Jet and Turkish Airlines 777 in 'near-miss' over London
Thread Starter
Join Date: Oct 2008
Location: London
Posts: 109
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Jet and Turkish Airlines 777 in 'near-miss' over London
A business jet came close to a mid-air collision with a Turkish Airlines passenger plane after taking off from London City Airport, a report has said.
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) study described the near-miss over London as a "serious incident".
The Citation 525 jet was about 100ft to 200ft below and half a mile away from the Boeing 777 passenger plane, heading to Heathrow with 232 people on board.
The near-miss happened on 27 July when both aircraft were at about 4,000ft.
The report said the control tower at London City Airport had cleared the German-owned business jet to climb to 3,000ft but when the flight crew acknowledged the instruction, they said they would be climbing to 4,000ft.
This instruction from the plane - a "readback" mistake - was not noticed by the controller at the tower, the AAIB said.
'Commands not followed'
Meanwhile, the Turkish flight had been cleared to descend to 4,000ft as it approached Heathrow Airport in west London.
If the planes had come close during bad weather "the only barrier to a potential mid-air collision" would have been built-in collision-avoidance systems as the aircraft would not have been able to see each other, the AAIB said.
But the report said that when the aircraft came close the Turkish flight crew had not "followed the commands" of three on-board collision-avoidance warnings and the Citation jet did not even have the equipment, known as TCAS II.
It was a pilot sitting on the observer seat of the passenger plane who saw the business jet, carrying two crew members and one passenger, "pass west of them at an estimated 100 to 200ft below", the report said.
In its account the Citation's captain said he had the passenger plane in sight "all the time" and at first thought his jet would be "well above" it.
The AAIB suggested authorities should consider making the TCAS II equipment mandatory for planes flying in the London area.
FULL REPORT - BBC News - Jet and Turkish Airlines 777 in 'near-miss' over London
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) study described the near-miss over London as a "serious incident".
The Citation 525 jet was about 100ft to 200ft below and half a mile away from the Boeing 777 passenger plane, heading to Heathrow with 232 people on board.
The near-miss happened on 27 July when both aircraft were at about 4,000ft.
The report said the control tower at London City Airport had cleared the German-owned business jet to climb to 3,000ft but when the flight crew acknowledged the instruction, they said they would be climbing to 4,000ft.
This instruction from the plane - a "readback" mistake - was not noticed by the controller at the tower, the AAIB said.
'Commands not followed'
Meanwhile, the Turkish flight had been cleared to descend to 4,000ft as it approached Heathrow Airport in west London.
If the planes had come close during bad weather "the only barrier to a potential mid-air collision" would have been built-in collision-avoidance systems as the aircraft would not have been able to see each other, the AAIB said.
But the report said that when the aircraft came close the Turkish flight crew had not "followed the commands" of three on-board collision-avoidance warnings and the Citation jet did not even have the equipment, known as TCAS II.
It was a pilot sitting on the observer seat of the passenger plane who saw the business jet, carrying two crew members and one passenger, "pass west of them at an estimated 100 to 200ft below", the report said.
In its account the Citation's captain said he had the passenger plane in sight "all the time" and at first thought his jet would be "well above" it.
The AAIB suggested authorities should consider making the TCAS II equipment mandatory for planes flying in the London area.
FULL REPORT - BBC News - Jet and Turkish Airlines 777 in 'near-miss' over London
Ut Sementem Feeceris
I thought TCAS was mandatory? Or is the Citation too small 
Of course the bigger question is why the Turkish didn't "follow the commands" of its TCAS. Obviously the lessons of Uberlingen (sp?) have not been learned by everyone.
Controversial, and I've not read the report yet, and I appreciate the errors by the controller and Citation crew were the first two holes in the cheese .... but why are crews of a MAJOR airline still disregarding TCAS? I share this airspace with them - I expect them to abide by the rules.
Tin hat on.
A4
Ok, I've skimmed the report - not a nice scenario to be presented with. A "crossing descend" followed by "increase descent", followed by "climb" with a controller request thrown in for good measure but it does seem the increase descent was as a result of not following an initial TCAS instruction.
Link to report: Air Accidents Investigation: Citation 525, D-ITAN and Boeing 777 300ER, TC-JJA
Of course the bigger question is why the Turkish didn't "follow the commands" of its TCAS. Obviously the lessons of Uberlingen (sp?) have not been learned by everyone.
Controversial, and I've not read the report yet, and I appreciate the errors by the controller and Citation crew were the first two holes in the cheese .... but why are crews of a MAJOR airline still disregarding TCAS? I share this airspace with them - I expect them to abide by the rules.
Tin hat on.
A4
Ok, I've skimmed the report - not a nice scenario to be presented with. A "crossing descend" followed by "increase descent", followed by "climb" with a controller request thrown in for good measure but it does seem the increase descent was as a result of not following an initial TCAS instruction.
Link to report: Air Accidents Investigation: Citation 525, D-ITAN and Boeing 777 300ER, TC-JJA
Last edited by A4; 9th Sep 2010 at 07:19.
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: UK
Posts: 1,114
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ok, I've skimmed the report - not a nice scenario to be presented with. A "crossing descend" followed by "increase descent", followed by "climb" with a controller request thrown in for good measure but it does seem the increase descent was as a result of not following an initial TCAS instruction.
"London, Turkish 1991 TCAS RA standby". Followed smartly by following the TCAS instructions.
Another Turkish training flight with an observer on the jumpseat and they are getting themselves into a pickle. The skipper must be Turkeys answer to Chuck Yeager to be in the LHS of a 777 and a TRI or TRE with only 4300hrs.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: uk
Posts: 857
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
1) Citation 525, D-ITAN
2) Boeing 777 300ER, TC-JJA
[...]
1) 4,300 hours (of which 1,250 hours were on type)
Last 90 days - 60 hours
Last 28 days - 30 hours
2) Not known
Last 90 days - not known
Last 28 days - not known
So the worry now is not that the Turkish skipper is low hours, but that Turkish don't know how many hours... or they aren't co-operating with AAIB investigations. 2) Boeing 777 300ER, TC-JJA
[...]
1) 4,300 hours (of which 1,250 hours were on type)
Last 90 days - 60 hours
Last 28 days - 30 hours
2) Not known
Last 90 days - not known
Last 28 days - not known
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
3300fpm with 1000' to go seems to be vastly excessive and poor airmanship. I assume the min climb gradient is required for noise/low level obstacles out of LCY?
Leaving aside the THY crew errors, I wonder what would have happened if they HAD followed the initial 'descend' RA - presumably the kit thought the Citation was going through their level (based on R of C) but in fact was apparently going to level off (quite a bunt I would have thought!).
Nearly a very big bang.
Leaving aside the THY crew errors, I wonder what would have happened if they HAD followed the initial 'descend' RA - presumably the kit thought the Citation was going through their level (based on R of C) but in fact was apparently going to level off (quite a bunt I would have thought!).
Nearly a very big bang.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Scotland
Posts: 391
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I believe this incident was the trigger for the 3000 feet cleared altitude seperate readback when you get your clearance from LCY ground. The procedure nowadays at LCY is that you get the clearance and read that back. Then you get your stop altitude and QNH and you have to read that back as well. Before this we'd never had this. It's on the plates anyway.
It's annoying for us regulars in LCY but I can totally see the point why they implemented this. Loads of business jets at LCY and you could be turning and nearly leveling off at 3000ft with LHR inbounds only 1000ft above. Sometimes quite impressive. The other week we ljust evelled off at 3000ft and had 2x A380's above us at 4000ft inbound for 27R at LHR.
It's annoying for us regulars in LCY but I can totally see the point why they implemented this. Loads of business jets at LCY and you could be turning and nearly leveling off at 3000ft with LHR inbounds only 1000ft above. Sometimes quite impressive. The other week we ljust evelled off at 3000ft and had 2x A380's above us at 4000ft inbound for 27R at LHR.
Join Date: Jan 2006
Location: .
Posts: 20
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
With "Enhanced Surveillance", doesn't the controller see the altitude set in the window?
There was no downlink from D-ITAN of the flight level selected on the autopilot and so the level-bust could not be anticipated by the controller. D-ITAN did not report on the Thames radar frequency until so close to the point of minimum separation that the controller did not have time to take effective action to resolve the situation.
Join Date: Nov 1999
Location: Ireland
Posts: 1,621
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: Euroville
Posts: 455
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Airprox with 777 sparks London City procedure revision
Airprox with 777 sparks London City procedure revision
By David Kaminski-Morrow
London City Airport has revised its procedures following a serious airprox incident involving a Turkish Airlines Boeing 777-300ER and an executive jet which mistakenly climbed above its cleared level on departure.
Investigators have highlighted 21 occasions in the past six years in which aircraft departing City have exceeded the 3,000ft altitude 'step' contained in the airport's standard outbound tracks - a third of them resulting in loss-of-separation events.
As a result of the incident with between the 777 and a Cessna Citation 525 jet, on 27 July last year, the UK's Air Accidents Investigation Branch recommended that the airport remove all 'step climb' procedures and, to avoid confusion, fix all departure tracks to terminate at 3,000ft.
New communications procedures have been implemented at City, the AAIB says, which are designed to ensure that crews understand the requirement to level off at 3,000ft.
In a statement London City's operator says that it has "thoroughly reviewed" the incident report and instigated procedural changes which "comply" with the AAIB's safety recommendations.
While the Citation had been cleared to climb to 3,000ft on departure, the crew erroneously read back a clearance to 4,000ft, which went uncorrected by air traffic control.
As the aircraft took off to the west, and turned north, it came into conflict with the 777 which had been cleared to turn south and descend also to 4,000ft.
While the 777's collision-avoidance system transmitted resolution advisories to descend, the crew "did not respond to [the advisories] in time to affect the geometry of the incident".
The AAIB stresses that, as a result, the conflict was not resolved by the collision-avoidance system, and has recommended that Turkish Airlines improve its training.
Investigators state that the aircraft were on a near-reciprocal heading, at about 0.5nm distance, with a vertical separation of 100-200ft. Weather conditions were clear enough to allow the Citation crew to obtain visual contact with the 777 and adjust the jet's flightpath to resolve the conflict.
Airprox with 777 sparks London City procedure revision
By David Kaminski-Morrow
London City Airport has revised its procedures following a serious airprox incident involving a Turkish Airlines Boeing 777-300ER and an executive jet which mistakenly climbed above its cleared level on departure.
Investigators have highlighted 21 occasions in the past six years in which aircraft departing City have exceeded the 3,000ft altitude 'step' contained in the airport's standard outbound tracks - a third of them resulting in loss-of-separation events.
As a result of the incident with between the 777 and a Cessna Citation 525 jet, on 27 July last year, the UK's Air Accidents Investigation Branch recommended that the airport remove all 'step climb' procedures and, to avoid confusion, fix all departure tracks to terminate at 3,000ft.
New communications procedures have been implemented at City, the AAIB says, which are designed to ensure that crews understand the requirement to level off at 3,000ft.
In a statement London City's operator says that it has "thoroughly reviewed" the incident report and instigated procedural changes which "comply" with the AAIB's safety recommendations.
While the Citation had been cleared to climb to 3,000ft on departure, the crew erroneously read back a clearance to 4,000ft, which went uncorrected by air traffic control.
As the aircraft took off to the west, and turned north, it came into conflict with the 777 which had been cleared to turn south and descend also to 4,000ft.
While the 777's collision-avoidance system transmitted resolution advisories to descend, the crew "did not respond to [the advisories] in time to affect the geometry of the incident".
The AAIB stresses that, as a result, the conflict was not resolved by the collision-avoidance system, and has recommended that Turkish Airlines improve its training.
Investigators state that the aircraft were on a near-reciprocal heading, at about 0.5nm distance, with a vertical separation of 100-200ft. Weather conditions were clear enough to allow the Citation crew to obtain visual contact with the 777 and adjust the jet's flightpath to resolve the conflict.
As one who lives pretty much underneath this point, and so observes things from the ground, I have a bit of an interest.
It's not only the LCY departures that have bust their level here; the last AAIB report I recall at the same point, it was the Heathrow arrival which had descended below their assigned level.
Don't think that going up at 3,300 fpm out of LCY is somehow necessary for obstacle clearance, there are plenty of F50s climbing much more sedately out of LCY which comply with the limits perfectly well.
I wonder why inbound Heathrows are sometimes descended to 4,000 feet at this exact point; again from observation they pass overhead at a range of heights, and why an extra 1,000 feet as a buffer cannot be allowed at this point I will leave for others to comment on. Certainly on the odd occasions when LCY is on easterlies and Heathrow is on westerlies, inbounds to LCY are turning finals over the Houses of Parliament at 3,000 feet, and the Heathrow inbound traffic is obviously all still at 4,000 or more, so quite why they have to be down to 4,000 some 6 miles to the east is something I would be interested to know the reason for.
Did I miss in the report that the LCY ATIS also emphasises the 3,000 feet limitation, or did this not get put on until after this incident ?
It's not only the LCY departures that have bust their level here; the last AAIB report I recall at the same point, it was the Heathrow arrival which had descended below their assigned level.
Don't think that going up at 3,300 fpm out of LCY is somehow necessary for obstacle clearance, there are plenty of F50s climbing much more sedately out of LCY which comply with the limits perfectly well.
I wonder why inbound Heathrows are sometimes descended to 4,000 feet at this exact point; again from observation they pass overhead at a range of heights, and why an extra 1,000 feet as a buffer cannot be allowed at this point I will leave for others to comment on. Certainly on the odd occasions when LCY is on easterlies and Heathrow is on westerlies, inbounds to LCY are turning finals over the Houses of Parliament at 3,000 feet, and the Heathrow inbound traffic is obviously all still at 4,000 or more, so quite why they have to be down to 4,000 some 6 miles to the east is something I would be interested to know the reason for.
Did I miss in the report that the LCY ATIS also emphasises the 3,000 feet limitation, or did this not get put on until after this incident ?
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: Cornwall-on-Hudson, New York
Posts: 875
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"A passenger plane": Yes, I understand that there are aircraft that carry cargo, and even some that carry weapons, for that matter, but it's basically just that I have never, ever heard an actual pilot refer to an aircraft as "a passenger plane." In fact few pilots refer to an aircraft of any sort as "a plane," that being a carpenter's tool.
Ultimately, my gripe is having to wade through so much trash from simplayers and the people who at best ride in "passenger planes." There are plenty of enthusiast sites out there, and that's not what I come here for.
Ultimately, my gripe is having to wade through so much trash from simplayers and the people who at best ride in "passenger planes." There are plenty of enthusiast sites out there, and that's not what I come here for.
Join Date: Aug 2002
Location: London (Babylon-on-Thames)
Age: 42
Posts: 6,168
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Similar current thread here:
http://www.pprune.org/atc-issues/426...outbounds.html
Previous incident in the same area here :
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/28819...st-london.html
Forgive me but this airspace is as near as damn over my old home so I do have an interest, having watched this aerial ballet more than a few times. So many "planes".......
Anyhoo....for the educated non pilots who enjoy reading the boards, can someone give us top level explanation of what the new SIDs mean in practical terms and whether they are likely to solve this issue.
Given that the current procedure is :
SID clearnace delivery and readback
3000 ft climb limit and readback
What's the practical fix over and above this check I guess is my question?
Thanks
http://www.pprune.org/atc-issues/426...outbounds.html
Previous incident in the same area here :
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/28819...st-london.html
Forgive me but this airspace is as near as damn over my old home so I do have an interest, having watched this aerial ballet more than a few times. So many "planes".......
Anyhoo....for the educated non pilots who enjoy reading the boards, can someone give us top level explanation of what the new SIDs mean in practical terms and whether they are likely to solve this issue.
Given that the current procedure is :
SID clearnace delivery and readback
3000 ft climb limit and readback
What's the practical fix over and above this check I guess is my question?
Thanks
Last edited by Skipness One Echo; 10th Sep 2010 at 15:46.
What's the practical fix over and above this check I guess is my question?
As regards rate of climb/descent most operators require max rate 1,000 ft a minute when within 1,000 ft of a cleared level to avoid nuisance TCAS alerts.
Rates of climb or descent in excess of 1,000 fpm or more during the last 1,000feet before assigned altitude/flight level either in the climb or descent was a mandatory SAFETY call from the PNF when I joined Laker at the end of 1978.
Needless to say, this was long before TCAS had even been invented.
Surely the 1,000 fpm safety call is still normal SOP?
It certainly was in every company that I ever worked for.
Needless to say, this was long before TCAS had even been invented.
Surely the 1,000 fpm safety call is still normal SOP?
It certainly was in every company that I ever worked for.
Join Date: Mar 2009
Location: U.K
Age: 41
Posts: 28
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Am i missing something here
Am i missing something here. The german business jet mis-read the flight level, the controller did not correct them. The German aircraft continued to climb beyond its assigned altitude. Yet we have having a bash at the Turkish pilot who was doing what he was suppose to.
Can someone correct me if i am being thick please
Can someone correct me if i am being thick please