lucky escape.
Remember reading an article decades ago by an airline pilot who had grown up on aircraft such as StratoCruisers and Constellations crossing the pond. He then converted to the Boeing 707. After he had flown the B707 for circa 7 years he looked back though his logbook and realised that on said a/c he had never had an engine shutdown or any type of failure/fire etc. He went on to say that in his previous types on an atlantic crossing it was very rare not to encounter some form of engine problem (large piston engines with lots of reciprocating parts versus jets).
On older a/c with less reliable powerplants the crews routinely expected to encounter an engine malfunction and were therefore more "geared up" (sorry about the pun!) for a failure.
These days most crews hardly ever experience a real engine malfunction other than in the simulator. Throw in a bit of the "magenta line" culture and we have a potential recipe for disaster. This means that crews have to be even more disciplined and mentally alert for the events such as these. This in turn also means crews must be better trained in all respects.
It was purely fortuitous, I would suggest, that this was an incident and not a major accident - a very lucky escape.
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Ok, i have now read the report. In all probability these guys were muppets. I still stand by my view point, and fail to understand why others do not, that sometimes you may need to think for yourself.
Tony
Currently 777, before that the 747, mostly the -400...........European operator, over 15000 hours, mostly on the 744.
..I understand the assumptions that are made in order to produce the performance calculations, and the EFATO procedure you described, containing the level acceleration, rings bells of my EFATO training on the Classic 747 many years ago. My minor gripe with your OP was that Boeing's FCOM 1 for the likes of the 744 and the 777 describe a subtly different profile and demand a different procedure ( e.g. it's a climbing acceleration, there should be no need to make an MCP speed selection to increase the angle of climb ...), so I felt your seemingly blanket comment that:
was somewhat harsh.
That said I'm sure we're singing from the same hymn sheet in our thoughts about this incident
I would be interested to know what Type you are flying?
..I understand the assumptions that are made in order to produce the performance calculations, and the EFATO procedure you described, containing the level acceleration, rings bells of my EFATO training on the Classic 747 many years ago. My minor gripe with your OP was that Boeing's FCOM 1 for the likes of the 744 and the 777 describe a subtly different profile and demand a different procedure ( e.g. it's a climbing acceleration, there should be no need to make an MCP speed selection to increase the angle of climb ...), so I felt your seemingly blanket comment that:
It has been my experience that a lot of pilots are poorly trained in this procedure
That said I'm sure we're singing from the same hymn sheet in our thoughts about this incident
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I understand that on some types you can afford a slight climb on the third segment. The selection of MCT at the end of the third segment is making the asumption that thrust above MCT was used at the start of the take off. The 10 minute power limitation comes in to play (used to be 5 minutes). MCT must be set at the 10 minute period and the end of the third segment must be complete (ie flap retraction). This was the major reason for a flat segment to make sure you dont exceed the power limitation with flap still out.
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I note that the Captain was a TRI. Unbelievable
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I stand by my comment regarding poor training and knowledge. As an MCC instructor I would say that only 5% of the students had any idea of EFATO procedures on jet transports note that this training is not part of an MCC course. Most of these 250 hour FATPL students were hoping to get a jet transport job as soon as they had completed the course. The last hole in the cheese is that the airline trains them properly. In this case RAM did not.
It seems the answer is to slaughter all the Canada geese. I would have thought it better to close down the airport.
It seems the answer is to slaughter all the Canada geese. I would have thought it better to close down the airport.
The idea behind giving the commander the authority to deviate from established rules and procedures is to achieve higher level of safety through breaching them, not lower.
IMHO, this fellow was very near to getting totally overwhelmed by having the real emergency thrown on him and that's something that cannot be corrected by additional training. There should be psychological selection even before basic training is commenced, not quite dissimilar from:
Of course, we have come a long way from 1930ies, so such an approach might not serve well our enlightened age. Besides, harder selection would be bad for flight training industry and its collapse could adversely affect the airlines. We don't want that to happen, do we? 
IMHO, this fellow was very near to getting totally overwhelmed by having the real emergency thrown on him and that's something that cannot be corrected by additional training. There should be psychological selection even before basic training is commenced, not quite dissimilar from:
Originally Posted by Ernest Kellogg Gann
Separation of the dedicated from the merely hopeful has been a crafty affair performed mostly by the line's chief pilots. They are braced with a fixed set of standards from which, in self-protection, they rarely deviate. They are hard, suspicious men, navigating uncomfortably between what is a frankly commercial enterprise and a group of fractious, often temperamental, zealots. And since it is also their lot to be the first to inform a pilot's wife that she is now a widow, they do what they can to see within an applicant. They try to picture him a few years hence, when he may find himself beset with the troubles aloft. How will he behave in sole command, when a quick decision or even a sudden movement can make a difference between safety and tragedy? Yet the chief pilots do not look for heroes. They much prefer a certain intangible stability, which in moments of crisis is often found among the more irascible and reckless.
