American MD80 rough landing CLT/leaves debris!
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RVR being 1400 ft meant they were doing a cat 3 approach. A manual landing is not authorized. Hopefully the controllers not giving them a protected ILS inside the OM will take some of the blame off of them. They will have to take some of the responsibility of course.
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Not correct p51guy.
Ops Specs alllow RVR down to 1200 to be flown as a coupled approach and a manual landing. A CAT II. An autolanding is recommended, by the FCOM, but not mandatory.
Below 1200 a CAT III approach is required to an autoland.
protectthehornet is absolutely right. When the weather is below 800/2 you should (must) verify that the critical areas are protected any time you are flying an ILS approach.
Trusting an FAA controller to follow the rules is really not an option. After they screw up and cause a mistake, rather than face punishment or loss of their certification, they merely claim a stress related disability and get paid for an unlimited time, while they recuperate. And, during their stress related recovery, they are not required to speak with anybody about the investigation of the event they caused.
Jurassic Jet
Ops Specs alllow RVR down to 1200 to be flown as a coupled approach and a manual landing. A CAT II. An autolanding is recommended, by the FCOM, but not mandatory.
Below 1200 a CAT III approach is required to an autoland.
protectthehornet is absolutely right. When the weather is below 800/2 you should (must) verify that the critical areas are protected any time you are flying an ILS approach.
Trusting an FAA controller to follow the rules is really not an option. After they screw up and cause a mistake, rather than face punishment or loss of their certification, they merely claim a stress related disability and get paid for an unlimited time, while they recuperate. And, during their stress related recovery, they are not required to speak with anybody about the investigation of the event they caused.
Jurassic Jet
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AA's 737-800s do not have autoland capability. Hence the HUD and the hand flown CAT 3 landings. Most guys I've talked to say it's kinda fun and the HUD expanded LOC pretty much keeps the aircraft dead on centerline.
I believe the autoland capability was an option, AA chose not to go with it. I believe DL's 737-800s have both the HUD and autoland.
I do know that we (AA) are not authorized to autoland if there is a note on the Jepps stating that the localizer is not usable on rollout, which is indicated on the CLT 36 approach chart.
73
I believe the autoland capability was an option, AA chose not to go with it. I believe DL's 737-800s have both the HUD and autoland.
I do know that we (AA) are not authorized to autoland if there is a note on the Jepps stating that the localizer is not usable on rollout, which is indicated on the CLT 36 approach chart.
73
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Most guys I've talked to say it's kinda fun and the HUD expanded LOC pretty much keeps the aircraft dead on centerline.
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Yes at 1200 rvr they could have done a cat 2 approach. Then an autoland wouldn't be required. We usually brief the approach we are doing and stick with the procedures for that approach. A cat 3 would require an autopilot go around if localizer limits were exceeded. A cat 2 approach would of course allow a hand flown landing when VMC. Company sops don't want us to switch procedures and call outs during the approach. Cat 2 has a DH at 100 ft usually. A cat 3 doesn't. If they had caught the localizer on roll out not usable maybe they were doing a cat 2.
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my guess is this
the approach was not going well, drifting off localizer perhaps...but then the pilots saw the runway and ''went for it''. But as we all know, there is many a slip between the cup and lip.
Did they over bank to get to the runway and drag a wingtip along the runway lights?
Of course if they had ''gotten away with it" without damage and an on time arrival, no one would know except the captain and the f/o.
There are pilots who are not experienced and pilots that are very experienced...there is also the rare pilot who thinks he is the later but really the former. Granted, if the plane is one second away from burning up in the sky...you go for it...but that lucky attempt usually uses up all your luck for a career.
still not as bad as delta landing on a taxiway!
the approach was not going well, drifting off localizer perhaps...but then the pilots saw the runway and ''went for it''. But as we all know, there is many a slip between the cup and lip.
Did they over bank to get to the runway and drag a wingtip along the runway lights?
Of course if they had ''gotten away with it" without damage and an on time arrival, no one would know except the captain and the f/o.
There are pilots who are not experienced and pilots that are very experienced...there is also the rare pilot who thinks he is the later but really the former. Granted, if the plane is one second away from burning up in the sky...you go for it...but that lucky attempt usually uses up all your luck for a career.
still not as bad as delta landing on a taxiway!
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I do agree with protectthehornet's post 3 up, except for them "drifting off the localizer".
Seems to me, they had the (or both) autopilots coupled, and the signal got bent by the departing aircraft. The a/p kept them dead on a bent signal, causing a sverve or something, and as they saw at least something of the Rwy, lights or whatever, they tried to recover.
It can be very disorienting to fly in fog with little reference to the ground. (Believe me, I get the feeling regularily doing my manual HGS CAT IIIa).
It's just a guess, though. We will see what the report says...
Nic
PS.: Hey Micky, should I be speaking Dutch...?
Seems to me, they had the (or both) autopilots coupled, and the signal got bent by the departing aircraft. The a/p kept them dead on a bent signal, causing a sverve or something, and as they saw at least something of the Rwy, lights or whatever, they tried to recover.
It can be very disorienting to fly in fog with little reference to the ground. (Believe me, I get the feeling regularily doing my manual HGS CAT IIIa).
It's just a guess, though. We will see what the report says...
Nic
PS.: Hey Micky, should I be speaking Dutch...?
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admiral 346 may be quite right about a bent localizer course...
I also think that glide slope extension may not have happened...but we shall see
It always amazes me to find the runway after any sort of ILS. I am reminded of the fine film, "the High and the Mighty"...at the end, the DC4 breaks out of the clouds at night over San Francisco bay...and there ahead are the approach lights...in the film seen so much like a Christian Cross...redemption at the end of a glidepath.
Never take any ILS or instrument approach for granted.
(in "the high and the mighty", the DC4 has an engine dislodge from its mount, causing a fuel leak on a HNL to SFO flight...at night...the captain, who had been going a little crazy wants to ditch, but the copilot (john wayne) slaps some sense into him and they go for the runway...landing with some 30 gallons of avgas)
I hope you see the film some time.
I also think that glide slope extension may not have happened...but we shall see
It always amazes me to find the runway after any sort of ILS. I am reminded of the fine film, "the High and the Mighty"...at the end, the DC4 breaks out of the clouds at night over San Francisco bay...and there ahead are the approach lights...in the film seen so much like a Christian Cross...redemption at the end of a glidepath.
Never take any ILS or instrument approach for granted.
(in "the high and the mighty", the DC4 has an engine dislodge from its mount, causing a fuel leak on a HNL to SFO flight...at night...the captain, who had been going a little crazy wants to ditch, but the copilot (john wayne) slaps some sense into him and they go for the runway...landing with some 30 gallons of avgas)
I hope you see the film some time.
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I have the film on my computer, and the book in the shelf, along with the others by Gann. Great story, and I also appreciate a RWY appearing out of the haze at the end of an ILS, every single time.
Nic
Nic
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As to the ILS critical area, does anyone know where it is on this runway? It is entirely possible that its on the other side of the runway and therefore the controller would have been perfectly legal to launch those jets before American landed.
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The ILS critical areas must be maintained in order to provide CAT III beam quality to ILS point D, a point 3,000 feet down the runway from the threshold toward the LOC.
3-7-5. PRECISION APPROACH CRITICAL AREA
a. ILS critical area dimensions are described in FAAO 6750.16, Siting Criteria for Instrument Landing Systems. Aircraft and vehicle access to the ILS/MLS critical area must be controlled to ensure the integrity of ILS/MLS course signals whenever conditions are less than reported ceiling 800 feet or visibility less than 2 miles. Do not authorize vehicles/aircraft to operate in or over the critical area, except as specified in subpara a1, whenever an arriving aircraft is inside the ILS outer marker (OM) or the fix used in lieu of the OM unless the arriving aircraft has reported the runway in sight or is circling to land on another runway.
PHRASEOLOGY-
HOLD SHORT OF (runway) ILS/MLS CRITICAL AREA.
1. LOCALIZER CRITICAL AREA
(a) Do not authorize vehicle or aircraft operations in or over the area when an arriving aircraft is inside the ILS OM or the fix used in lieu of the OM when conditions are less than reported ceiling 800 feet or visibility less than 2 miles, except:
(1) A preceding arriving aircraft on the same or another runway that passes over or through the area while landing or exiting the runway.
(2) A preceding departing aircraft or missed approach on the same or another runway that passes through or over the area.
(b) In addition to subpara a1(a), do not authorize vehicles or aircraft operations in or over the area when an arriving aircraft is inside the middle marker when conditions are less than reported ceiling 200 feet or RVR 2,000 feet.
2. GLIDESLOPE CRITICAL AREA. Do not authorize vehicles or aircraft operations in or over the area when an arriving aircraft is inside the ILS OM or the fix used in lieu of the OM unless the arriving aircraft has reported the runway in sight or is circling to land on another runway when conditions are less than reported ceiling 800 feet or visibility less than 2 miles.
b. Air carriers commonly conduct “coupled” or “autoland” operations to satisfy maintenance, training, or reliability program requirements. Promptly issue an advisory if the critical area will not be protected when an arriving aircraft advises that a “coupled,” “CATIII,” “autoland,” or similar type approach will be conducted and the weather is reported ceiling of 800 feet or more, and the visibility is 2 miles or more.
PHRASEOLOGY-
ILS/MLS CRITICAL AREA NOT PROTECTED.
c. The Department of Defense (DOD) is authorized to define criteria for protection of precision approach critical areas at military controlled airports. This protection is provided to all aircraft operating at that military controlled airport. Waiver authority for DOD precision approach critical area criteria rests with the appropriate military authority.
NOTE-
Signs and markings are installed by the airport operator to define the ILS/MLS critical area. No point along the longitudinal axis of the aircraft is permitted past the hold line for holding purposes. The operator is responsible to properly position the aircraft, vehicle, or equipment at the appropriate hold line/sign or designated point. The requirements in para 3-1-12, Visually Scanning Runways, remain valid as appropriate.
REFERENCE-
AC150/5340-1, Standards for Airport Markings.
LOCALIZER CRITICAL AREAS. The latest edition of Order
6750.16, Siting Criteria for Instrument Landing Systems,
describes localizer and glide slope critical areas which shall be
marked and protected from parking and the unlimited movement of
surface and air traffic, to ensure the continuous integrity of
the signal received by the user aircraft.
a. The entire length of the longitudinal axis of the
aircraft shall be clear of the critical area when conditions are
such that the area must be protected. An aircraft with its
longitudinal axis aligned with the edge of a critical area is not
considered to be violating the critical area.
b. The worst case alignment of an aircraft for critical
area considerations is with its longitudinal axis perpendicular
to the runway (e.g., an aircraft departing the runway after
landing or taxiing across the runway).
c. The airport authority which controls ground traffic
movements must assure that appropriate controls and devices are
correctly located, and specific holding instructions implemented
when necessary, to protect the critical areas from ground traffic
approaching or departing an active runway if the critical area
dimension exceeds the distance of the normal runway holding
position marking from the runway centerline. Also, procedures
must be implemented to determine when an aircraft is clear of the
critical area when exiting the runway. Taxiway centerline
lead-off lights, where installed, shall be color-coded as
alternating green and yellow to denote the critical area. For
taxiways not equipped with centerline lights, a "Critical Area
Boundary" sign may be installed on the back side of the ILS sign
to indicate the critical area boundary.
d. Where the standard critical area has a significant
adverse impact on a specific taxi route, etc., it may be possible
through operational constraints to provide relief on a case-by-
case basis (e.g., considering the varying size of aircraft).
Mathematical modeling techniques are readily available to
facilitate this consideration.
REFERENCE-
FAAO 6750.24D
Looks like the controller definitely didn't protect the critical area.
Any bets as to who gets hammered with the mistake?
Jurassic Jet
3-7-5. PRECISION APPROACH CRITICAL AREA
a. ILS critical area dimensions are described in FAAO 6750.16, Siting Criteria for Instrument Landing Systems. Aircraft and vehicle access to the ILS/MLS critical area must be controlled to ensure the integrity of ILS/MLS course signals whenever conditions are less than reported ceiling 800 feet or visibility less than 2 miles. Do not authorize vehicles/aircraft to operate in or over the critical area, except as specified in subpara a1, whenever an arriving aircraft is inside the ILS outer marker (OM) or the fix used in lieu of the OM unless the arriving aircraft has reported the runway in sight or is circling to land on another runway.
PHRASEOLOGY-
HOLD SHORT OF (runway) ILS/MLS CRITICAL AREA.
1. LOCALIZER CRITICAL AREA
(a) Do not authorize vehicle or aircraft operations in or over the area when an arriving aircraft is inside the ILS OM or the fix used in lieu of the OM when conditions are less than reported ceiling 800 feet or visibility less than 2 miles, except:
(1) A preceding arriving aircraft on the same or another runway that passes over or through the area while landing or exiting the runway.
(2) A preceding departing aircraft or missed approach on the same or another runway that passes through or over the area.
(b) In addition to subpara a1(a), do not authorize vehicles or aircraft operations in or over the area when an arriving aircraft is inside the middle marker when conditions are less than reported ceiling 200 feet or RVR 2,000 feet.
2. GLIDESLOPE CRITICAL AREA. Do not authorize vehicles or aircraft operations in or over the area when an arriving aircraft is inside the ILS OM or the fix used in lieu of the OM unless the arriving aircraft has reported the runway in sight or is circling to land on another runway when conditions are less than reported ceiling 800 feet or visibility less than 2 miles.
b. Air carriers commonly conduct “coupled” or “autoland” operations to satisfy maintenance, training, or reliability program requirements. Promptly issue an advisory if the critical area will not be protected when an arriving aircraft advises that a “coupled,” “CATIII,” “autoland,” or similar type approach will be conducted and the weather is reported ceiling of 800 feet or more, and the visibility is 2 miles or more.
PHRASEOLOGY-
ILS/MLS CRITICAL AREA NOT PROTECTED.
c. The Department of Defense (DOD) is authorized to define criteria for protection of precision approach critical areas at military controlled airports. This protection is provided to all aircraft operating at that military controlled airport. Waiver authority for DOD precision approach critical area criteria rests with the appropriate military authority.
NOTE-
Signs and markings are installed by the airport operator to define the ILS/MLS critical area. No point along the longitudinal axis of the aircraft is permitted past the hold line for holding purposes. The operator is responsible to properly position the aircraft, vehicle, or equipment at the appropriate hold line/sign or designated point. The requirements in para 3-1-12, Visually Scanning Runways, remain valid as appropriate.
REFERENCE-
AC150/5340-1, Standards for Airport Markings.
LOCALIZER CRITICAL AREAS. The latest edition of Order
6750.16, Siting Criteria for Instrument Landing Systems,
describes localizer and glide slope critical areas which shall be
marked and protected from parking and the unlimited movement of
surface and air traffic, to ensure the continuous integrity of
the signal received by the user aircraft.
a. The entire length of the longitudinal axis of the
aircraft shall be clear of the critical area when conditions are
such that the area must be protected. An aircraft with its
longitudinal axis aligned with the edge of a critical area is not
considered to be violating the critical area.
b. The worst case alignment of an aircraft for critical
area considerations is with its longitudinal axis perpendicular
to the runway (e.g., an aircraft departing the runway after
landing or taxiing across the runway).
c. The airport authority which controls ground traffic
movements must assure that appropriate controls and devices are
correctly located, and specific holding instructions implemented
when necessary, to protect the critical areas from ground traffic
approaching or departing an active runway if the critical area
dimension exceeds the distance of the normal runway holding
position marking from the runway centerline. Also, procedures
must be implemented to determine when an aircraft is clear of the
critical area when exiting the runway. Taxiway centerline
lead-off lights, where installed, shall be color-coded as
alternating green and yellow to denote the critical area. For
taxiways not equipped with centerline lights, a "Critical Area
Boundary" sign may be installed on the back side of the ILS sign
to indicate the critical area boundary.
d. Where the standard critical area has a significant
adverse impact on a specific taxi route, etc., it may be possible
through operational constraints to provide relief on a case-by-
case basis (e.g., considering the varying size of aircraft).
Mathematical modeling techniques are readily available to
facilitate this consideration.
REFERENCE-
FAAO 6750.24D
Looks like the controller definitely didn't protect the critical area.
Any bets as to who gets hammered with the mistake?
Jurassic Jet
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That note on the rollout for a CAT approach has always made me shake my head. We autoland in CAT2 or CAT 3 conditions and rollout is used.
HUDs are really great and I applaud the use of them along with the manual flying required. Like the Jamaica landing incident today we will just have to wait for the final determination to see just what happened.
HUDs are really great and I applaud the use of them along with the manual flying required. Like the Jamaica landing incident today we will just have to wait for the final determination to see just what happened.
