Take off with snow on wing
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Originally Posted by Clandestino
They were not idiots in the medical sense but that they were ignoramuses is beyond doubt.
How could pilots be so ignorant to perform such a hazardous act ? IMHO, first: they have to be ignorant of aerodynamics and meteorology, second: gaps in their knowledge have to be filled by someone delivering his dead wrong message with great detail, patience and perseverance. Higher he be on the airline totem pole, it's easier for him to get the messages such as: "it will be blown off anyway" or "de-icing is useless but satisfies the authorities" across.
Unrealistic theory? Have a look at the last couple of pages on this thread.
How could pilots be so ignorant to perform such a hazardous act ? IMHO, first: they have to be ignorant of aerodynamics and meteorology, second: gaps in their knowledge have to be filled by someone delivering his dead wrong message with great detail, patience and perseverance. Higher he be on the airline totem pole, it's easier for him to get the messages such as: "it will be blown off anyway" or "de-icing is useless but satisfies the authorities" across.
Unrealistic theory? Have a look at the last couple of pages on this thread.
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@AirRabbit
I have carefully read your contributions and your analysis of the Air Florida crash and I took the time to read (parts of) the NTSB report. Your knowledge about this case is impressive and so is the polite language that you use while telling your side of the story. Not that it matters, but just for the record: you have convinced me. What you are saying is very plausible indeed. I would however respectfully like to suggest you to stop arguing with some of the members on this topic, simply because it's a waste of time. You said what you needed to say and did it very well. 
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Originally Posted by sabenaboy
I ... respectfully ... suggest you stop arguing with some of the members on this topic, simply because it's a waste of time. You said what you needed to say and did it very well.
My original comment was to correct what I saw as an incorrect impression that it was a the low engine takeoff power that caused the accident. The NTSB officially, and at least one NTSB participant (quoted by one of the posters here) collectively agreed that the engine power setting did not cause that accident.
Originally Posted by NTSB AAR82-08
The aircraft could not sustain flight because of the combined effects of
airframe snow or ice contamination which degraded lift and increased
drag and the lower than normal thrust set by reference to the erroneous
EPR indications. Either condition alone should not have prevented
continued flight.
airframe snow or ice contamination which degraded lift and increased
drag and the lower than normal thrust set by reference to the erroneous
EPR indications. Either condition alone should not have prevented
continued flight.
Originally Posted by PPRuNe staff
As these are anonymous forums the origins of the contributions may be opposite to what may be apparent. In fact the press may use it, or the unscrupulous, or sciolists*, to elicit certain reactions.
Originally Posted by GSLOC
We all know that stall warning won't occur (in ice-contamination case) when actual stall happen because system does not measure disturbed air flow and contamination on wings.
Originally Posted by GSLOC
Can they for instance command pitch that is in excess of reduced critical AOA?
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Frankly, I find AirRabit's analysis and comments very persuasive. I appreciate them very much.
Question: Given that most accidents involve a chain of causal elements ("but for ..." the accident wouldn't have happened), why elevate one (or more) to be the "probable cause" and relegate the rest to "contributing to"?
I know the NTSB may be charged by statute to do this, but does it really make sense? I believe that other jurisdictions (Canada?) just identify the causal elements and don't attempt to elevate any to being "THE Cause"?
Last point. It is called the "probable cause", not the "proven cause". So why the vitriol when someone posts a dissenting opinion?
Question: Given that most accidents involve a chain of causal elements ("but for ..." the accident wouldn't have happened), why elevate one (or more) to be the "probable cause" and relegate the rest to "contributing to"?
I know the NTSB may be charged by statute to do this, but does it really make sense? I believe that other jurisdictions (Canada?) just identify the causal elements and don't attempt to elevate any to being "THE Cause"?
Last point. It is called the "probable cause", not the "proven cause". So why the vitriol when someone posts a dissenting opinion?
Last edited by Crabman; 30th Apr 2012 at 13:56. Reason: Changed punctuation of a question to "?". Duh!
Controversial, moi?
There is no dissenting opinion included in the NTSB report. NTSB is pretty clear that too low power did not cause the accident on its own but that without it, the catastrophe would not have happened:
Addressing that one point would be appreciated, my apologies if I have missed where you have addressed it.
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Originally Posted by Clandestino
There is no dissenting opinion included in the NTSB report. NTSB is pretty clear that too low power did not cause the accident on its own but that without it, the catastrophe would not have happened
Of course there is no “dissenting opinions included IN the NTSB report … that’s not what NTSB reports do … but that doesn’t mean that there are NOT a large number of aviation professionals who have dissenting opinions about what that report says. As the investigation revealed (and referenced here) the “low power setting” of the engines did not cause the accident” … but the only way an airplane could have continued flight – even with all the power both engines were capable of producing - would have been if the attitude of the airplane was such that the engines – even at Max Thrust – could have pushed the airplane through the air at the attitude achieved at that time. Recall the video of the F-100, with the afterburner lit? Recall it wallowing through the air prior to impact? … this was THE specific event that generated the term “Sabre-dance.” That F-100 SuperSabre was at a pitch attitude that even with the A/B blasting everything under it into small dust particles – there was insufficient thrust to push that airplane in the direction opposite to that thrust. So too was that B-737 … the pitch attitude of that B-737 – caused by the uncontrolled pitch-up caused by the incorrect deicing/anti-icing procedures applied – was such that all the thrust of both those engines – and I don’t care what power setting they could have selected – would have resulted in exactly the same end … just like what occurred to that F-100 SuperSabre. Just in case you forgot, jet engines produce thrust to push the airplane in the direction opposite to that thrust vector – nothing more – nothing less. With any thrust, an airplane would be able to be pushed only in the direction opposite to that thrust direction. In both of these cases, the F-100 and the B-737 … there wasn’t enough thrust capable of being generated even with the added thrust of the A/B in the F-100 case … even with full power, maximum power, throttles-bent-over-the-fire-wall power in the B-737 case – there wasn’t enough thrust to push the airplane “forward” sufficiently to achieve sufficient lift to maintain flight. And, before someone points out that "they did it in a simulator." Yeah. I know something about simulators as well ... and given the right knowledge and time at the simulator's input keyboard, I can make a Cessna 152 simulator "fly" just exactly like the space shuttle.
Originally Posted by M.Mouse
So how do you answer AirRabbit's conjecture that the B737 characteristic for alarming and uncontrollable behaviour with leading edge contamination possibly occurred and all that greater thrust would have achieved would have been that the aircraft and its occupants would have reached the point where the tragedy was inevitable marginally quicker?
Addressing that one point would be appreciated, my apologies if I have missed where you have addressed it.
Addressing that one point would be appreciated, my apologies if I have missed where you have addressed it.
As I pointed out … way back on April 17th in post #276 …
I believe that once this crew pushed the throttles forward with the intent to takeoff, they were doomed. The only way that an accident could have been avoided at that point, was to have kept the airplane on the ground until a sufficiently higher airspeed was reached prior to initiating the rotation. Unfortunately, not only did the crew not know that this would be necessary, they wouldn’t have known the “magic” airspeed number. Even if they had pushed both throttles all the way to the firewall from brake release, and then rotated at the computed rotation airspeed (as they did) the airplane would have performed in exactly the same way. It would have uncontrollably pitched up to at least the 22 – 24 degree attitude; likely more given witness statements … where some said they saw “the aircraft was flying at an unusually low altitude with the wings level at a nose-high attitude of 30 degrees to 40 degrees before it hit the bridge.” It would have entered the same deep aerodynamic stall. The flight crew would have been unable to bring the nose down aerodynamically. Unfortunately, in that condition, full thrust on both engines would have been insufficient to maintain flight. All who were affected by this tragedy were victims of longitudinal differential lift. The flight crew did not have the luxury of time to analyze, consider, and choose accordingly.
For Reference:
Aviation Video: F-100 test flight crash (Sabre Dance) | Patrick's Aviation
Last edited by AirRabbit; 1st May 2012 at 20:10.
Originally Posted by M.Mouse
So how do you answer AirRabbit's conjecture that the B737 characteristic for alarming and uncontrollable behaviour with leading edge contamination possibly occurred and all that greater thrust would have achieved would have been that the aircraft and its occupants would have reached the point where the tragedy was inevitable marginally quicker?
Originally Posted by NTSB AAR82-08, page 54
The Safety Board concludes that neither the low thrust used during the takeoff
nor the presence of snow or ice on the aircraft, alone, would likely have led to the crash.
In most other reported incidents in which B-737’s have pitched up during takeoff, the
flightcrews had sufficient control authority with forward control column force and
stabilizer trim to overcome the pitching moment, reduce the pitch attitude, accelerate
to a lower angle of attack, and climb out successfully. The Safety Board believes that if
the proper thrust level (that for 2.04 EPR) had been used for the takeoff this flightcrew
could have recovered from any difficulties caused by the contamination - induced
aerodynamic performance penalties.
Furthermore, based upon the engineering simulation, the Safety Board
concludes that even with the low thrust during the takeoff roll and the aerodynamic
penalty of the snow or ice contamination, the accident was not inevitable as the aircraft
lifted off. However, both immediate recognition of the situation and positive effective
actions by the flightcrew to both counter the noseup pitching moment and add thrust were
required. With these actions, the aircraft should have been capable of continued
acceleration and achieved a sufficient performance margin for climbout.
nor the presence of snow or ice on the aircraft, alone, would likely have led to the crash.
In most other reported incidents in which B-737’s have pitched up during takeoff, the
flightcrews had sufficient control authority with forward control column force and
stabilizer trim to overcome the pitching moment, reduce the pitch attitude, accelerate
to a lower angle of attack, and climb out successfully. The Safety Board believes that if
the proper thrust level (that for 2.04 EPR) had been used for the takeoff this flightcrew
could have recovered from any difficulties caused by the contamination - induced
aerodynamic performance penalties.
Furthermore, based upon the engineering simulation, the Safety Board
concludes that even with the low thrust during the takeoff roll and the aerodynamic
penalty of the snow or ice contamination, the accident was not inevitable as the aircraft
lifted off. However, both immediate recognition of the situation and positive effective
actions by the flightcrew to both counter the noseup pitching moment and add thrust were
required. With these actions, the aircraft should have been capable of continued
acceleration and achieved a sufficient performance margin for climbout.
Originally Posted by NTSB AAR82-08, page 68
The engineering simulation of Flight 90’s flight profile disclosed that the aircraft’s rate of acceleration after liftoff, below normal
because of the reduced thrust, was further impaired by a high noseup pitch attitude attained during the takeoff rotation.
Consequently, the aircraft did not reach an airspeed
safely above the stall speed. The high pitch attitude occurred because the flightcrew
failed to, or was unable to, react quickly enough to counter the aircraft’s longitudinal trim
change produced by the wing leading edge contamination. The reports since 1970 by other
operators who have experienced abrupt pitchup or rol off immediately after liftoff of
B-737 aircraft indicate that the B-737 may have a greater known inherent pitchup
characteristic than other aircraft in this regard a result of small amounts of frost, snow,
or ice on the wing leading edge. The Safety Board could not determine whether the
aerodynamic design makes the B-737 more sensitive to pitching or rolling moments when
the wing is contaminated, or whether more frequent operation of these aircraft in
environmental conditions conducive to snow or ice accretion during ground operations,
coupled with the near to the ground wing placement, accounts for the higher number of
reported B-737 pitchup/rolloff incidents, Regardless, the Safety Board concludes that the
pitchup tendency of the aircraft because of leading edge contamination contributed to the
accident. However, to place this contributing factor in perspective, the Board notes that no
aircraft design requirements include the ability to perform with snow or ice
contamination and that any known contamination, regardless of the amount or depth, must
be viewed as potentially critical to a successful takeoff. For this reason, flightcrews are
not only dissuaded, but are prohibited, from attempting a takeoff with such
contamination.
because of the reduced thrust, was further impaired by a high noseup pitch attitude attained during the takeoff rotation.
Consequently, the aircraft did not reach an airspeed
safely above the stall speed. The high pitch attitude occurred because the flightcrew
failed to, or was unable to, react quickly enough to counter the aircraft’s longitudinal trim
change produced by the wing leading edge contamination. The reports since 1970 by other
operators who have experienced abrupt pitchup or rol off immediately after liftoff of
B-737 aircraft indicate that the B-737 may have a greater known inherent pitchup
characteristic than other aircraft in this regard a result of small amounts of frost, snow,
or ice on the wing leading edge. The Safety Board could not determine whether the
aerodynamic design makes the B-737 more sensitive to pitching or rolling moments when
the wing is contaminated, or whether more frequent operation of these aircraft in
environmental conditions conducive to snow or ice accretion during ground operations,
coupled with the near to the ground wing placement, accounts for the higher number of
reported B-737 pitchup/rolloff incidents, Regardless, the Safety Board concludes that the
pitchup tendency of the aircraft because of leading edge contamination contributed to the
accident. However, to place this contributing factor in perspective, the Board notes that no
aircraft design requirements include the ability to perform with snow or ice
contamination and that any known contamination, regardless of the amount or depth, must
be viewed as potentially critical to a successful takeoff. For this reason, flightcrews are
not only dissuaded, but are prohibited, from attempting a takeoff with such
contamination.
So how come some PPRuNers get convinced by the theories that are at odds with the expert analysis and have no traceable source? PukinDog nicely analyzed one such contribution:
Originally Posted by Pukin Dog
You make decent enough arguments on a few points, food for thought anway, but wrapping them in a suggestion that this crew's actions and words represent anything like a barometer of "what was known", done, and disseminated (including to them) re winter ops/contamination/ etc 1982 is a gross misrepresentation. This crew was nothing of the kind, and you whitewashing this crew's inexperience and non-compliance for the sake of focusing on the de-icing issue hints of an agenda.
Realistic picture, eh? Not at all. So how come it is believable? Basic HF: people are convinced of something because they want to be convinced. If reading the accident report pages where crew's mistakes are neatly explained fills you with horror and, despite the facts, you want to believe that QH90 (or any other) crew did their best but it was tragically insufficient, to sooth your anxiety you would do well to listen to alternative theories of e.g: de-icing with water, composite fins being weaker than metal ones or Airbus cockpit being a deathtrap by design.
However, if you are into learning something from mistakes of others, lest you repeat them, it's far better to read and understand what is written in the official accident report. Stress is on understanding as it will help you recognize skewed reports produced under undue political pressure or when the good report is unduly smeared as false.
Whatever suits you, terms of the PPRuNe use do not preclude going whichever path you choose. Outcomes might differ, though.
DOVE
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I cannot refrain from intervening because it can be deadly for your seeds to sprout.
"Quousque tandem abutere, AirRabbit, patientia nostra?"
You know me and the pulpit my words come from.
Can I say the same of you?
I don’t think you’ve ever been (sitting at the front row of a plane and not in front of a 6-Drawer Oak desk) in such a situation:
Typical winter night in Europe, about to leave from an airport during a dreadful snowstorm.
In addition to the usual procedures we had to:
- Take a place in the queue for the de-icing
- Wait every few tens of minutes for the runway in use and taxiways to be cleared from snow.
- Based on the estimated time of completion of the aforementioned procedures, request a slot for departure.
- Calculating the synchronization of all of that to determine if and when to surrender to the pressure of ramp agent who wanted the passengers to be embarked.
I had long since given up the scheduled departure time.
It's obvious that it was wishful thinking to have all the above operations completed all together.
If the runway had been cleared, the plane was not yet being deiced / anti-iced, or vice versa, or the slot provided had expired and reassigned half an hour later, and then we had to go back to the starting point.
If the passengers had boarded, we had to invite them to remain on board for not losing the priority acquired; maybe we prayed the flight attendants to serve a refreshment.
Finally everything was ready to start (there was a tyrannical "holdover time"), but not without having alerted the Purser not to hesitate to advise if he saw some snow on the wings.
And then:
There were conditional procedures to apply: special operations, "Cold Weather Operations" and "T.O. and Landing on Contaminated Rwys ".
They had to be performed, with the contribution of PF and PNF; a flight controls test at the beginning and at the end of taxi, a test of extension and retraction of the flaps / slats, the activation of Engine Anti-ice (with engine run-up every ten minutes to remove any ice formed on the intake of the engines and on PT2 probes), and the predisposition of the Airfoil anti-ice, after start.
After rotation we were expected to cycle the “retraction / extension / retraction” of the landing gear in order to shake any slush from it.
It's absolutely clear that avoiding all of this fuss would make life much more easy, and I confess that more than once I found myself in the embarrassing
position to explain to a passenger of mine stating: "That guy did not perform the deicing and is going, while we are having such a delay ... "
My answer: "Safety is our first goal."
CONTAMINATION ON ANY PART OF THE AIPLANE: NO GO!
"Quousque tandem abutere, AirRabbit, patientia nostra?"
You know me and the pulpit my words come from.
Can I say the same of you?
I don’t think you’ve ever been (sitting at the front row of a plane and not in front of a 6-Drawer Oak desk) in such a situation:
Typical winter night in Europe, about to leave from an airport during a dreadful snowstorm.
In addition to the usual procedures we had to:
- Take a place in the queue for the de-icing
- Wait every few tens of minutes for the runway in use and taxiways to be cleared from snow.
- Based on the estimated time of completion of the aforementioned procedures, request a slot for departure.
- Calculating the synchronization of all of that to determine if and when to surrender to the pressure of ramp agent who wanted the passengers to be embarked.
I had long since given up the scheduled departure time.
It's obvious that it was wishful thinking to have all the above operations completed all together.
If the runway had been cleared, the plane was not yet being deiced / anti-iced, or vice versa, or the slot provided had expired and reassigned half an hour later, and then we had to go back to the starting point.
If the passengers had boarded, we had to invite them to remain on board for not losing the priority acquired; maybe we prayed the flight attendants to serve a refreshment.
Finally everything was ready to start (there was a tyrannical "holdover time"), but not without having alerted the Purser not to hesitate to advise if he saw some snow on the wings.
And then:
There were conditional procedures to apply: special operations, "Cold Weather Operations" and "T.O. and Landing on Contaminated Rwys ".
They had to be performed, with the contribution of PF and PNF; a flight controls test at the beginning and at the end of taxi, a test of extension and retraction of the flaps / slats, the activation of Engine Anti-ice (with engine run-up every ten minutes to remove any ice formed on the intake of the engines and on PT2 probes), and the predisposition of the Airfoil anti-ice, after start.
After rotation we were expected to cycle the “retraction / extension / retraction” of the landing gear in order to shake any slush from it.
It's absolutely clear that avoiding all of this fuss would make life much more easy, and I confess that more than once I found myself in the embarrassing
position to explain to a passenger of mine stating: "That guy did not perform the deicing and is going, while we are having such a delay ... "
My answer: "Safety is our first goal."
CONTAMINATION ON ANY PART OF THE AIPLANE: NO GO!
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"It's absolutely clear that avoiding all of this fuss would make life much more easy, and I confess that more than once I found myself in the embarrassing
position to explain to a passenger of mine stating: "That guy did not perform the deicing and is going, while we are having such a delay ... "
My answer: "Safety is our first goal."
If anything is going to be learnt from the vid of the flight from SVO its that us passengers are far more likely to accept your explanation than was so even a few months ago.
position to explain to a passenger of mine stating: "That guy did not perform the deicing and is going, while we are having such a delay ... "
My answer: "Safety is our first goal."
If anything is going to be learnt from the vid of the flight from SVO its that us passengers are far more likely to accept your explanation than was so even a few months ago.
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When M.Mouse asked about the B737 characteristic for alarming and uncontrollable behaviour with leading edge contamination, you answer with …
…and you come up with the following??
The NTSB’s words (not mine) … “in most other reported incidents … the flightcrews had sufficient control authority…” Most? What about the other incidents? Just how many “other incidents” were there? Did any of those other incidents include an absence of control authority? What happened in THOSE cases?
So the “expert opinions” you settle on are these? Do you have an opinion on which of these diametrically opposite expert opinions is the one you care to believe? … which is it? …The crew could have recovered but failed to do so … or … the crew was unable to recover? Did you flip a coin … or are you prejudiced and don’t want anyone to know?
While I will stop way short of claiming to be an aerodynamic expert on the B-737-200, I am rated on the B-737 and I do have considerable time in the -200 series aircraft (even more in other makes/models … despite some here, like Mr. Doves, who choose to disbelieve my “profile” information – which, of course, is their – his – individual choice – even if, however self-serving it may seem to others to be, I will continue to believe that I am my own best judge of my own knowledge and experience.) … it is my contention that the NTSB selected a “middle-of-the-road” response by saying (see NTSB AAR82-08, page 68) “The reports since 1970 by other operators who have experienced abrupt pitchup or roll off immediately after liftoff of B-737 aircraft indicate that the B-737 may have a greater known inherent pitchup characteristic than other aircraft in this regard a result of small amounts of frost, snow, or ice on the wing leading edge. The Safety Board could not determine whether the aerodynamic design makes the B-737 more sensitive to pitching or rolling moments when the wing is contaminated, or whether more frequent operation of these aircraft in environmental conditions conducive to snow or ice accretion during ground operations, coupled with the near to the ground wing placement, accounts for the higher number of reported B-737 pitchup/rolloff incidents, Regardless, the Safety Board concludes that the pitchup tendency of the aircraft because of leading edge contamination contributed to the accident.”
It sounds as though the NTSB recognizes that it’s not as damning to accuse a system or design feature of an airplane as having contributed to an accident as it is to say that particular system or design feature actually caused an accident. Libility … cost … reputation … etc., get to be really stupifyingly large issues that no one in a political arena would be willing to challenge. Now, I suppose you’re going to tell us that government officials don’t protect themselves and their organizations when they believe that is the proper or prudent thing to do … sure … we all know that.
Contrary to Clandestino’s claim that “a certain poster” (could he possibly have meant someone other than me?) has submitted “…some true details, some true yet grotesquely exaggerated, some completely irrelevant, some that are so-pulled-out-of-the-thin-air they cannot be verified at all and some brazenly false.” With the amount of information I’ve posted – I’ll not offer an all-encompassing denial … but I will – and I do – deny that anything I’ve posted is knowingly wrong, knowingly inaccurate, knowingly exaggerated, knowingly irrelevant, and certainly NOT “brazenly false.” To the contrary – everything I’ve posted has been relevant – or I wouldn’t have posted it (still don’t understand that accusation) … some of what I posted is directly from our friends at the NTSB – everything I posted is, to the very best of my professional knowledge and training, is true … at least as the facts that support them are true, without any exaggeration or limitation – and nothing – absolutely nothing in any of my posts was “pulled-out-of-thin-air” – and were I not trying to keep this discussion on a civil level (for everyone and everything concerned) that kind of comment could have been taken in a way that, had it been offered personally in the local pub – there is at least a reasonable chance that both of us would have been taken away – one to a local medical facility and the other to a local constabulary – and I would have hoped he had resilient recuperative abilities. While some here may think lying to be an acceptable, perhaps even an expected, part of this business, but I don’t … I don’t lie, I don’t expect others to lie, and I particularly don’t appreciate being accused of doing it. If anyone here can point to anything that I’ve posted about which you have legitimate concerns as being untruthful or inaccurate in any way… please let me know and I’ll do my very best to provide whatever additional facts, theories, reports, or other information that may be appropriate to rectify that issue – but, as many of you know here, I’ll stop short of providing information that may give away my identity. As I’ve repeated here often … if my employers knew of my participation, I’d likely get an opportunity to refer to them as my “former” employers – and that is a step I’m not quite ready to make – it also requires me to be a bit more informative in my posts – as you would then either agree or disagree based on the merits of what I post and not be tempted to agree or disagree with me because of the positional authority I may hold. For example if I were a senior NTSB investigator – you might tend to believe me more – but my bosses on the Board might think I’ve overstepped my agreed-to responsibilities and other oaths I may have taken.
What I continue to find hard to believe is that throughout history professional aviators have not appreciated the label of “pilot error” that gets affixed to more than a fair share of difficult to analyze accident or incident situations. Sure pilots make errors – even very good pilots make errors – I’ve certainly made my fair share – perhaps more than my fair share. Sometimes errors wind up contributing to or causing accidents or incidents - sometimes they do not. Sometimes accusations are true and accurate … sometimes they are not.
Mr. Clandestino alleges that I (he uses the term “contributor” – hmmm … wonder if there is a sinister concern for being caught in a slander?) believe that the crew “was betrayed” by a whole series of people and events – concluding by stating that “…people are convinced of something because they want to be convinced…” and even describes the flight crew as “poor and hapless … tragically betrayed by almost everyone.” An aside here, for a moment … it is clear that Mr. Clandestino understands, or at least rather easily uses, “figures of speech” in his communications … where the particular figure of speech he chooses to use here, described as “irony,” is used in his description of the crew here … where, clearly, he says one thing but the intent is clearly to convey the opposite thing - that the crew members are not “poor and hapless” and were not “tragically betrayed by almost everyone.” For everyone’s benefit, the use of an “ironic” statement, as defined in most English textbooks, is the following: “Irony - the use of word/sentence in a way that conveys a meaning opposite to its usual meaning.” Some here may recall the allegation made that the flight crew deliberately taxied behind a preceding airplane to “get his wings deiced.” And they based that on a CVR transcript that read, as I recall “Don’t do that Apple, I need by other wing done.” Is it so out of bounds to even remotely consider that the intent of this statement would also be an ironic statement? As the definition says … “the use of word/sentence in a way that conveys a meaning opposite to its usual meaning.” As an exercise, try tape recording your next departure from engine start to level off and see if, or how many times, you and your “mates” use Ironic statements to punctuate or add to the conversation. It just might scare you to realize that what you said, would be what everyone would hear if you were to die in a subsequent crash of that airplane.
He apparently does not believe that the flight crew was
Well – what did the de-icing crew pour all over the airplane? According to the NTSB report the airplane “…was deiced with 100 percent water and the final overspray was applied with a 20 to 30 percent deicer to water solution selected. Subsequent tests of deicing fluid/water solution taken from the Trump vehicle showed that the mixture dispensed differed substantially from the mixture selected. The percent of deicing fluid in solution was about 18 percent rather than 30 percent.” A fact that was also revealed during the tests conducted on the Trump vehicle but not included in the NTSB report, was that the mixture of 18 percent (rather than 30 percent when that value was selected) was measured at nominal, or close to zero, flow rate. The content with any additional flow rate was extracted almost exclusively from the water tank and virtually none from the glycol tank. The specific numbers were not available as the flow rate “pulsed” with the RPM of the drive pump and there was the residual amount of glycol present at the nominal flow rate. At the completion of the test, it was evident that the volume in the water tank was lowered by approximately the amount calculated for the time additional flow rates were used, but the volume in the glycol tank was not appreciably changed during this period of increase flow rate.
He apparently does not believe that the flight crew was
I’m not sure of this reference, as there is no mention of “holdover times” or “HOT” in the Accident Report anywhere that I can find. Perhaps he could provide all of us with a reference for his thoughts on this issue?
He apparently does not believe that the flight crew was
Let’s see about this one:
NTSB Report Page (ii) “…the known inherent pitchup characteristics of the B-737 aircraft when the leading edge is contaminated with even small amounts of snow or ice…”
NTSB Report Page 1 “…the known inherent pitchup characteristics of the B-737 aircraft when the leading edge is contaminated with even small amounts of snow or ice…”
NTSB Report Page 34 “…Since 1970 there have been a number of reports by operators of B-737 aircraft, who have experienced an aircraft pitchup or rolloff immediately after takeoff in weather conditions which were conducive to the formation of ice or frost on the wing leading edges. The Safety Board is aware of 22 such reports during the period.”
NTSB Report Page 35 “…The continuation of reports of pitchup/rolloff occurrences prompted The Boeing Co to examine further the B-737 aircraft sensitivity to leading, edge contamination. In 1977 plans were formulated for wind tunnel and flight tests. Even before conducting these tests, The Boeing Co. on February 23, 1979, issued Operations Manual Bulletin 79-2 to advise flightcrews of a possible inadvertent pitchup/rolloff after takeoff due to ice accumulation on leading edge devices. The bulletin stated that several operators of B-737’s had reported pitchup and/or rolloff after takeoff caused by ice accumulations on leading edge devices and that such incidents had usually occurred following the application of reverse thrust while taxiing on snow-covered taxiways.
NTSB Report Page 35 As part of its investigation of the reported incidents, The Boeing Co. flight tested a B-737-200 advanced airplane in the fall of 1980 to quantify the aerodynamic effects of contaminated leading edge slats. The leading edge slats were coated with an epoxy potting compound and the surface was roughened with a paint roller to simulate a coating with corn ice. A series of stalls was conducted with flaps up, and at flap positions of 1, 15, and 40. The stall characteristics with both symmetric and asymmetric leading edge contaminations were characterized by a very apparent pitchup, yaw rate, and rolloff. These characteristics were more pronounced at flap settings less than 5…
OK. OK. I think you get the picture. Betrayed? Maybe? If YOU were flying an airplane that had these kinds of “known” tendencies … and knew that they had occurred more than 20 times … would you like to know?
He apparently does not believe that the flight crew was
Well, it is true that the accident flight was cleared onto the runway at 1558:58. Subsequently, they were cleared for takeoff at 1559:24. Those times don’t look too “pushed” until you realize that there was moderate snow falling throughout this time – and the taxiways and the runway had some accumulation. Do you taxi from a snow-covered taxiway onto a snow-covered runway using the same techniques you would use if the taxiway and runway were clear and dry? Of course not! Is everyone aware that the tower controller could not “see” the approach end or the departure end of the runway at that time? So, maybe we can see if they were “betrayed” by looking again at the CVR transcript:
1600:03 LC Eastern fourteen fifty-one, the wind Is zero one zero at one one you're cleared to land runway three six, the visual range touchdown two thousand elght hundred rollout one thousand six hundred/
1600:04
1600:05 CAM-2 Ah, that's not right
1600:06
1600:07 CAM-2 (Well) ---
1600:08
1600:09 CAM-1 Yes It is, there's eighty
1600:10 CAM-2 Maw, I don't think that's right
1600:11 E451 Fourteen fifty-one cleared 'to land over the lights
Now, I should point out (not that you weren’t aware of it – just reminding everyone) that one of the difficulties in reading a CVR transcript and understanding what took place just prior – during – or just after any point on that transcript is not recognizing that some things are said in a second or less … other things take a bit longer to say … for example … the Local Controller’s clearance to EA1451. It’s on the CVR Transcript as having been said at 1600:03. Try reading that statement and see how long it takes. Also, you have to know that controller had to view his “bright” scope, the indications for wind speed and direction … and … make that radio call. Was all that done in 1 second? I doubt it … in fact, I suspicion that as the Local Controller unkeyed his microphone after issuing the landing clearance, the Eastern pilot immediately responded – even though the time of that radio call is shown to be at 1600:11 – fully 8 seconds after the Transcript indicates the time of the clearance being issued. Throughout this Eastern-Tower exchange the accident flight crew was busy making a takeoff.
Don’t let me put thoughts into your head – you decide. You’re the Captain on the B-737. You’ve received clearance onto the runway, taxied out, begun the line-up turn, pushed up the throttles to get the engines spooled … the F/O takes control of the airplane. He further spools the engines up toward TO EPR setting – what are you watching? The throttle position? … the engine EPR gauges?… the centerline of the runway? Your F/O sets what he believes is or is close to TO EPR and you prepare to take over monitoring of the throttles. At that time, he says something like “Geeze – look at that thing? That don’t seem right, does it?” Where do you look to see what he’s talking about? … remember, you’re blasting down a snow-covered runway, with the windshield wipers on – unable to see very far ahead … do you care what progress you’re making? … do you care what your airspeed is now? By the time you ask yourself those questions, he again says “Ah … that’s not right” All this while you’ve heard the tower controller issuing landing clearance to that guy behind you … You look at the airspeed … 80 knots … and you decide to let the F/O know where you were and your airspeed … so you say in a calm and clear voice, “Yes it is, there’s eighty” … and just as you get those words from your mouth, you hear the landing traffic over the tower frequency respond to the tower controller’s clearance by saying, “1451 cleared to land over the lights.” WHAT?!?!? OVER THE FRIGGIN LIGHTS!?!?!? What do you do, now … abort?
It would seem that Mr. Clandestino is “hoisted by his own petard.” By way of example he states:
Or … perhaps this could be said somewhat differently … “people are convinced of something because they want to be convinced. If reading the accident report pages where crew's mistakes are neatly explained fills you with satisfaction and comfort because you never make those kinds of errors, and, because of these facts, you want to believe that you are insulated from similar potentialities of crew error or confluence of other apparently dissimilar circumstances such that your anxiety may be soothed, you would do well to read only the report and not challenge any aspect regardless of how familiar that aspect may sound.”
Again, a worthwhile quote:
One additional quote from the Accident Report - once again leading interested readers to the conclusion that the airplane was "auto-rotated" to an unrealisitc and unrecoverable pitch attidue due to the wing contamination caused by impropter deicing/anti-icing procedures and equipment.
A slight tendency to pitch up - slight tendency - 30 to 40 degrees nose up? Really?
Originally Posted by Clandestino
How could I possibly answer that? I am not an aerodynamicist familiar with 732. Heck, I'm not even rated on her, but I can easily find an expert opinion on the matter:
(NTSB AAR82-08, page 54) “In most other reported incidents in which B-737’s have pitched up during takeoff, the flightcrews had sufficient control authority with forward control column force and stabilizer trim to overcome the pitching moment, reduce the pitch attitude, accelerate to a lower angle of attack, and climb out successfully.”
(NTSB AAR82-08, page 54) “The Safety Board believes that if the proper thrust level (that for 2.04 EPR) had been used for the takeoff this flightcrew could have recovered from any difficulties caused by the contamination – induced aerodynamic performance penalties.”
and
(NTSB AAR82-08, page 52) “If the flightcrew failed to, or was unable to, counter the pitchup moment of the aircraft with sufficient forward control column force, the aircraft could become airborne at an excessively high pitch attitude. The aircraft would not accelerate and it would retain a high angle of attack and high drag.”
and
(NTSB AAR82-08, page 52) “If the flightcrew failed to, or was unable to, counter the pitchup moment of the aircraft with sufficient forward control column force, the aircraft could become airborne at an excessively high pitch attitude. The aircraft would not accelerate and it would retain a high angle of attack and high drag.”
While I will stop way short of claiming to be an aerodynamic expert on the B-737-200, I am rated on the B-737 and I do have considerable time in the -200 series aircraft (even more in other makes/models … despite some here, like Mr. Doves, who choose to disbelieve my “profile” information – which, of course, is their – his – individual choice – even if, however self-serving it may seem to others to be, I will continue to believe that I am my own best judge of my own knowledge and experience.) … it is my contention that the NTSB selected a “middle-of-the-road” response by saying (see NTSB AAR82-08, page 68) “The reports since 1970 by other operators who have experienced abrupt pitchup or roll off immediately after liftoff of B-737 aircraft indicate that the B-737 may have a greater known inherent pitchup characteristic than other aircraft in this regard a result of small amounts of frost, snow, or ice on the wing leading edge. The Safety Board could not determine whether the aerodynamic design makes the B-737 more sensitive to pitching or rolling moments when the wing is contaminated, or whether more frequent operation of these aircraft in environmental conditions conducive to snow or ice accretion during ground operations, coupled with the near to the ground wing placement, accounts for the higher number of reported B-737 pitchup/rolloff incidents, Regardless, the Safety Board concludes that the pitchup tendency of the aircraft because of leading edge contamination contributed to the accident.”
It sounds as though the NTSB recognizes that it’s not as damning to accuse a system or design feature of an airplane as having contributed to an accident as it is to say that particular system or design feature actually caused an accident. Libility … cost … reputation … etc., get to be really stupifyingly large issues that no one in a political arena would be willing to challenge. Now, I suppose you’re going to tell us that government officials don’t protect themselves and their organizations when they believe that is the proper or prudent thing to do … sure … we all know that.
Contrary to Clandestino’s claim that “a certain poster” (could he possibly have meant someone other than me?) has submitted “…some true details, some true yet grotesquely exaggerated, some completely irrelevant, some that are so-pulled-out-of-the-thin-air they cannot be verified at all and some brazenly false.” With the amount of information I’ve posted – I’ll not offer an all-encompassing denial … but I will – and I do – deny that anything I’ve posted is knowingly wrong, knowingly inaccurate, knowingly exaggerated, knowingly irrelevant, and certainly NOT “brazenly false.” To the contrary – everything I’ve posted has been relevant – or I wouldn’t have posted it (still don’t understand that accusation) … some of what I posted is directly from our friends at the NTSB – everything I posted is, to the very best of my professional knowledge and training, is true … at least as the facts that support them are true, without any exaggeration or limitation – and nothing – absolutely nothing in any of my posts was “pulled-out-of-thin-air” – and were I not trying to keep this discussion on a civil level (for everyone and everything concerned) that kind of comment could have been taken in a way that, had it been offered personally in the local pub – there is at least a reasonable chance that both of us would have been taken away – one to a local medical facility and the other to a local constabulary – and I would have hoped he had resilient recuperative abilities. While some here may think lying to be an acceptable, perhaps even an expected, part of this business, but I don’t … I don’t lie, I don’t expect others to lie, and I particularly don’t appreciate being accused of doing it. If anyone here can point to anything that I’ve posted about which you have legitimate concerns as being untruthful or inaccurate in any way… please let me know and I’ll do my very best to provide whatever additional facts, theories, reports, or other information that may be appropriate to rectify that issue – but, as many of you know here, I’ll stop short of providing information that may give away my identity. As I’ve repeated here often … if my employers knew of my participation, I’d likely get an opportunity to refer to them as my “former” employers – and that is a step I’m not quite ready to make – it also requires me to be a bit more informative in my posts – as you would then either agree or disagree based on the merits of what I post and not be tempted to agree or disagree with me because of the positional authority I may hold. For example if I were a senior NTSB investigator – you might tend to believe me more – but my bosses on the Board might think I’ve overstepped my agreed-to responsibilities and other oaths I may have taken.
What I continue to find hard to believe is that throughout history professional aviators have not appreciated the label of “pilot error” that gets affixed to more than a fair share of difficult to analyze accident or incident situations. Sure pilots make errors – even very good pilots make errors – I’ve certainly made my fair share – perhaps more than my fair share. Sometimes errors wind up contributing to or causing accidents or incidents - sometimes they do not. Sometimes accusations are true and accurate … sometimes they are not.
Mr. Clandestino alleges that I (he uses the term “contributor” – hmmm … wonder if there is a sinister concern for being caught in a slander?) believe that the crew “was betrayed” by a whole series of people and events – concluding by stating that “…people are convinced of something because they want to be convinced…” and even describes the flight crew as “poor and hapless … tragically betrayed by almost everyone.” An aside here, for a moment … it is clear that Mr. Clandestino understands, or at least rather easily uses, “figures of speech” in his communications … where the particular figure of speech he chooses to use here, described as “irony,” is used in his description of the crew here … where, clearly, he says one thing but the intent is clearly to convey the opposite thing - that the crew members are not “poor and hapless” and were not “tragically betrayed by almost everyone.” For everyone’s benefit, the use of an “ironic” statement, as defined in most English textbooks, is the following: “Irony - the use of word/sentence in a way that conveys a meaning opposite to its usual meaning.” Some here may recall the allegation made that the flight crew deliberately taxied behind a preceding airplane to “get his wings deiced.” And they based that on a CVR transcript that read, as I recall “Don’t do that Apple, I need by other wing done.” Is it so out of bounds to even remotely consider that the intent of this statement would also be an ironic statement? As the definition says … “the use of word/sentence in a way that conveys a meaning opposite to its usual meaning.” As an exercise, try tape recording your next departure from engine start to level off and see if, or how many times, you and your “mates” use Ironic statements to punctuate or add to the conversation. It just might scare you to realize that what you said, would be what everyone would hear if you were to die in a subsequent crash of that airplane.
He apparently does not believe that the flight crew was
“…betrayed by the de-icing crew that poured water instead of glycol mixture on their wing.”
He apparently does not believe that the flight crew was
”… betrayed by FAA by not having developed the holdover times at the time.
He apparently does not believe that the flight crew was
”… betrayed by the Boeing co designing the aeroplane that would pitch-up when stalling with iced leading edge.”
NTSB Report Page (ii) “…the known inherent pitchup characteristics of the B-737 aircraft when the leading edge is contaminated with even small amounts of snow or ice…”
NTSB Report Page 1 “…the known inherent pitchup characteristics of the B-737 aircraft when the leading edge is contaminated with even small amounts of snow or ice…”
NTSB Report Page 34 “…Since 1970 there have been a number of reports by operators of B-737 aircraft, who have experienced an aircraft pitchup or rolloff immediately after takeoff in weather conditions which were conducive to the formation of ice or frost on the wing leading edges. The Safety Board is aware of 22 such reports during the period.”
NTSB Report Page 35 “…The continuation of reports of pitchup/rolloff occurrences prompted The Boeing Co to examine further the B-737 aircraft sensitivity to leading, edge contamination. In 1977 plans were formulated for wind tunnel and flight tests. Even before conducting these tests, The Boeing Co. on February 23, 1979, issued Operations Manual Bulletin 79-2 to advise flightcrews of a possible inadvertent pitchup/rolloff after takeoff due to ice accumulation on leading edge devices. The bulletin stated that several operators of B-737’s had reported pitchup and/or rolloff after takeoff caused by ice accumulations on leading edge devices and that such incidents had usually occurred following the application of reverse thrust while taxiing on snow-covered taxiways.
NTSB Report Page 35 As part of its investigation of the reported incidents, The Boeing Co. flight tested a B-737-200 advanced airplane in the fall of 1980 to quantify the aerodynamic effects of contaminated leading edge slats. The leading edge slats were coated with an epoxy potting compound and the surface was roughened with a paint roller to simulate a coating with corn ice. A series of stalls was conducted with flaps up, and at flap positions of 1, 15, and 40. The stall characteristics with both symmetric and asymmetric leading edge contaminations were characterized by a very apparent pitchup, yaw rate, and rolloff. These characteristics were more pronounced at flap settings less than 5…
OK. OK. I think you get the picture. Betrayed? Maybe? If YOU were flying an airplane that had these kinds of “known” tendencies … and knew that they had occurred more than 20 times … would you like to know?
He apparently does not believe that the flight crew was
”…betrayed by the Air Traffic Controllers using too little spacing between them and landing Eastern.”
1600:03 LC Eastern fourteen fifty-one, the wind Is zero one zero at one one you're cleared to land runway three six, the visual range touchdown two thousand elght hundred rollout one thousand six hundred/
1600:04
1600:05 CAM-2 Ah, that's not right
1600:06
1600:07 CAM-2 (Well) ---
1600:08
1600:09 CAM-1 Yes It is, there's eighty
1600:10 CAM-2 Maw, I don't think that's right
1600:11 E451 Fourteen fifty-one cleared 'to land over the lights
Now, I should point out (not that you weren’t aware of it – just reminding everyone) that one of the difficulties in reading a CVR transcript and understanding what took place just prior – during – or just after any point on that transcript is not recognizing that some things are said in a second or less … other things take a bit longer to say … for example … the Local Controller’s clearance to EA1451. It’s on the CVR Transcript as having been said at 1600:03. Try reading that statement and see how long it takes. Also, you have to know that controller had to view his “bright” scope, the indications for wind speed and direction … and … make that radio call. Was all that done in 1 second? I doubt it … in fact, I suspicion that as the Local Controller unkeyed his microphone after issuing the landing clearance, the Eastern pilot immediately responded – even though the time of that radio call is shown to be at 1600:11 – fully 8 seconds after the Transcript indicates the time of the clearance being issued. Throughout this Eastern-Tower exchange the accident flight crew was busy making a takeoff.
Don’t let me put thoughts into your head – you decide. You’re the Captain on the B-737. You’ve received clearance onto the runway, taxied out, begun the line-up turn, pushed up the throttles to get the engines spooled … the F/O takes control of the airplane. He further spools the engines up toward TO EPR setting – what are you watching? The throttle position? … the engine EPR gauges?… the centerline of the runway? Your F/O sets what he believes is or is close to TO EPR and you prepare to take over monitoring of the throttles. At that time, he says something like “Geeze – look at that thing? That don’t seem right, does it?” Where do you look to see what he’s talking about? … remember, you’re blasting down a snow-covered runway, with the windshield wipers on – unable to see very far ahead … do you care what progress you’re making? … do you care what your airspeed is now? By the time you ask yourself those questions, he again says “Ah … that’s not right” All this while you’ve heard the tower controller issuing landing clearance to that guy behind you … You look at the airspeed … 80 knots … and you decide to let the F/O know where you were and your airspeed … so you say in a calm and clear voice, “Yes it is, there’s eighty” … and just as you get those words from your mouth, you hear the landing traffic over the tower frequency respond to the tower controller’s clearance by saying, “1451 cleared to land over the lights.” WHAT?!?!? OVER THE FRIGGIN LIGHTS!?!?!? What do you do, now … abort?
It would seem that Mr. Clandestino is “hoisted by his own petard.” By way of example he states:
Originally Posted by Clandestino
“…people are convinced of something because they want to be convinced. If reading the accident report pages where crew's mistakes are neatly explained fills you with horror and, despite the facts, you want to believe that QH90 (or any other) crew did their best but it was tragically insufficient, to sooth your anxiety you would do well to listen to alternative theories of e.g: de-icing with water…”
Again, a worthwhile quote:
Originally Posted by Clandestino
Whatever suits you, terms of the PPRuNe use do not preclude going whichever path you choose. Outcomes might differ, though.
Ground witnesses generally agreed that the aircraft was flying at an unusually low altitude with the wings level and had attained a nose-high attitude of 30 degrees to 40 degrees nose up before it hit the bridge.
Last edited by AirRabbit; 4th May 2012 at 13:16.
Originally Posted by DOVES
I cannot refrain from intervening because it can be deadly for your seeds to sprout.
The fellow plays his own tune for his own audience.
No need too feed him.
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@AirRabbit
Well, great post once again. You convinced me -and many others, Im sure- even more!
But... I still think you should have followed my advice and stop responding.
He said it himself: "No need to feed him" (He's not worth the trouble and he's just harassing you. Don't take the bite.)
(English is not my mother tongue. I apologise for not being able to respond as eloquently as you can.)
But... I still think you should have followed my advice and stop responding.
He said it himself: "No need to feed him" (He's not worth the trouble and he's just harassing you. Don't take the bite.)
(English is not my mother tongue. I apologise for not being able to respond as eloquently as you can.)
Got away with the snowy wings - again!
Interestingly, when you open the video on YouTube, first suggested similar video is:
It's about AirFlorida 90. Recommended if your Russian is better than English.
Interestingly, when you open the video on YouTube, first suggested similar video is:
It's about AirFlorida 90. Recommended if your Russian is better than English.
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Maybe its time the FAA updates its FARs?
According to FAR 121 ,Aeroflot did not break any of its rules..as reckless as its pilots actions may have been..
According to FAR 121 ,Aeroflot did not break any of its rules..as reckless as its pilots actions may have been..
(d) A certificate holder may continue to operate under this section without a program as required in paragraph (c) of this section, if it includes in its operations specifications a requirement that, any time conditions are such that frost, ice, or snow may reasonably be expected to adhere to the aircraft, no aircraft will take off unless it has been checked to ensure that the wings, control surfaces, and other critical surfaces are free of frost, ice, and snow. The check must occur within five minutes prior to beginning takeoff. This check must be accomplished from outside the aircraft.
[Doc. No. 6258, 29 FR 19222, Dec. 31, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 121–231, 57 FR 44942, Sept. 29, 1992; Amdt. 121–253, 61 FR 2615, Jan. 26, 1996]
[Doc. No. 6258, 29 FR 19222, Dec. 31, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 121–231, 57 FR 44942, Sept. 29, 1992; Amdt. 121–253, 61 FR 2615, Jan. 26, 1996]
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@de facto
How on earth do you conclude that aircraft could possibly have complied with:
Never mind that conducting an inspection from outside the aircraft within 5 mins of takeoff at a Russian airport is probably impossible without the security guys getting very excited.
How on earth do you conclude that aircraft could possibly have complied with:
it has been checked to ensure that the wings, control surfaces, and other critical surfaces are free of frost, ice, and snow.
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Maybe its time the FAA updates its FARs?
According to FAR 121 ,Aeroflot did not break any of its rules..as reckless as its pilots actions may have been..
According to FAR 121 ,Aeroflot did not break any of its rules..as reckless as its pilots actions may have been..
I don't think the reg you quoted means what you think it means. All that says is IF a part 121 operator does not have an approved ground deicing/anti-icing program, they may still take off when weather conditions could create structural contamination on the aircraft if they do a pre-takeoff contamination check within 5 minutes of takeoff from the exterior of the aircraft. If there is no ice or snow adhering, they may take off.
If the airline does have an approved ground deicing/anti-icing program, then that program must be adhered to.
Basically, if I had a little commuter operation out of San Juan, it might not be worth it to me to come up with a ground ice program in my ops specs. If a freak snowstorm hit the Caribbean, I could still take off if I was able to perform the pre-takeoff contamination check AND the airplane was clean. If anything was adhering to the wings, or any other critical surface, no takeoff.
With that in mind, from that video the Aeroflot plane would have been in violation.
Taking what FAR 121 actually says:-
"(d) A certificate holder may continue to operate under this section without a program as required in paragraph (c) of this section, if it includes in its operations specifications a requirement that, any time conditions are such that frost, ice, or snow may reasonably be expected to adhere to the aircraft, no aircraft will take off unless..."
Then if conditions are such that frost, ice, or snow may reasonably expected NOT to adhere.. then it does NOT apply.
So in properly cold countries, some of which have an almost infinite number of words for different types of snow, it is possible that a pilot with that knowledge might know that it was dry snow and not thick enough for the weight to cause melting on a very cold wing/tail. And that a couple of sweeps with a soft broom confirmed that he was correct.
I live in balmy Surrey and even I can tell which snow I need to clear from my bonnet, and that which I know will have blown off by the end of the lane.
I'm not saying that I wouldn't have been raising hell in the cabin on that flight, but that FAR 121 does offer a get out clause.
"(d) A certificate holder may continue to operate under this section without a program as required in paragraph (c) of this section, if it includes in its operations specifications a requirement that, any time conditions are such that frost, ice, or snow may reasonably be expected to adhere to the aircraft, no aircraft will take off unless..."
Then if conditions are such that frost, ice, or snow may reasonably expected NOT to adhere.. then it does NOT apply.
So in properly cold countries, some of which have an almost infinite number of words for different types of snow, it is possible that a pilot with that knowledge might know that it was dry snow and not thick enough for the weight to cause melting on a very cold wing/tail. And that a couple of sweeps with a soft broom confirmed that he was correct.
I live in balmy Surrey and even I can tell which snow I need to clear from my bonnet, and that which I know will have blown off by the end of the lane.
I'm not saying that I wouldn't have been raising hell in the cabin on that flight, but that FAR 121 does offer a get out clause.