Sooo, You Want to Fly for Korean Airlines Do You?
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Airbubba:
The audit I saw is not the one posted by the Kiwi. I don't know where that came from. The one I saw was the original one done by the Delta team.
The audit I saw is not the one posted by the Kiwi. I don't know where that came from. The one I saw was the original one done by the Delta team.
The document I linked to seems to be often bandied about as the real deal but some of us can see that it clearly was not written by Delta pilots or even Americans. I believe Alex Paterson may have posted it on his website years ago but it now seems to be removed.
Some of the Ozmate AFAP alums were trying to convince me that these were the actual DL-KE audit findings but observations like "Captain over pattered [sic] the FO so much on the approach, the FO was having difficulty concentrating on the flying." and "Loosening of collar and tie reduces fatigue and should be encouraged." tells me that the author(s) weren't a bunch of good ole boys from Atlanta.
And like I said, the Kiwi comments are not all bad, probably authentic but very subjective observations of an individual in response to a request for inputs.
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KAL history
the history the first audit was by a South African Pilot ( not Kiwi). It was filed for the benefit of the Delta reorganization (2000 I believe) The second diatribe was from a failed ex-Delta pilot who was also fired from Delta for fraud. He certainly had some valid points but was a real pain.
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The second diatribe was from a failed ex-Delta pilot who was also fired from Delta for fraud. He certainly had some valid points but was a real pain.
"I couldn't do my own job without getting canned - pay me to show you how to run your operation!"
Some of the folks who pop up with sound bites on CNN and the like after an aviation incident have very colorful employment histories.
Anyway, the 'Delta Audit of Korean Airlines' has been sighted (and cited) more than Elvis but no one seems to really have a copy after all these years.
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Airbubba,
I think this may be what you are looking for... (not exactly sure)
korean airlines internal audit safety report
It came via B-HKD's post in the Tech Log. There are 43 items mentioned in the body of the report. But note the introduction, there is a caveat...
Oh, you need to download the report, it is in pdf form, from the gray block towards the bottom of the blog.
TD
I think this may be what you are looking for... (not exactly sure)
korean airlines internal audit safety report
It came via B-HKD's post in the Tech Log. There are 43 items mentioned in the body of the report. But note the introduction, there is a caveat...
Oh, you need to download the report, it is in pdf form, from the gray block towards the bottom of the blog.
TD
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Just to give the readers some of the time lines of Korean Airline's checkered history. The audit was initiated after the crash of KAL 801 in 1997 in Guam. Lose your life but don't lose face. Much of the progress and change KAL made after Dave Greenberg was there has fallen by the wayside. From some of the incidents that have occurred over there it is a miracle they haven't had another Guam. It must be because of all of that foreign "riff-raff".
Korean Airlines Internal Audit Report – an airline waiting to happen
October 1, 2009
The following internal safety audit report into Korean Airlines flying operations was conducted in September 1998 by an external New Zealand check and training pilot. The internal safety audit report was allegedly part of a wider program being overseen by Delta Airlines of America. It was never intended to be public.
The report was allegedly required by the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) and insurance companies in the aftermath of the Korean Airlines B747 crash at Guam on 06/08/97 (Flight 801) as a precursor to the setting up of a proposed code sharing arrangement between KAL and Delta Airlines. Prior to any bilateral code share arrangement it is typical to have both organisations conduct mutual audits to satisfy their own internal management, insurance agencies and external legislating authorities.
According to The Wall Street Journal story of 8th April 1999, KAL Executive Vice President Yi-Taek Shim has admitted that “the leaked audit was an internal report written by an expatriate KAL pilot who no longer works for the airline.”
The audit reveals an endemic level of complacency, arrogance and incompetence pervading all sections of Korean Airlines flight operations and apparently was reportedly rejected by Korean Airlines management at that time. Since that time, however, the airline has welcomed Western operational influences and is slowly overhauling the dangerous culture of incompetence that plagues the crew.
Between 1970 and 1999 Korean Air wrote off 16 aircraft in serious incidents and accidents, with the loss of over 700 lives. If safety is no accident, neither is their high accident record. This report demonstrates why.
In 2000 – after acknowledging that they were an international disgrace – Korean Air recruited David Greenberg, a retired Delta Air Lines vice president, to run its operations. He was charged with the impossible task of rescuing the airline from destroying itself. He introduced merit based promotion and cracked down on the corrupt friendship based fast-track promotions for the inner circle of politically aligned pilots, he introduced a new and improved rigorous training program for pilots and made attempts at introducing a western style of cockpit resource management to enhance crew communications. On the surface KAL they seem to have been mildly successful; their last passenger fatal accident was the same one that inspired this report.
Some say Korean are an accident waiting to happen. In the meantime, however, they seem to be an airline waiting to happen. Time will tell.
This blog was originally published on flight.org in 2006.
October 1, 2009
The following internal safety audit report into Korean Airlines flying operations was conducted in September 1998 by an external New Zealand check and training pilot. The internal safety audit report was allegedly part of a wider program being overseen by Delta Airlines of America. It was never intended to be public.
The report was allegedly required by the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) and insurance companies in the aftermath of the Korean Airlines B747 crash at Guam on 06/08/97 (Flight 801) as a precursor to the setting up of a proposed code sharing arrangement between KAL and Delta Airlines. Prior to any bilateral code share arrangement it is typical to have both organisations conduct mutual audits to satisfy their own internal management, insurance agencies and external legislating authorities.
According to The Wall Street Journal story of 8th April 1999, KAL Executive Vice President Yi-Taek Shim has admitted that “the leaked audit was an internal report written by an expatriate KAL pilot who no longer works for the airline.”
The audit reveals an endemic level of complacency, arrogance and incompetence pervading all sections of Korean Airlines flight operations and apparently was reportedly rejected by Korean Airlines management at that time. Since that time, however, the airline has welcomed Western operational influences and is slowly overhauling the dangerous culture of incompetence that plagues the crew.
Between 1970 and 1999 Korean Air wrote off 16 aircraft in serious incidents and accidents, with the loss of over 700 lives. If safety is no accident, neither is their high accident record. This report demonstrates why.
In 2000 – after acknowledging that they were an international disgrace – Korean Air recruited David Greenberg, a retired Delta Air Lines vice president, to run its operations. He was charged with the impossible task of rescuing the airline from destroying itself. He introduced merit based promotion and cracked down on the corrupt friendship based fast-track promotions for the inner circle of politically aligned pilots, he introduced a new and improved rigorous training program for pilots and made attempts at introducing a western style of cockpit resource management to enhance crew communications. On the surface KAL they seem to have been mildly successful; their last passenger fatal accident was the same one that inspired this report.
Some say Korean are an accident waiting to happen. In the meantime, however, they seem to be an airline waiting to happen. Time will tell.
This blog was originally published on flight.org in 2006.
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Yes, I stand corrected. Many of the South Africans obtained NZ and Aussie nationality. When the left SA the future was far some certain. I guess I always considered him South African. G
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I met a retired ex-pat captain who flew one of the heavy KAL tri-jets (I think) with a flight engineer. He said that every command given to his Korean FO was refererred back to the older flight engineer, by means of an anxious glance, for the "the nod". Apparently, by tradition the FE had automatic seniority because of his age.
He said the whole time he felt like he had "a saboteur on the flight deck."
And someone else descibed an ex-pat Captain and local FO fighting with opposite yoke inputs on a take off - captain pulling up & FO pushing forward. Eventually smacked the nose down and wrote off the hull. Can anyone verify that caper?
He said the whole time he felt like he had "a saboteur on the flight deck."
And someone else descibed an ex-pat Captain and local FO fighting with opposite yoke inputs on a take off - captain pulling up & FO pushing forward. Eventually smacked the nose down and wrote off the hull. Can anyone verify that caper?
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Having worked in Korea for 5 years, I can verify that the Korean culture has direct safety impacts on the flight. Whether you like or dislike the culture is a matter of personal opinion, but it definitely does not belong on a flight deck.
Some of the FO's and Captains I flew with were really nice, but the entire experience I had was one that made me really dislike going to work. The Korean work environment is one of hostility, stress and they constantly worry about everything.
Some of the FO's and Captains I flew with were really nice, but the entire experience I had was one that made me really dislike going to work. The Korean work environment is one of hostility, stress and they constantly worry about everything.
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Having worked in Korea for 5 years, I can verify that the Korean culture has direct safety impacts on the flight. Whether you like or dislike the culture is a matter of personal opinion, but it definitely does not belong on a flight deck.
A friend of mine spent two years there on a 744 command contract. He mentioned there were some 'testing' moments. For example, when he emerged from the bunk on cessation of his scheduled rest to find he was alone on the flight deck! After that incident, he always took his rest in the seat.
Two years was enough for him.
Two years was enough for him.
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Airbubba,
I think this may be what you are looking for... (not exactly sure)
korean airlines internal audit safety report
I think this may be what you are looking for... (not exactly sure)
korean airlines internal audit safety report
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Interesting thread.
Korea is no different than China, Japan or any other Asian country.
If western pilots look for Jobs in Asia is because their options are scarse.
Korean Air is not a bad place to work, one must realize that this is the best commuting contract right now. There are hundreds of pilots applying every month, but the failure rate are fairly high. Korean Air has reputation for being the worse place to work, but other airlines in Asia are worse than Korean Air, Been there Done that, not to mention airlines in Arab countries.
So, If you want to join KAL, rest assured that you will get your days off as planned, your family will be seated in business class with confirmed space (Economy upgrade to Prestige class), and IF you are smart, you’ll remain quiet and do KAL procedures.
Fly Safe.
Korea is no different than China, Japan or any other Asian country.
If western pilots look for Jobs in Asia is because their options are scarse.
Korean Air is not a bad place to work, one must realize that this is the best commuting contract right now. There are hundreds of pilots applying every month, but the failure rate are fairly high. Korean Air has reputation for being the worse place to work, but other airlines in Asia are worse than Korean Air, Been there Done that, not to mention airlines in Arab countries.
So, If you want to join KAL, rest assured that you will get your days off as planned, your family will be seated in business class with confirmed space (Economy upgrade to Prestige class), and IF you are smart, you’ll remain quiet and do KAL procedures.
Fly Safe.
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Zekeigo:
You forgot one other detail. It's OK if a korean employee wants to assault you.
So, If you want to join KAL, rest assured that you will get your days off as planned, your family will be seated in business class with confirmed space (Economy upgrade to Prestige class), and IF you are smart, you’ll remain quiet and do KAL procedures.
Fly Safe.
Fly Safe.
you’ll remain quiet and do KAL procedures
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KAL
Korean Air is not a bad place to work, one must realize that this is the best commuting contract right now. There are hundreds of pilots applying every month, but the failure rate are fairly high. Korean Air has reputation for being the worse place to work, but other airlines in Asia are worse than Korean Air, Been there Done that, not to mention airlines in Arab countries.
Yep. I tell guys that are thinking about coming to KAL it's what you make of it. You can be happy or unhappy, it's your choice. Nothing is perfect and that's why I ended up here, looking for something a little better than what I had. KAL is not perfect but it's much better than where I was before. So keep your head down, do the best you can with the procedures, and take your days off as planned.
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I got this one sent through from a buddy of mine who bailed from KAL after 12 months. His crewing company wanted to know why he was leaving, so he told 'em. Pretty much sums it up....
Hi Xxxxxx,
The shrinking value of the USD, the attitude to the foreign pilots, the lack of adequate training and the poor attitude to flight safety are all reasons to leave KAL.
I have been told that the last time the foreign pilot reps approached the company about the non-competitive salary package, they were told it was not going to change and it was none of their business. The Korean crews would obviously be happy to see all of us go, but I fear for the flying public if that happens. When the foreign training advisor was asked to gather information on current issues concerning the foreign pilot group, he was made a pariah and accused of trying to form a union. The manager who asked him to gather the information denied ever making the request. The foreign manager resigned from his post as a result. A sad loss for Korean (although I doubt they looked at it that way), as the few foreigners who work in flight ops management really do try to make a difference.
The failure rate for the interview process is purely the result of the union pilots input at the simulator stage. The state of serviceability of the 777 simulator is a complete joke for a major airline. Candidates are sometimes asked to do irrelevant and ridiculous tasks and are failed for nonsense. From what I have seen of the skill level of the local KAL crews, few, if any of them would ever pass the interview and simulator. KAL needs more foreign pilots, not just to make up the numbers, but because the standard of many of the Korean crews is abysmal. If they are to continue on their current accident free run, more Korean pilots are not the answer. I realise you make your living employing pilots for KAL, but if I knew 18 months ago what I know now about KAL, I would not have applied. After a while I guess some people can become immune to what is going on around them, but I found it very frustrating.
I have kept records of some of the ridiculous incidents that have taken place during my tenure at KAL, and of the attitudes of the crews I have flown with, and their responses to those incidents. The average Korean pilots understanding of the aircraft he is flying and of the operation in general is very limited. You can teach a monkey to follow a procedure, but not to understand what he is trying to achieve. When something out of the ordinary happens, they are all at sea.
The poor standards are not entirely the Korean pilots fault. Korean managements attitude to safety is appalling. Hardly surprising when you consider they have a raffle every couple of years and change all the managers. People are not promoted to management because they have any talent or ability, let alone a desire to see things change for the better. They run the airline like a private club. There is no continuity or accountability at the flight operations management level. They send us emails about improving safety, but nobody ever replied or even acknowledged any emails I sent. The changes to CAT3 operations last year were a classic example. None of the line crews I flew with understood what they were doing. At a recurrent ground school a local LCP admitted he had no clue either, and when I explained the correct procedures to he and two local FO's told me that I did not understand the concept of all weather operations (I must have been wrong for the past 18 years). Recurrent tests and exams are always accompanied by a set of answers, so there is no attempt to improve knowledge or standards, just to make sure everyone passes and the operation continues. My radio licence test consisted of attending a classroom to watch the movie "Flightplan" (with Jodie Foster) and an 80's movie about a couple of guys ferrying Pawnees across the Pacific. Attendance was mandatory. Bored out of my skull, I slept through the second movie. My Radio Licence turned up a few weeks later.
I have attended two safety meetings, which local management are supposed to attend. On both occasions they were absent during the meetings and only turned up for the free buffet and drinks after the meeting. We received notices to flight crew that were only published in Korean. When I found mistakes in the Oral test for my annual check, the Korean version of the test was changed, but not the English version. On both of my final line checks I was exposed to incompetence and interference from my 'supporting' LCP's. Their knowledge of the aircraft is appalling and their idea of competence is to be able to quote procedures parrot fashion without understanding what they are doing, or even if it is appropriate to the situation. Everything is a competition and comes down to who is right, rather than what is right. My LIP (who had an extremely poor command of English) gave me bad grades because I followed SOP rather than follow his unsafe, non-standard, "time saving" techniques. When I queried this he threw my training folder at me and fed me a bull**** line about how the chief pilot told him he could do it the SOP way or his own way. He struggled on the radio on most of our training sectors and did not exhibit a single trait that would have made him an instructor in any other airline. Another expat pilot told me he had the same instructor when he joined and experienced similar problems.
Crews refuse to de-ice their aircraft because they consider it macho to take off with an ice covered aeroplane. I have had debates with Korean captains on more than one occasion about the state of the aircraft, and have been challenged by ground engineers for recommending to the operating captain that we remove the ice and snow that was evident on the aircraft. An auditor told me how de-icing staff were caught diluting de-icing fluid and selling the balance back to the fluid provider, and then signing the fluid off as 100%.
I have operated flights where, for 10 hours, the Korean first officer refuses to speak to me because he doesn't like foreigners. This is after I have introduced myself and done everything possible to be extremely polite and accommodating. I have spent almost 4 hours in the cockpit without any contact from the cabin. The cabin crew close all the window shades immediately after takeoff regardless of what time of day it is, so if the cockpit crew were asleep, dead or whatever and the aircraft was intercepted, nobody would know. Maybe another KAL 007 incident would change that. We are required to attend a briefing before every flight with the cabin crew, and if the operating captain is Korean, the whole thing is done in Korean. When I brief, the cabin crew understand little if any of what I say, (if their subsequent questions are any indication). CRM is non-existent and there is often a palpable animosity between flight and cabin crew.
We are forced to fly with all radios blaring, the loudspeaker turned up and a headset on, with cabin calls, PA's, radio chatter and ATC all mixed into one garbled barrage of sound. Apparently this is so we don't miss any ATC calls. Of course, it has the opposite effect, but it's a procedure, so it must be followed without regard for common sense. Crews ask me to be a safety pilot and then conduct all their briefings and conversation in Korean and ignore me when I point out threats to safety. I have seen crews attempt to descend through their cleared level and then argue with me that they are right, attempt to taxi across active runways when told to hold short, ignore ATC speed instructions, fight with each other over who is right, captains yelling at FO's...all the things that KAL supposedly don't do any more. Colleagues have seen worse than this. I won't act as safety pilot any more as my presence on the flight deck in the event of any incident will no doubt see the finger pointed at me for not preventing the situation.
Dispatchers have a poor command of English, so any problems arising from incorrect or nonsensical flight plans are difficult to resolve. They assume they are in command of the flight and come up with ridiculous responses to serious situations. Yet the Korean crews will follow the dispatchers guidance without question. A 747 with smoke in the cockpit was told to continue, as was a 777 mid-Pacific with a fuel leak. The 747 avoided disaster through pure chance. Luckily the 777 had an expat on board and diverted to Anchorage.
I don't think it's a matter of if KAL have another accident, but when. They simply don't want to change their poor safety culture because it may be painful and involve some short term loss of face for the older guys. Making English the required language for all flight operations staff (and enforcing the rule) would be a good start. Crews always fall back on the few manuals that are published in Korean, and ignore those that are only presented in English. Doing away with the Korean books would be difficult for a while but would ultimately improve operations, crew knowledge and understanding, and ultimately safety.
It could the best airline, and should be the best job in the world, but the Koreans don't seem to want that to happen.
Regards,
Xxxxxx Xxxxxxxxx
Hi Xxxxxx,
The shrinking value of the USD, the attitude to the foreign pilots, the lack of adequate training and the poor attitude to flight safety are all reasons to leave KAL.
I have been told that the last time the foreign pilot reps approached the company about the non-competitive salary package, they were told it was not going to change and it was none of their business. The Korean crews would obviously be happy to see all of us go, but I fear for the flying public if that happens. When the foreign training advisor was asked to gather information on current issues concerning the foreign pilot group, he was made a pariah and accused of trying to form a union. The manager who asked him to gather the information denied ever making the request. The foreign manager resigned from his post as a result. A sad loss for Korean (although I doubt they looked at it that way), as the few foreigners who work in flight ops management really do try to make a difference.
The failure rate for the interview process is purely the result of the union pilots input at the simulator stage. The state of serviceability of the 777 simulator is a complete joke for a major airline. Candidates are sometimes asked to do irrelevant and ridiculous tasks and are failed for nonsense. From what I have seen of the skill level of the local KAL crews, few, if any of them would ever pass the interview and simulator. KAL needs more foreign pilots, not just to make up the numbers, but because the standard of many of the Korean crews is abysmal. If they are to continue on their current accident free run, more Korean pilots are not the answer. I realise you make your living employing pilots for KAL, but if I knew 18 months ago what I know now about KAL, I would not have applied. After a while I guess some people can become immune to what is going on around them, but I found it very frustrating.
I have kept records of some of the ridiculous incidents that have taken place during my tenure at KAL, and of the attitudes of the crews I have flown with, and their responses to those incidents. The average Korean pilots understanding of the aircraft he is flying and of the operation in general is very limited. You can teach a monkey to follow a procedure, but not to understand what he is trying to achieve. When something out of the ordinary happens, they are all at sea.
The poor standards are not entirely the Korean pilots fault. Korean managements attitude to safety is appalling. Hardly surprising when you consider they have a raffle every couple of years and change all the managers. People are not promoted to management because they have any talent or ability, let alone a desire to see things change for the better. They run the airline like a private club. There is no continuity or accountability at the flight operations management level. They send us emails about improving safety, but nobody ever replied or even acknowledged any emails I sent. The changes to CAT3 operations last year were a classic example. None of the line crews I flew with understood what they were doing. At a recurrent ground school a local LCP admitted he had no clue either, and when I explained the correct procedures to he and two local FO's told me that I did not understand the concept of all weather operations (I must have been wrong for the past 18 years). Recurrent tests and exams are always accompanied by a set of answers, so there is no attempt to improve knowledge or standards, just to make sure everyone passes and the operation continues. My radio licence test consisted of attending a classroom to watch the movie "Flightplan" (with Jodie Foster) and an 80's movie about a couple of guys ferrying Pawnees across the Pacific. Attendance was mandatory. Bored out of my skull, I slept through the second movie. My Radio Licence turned up a few weeks later.
I have attended two safety meetings, which local management are supposed to attend. On both occasions they were absent during the meetings and only turned up for the free buffet and drinks after the meeting. We received notices to flight crew that were only published in Korean. When I found mistakes in the Oral test for my annual check, the Korean version of the test was changed, but not the English version. On both of my final line checks I was exposed to incompetence and interference from my 'supporting' LCP's. Their knowledge of the aircraft is appalling and their idea of competence is to be able to quote procedures parrot fashion without understanding what they are doing, or even if it is appropriate to the situation. Everything is a competition and comes down to who is right, rather than what is right. My LIP (who had an extremely poor command of English) gave me bad grades because I followed SOP rather than follow his unsafe, non-standard, "time saving" techniques. When I queried this he threw my training folder at me and fed me a bull**** line about how the chief pilot told him he could do it the SOP way or his own way. He struggled on the radio on most of our training sectors and did not exhibit a single trait that would have made him an instructor in any other airline. Another expat pilot told me he had the same instructor when he joined and experienced similar problems.
Crews refuse to de-ice their aircraft because they consider it macho to take off with an ice covered aeroplane. I have had debates with Korean captains on more than one occasion about the state of the aircraft, and have been challenged by ground engineers for recommending to the operating captain that we remove the ice and snow that was evident on the aircraft. An auditor told me how de-icing staff were caught diluting de-icing fluid and selling the balance back to the fluid provider, and then signing the fluid off as 100%.
I have operated flights where, for 10 hours, the Korean first officer refuses to speak to me because he doesn't like foreigners. This is after I have introduced myself and done everything possible to be extremely polite and accommodating. I have spent almost 4 hours in the cockpit without any contact from the cabin. The cabin crew close all the window shades immediately after takeoff regardless of what time of day it is, so if the cockpit crew were asleep, dead or whatever and the aircraft was intercepted, nobody would know. Maybe another KAL 007 incident would change that. We are required to attend a briefing before every flight with the cabin crew, and if the operating captain is Korean, the whole thing is done in Korean. When I brief, the cabin crew understand little if any of what I say, (if their subsequent questions are any indication). CRM is non-existent and there is often a palpable animosity between flight and cabin crew.
We are forced to fly with all radios blaring, the loudspeaker turned up and a headset on, with cabin calls, PA's, radio chatter and ATC all mixed into one garbled barrage of sound. Apparently this is so we don't miss any ATC calls. Of course, it has the opposite effect, but it's a procedure, so it must be followed without regard for common sense. Crews ask me to be a safety pilot and then conduct all their briefings and conversation in Korean and ignore me when I point out threats to safety. I have seen crews attempt to descend through their cleared level and then argue with me that they are right, attempt to taxi across active runways when told to hold short, ignore ATC speed instructions, fight with each other over who is right, captains yelling at FO's...all the things that KAL supposedly don't do any more. Colleagues have seen worse than this. I won't act as safety pilot any more as my presence on the flight deck in the event of any incident will no doubt see the finger pointed at me for not preventing the situation.
Dispatchers have a poor command of English, so any problems arising from incorrect or nonsensical flight plans are difficult to resolve. They assume they are in command of the flight and come up with ridiculous responses to serious situations. Yet the Korean crews will follow the dispatchers guidance without question. A 747 with smoke in the cockpit was told to continue, as was a 777 mid-Pacific with a fuel leak. The 747 avoided disaster through pure chance. Luckily the 777 had an expat on board and diverted to Anchorage.
I don't think it's a matter of if KAL have another accident, but when. They simply don't want to change their poor safety culture because it may be painful and involve some short term loss of face for the older guys. Making English the required language for all flight operations staff (and enforcing the rule) would be a good start. Crews always fall back on the few manuals that are published in Korean, and ignore those that are only presented in English. Doing away with the Korean books would be difficult for a while but would ultimately improve operations, crew knowledge and understanding, and ultimately safety.
It could the best airline, and should be the best job in the world, but the Koreans don't seem to want that to happen.
Regards,
Xxxxxx Xxxxxxxxx