I was simply referring to the fact that the sidestick issue seems to come up, rightly or wrongly, in about all threads concerning Airbus aircraft (see AF447 and Emirates EK407)
This emoticon was supposed to express some cynicism.
"Probably too complicated for a PA38 pilot to understand"
Are you always so fast in jumping to conclusions? And BTW: I have never flown a PA38. Hopefully your "engineering" was of a higher standard than your typing.
Last edited by KiloMikePapa; 20th Dec 2011 at 12:59.
Reason: Corrected a reference to keep lakerman happy
From reading the report, the FCPC commanded a pitch down for 2 seconds, during which time the captain was unable to counteract the pitch down using stick back commands. Thus this incident was due to erroneous protection activation, which the flight crew was unable to override.
this is the key difference between the 777 indicidents and the A330 incident.
Obviously both systems are very safe, but the efficacy of flight control systems, should, IMHO, be continually reevaluated and changed if required, and this report seems to well serve this purpose.
In 1.1.5 it is written "The crew advised that, because the autotrim was not working, they thought the flight control system was in direct law."
Previously they also said that the crew received an ECAM warning advising them they were in Alternate law. Is that the only indication the crew gets when the aircraft goes from one law to another? A ECAM message that could be buried below the rest if the crew don't deal with them? Or is there some kind of clear other indication when switching laws?
Note that the aircraft never went in to direct law but remained in alternate law for the rest of the flight.
The magazine Information Week, has an assessment that references the same final report and highlights the software programming error:
... according to the final report on the incident from the ATSB, the problem wasn't just a faulty ADIRU, but also a programming error involving the flight computers. In particular, the airplane software wasn't written to handle an event in which an ADIRU began outputting erroneous data at regular intervals.
Notably, the flight computers averaged the angle of attack data from two of the ADIRUs to compute the airplane's true angle of attack. If the data from the two ADIRUs significantly differed, however, then the flight computers discarded the values and used the one they'd computed 1.2 seconds prior. But investigators said that the algorithm couldn't handle an episode in which an ADIRU began feeding erroneous information at 1.2-second intervals. That led to the flight computers computing an incorrect angle-of-attack reading, causing it to execute the two dives, one of which subjected passengers to forces of 0.8 G.
They then report on the rarity of the event but programming was a key factor of the upset, once the initial failure had occurred.
Passenger compensation, $400k for a near death experience
ABC (Australia) news reporting today that a payout of up to US$400k has been offered to injured passengers. Some passengers have said that they would refuse the payout and take a class action to the aircraft manufacturer and Northrop Grumman for "millions of $"
Leaving your seat belt is for your own protection against natural courses. It is not rectification for foreseeable injury caused by normal use of the aircraft (aka if they know the data is wrong 1.2 seconds ago, why did it use it 1.2 seconds later instead of the closest correct data to that point). That is a foreseeable problem for any reasonable programmer in their position designing that system. This is different from how it is not reasonably possible to make a perfect system.
There can be contribution from a person, but it would not be reasonable to expect a person to sit there for the whole flight never getting out of the seat. Also they did not add to the cause of the aircraft inflicting damage. It would be minimal contribution by the people at best.
Think of it like a car. If I make a case where it does not break under conditions because of a 0.00001P chance when the system could have been reasonable designed and foreseeable against this flaw, then the fact the guy is not wearing a helmet to stop head injuries is irreverent.
That's like saying run quickly now because I'm going to fire an RPG at you. The fact I told you to run quickly does not change the fact I fired an RPG at you.
A considerable reason in this is people are not meant to sit still for a long haul flight. DTV is a prime example of this. Your bladder too. While it is a good safety requirement to protect against the unknown external forces, it is not a defense against an accidence of their own cause.
Another way to think of it is I drive a wide load truck down the street with a at 5am every day. Some day I will be going down one street and hit something because the truck is too big. The fact I had lights flashing on top does not mean I am not responsible for the damage. If someone walked in front of the truck, then no as that would be a proactive contribution. I will have to anticipate this cost will occur sometime, that's why I get insurance from an insurance company (which for tax purposes is actually very similar to an investment fund). I could counter this by placing sensors all over the truck, and doing so may be able to lower my insurance costs.
Some of the injured passengers may have been in their seats with their belts securely fastened but were injured by passengers who weren't.
I'd be interesting if those passengers injured by other passengers not wearing their belts file law suits against them for negligence. If successful, this may then encourage more people to fasten their belts when seated.