JW411

I have absolutely no real desire to contribute to this discussion except for one extraordinary memory that I have of ex-Metro pilots.

About 20 years ago, I was training an ex-RAF pilot who had been flying the Metro, how to fly the BAe146. I could not believe how much aileron he was applying to achieve almost every manoeuvre in the simulator. He soon settled down but we had to go through the same exercise (to a lesser extent) when we got to the BAe146 aeroplane.

A couple of years later, I encountered another pilot with exactly the same problem. "You haven't just been flying Metros have you?" said I. "Yes indeed", said he, "how did you know?".

Then I had a third one!

Perhaps those of you out there who actually know what you are talking about could tell me if it really was necessary to use a lot of aileron on the Metro to make it do what you wanted it to do?

gcal

Jazzkey
I utterly agree with you and said as much in an earlier post which has been wiped. It seems that many posts which do not agree to a strict protocol suffer the same fate; yet others wild beyond exaggeration are allowed to remain.
I do not know how to quote on this forum and it does seem to be not an easy thing to do.

Island Jockey

Based on the photos quite clearly showing a feathered port engine, I would dare to suggest that the right wingtip struck the ground/runway during the inversion sequence due to an engine out at go-around, and was not the cause but already an effect.

On the TPE331 Engine the Prop will feather if the engine shuts down. During normal shut down the Pilot selects HP fuel off and then selects power leaver towards reverse, holds it so the pitch locks in fine. The prop seen in feather does not give 100% indication that it was in feather when the aircraft was still flying.

Livesinafield

Based on the photos quite clearly showing a feathered port engine

Sorry cant use the quote system... lets not get ahead of ourselves here we don't know if it was feathered it just looks that way maybe it is doesn't mean the crew feathered it..(also id say if there was an engine failure at some point its possible we would have herd about it by now unless it happened at the very last minute)

I found somewhere the metro can be operated single crew but in cargo con-fig only...pax has to be 2 crew operation is this due i wonder to the fact theres no cabin crew..?

seriously doubt the new captain would have been paired with a new FO

in my last airline

Hi Locked Door,
Re: DH/A I have pulled the following diagram from ICAO annexe 6 JAR OPS 1 subpart E. I am certainly not trying to evaluate what happened in Cork, but was just taking the opportunity to highlight a common misconception amongst pilots that, 'AT' DH/A you look up and see what you can see and then say LAND or GO-AROUND. The decision must be made BY DH. See below;

http://www.skybrary.aero/images/101010-1.jpg

judge11

'seriously doubt the new captain would have been paired with a new FO' - you might doubt it but you'd better believe it - it happens.

Guys, what is there about this statement:

'Investigators said it would appear at this stage that the aircraft was operating normally until it hit the ground'

that is encouraging many of you to run with this 'engine failure' theory?

Livesinafield

Ahh ok... so is it not a law then? just SOP for a company for e.g in my company I think its 100 hours on type...new capt- FO needs 100 on type...

BALLSOUT

regarding the claims that the aircraft may have rolled inverted because of a port engine failure. If this did happen, it would have rolled to the left, towards the dead engine. This I expect would have taken it to the left of the runway towards the terminal buildings.

judge11

For the 3rd and final time, I promise:

'Investigators said it would appear at this stage that the aircraft was operating normally until it hit the ground'

What is there about this statement that is difficult to understand.

dixi188

JW411

Re. Aileron control on Metro liners.

IIRC, About 20 years ago 2 were certified on the UK register for Ellen Vallan Airlines at Bournemouth. (EVA didn't last long)

They were fitted with longer ailerons due to the CAAs concern over roll control.

I've no idea if this is relevant to the accident though.

sevenstrokeroll

jazzykex...I do take some exception as I have earned a living flying the metroliner (albeit 23plus years ago...jets now thank God). Some of the comments here show an understanding of flying ...granted some are a little too conclusive assuming that the crew feathered the engine/prop is a bit too much of a leap just yet.

I think it is useful for pilots to think about what might have happened...it is like going for a run...are you practicing to run away from a bear? no...but if it happens that you run into a bear, it might help.


It is interesting to note the comments about the RAF instructor and roll control. AS I mentioned the wing was extended...but the ailerons were not. The shorter wing Metro 2/2A was much crisper in roll control.

It is simply very easy to over control an airplane with limited visual reference. I've also wondered what the fuel state and position of one ''crossflow'' valve is/was.

The metro does not have powered ailerons and feels a bit stiff. I've also flown the BAE146 (briefly thank God) and it feels much lighter on the controls.

I wrote an article about transitioning to visual, and if you google: transitioning to visual, you might find it on the avweb site.

If the crash was caused by visual miscues, losing sight of the runway in the flare, or any of the problems in the last few seconds of landing, it should be a wakeup call for more training.

It is quite foggy in the central valley of California, where I flew the metroliner. Also flew a great deal into the one airport selected for ''blind landing'' experiements due to is fog (arcata/eureka). Things can get dicey and the only way to learn is by experience, flying with someone who has ''been there and done that''.

IslandPilot

judge11, the qualifying word is "appear" - the full story will not emerge until the FDR/CVR data has been analysed

IslandPilot

well said sevenstrokeroll, we learn by others experiences

BALLSOUT

gudge11.
I am not suggesting there was an engine failure, in fact I thought my statement was suggesting there wasn't.
Anyone considered the possability that the left engine simply ran down due to fuel starvation as the aircraft rolled to the right and the fuel pick ups in the left tank ran dry?

On_The_Top_Bunk

Are you serious or have you just come back from daycare classes?

SATCOS WHIPPING BOY

This particular incident has brought me back to PPRuNe.

I am no longer an ATCO - (I retired a long while back) but the Cork crash had an effect in my current job, staff at work were interested in what had happened...and why.

Anyway , long story short we skimmed through the online articles and I was amazed at the amount of crap that was being spouted by the media ie, the aircraft made an approach from the south to runway 17 ..and the crew made several attempts to land even though this was illegal etc etc


so i suggested we log in to PPRuNe to see what the pros had to say..

I must admit I was embarrassed ...within hours of the incident it had been stated on here that the crew were "cowboys"...the airline (virtual-airline) were known for bad practices and it was decided that a 3rd approach was in some way or other totally against all rules.

The upshot of all of this is simple..if tomorrow the Daily Star reports that it has found another B-17 on the moon and "professionals" on here say that they haven't..we would be more inclined to believe the journalists.

as far as I remember ( and i'm sure things won't have changed that much)

Decision Height: The height by which a decision to continue an approach or execute a missed approach has to be made. If DH = 200ft then on approach

at 250ft can you see the required references? yes= land, no=continue approach

at 205ft can you see the required references? yes= land, no=continue (but get ready for MA.....

at 200 can you see the required references? yes=land, no = execute missed approach.

therefore Decision is made AT decision height but preparations to execute MA are made prior to that point. The MA procedure does cater for a/c dipping below DH. simple really.


Multiple approaches in bad weather..OK i'm ex-military and civil rules / company SOPs may be different in this modern "blame" riddled society but as far as I recall the ultimate responsibility lay with the a/c captain - if he wanted to make 20 attempts then so be it, so long as he had enough fuel to make his diversion (and allow for one MA there) IIRC.
All fine and dandy in a mil a/c but paying passengers might get a tad upset after maybe the nth attempt and so a company SOP of a limit on attempted approaches. There is also the cost implication, why waste £10,000 on fuel trying to land at airport X when it will cost just £3000 to ferry the passenger by coach from airport Y and you can blame the "inconvenience" on the weather.

As for making approaches to reciprocal runway (no hassle in this incident as the wind (on the METARs) was negligible) that is not unusual - it saves time and money and effort but one MUST remember to switch the runway lighting to the one that is being used . I remember doing a PAR at Boscombe down. the weather was abysmal and visibility from the tower was awful. a/c broke off the approach at his 200ft minima and started his MA , next call I got was "c/s switching stud 2" he then did a quick tear-drop and made a safe landing on the reciprocal runway. It transpired we had a massive fog bank running north to south and out to the west but the conditions to the east of the a/f were fantastic and as he flew through into clear air he went visual.

but i digress

please chaps, let the enquiry take its course and lets stop feeding the media mis-information, red-herrings and non-facts...they are quite good at making it up without our (your) help.

Bearcat

Satcos, all rambling waffle apart from your last paragraph that hits the nail on the head.....let the investigators do their job. I fear the report will be damning.

SATCOS WHIPPING BOY

no, not rambling waffle (ok maybe a bit)...just an explanation as to why i have posted after such a long absence and MY views on some of the queries that have been raised ref DH and multiple approaches in bad weather (speaking from experience) plus it's late and i've had aglass or two of vino

sevenstrokeroll

on the top bunk:

if the plane was off course and a drastic over correction was made, you might drag a wingtip. what don't you understand?

sevenstrokeroll

I fly in the USA. We use slightly different terms and measures.

Generally speaking:

CAT 1 ILS approaches require 1/2 mile visibility...this can be slightly reduced with better approach and runway lighting. It is against the rules to start an approach if the weather is reported below minimums. I can only imagine that the metroliner had received word that the wx was at or above minimums when they started the approach.

even though some of the published metars might indicate below minimums, fog can change so quickly that values might be reported from the control tower that have not yet reached the media. indeed attempting approaches to opposite ends of the same runway indicates knowledge of local wx phenomenoa and is something I would attempt at many airports.

There is so much talk about 3 approaches. The only thing that really matters is if the fatigue of making so many approaches has taken its toll on the pilots and if the fuel is starting to demand diversion to a safe alternate airport. While some airlines may actually have it in their rules (flight ops manuals), one simply shouldn't read too much into this...

Except when there is a condition known by the slang term: Get There ITIS (as in laryngitis). Sometimes, (and I AM NOT SAYING THIS TIME) you can want to get some place too badly and you try too hard...perhaps ,and I say again PERHAPS, bending the rules slightly. Again, I don't know if that is the case in this situation.

The metroliner most likely is not equipped for coupled autopilot approaches. At least mine were not. Maybe this one was, maybe not. The metroliner is an adequate if not deluxe sort of plane. I would rather drive a rolls royce than a honda civic...but both will probably get you there just fine. Same sort of thing with the metroliner...and it aint' no rolls.

The engines on this type are just fine. While I mentioned the NTS system, its not a big deal, just an interesting thing to pilots who have flown different type engines.

Now, what can go wrong? What caused this crash?

I will say that landing a plane in foggy conditions is very demanding upon the crew. Mistakes can be made. As some have said, it is possible to see an airport's runway 10 miles away, but the last 20 feet it can vanish in fog. I've had this happen and boy, it gets your attention fast. It is also possible to over control or over compensate if you are off the exact centerline of the runway. You've just been ''on instruments'' and now must quickly transition to visual cues, cues that can be obscured by the fog. I still think about some less than perfect maneuvering near the end of an instrument approach in my own flying. And that was over 20 years ago. It never got close to clipping a wing tip, but it wasn't as gentle as I would have liked.

A myriad of mechanical problems could have happend...but probably didn't. There is more than one attitude gyro for example, the plane is flyable on one engine...though engine out ops are demanding, especially at low altitude.

The discipline in the cockpit for an instrument approach is very demanding. I do not have any access to the training methods of this airline. But I've flown for 3 small airlines and one big airline. The big airline did it right, one of the three small airlines did it right (of course they were the first to go out of business...doing it ''right'' costs money) the other two airlines didn't do a good job of training.


So...I think they started each and every approach ''legally''. That the number of approaches, except as outlined above, doesn't matter.

What happened? We need more information and I'm sure the authorities will do an honest job of finding out.

But we should, as pilots and interested observers, continue to have discussions of how to improve our own flying.