Take off with snow on wing
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Eastern Airlines
Any old Eastern guys out there? Flew with a few that talked about DC-9s with a foot of snow on the wings.
un official procedure was,
1. make sure you have >88% N1 t/o thrust
2. Vr + 20
3. snow blows off
un official procedure was,
1. make sure you have >88% N1 t/o thrust
2. Vr + 20
3. snow blows off
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If we are talking early DC9 10-15 with no LE devices, that is insanity.
The number of crashes involving swept wing jets with no LED's is evidence of that.
The number of crashes involving swept wing jets with no LED's is evidence of that.
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I'm self-loading freight.... now, an aged bitterly frustrated (by youthful circumstances beyond my control) wannabe from following the career I was designed for, which was to fly professionally like you guys. Then, late in life when I was able to afford to go for a PPL and just about to solo I dissected my aorta. That was quite a bad-hair day and ended my flying totally.
Meanwhile I had become an academic lawyer with a specialist interest in criminal law, and have focused (and published some papers in learned journals) on the criminal law aspects of flight safety. Now retired, I still read avidly and still do try to think about the theoretical basis of safety.
I watched the video that started this thread with interest and surprise. It is really ugly. As far as I can recall, nowhere in anything that I have read does it say that one may take off with an ice-contaminated aircraft "provided that.....". The quotations by UUWUDZX (posting 208) from the Airbus manual seems to sum up what I always thought the situation to be.
During my short-lived flying training I recall my instructors teaching me that, while there may be some interest in defining the different forms which ice can take, they all have one thing in common: anywhere on an aircraft, ice is to be presumed to be incompatible with safe flight, and it is certainly poor airmanship to try to take off without determining that there is none.
Reading what I have done on this thread, something else comes across forcefully to me. The fact that some contaminated aircraft have successfully taken off and flown while others have failed actually highlights the dangers of ice: its effects are unpredictable, and accordingly to be avoided. One contributor to this thread pointed out that even loose dry snow can hide problems. Empirical ad hoc research into whether one can successfully take off or not thus seems to be of no value, and to be discouraged.
So may I ask: aside from the cost of the process and delay, for what reasons would a pilot with passengers on board and who was aware of ice decide not to de-ice? If the reasons are only cost and delay, then surely pressure from the accountants must be resisted?
The impression I have formed in seeking to understand some of the theory underlying safety is that one would always try to avoid having to make subjective and discretionary judgements on safety-critical issues. A yes-no, black-white, on-off situation is preferable to one in which one has to use one's judgement, and this forms the basis of the cliché to the effect that if there's a doubt then there is no doubt. If this is correct, then am I also right to think that the typical professional pilot prefers to fly as routinely as possible, but trains for emergencies in a simulator hoping that the skills so acquired will never be needed? If this analysis is correct, why would pilots want to be in a situation in which they would look at ice and say, "Well..... I wonder.... maybe.... oh, we'll give it a go"?
From a legal point of view, my interpretation of all the "endangering" legislation I have looked at is that even if one succeeded in taking off and flying then one would still have been committing an offence precisely because the effects of ice are unpredictable. It would then be sufficient to prove recklessness (crudely, knowing disregard of the dangers) if one knew of the ice on the airframe; or if one knew that, in the prevailing conditions, there might be ice but decided not to check. In this case, one should be deemed to have known that there was ice (even, in fact, if there was none...... which is an interesting thought -- in addition to other forms of ice, we now have virtual ice!).
As a matter of prosecution policy, it seems that the point of view of the industry with all its muscle is one of "heads we win, tails you lose": if the aircraft took off and flew (I won't say "safely"), a prosecution is unlikely as a matter of policy and anyway the probability is that nobody significant will have noticed. If the aircraft crashed, then who's likely to survive to be prosecuted........?
The criminal law is a blunt weapon, but if its use is for deterrence then the policy behind prosecutions is flawed. I'd like to offer a comment or three.
Early on in the thread (eg pudoc, posting #28, is typical) some contributors remarked that they would intervene if they were passengers. The trouble with this is that it's too random and uncertain -- it presupposes a knowledgeable and confident passenger at a window seat.
On the other hand, why not formalise the situation? May I ask: is there any SOP which requires ground personnel proactively and routinely to draw the commander's attention to safety-critical issues regardless of whether the commander is or may be aware of the matter? If one assumes a worst-case scenario, the crew may (without necessarily being at fault) be unaware of ice; do ground personnel have no duty to raise the alert? As the final decisions are the commander's, receiving a formal alert would put great pressure on the commander to address the matter.
My thinking here is that one problem is, as I see it, that human beings have the capacity to talk themselves into doing the most unreasonable things. My lay understanding of CRM training is that this is addressed. Something is sometimes needed to break the causative chain before it matures into catastrophe. Would it be too invasive of the commander's discretion if someone on the ground had the authority to delay departure until either the aircraft has been de-iced, or the commander has explicitly overruled the delay?
Apart from anything else, this would create solid evidence of recklessness if it was needed in subsequent criminal or disciplinary proceedings.
But the penal sanction can be a pretty blunt weapon and is easily used inappropriately. During my working years as an academic, I realised that we don't always ask what, precisely, we hope to acheive by the use of the penal sanction (and I include internal disciplinary proceedings). I would have thought that here it is not to exact vengeance, but to prevent the harm from happening. The fact that more people than just the pilot would now be involved suggests to me that the criminal sanction can be exploited to create a culture of "I do not and never would do a thing like that, nor should anybody else, and the intervention of the ground personnel has been helpful in securing that objective standard."
Meanwhile I had become an academic lawyer with a specialist interest in criminal law, and have focused (and published some papers in learned journals) on the criminal law aspects of flight safety. Now retired, I still read avidly and still do try to think about the theoretical basis of safety.
I watched the video that started this thread with interest and surprise. It is really ugly. As far as I can recall, nowhere in anything that I have read does it say that one may take off with an ice-contaminated aircraft "provided that.....". The quotations by UUWUDZX (posting 208) from the Airbus manual seems to sum up what I always thought the situation to be.
During my short-lived flying training I recall my instructors teaching me that, while there may be some interest in defining the different forms which ice can take, they all have one thing in common: anywhere on an aircraft, ice is to be presumed to be incompatible with safe flight, and it is certainly poor airmanship to try to take off without determining that there is none.
Reading what I have done on this thread, something else comes across forcefully to me. The fact that some contaminated aircraft have successfully taken off and flown while others have failed actually highlights the dangers of ice: its effects are unpredictable, and accordingly to be avoided. One contributor to this thread pointed out that even loose dry snow can hide problems. Empirical ad hoc research into whether one can successfully take off or not thus seems to be of no value, and to be discouraged.
So may I ask: aside from the cost of the process and delay, for what reasons would a pilot with passengers on board and who was aware of ice decide not to de-ice? If the reasons are only cost and delay, then surely pressure from the accountants must be resisted?
The impression I have formed in seeking to understand some of the theory underlying safety is that one would always try to avoid having to make subjective and discretionary judgements on safety-critical issues. A yes-no, black-white, on-off situation is preferable to one in which one has to use one's judgement, and this forms the basis of the cliché to the effect that if there's a doubt then there is no doubt. If this is correct, then am I also right to think that the typical professional pilot prefers to fly as routinely as possible, but trains for emergencies in a simulator hoping that the skills so acquired will never be needed? If this analysis is correct, why would pilots want to be in a situation in which they would look at ice and say, "Well..... I wonder.... maybe.... oh, we'll give it a go"?
From a legal point of view, my interpretation of all the "endangering" legislation I have looked at is that even if one succeeded in taking off and flying then one would still have been committing an offence precisely because the effects of ice are unpredictable. It would then be sufficient to prove recklessness (crudely, knowing disregard of the dangers) if one knew of the ice on the airframe; or if one knew that, in the prevailing conditions, there might be ice but decided not to check. In this case, one should be deemed to have known that there was ice (even, in fact, if there was none...... which is an interesting thought -- in addition to other forms of ice, we now have virtual ice!).
As a matter of prosecution policy, it seems that the point of view of the industry with all its muscle is one of "heads we win, tails you lose": if the aircraft took off and flew (I won't say "safely"), a prosecution is unlikely as a matter of policy and anyway the probability is that nobody significant will have noticed. If the aircraft crashed, then who's likely to survive to be prosecuted........?
The criminal law is a blunt weapon, but if its use is for deterrence then the policy behind prosecutions is flawed. I'd like to offer a comment or three.
Early on in the thread (eg pudoc, posting #28, is typical) some contributors remarked that they would intervene if they were passengers. The trouble with this is that it's too random and uncertain -- it presupposes a knowledgeable and confident passenger at a window seat.
On the other hand, why not formalise the situation? May I ask: is there any SOP which requires ground personnel proactively and routinely to draw the commander's attention to safety-critical issues regardless of whether the commander is or may be aware of the matter? If one assumes a worst-case scenario, the crew may (without necessarily being at fault) be unaware of ice; do ground personnel have no duty to raise the alert? As the final decisions are the commander's, receiving a formal alert would put great pressure on the commander to address the matter.
My thinking here is that one problem is, as I see it, that human beings have the capacity to talk themselves into doing the most unreasonable things. My lay understanding of CRM training is that this is addressed. Something is sometimes needed to break the causative chain before it matures into catastrophe. Would it be too invasive of the commander's discretion if someone on the ground had the authority to delay departure until either the aircraft has been de-iced, or the commander has explicitly overruled the delay?
Apart from anything else, this would create solid evidence of recklessness if it was needed in subsequent criminal or disciplinary proceedings.
But the penal sanction can be a pretty blunt weapon and is easily used inappropriately. During my working years as an academic, I realised that we don't always ask what, precisely, we hope to acheive by the use of the penal sanction (and I include internal disciplinary proceedings). I would have thought that here it is not to exact vengeance, but to prevent the harm from happening. The fact that more people than just the pilot would now be involved suggests to me that the criminal sanction can be exploited to create a culture of "I do not and never would do a thing like that, nor should anybody else, and the intervention of the ground personnel has been helpful in securing that objective standard."
Machinbird
Agreed, I'm really not sure what relevance that video has to the thread since it wasn't a case of running out of stabilator authority...
As I heard it the story behind the video is that there was a loss of both powered Flight Contol hydraulic systems ( PC 1 and PC 2) and therefore, as you rightly say, there was no stabilator control at all.
The video of the Phantom pitching up was taken of an early test hop at the McDonnell factory. They apparently did not have any stabilator control at all and it was stuck full nose up.
Agreed, I'm really not sure what relevance that video has to the thread since it wasn't a case of running out of stabilator authority...
As I heard it the story behind the video is that there was a loss of both powered Flight Contol hydraulic systems ( PC 1 and PC 2) and therefore, as you rightly say, there was no stabilator control at all.
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As a point of interest, what are the chances that the 2 "spokespersons" from Aeroflot would have quoted the same misplaced platitudes , had they been viewing the video recording at an accident investigation hearing. . . . . the images having been downloaded from a charred machine extracted from a pile of smouldering wreckage at the end of the runway.
I would suggest fairly slim.
I would suggest fairly slim.
Controversial, moi?
I second Regulation 6's comment.
I have nothing much to add to Connetts post except to answer his question:
In a perfect world a sound idea. In the late 90's I was departing Newcastle in a B757. My co-pilot's sector, therefore he had done the walkround. Conditions were cold with light rain/drizzle/sleet. He mentioned to me after his walkround that we might need de-icing but was unsure and had asked the ground engineer to check the wings before push-back.
The ground engineer advised that we didn't need de-icing. During taxi out my co-pilot, a relatively new hire but very experienced RAF fast jet pilot, said he wasn't happy and would I mind if he went into the cabin to look at the wings from a window. When he returned he was very angry and informed me that he could clearly see frozen deposits. We returned to stand and found significant ice on the wings.
I didn't need to say much to the ground engineer after my co-pilot had forcefully pointed out a salient fact or two!
My point being that commercial pressure, time pressure (delays can ruin a stations delay statistics) or sheer idleness and complacency would all play a part. There is but one arbiter regarding de-icing or not and that is the captain.
I have in my career several times experienced engineers (a jolly fine bunch in general) being less than frank when trying to convince me an aeroplane is fit for departure.
I am fortunate that my company (British Airways) will never discipline a captain for making an honest, safety related decision, no matter how costly. If the decision was wrong there might be an informal debrief to examine how things might have been done better but nothing more. That does remove one massive source of pressure from a captain.
Regrettably British Airways and many other reputable airlines with a sound safety culture are by no means the norm, especially when one looks at countries where there is a culture of corruption and a less than rigorous attitude to maintenance and SOPs.
There is no panacea and it scares me to read some of the comments from professional pilots justifying attempting a take-off without a clean wing.
I have nothing much to add to Connetts post except to answer his question:
May I ask: is there any SOP which requires ground personnel proactively and routinely to draw the commander's attention to safety-critical issues regardless of whether the commander is or may be aware of the matter?
The ground engineer advised that we didn't need de-icing. During taxi out my co-pilot, a relatively new hire but very experienced RAF fast jet pilot, said he wasn't happy and would I mind if he went into the cabin to look at the wings from a window. When he returned he was very angry and informed me that he could clearly see frozen deposits. We returned to stand and found significant ice on the wings.
I didn't need to say much to the ground engineer after my co-pilot had forcefully pointed out a salient fact or two!
My point being that commercial pressure, time pressure (delays can ruin a stations delay statistics) or sheer idleness and complacency would all play a part. There is but one arbiter regarding de-icing or not and that is the captain.
I have in my career several times experienced engineers (a jolly fine bunch in general) being less than frank when trying to convince me an aeroplane is fit for departure.
I am fortunate that my company (British Airways) will never discipline a captain for making an honest, safety related decision, no matter how costly. If the decision was wrong there might be an informal debrief to examine how things might have been done better but nothing more. That does remove one massive source of pressure from a captain.
Regrettably British Airways and many other reputable airlines with a sound safety culture are by no means the norm, especially when one looks at countries where there is a culture of corruption and a less than rigorous attitude to maintenance and SOPs.
There is no panacea and it scares me to read some of the comments from professional pilots justifying attempting a take-off without a clean wing.
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note to self
yup russia......NOTE to self, never fly with a russina company. Why do we keep seeing this, I myself witnessed a russian 757 takeoff from gardamoen oslo with 10-15 cm snow on the wings.....we all figured he would crash at the end of rwy butttt noo, he got airborne on the very last meters. stupid 
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I’ll add my compliments to those of Regulation 6 and M.Mouse … and add one additional comment …
As the former US FAA Administrator said repeatedly, “we cannot legislate professionalism,” and I think most everyone would agree – certainly I do. The precepts of professionalism that are most regularly described typically include attitude, competence, conduct, and perhaps above all, character – none of which, perhaps with the exception of competence, lend themselves very easily to a set of recognizable standards.
This is the underlying reason that in an earlier post I pointed out the regulatory requirement that addresses taking off with contaminants posing a safety risk, and attempted to point out why it may be that many (most?) of those pilots who seem to treat wing contamination with less respect than others … do so with confidence that governmental officials are of the opinion that only extreme cases warrant a particular response, and situations not as extreme may be disregarded and a continuation of “ops normal” may proceed. The reference is 14CFR §91.527(a) and it says, “No pilot may take off an airplane that has frost, ice, or snow adhering to any propeller, windshield, stabilizing or control surface; to a powerplant installation; or to an airspeed, altimeter, rate of climb, or flight attitude instrument system or wing…” (my emphasis added). To many, this requirement just may indicate that as long as a contaminant isn’t known to be adhering to the wing, particularly if it’s snow that has just recently fallen on the wing’s surface, it’s perfectly acceptable and certainly legal, to takeoff. The video at the start of this thread would seem to verify that there continues to be those who likely maintain this understanding and act accordingly. I’m not offering excuses … I’m suggesting that we haven’t yet done “all we can” to eliminate potentially confusing signals to those who do this job regularly.
Originally Posted by M.Mouse
There is no panacea and it scares me to read some of the comments from professional pilots justifying attempting a take-off without a clean wing.
This is the underlying reason that in an earlier post I pointed out the regulatory requirement that addresses taking off with contaminants posing a safety risk, and attempted to point out why it may be that many (most?) of those pilots who seem to treat wing contamination with less respect than others … do so with confidence that governmental officials are of the opinion that only extreme cases warrant a particular response, and situations not as extreme may be disregarded and a continuation of “ops normal” may proceed. The reference is 14CFR §91.527(a) and it says, “No pilot may take off an airplane that has frost, ice, or snow adhering to any propeller, windshield, stabilizing or control surface; to a powerplant installation; or to an airspeed, altimeter, rate of climb, or flight attitude instrument system or wing…” (my emphasis added). To many, this requirement just may indicate that as long as a contaminant isn’t known to be adhering to the wing, particularly if it’s snow that has just recently fallen on the wing’s surface, it’s perfectly acceptable and certainly legal, to takeoff. The video at the start of this thread would seem to verify that there continues to be those who likely maintain this understanding and act accordingly. I’m not offering excuses … I’m suggesting that we haven’t yet done “all we can” to eliminate potentially confusing signals to those who do this job regularly.
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AirRabbit wrote:
Might I add, sir, that the precepts of professionalism are contained within oneself and need not be of recognizable standards, i.e., those standards are the ones you set for yourself. Recognizable by others, or not. As a former military man I'm certain you know of what I write.
The precepts of professionalism that are most regularly described typically include attitude, competence, conduct, and perhaps above all, character – none of which, perhaps with the exception of competence, lend themselves very easily to a set of recognizable standards.
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Originally Posted by rgbrock1
Might I add, sir, that the precepts of professionalism are contained within oneself and need not be of recognizable standards, i.e., those standards are the ones you set for yourself. Recognizable by others, or not. As a former military man I'm certain you know of what I write.
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Connetts,
Erudite and informative, and a very good post.
However, this, and all the other sideways discussions tend to take away from the fundamental point.
Any contamination on any surface means no go.
This really is black and white and I can't believe some of the posts on this thread.
Some real insanity here. Right from my very first PPL flight, it was a given. If there is anything other than paint on the wings, it needs to be removed. Full. Bloody. Stop.
Erudite and informative, and a very good post.
However, this, and all the other sideways discussions tend to take away from the fundamental point.
Any contamination on any surface means no go.
This really is black and white and I can't believe some of the posts on this thread.
Some real insanity here. Right from my very first PPL flight, it was a given. If there is anything other than paint on the wings, it needs to be removed. Full. Bloody. Stop.
M.Mouse
Your experience regarding the ground Eng and the F/O.
I have seen stand up rows on the flight deck and airbridge between flt crew, ground staff and engineer regarding de-icing. The Eng says it needs doing, the ground staff saying it will cause a delay and the Capt stuck in the middle trying to keep his job.
It's not pretty.
As you say, some employers place a different value on safety than our own.
Keep safe.
Your experience regarding the ground Eng and the F/O.
I have seen stand up rows on the flight deck and airbridge between flt crew, ground staff and engineer regarding de-icing. The Eng says it needs doing, the ground staff saying it will cause a delay and the Capt stuck in the middle trying to keep his job.
It's not pretty.
As you say, some employers place a different value on safety than our own.
Keep safe.
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AirRabbit wrote:
Excellent point AirRabbit, by including the word 'adhering' the regulators are adding a degree of ambiguity to what should be a very simple and clear message here.
It's encouraging to note that the word isn't adopted in the appropriate section of EU-OPS where it states: "..A commander shall not commence take-off unless the external surfaces are clear of any deposit which might adversely affect the performance and/or controllabilty of the aeroplane, except as permitted in the Aeroplane Flight Manual.."
Basically the same requirement but less likely to lead to misinterpretation.
This is the underlying reason that in an earlier post I pointed out the regulatory requirement that addresses taking off with contaminants posing a safety risk, and attempted to point out why it may be that many (most?) of those pilots who seem to treat wing contamination with less respect than others … do so with confidence that governmental officials are of the opinion that only extreme cases warrant a particular response, and situations not as extreme may be disregarded and a continuation of “ops normal” may proceed. The reference is 14CFR §91.527(a) and it says, “No pilot may take off an airplane that has frost, ice, or snow adhering to any propeller, windshield, stabilizing or control surface; to a powerplant installation; or to an airspeed, altimeter, rate of climb, or flight attitude instrument system or wing…” (my emphasis added). To many, this requirement just may indicate that as long as a contaminant isn’t known to be adhering to the wing, particularly if it’s snow that has just recently fallen on the wing’s surface, it’s perfectly acceptable and certainly legal, to takeoff. The video at the start of this thread would seem to verify that there continues to be those who likely maintain this understanding and act accordingly. I’m not offering excuses … I’m suggesting that we haven’t yet done “all we can” to eliminate potentially confusing signals to those who do this job regularly.
It's encouraging to note that the word isn't adopted in the appropriate section of EU-OPS where it states: "..A commander shall not commence take-off unless the external surfaces are clear of any deposit which might adversely affect the performance and/or controllabilty of the aeroplane, except as permitted in the Aeroplane Flight Manual.."
Basically the same requirement but less likely to lead to misinterpretation.
including the word 'adhering' the regulators are adding a degree of ambiguity to what should be a very simple and clear message here.
Care to interpret it yourself then accept the violation
If it is still on your aircraft when you push back then it is adhering.
There is still room in an SOP once you depart with a clean wing. But you need to start someplace with a known degree of safety
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Chinese Know How:
Captain Felix Smith in his excellent autobiography " China Pilot " ( memoirs of flying in China during the civil war till 1949 ) tells how Chinese engineers would de-ice his C46 Curtis Commando during mid winter operations in northern Manchuria. They simply tossed a rope over the wing and then sawed of the ice and snow by working the rope from wing root to wing tip. It cost nothing, was quick , simply, effective and above all gave a perfectly clear upper surface and leading edge. Says heaps for Chinese know how when compared to expensive modern day de-icing methods.
Those same Chinese ground crew had their own final double check method for ensuring that onloaded fuel was not contaminated with water. So simple it's hard to believe. If anyone is interested I can pass on how they did it. Felix Smith says as Captain of the C46 he also did this just to be sure.
Those same Chinese ground crew had their own final double check method for ensuring that onloaded fuel was not contaminated with water. So simple it's hard to believe. If anyone is interested I can pass on how they did it. Felix Smith says as Captain of the C46 he also did this just to be sure.