Crash-Cork Airport
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Not sure why so many are obsessed with the issue of Manx2.com being a virtual airline. Sweden, for example, if full of them (just think of all those "xyz-flygs"). The criticism always seems to relate to the use of Spanish, German or Czech airlines - I have not seen Links Air being mentioned here. So one could get funny feeling that behind the criticism is the idea that only airlines from the UK can provide a decent, safe and proper service....
From my point of view (as far as the travelling public's perception is concerned), franchising is not much better that the manx2.com concept as the image is created that the passenger is doing business with someone else than he actually is . or maybe even worse as usually a much trusted brand is being franchised.
From my point of view (as far as the travelling public's perception is concerned), franchising is not much better that the manx2.com concept as the image is created that the passenger is doing business with someone else than he actually is . or maybe even worse as usually a much trusted brand is being franchised.
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Virginblue - I don't think that anyone is saying that only UK airlines are capable of safe operations. What really matters is who is whom do you seek redress from in the case of delays, contractual issues and god forbid, injuries? In a franchising or sub-contracted operation, it's the name on the ticket. But when a ticket seller gets involved, they take the cash but not the risk. Manx2's website implied that it was an airline. Then following a crash with their logo on the tail, they ceased operations. Sloping sholders? Another similar organisation even has the cheek to say that its flights are on time. But they don't have any flights - or do they? I think ticket selling organisations must clearly state in big letters "WE ONLY TAKE CASH, NOT RESPONSIBILITY. FOR CLAIMS, CONTACT..." on the top of every communication. It's not sexy but there again, neither is their business style. It stinks!
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From the Irish Times - date below:
Coroner Court
Wed, Jun 11, 2014, 14:56
A jury has returned verdicts of accidental death at the inquest into the deaths of six people killed when their Manx2 flight crashed in thick fog as it was preparing to land at Cork Airport over three years ago.
The jury of six men and one woman took just over 40 minutes to return the verdicts of accidental death in the case of the two crew and four passengers killed when the Fairchild SA227-BC Metro crashed at Cork Airport on February 10th 2011.
Coroner Court
Wed, Jun 11, 2014, 14:56
A jury has returned verdicts of accidental death at the inquest into the deaths of six people killed when their Manx2 flight crashed in thick fog as it was preparing to land at Cork Airport over three years ago.
The jury of six men and one woman took just over 40 minutes to return the verdicts of accidental death in the case of the two crew and four passengers killed when the Fairchild SA227-BC Metro crashed at Cork Airport on February 10th 2011.
Have been following this thread from the beginging and not being able to fly a plane, I am a master mariner, I have a couple of questions.
Several posters have described the cause of the accident to being below minima.
Marine enquiriess ask 1. Cause of event, and 2. contributing causes.
Did the accident happen because the plane was too low, or did it happen because the plane acted like a bucking bull due to going astern on one engine.
And if the the former is the case, at what height could the plane be recovered from the violent rolls.
Lasltly would that height be greater than the permissable minima for this plane.
Several posters have described the cause of the accident to being below minima.
Marine enquiriess ask 1. Cause of event, and 2. contributing causes.
Did the accident happen because the plane was too low, or did it happen because the plane acted like a bucking bull due to going astern on one engine.
And if the the former is the case, at what height could the plane be recovered from the violent rolls.
Lasltly would that height be greater than the permissable minima for this plane.
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Interesting challenge to select a single cause. Perhaps easier to consider the primary hazard, the ground.
Continuing towards the ground, i.e; below minimums, without being able to see it should, for any reasonable person, introduce an escalation of risk that is unacceptable. In addition, proximity to the ground reduces the time available to diagnose and apply the correct recovery action.
Add inexperience, both pilots manipulating but not co-ordinating the aircrafts primary controls, increased stress levels, tiredness, etc this may well be classified by the coroner as an accident but to aviation, and maritime, proessionals this event was predictable albeit the magnitude was not.
Rolling or excessively banking this aircraft would take it beyond certified limits and into the realms of upset recovery (UR) for the crew. These are not practised in the real, commercial, world and not accurately modelled in the simulated world, but nevertheless should be recoverable with sufficient altitude. Generally, 'below minimums' is insufficient altitude to recover from such an upset.
Continuing towards the ground, i.e; below minimums, without being able to see it should, for any reasonable person, introduce an escalation of risk that is unacceptable. In addition, proximity to the ground reduces the time available to diagnose and apply the correct recovery action.
Add inexperience, both pilots manipulating but not co-ordinating the aircrafts primary controls, increased stress levels, tiredness, etc this may well be classified by the coroner as an accident but to aviation, and maritime, proessionals this event was predictable albeit the magnitude was not.
Rolling or excessively banking this aircraft would take it beyond certified limits and into the realms of upset recovery (UR) for the crew. These are not practised in the real, commercial, world and not accurately modelled in the simulated world, but nevertheless should be recoverable with sufficient altitude. Generally, 'below minimums' is insufficient altitude to recover from such an upset.
Last edited by darkbarly; 6th Jul 2014 at 15:13. Reason: typo
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Reefrat: The aircraft was not being flown correctly. It appears the last part of the approach, when they were lower than their discussion height, was flown too slowly. This resulted in a loss of control when they initiated a go-around. Never be low and slow.
Additionally, a public transport aircraft should be remain controllable at all times, when on the ground or in the air following the failure of any engine. So if an engine failed or spooled up at a different rate to the other, that still should not have been a problem. But a turboprop engine producing reverse is generally a terminal event (as ever, there are some exceptions). Because if this, interlocks are fitted to prevent reverse selection in flight. But when one engine does produce reverse thrust in flight, it will not produce a "bucking bronco." Something far more violent occurs: one wing stops flying, drops and the aircraft yaws and rolls after it. This is often unrecoverable even from thousands of feet (Luxair 9642), let alone close to the ground. I do not believe it is flight tested and there is no requirement to do so. And to put things in perspective, the decision height for a Cat I ILS is generally in the order 200' AGL.
Why this crew flew below the decision height on multiple occasions is the interesting question. Whatever the reason/s, there are certain failings we all suffer from. Amongst these, you'll often find that crews are often their own worst enemies and push things too far. Others work for dreadful employers who won't pay them for diversions or late arrivals. Others expect them to perform tasks which can only done by licensed engineers. Others work without proper supervision. The AAIU have prepared a very interesting report on this one.
Additionally, a public transport aircraft should be remain controllable at all times, when on the ground or in the air following the failure of any engine. So if an engine failed or spooled up at a different rate to the other, that still should not have been a problem. But a turboprop engine producing reverse is generally a terminal event (as ever, there are some exceptions). Because if this, interlocks are fitted to prevent reverse selection in flight. But when one engine does produce reverse thrust in flight, it will not produce a "bucking bronco." Something far more violent occurs: one wing stops flying, drops and the aircraft yaws and rolls after it. This is often unrecoverable even from thousands of feet (Luxair 9642), let alone close to the ground. I do not believe it is flight tested and there is no requirement to do so. And to put things in perspective, the decision height for a Cat I ILS is generally in the order 200' AGL.
Why this crew flew below the decision height on multiple occasions is the interesting question. Whatever the reason/s, there are certain failings we all suffer from. Amongst these, you'll often find that crews are often their own worst enemies and push things too far. Others work for dreadful employers who won't pay them for diversions or late arrivals. Others expect them to perform tasks which can only done by licensed engineers. Others work without proper supervision. The AAIU have prepared a very interesting report on this one.
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Its all about energy.
Low height you have low potential energy.
Low speed and you have low kinetic energy.
You need energy to recover from any mistake.
Up high you can recover, and if your going fast you can recover.
If you have neither you don't.
Low height you have low potential energy.
Low speed and you have low kinetic energy.
You need energy to recover from any mistake.
Up high you can recover, and if your going fast you can recover.
If you have neither you don't.
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This crash fundamentally had sod-all to do with 'energy' or anything like that.
It was all about decisions. Decisions to do a third approach when the visibility was below minimums for that approach, and then continue that approach busting two sets of minimums.
FULL STOP.
It was all about decisions. Decisions to do a third approach when the visibility was below minimums for that approach, and then continue that approach busting two sets of minimums.
FULL STOP.
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the thing is Trossie I am willing to bet that the skipper had done it several times before as a FO and survived.
I agree it wouldn't have happened to me because I would have never made an approach in the first place.
The comment was more for our Ship master to relate to his expert knowledge on ship handling which to be honest in my experience is far harder in confined spaces with a large vessel than landing an aircraft.
I agree it wouldn't have happened to me because I would have never made an approach in the first place.
The comment was more for our Ship master to relate to his expert knowledge on ship handling which to be honest in my experience is far harder in confined spaces with a large vessel than landing an aircraft.
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You will find that that is very much what the AAIU reported, the problem is that when people bust these very clearly laid down rules that are there to AVOID crashes like this, organisations like the AAIU then have all the tedious extra work of trying to find contributing factors. And, of course, those comments are not 'for free', they are taken from information detailed in the AAIU report!
(You're not one of those 'limits busters' yourself are you?)
(You're not one of those 'limits busters' yourself are you?)
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This crash fundamentally had sod-all to do with 'energy' or anything like that.
It was all about decisions. Decisions to do a third approach when the visibility was below minimums for that approach, and then continue that approach busting two sets of minimums.
FULL STOP.
It was all about decisions. Decisions to do a third approach when the visibility was below minimums for that approach, and then continue that approach busting two sets of minimums.
FULL STOP.
I agree that busting limits is a no-no, but I would be mindful that other, less experienced aviators reading such emphatic thoughts might conclude that 200' is perfectly safe.
It provides for an acceptable level of safety, that's all. 300` is safer but unacceptable commercially. There's a trade off, of course.
What is clear is that any crew stepping out the box of standards, and there are many limits within this, increase significantly the likelihood of a bad outcome where there are other unforeseen system (organisational) failures.
To conclude that it was the crews actions alone sets us back 30 years and endorses poor crew training, poor operational control and supervision, inadequate state oversight and the need to apportion blame.
Did the accident happen because the plane was too low, or did it happen because the plane acted like a bucking bull due to going astern on one engine.
And if the the former is the case, at what height could the plane be recovered from the violent rolls.
I am still a bit confused, my real question was how at what altitude could you recover from self induced stall of the port wing
And if the the former is the case, at what height could the plane be recovered from the violent rolls.
I am still a bit confused, my real question was how at what altitude could you recover from self induced stall of the port wing
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Well in general if you screw up high up you can covert your potential energy into kinetic and get away with it.
But you do have certain situations such as spinning.
Which require more height, a lot more height.
And to be honest it depends on who is on the stick how much you will use.
Similar to boats at lower speeds the controls are less effective. It is not a speed regime that commercial pilots are used to be in especially if they do their recurrent checks on the aircraft.
there is also a thing called Vmca
There are loads of factors, which as the Captain you have to make sure you don't put your self in the position of being exposed to these factors.
The development of a Captain starts the first day they step into a cockpit, it doesn't matter how much theory you pump into them they get led by the Captains they fly with. I very much doubt the Captain made what he did up on the day.
You also have to think about the time scale involved at the speeds and rates of decent we are talking about. At the normal 700-800ft per min approach decent rate 50ft is only 4 seconds. Which doesn't give you a lot of time to sort things out. Which is why most Captains would have been flying it themselves and not allowing a low houred FO to fly the approach.
Here is a video of a fully automated airbus doing a landing in better conditions than they had on the day.
.
And this one in slightly worse.
It very hard to describe the final moments of a minimums approach, your adrenaline is up from 200ft its see the lights and 20 seconds later your on the ground. The beating your body gets from hormones just doing a successful approach once is quite high but, to then put it through the same thing 3 times they will have been in a form of battle shock getting low on energy and I wouldn't be surprised if the FO's limbs will have been twitching with having coming up and down off an adrenaline high so often with no real time to recover. He won't have been used to it with his experience he must have been terrified. Even after a minimums legal landing inexperienced FO's are buzzing on the adrenalin. Doing it three times will have used up all his ready energy and his body will have been in emergency mode with its reduction in reaction times and performance both physical and mental.
From the CVR recording it went from everything illegal but seeming OK to crash in 2 seconds.
But you do have certain situations such as spinning.
Which require more height, a lot more height.
And to be honest it depends on who is on the stick how much you will use.
Similar to boats at lower speeds the controls are less effective. It is not a speed regime that commercial pilots are used to be in especially if they do their recurrent checks on the aircraft.
there is also a thing called Vmca
There are loads of factors, which as the Captain you have to make sure you don't put your self in the position of being exposed to these factors.
The development of a Captain starts the first day they step into a cockpit, it doesn't matter how much theory you pump into them they get led by the Captains they fly with. I very much doubt the Captain made what he did up on the day.
You also have to think about the time scale involved at the speeds and rates of decent we are talking about. At the normal 700-800ft per min approach decent rate 50ft is only 4 seconds. Which doesn't give you a lot of time to sort things out. Which is why most Captains would have been flying it themselves and not allowing a low houred FO to fly the approach.
Here is a video of a fully automated airbus doing a landing in better conditions than they had on the day.
And this one in slightly worse.
It very hard to describe the final moments of a minimums approach, your adrenaline is up from 200ft its see the lights and 20 seconds later your on the ground. The beating your body gets from hormones just doing a successful approach once is quite high but, to then put it through the same thing 3 times they will have been in a form of battle shock getting low on energy and I wouldn't be surprised if the FO's limbs will have been twitching with having coming up and down off an adrenaline high so often with no real time to recover. He won't have been used to it with his experience he must have been terrified. Even after a minimums legal landing inexperienced FO's are buzzing on the adrenalin. Doing it three times will have used up all his ready energy and his body will have been in emergency mode with its reduction in reaction times and performance both physical and mental.
From the CVR recording it went from everything illegal but seeming OK to crash in 2 seconds.
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Direct from the AAIU report:
Please note the first two. Yes, the others are there too, but after those first two.
mad jock, I think that those videos are very good for putting this into context. Just to add to them, everyone should realise that in both of them the aeroplanes were being flown by autopilot, a requirement for those approaches. The aeroplane in the Cork crash incident had no autopilot.
The Investigation identified the following factors as being significant:
- The approach was continued in conditions of poor visibility below those required.
- The descent was continued below the Decision Height without adequate visual reference being acquired.
- Uncoordinated operation of the flight and engine controls when go-around was attempted. The engine power-levers were retarded below the normal in-flight operational range, an action prohibited in flight.
- A power difference between the engines became significant when the engine power levers were retarded below the normal in-flight range.
- Tiredness and fatigue on the part of the Flight Crew members.
- Inadequate command training and checking.
- Inappropriate pairing of Flight Crew members, and
- Inadequate oversight of the remote Operation by the Operator and the State of the Operator.
- The approach was continued in conditions of poor visibility below those required.
- The descent was continued below the Decision Height without adequate visual reference being acquired.
- Uncoordinated operation of the flight and engine controls when go-around was attempted. The engine power-levers were retarded below the normal in-flight operational range, an action prohibited in flight.
- A power difference between the engines became significant when the engine power levers were retarded below the normal in-flight range.
- Tiredness and fatigue on the part of the Flight Crew members.
- Inadequate command training and checking.
- Inappropriate pairing of Flight Crew members, and
- Inadequate oversight of the remote Operation by the Operator and the State of the Operator.
mad jock, I think that those videos are very good for putting this into context. Just to add to them, everyone should realise that in both of them the aeroplanes were being flown by autopilot, a requirement for those approaches. The aeroplane in the Cork crash incident had no autopilot.
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Wasn't this tragedy a result of the decision to go around with different pilots hands on throttle and stick.
But, possibly, an equal factor was the decision to go around at all. If you're stabilised and bang on gs and loc, why not just continue?
But, possibly, an equal factor was the decision to go around at all. If you're stabilised and bang on gs and loc, why not just continue?
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Metroliner crash
Fairchild Swearingen Metroliner - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
I seem to remember the Bearskin crash at Mirabel airport where there was a gear failure involved. See link above.........
I further remember that these aircraft when passing over my house on climb out had very noisy props and, according to one pilot I knew, it was a hot landing airplane.
I seem to remember the Bearskin crash at Mirabel airport where there was a gear failure involved. See link above.........
I further remember that these aircraft when passing over my house on climb out had very noisy props and, according to one pilot I knew, it was a hot landing airplane.
Drain Bamaged
Fairchild Swearingen Metroliner - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
I seem to remember the Bearskin crash at Mirabel airport where there was a gear failure involved. See link above.........
I further remember that these aircraft when passing over my house on climb out had very noisy props and, according to one pilot I knew, it was a hot landing airplane.
I seem to remember the Bearskin crash at Mirabel airport where there was a gear failure involved. See link above.........
I further remember that these aircraft when passing over my house on climb out had very noisy props and, according to one pilot I knew, it was a hot landing airplane.
A totally different accident from the one involved in this long topic.
Weather was close to minimums but still within limits. They lost control because they....Lost a wing.
They had a fire who started in the wheel well just after taking off rwy 24L In Dorval. Fire extended to the engine, they shut it down.
Polemic at the time was their choice of runway for divertion in Mirabel since another one may have cut down their air time. This was proved wrong in the accident report, rwy 24 at CYMX was a good choice considering all the factors involved.
Never the less, fire did its job, eat up a spar and their left wing broke up on short final.
"If you're stabilised and bang on gs and loc, why not just continue?"
"If you're stabilised and bang on gs and loc, why not just continue?"
I hope this isn't from someone who fits "PP" part of PPRuNe, as it seems to indicate a basic lack of understanding of what minima are for and how they are determined!!
Just because your instruments say you are "stabilised and bang on gs and loc" it does not follow that your flight trajectory is safe to continue below DH!
DH is simply the lowest altitude that the Loc and G/S accuracy can be assured such that a missed approach can be carried out on instruments, without infringing obstacle clearance criteria.
The decision the pilot is required to make at DH is that the visual cues from the "non-instrument" world have enabled him to finish assessing the aircraft's actual position AND actual trajectory, and concluding that BOTH are satisfactory to continue to a landing. If not a go-around is mandatory.
I hope this isn't from someone who fits "PP" part of PPRuNe, as it seems to indicate a basic lack of understanding of what minima are for and how they are determined!!
Just because your instruments say you are "stabilised and bang on gs and loc" it does not follow that your flight trajectory is safe to continue below DH!
DH is simply the lowest altitude that the Loc and G/S accuracy can be assured such that a missed approach can be carried out on instruments, without infringing obstacle clearance criteria.
The decision the pilot is required to make at DH is that the visual cues from the "non-instrument" world have enabled him to finish assessing the aircraft's actual position AND actual trajectory, and concluding that BOTH are satisfactory to continue to a landing. If not a go-around is mandatory.
