I wasn't rubbishing any one. I stated what I experienced and my feelings at the time. I am not exactly a first trip SLF and I don't care if the airline is "third world" ( I'm not sure what that really means anyway). It happened.
I was concerned that the BEA would be involved in the investigation. Some conflict of interest is likely - didn't they have a hand in banning the airplane from Frence Air Space? Should be interesting.
There seems to be a complete shut-down on any and all information on this accident----lets hope its not going to go the way the last Kenya Airlines accident probe went.....nothing.
There was no report on the KQ 738 at Douala
There was nothing to learn from though except that autopilots don't switch on themselves and pilots must know into which direction to turn the yoke.
There seems to be a complete shut-down on any and all information on this accident----lets hope its not going to go the way the last Kenya Airlines accident probe went.....nothing.
My earllier post disappeared into "thin air" so here's a follow up. FWIW
One of the most practiced maneuvers professional pilots fly during every sim visit is the Go-Around.
Are we to believe that a highly 'experienced' crew (their words, not mine) botched a go-around? A maneuver we are completely prepared for? A maneuver we brief on every approach? (possible but not likely)
I'm must be missing something here.
Safety audit. Banned from Europe. What's that got to do with this accident? They weren't flying an approach into an airport in Europe. Until we know more about this accident, how do we know this crew was a 'safety' concern. A310/A300 crews have known about AP behavior in a go-around via Blue pages since the China Airlines go-around accident in Tokyo back in the 90s.
Having read the METAR and the approach, there should have been nothing 'overly" challenging for this aircraft or crew on this approach at night. Risk management training (which they should have received) would have most likely covered spatial disorientation as part of a prelanding brief by the PF. I'm guessing.
would have most likely covered spatial disorientation as part of a prelanding brief by the PF. I'm guessing.
In 23,000 hrs of flying I have never heard of this briefing. I guess if you felt dizzy starting the approach it might be appropriate, to be thorough. Isn't it like saying I may not know which way is up in the dark because this happens frequently?
I certainly include in my briefings if we are flying into a black-hole type airport. I do believe it is relevant even if you don't plan to crash that day! No need to mention disorientation. We are all familiar with the black-hole effect and what it implies.
Yemenia Airways is canceling all its flights between Yemen and the Comoros Islands after this week's crash on the same route, the airline said Saturday. One more flight between Sanaa and Moroni is scheduled for Sunday, but all flights on the route are canceled after that, Yemenia said.
So with Emirates, Air France and now Yemenia pulling out, what other airlines are left?
Or will they now have to go by boat to Reunion and catch a flight from there?
A310/A300 crews have known about AP behavior in a go-around via Blue pages since the China Airlines go-around accident in Tokyo back in the 90s.
I don't think Dynasty crashed a 'bus in Narita in the 90's. They crashed A300-600R's at Nagoya in 1994 and Taipei in 1998. Both crashes involved botched go arounds, fighting the autopilot with an abrupt pitchup and stall after the autopilot had trimmed the stab noseup. After the TPE crash, China Airlines' A300 fleet became mostly an expat flight crew operation, a couple of friends ended up there.
The A310/A300 aircraft don't pull the power back to maintain 2000 fpm on a go around like the modern Boeings, instead, they go whole hog with TOGA power. Also, their autothrottles are more agressive in my experience giving a really quick pitch up on a two engine go around, especially on the A310 which is overpowered and short coupled compared to the A306.
Gulf Air crashed an A320 at Bahrain in 2000 after a go around attempt, it is thought that the rapid power change and pitch up without visual references induced a somatogravic illusion in the pilot flying, causing him to think he needed to lower the nose, the plane flew into the water.
I fully agree with AirBubba on the last paragraph...but we also cannot rule out in this Comoros crash some similarities with that of Armavia 320 near Sochi at night in bad weather, after a missed app too, my 2 cents...
Too strong tailwind, followed by a go-around, in a now light aircraft, A/P disconnected manually due to high pitch-up, mistrimmed due to push on yoke...could be a plausible explanation for this one.
Let`s see the report .
Praise be.... At least we might be able to achieve closure one one of the ongoing investigations. Fingers crossed they might also find the AF447 boxes but, sadly, I don't think that's going to happen now.