I read that Yemenia had already been asked to attend a meeting in Brussels next month regarding their safety and access to EU airspace, before this accident occurred.
Not sure if this is gospel, but it does start to explain a few things if true.
Welll...all this Black-List & EU Banning stills confusing as hell...for example TAAG-Angola Airlines is still banned from EU Airspace...however it is only the planes of TAAG under D2 Reg's, and not the Company itself, it seems....here in Portugal we have lots of weekly flights of TAAG to Lisbon, under DTA Flight Plans, fully allowed, as long its another plane doing the flight...SAA 744 its the case here mainly.
So TAAG still and could fly, as long others flying for them, even maintaining their own original FPL's codes and callsigns
This is, apparently, a very difficult airport to fly into, especially at night and/or poor weather.
I am curious whether other "more respected" (for want of a better term) airlines use this airport, and if so, what percentage of them have a daylight-only landing policy?
Normally it's the government of Comores
As they certainly not have a like NTSB or BEA (poor country) .. they will require a other authority for handle the investigations.
As french is language in Comores it's likely a french language country will be choice..
Maybe Canada .. but more likely the french BEA due to the French-Comores politics and economics relations + plane is french construction and the already stuff available in the region (Reunion island .. etc..)
IMHO
Who said there was bad weather? The METAR showed CAVOK earlier in this thread, though it was a bit windy. More likely the vessel experienced a stormy sea during rescue operations.
Who said there was a go-around? It was said earlier, all was normal, aircraft transferred to TWR, then no contact. A go-around - given CAVOK - would certainly have been seen from the Tower. I would think, the aircraft may never have come that close to the Tower so it could be seen. Yes seen, with eyes. I am not talking about radar.
I wonder if they had the correct altimeter setting.
Excellent question. The simple error of forgetting to change from QNE to QNH, at night, over water, and under the right conditions could easily cause you to descend until you strike the surface. A functional E-GPWS or a good radio altimiter might avoid that, but over the ocean either warning might come to late or not at all.
The TAF posted earlier in this thread gave the viz as 9999. There was also an eye-witness report from someone watching the aircraft approach who said that it 'veered away'. However, the eyewitness might have been confused by the commencement of the teardrop turn on the HA NDB rather than just before touchdown.
Surplus 1:
I raised that point very early in this thread. Very real possibility as you say.
To others who have actually flown the approach to 20, I wonder why it has to be so complex. Wouldn't an approach similar to (the now closed) Kai Tak 13 be easier? Fly inbound at something like 130 until the HAI VOR is 2 miles DME bearing (say) 170 and commence the turn keeping the 2 bright lights on the left as you do now (i.e. For the Kai Tak Checkerboad substitute the lights)
Here is a drawing of what I mean.
Excellent question. The simple error of forgetting to change from QNE to QNH, at night, over water, and under the right conditions could easily cause you to descend until you strike the surface. A functional E-GPWS or a good radio altimiter might avoid that, but over the ocean either warning might come to late or not at all.
My bold ...
Agreed, but on this night that would only account for a 100' error (if I've done the sums right). Altimeter erroneously set maybe, otherwise we may need to look elsewhere.
Agreed, but on this night that would only account for a 100' error (if I've done the sums right). Altimeter erroneously set maybe, otherwise we may need to look elsewhere.
Point well made, I didn't check any numbers - just the concept. Here's another hypothesis: How easy is it to misread the altimeters in an A310? I've never been on its flight deck. But I know of an incident in my former airline [B-707] where a crew misread the altimeters and descended to 410 ft instead of 4100 ft. At night, over water.
You don't hit anything at 410 ft, but a similar error could prove to be scary if not disastrous. A lot could depend on how you react when/if you catch the error.
Aonther question: Do the auto throttles move on the A310? Could they have been in flight-idle descending - A/THR OFF - leveled (AP - ON), were distracted, and simply failed to notice decaying airspeed and add power until the shaker went off disconnecting the AP. Where would the stab trim be in that scenario and would they have enough elevator authority to avoid the actual stall when TOGA was applied? Just speculation - my knowledge of this a/c is zero - but its happened before on a different type. If I remember correctly, that crew stalled the aircraft twice before eventually recovering.
Press reports (from survivor interview) that pax were briefed and had prepared for ditching.
Quote:
To others who have actually flown the approach to 20, I wonder why it has to be so complex. Wouldn't a similar approach to (the now closed) Kai Tak 13 be easier? Fly inbound at something like 130 until the HAI VOR is 2 miles DME bearing (say) 170 and commence the turn keeping the 2 bright lights on the left as you do now (i.e. For the Kai Tak Checkerboad substitute the lights)
Approach procedures are laid out in reference to ICAO standards. They take into account cloud breaking at the Missed Approach Point only and hidden obstacles around. For good reasons they never lead straight into high terrain as your proposal would. The IAP 02 Visual/MVI 20 is pretty standard for locations like this and there is nothing weird about it. It may be difficult to fly when winds are strong, but it is a legal procedure. I again refer to Funchal, Madeira, daily flown numerous times, even much more complex. It is all about adherence to procedures and training.
The prosecutor of Bobigny opened a judicial investigation against X for "manslaughter" and launched a criminal investigation to "ascertain the circumstances of the accident." Jurisdiction in this matter because most of the passengers boarded in Roissy.
A survey of "flagrante delicto" was entrusted to the search brigade of the gendarmerie airline (GTA).
Press reports (from survivor interview) that pax were briefed and had prepared for ditching.
Source please.
In many french newspapers I read:
Quote:
The Falcon 900 by the Secretary of State, on Wednesday evening of Moroni, landed at Le Bourget on Thursday morning, carrying the young survivor Bahia. During this long flight, it was entrusted to the Secretary of State Alain Joyandet who relayed some of his first confession. "It tells what happened to him in pieces because she was obviously shocked. She said that at one time instructions were given to passengers to fast seatbelts. She said then she would have felt a bit like Electricity is the term used. And then, very quickly, it was found in water, agrippée to a piece of the aircraft with which it has fought to keep life for 12 hours "
I think this is normal to have "Fasten seatbelts" when plane will land.
Don't forget this is a girl from 13 years returning by luck from hell.
Indeed, but the lights of the city were always on and always bright and the approach strobe was curved to show the correct turn angle. i sat in the jump seat many times in both day and night landings there. seems quite a different setting than the approach described here (although i admit i have never been to moroni).
As SLF I flew Yemen Air from Sanaa to Djbouti about 10yrs ago, there was no check in baggage it was all was carry on. End result was bags in the isles, between seats and on laps. It's the only flight I have eve been nervous on.
Hopefully things have improved
As SLF, I flew Yemenia from Sanaa to Dubai in the mid 90's on a 727.
Bags WERE checked in. The cabin crew were professional and courteous. The pilot (or at least one of them) made announcements in English as well as Arabic. And while I would have preferred to have flown with a western or major mid-east carrier, I never felt unsafe or uncomfortable.
Well said. It's too easy to rubbish an organisation just because it happens to be third world. If an official investigation determines that the Yemenia A310 came down as a result of bad maintenance or bad operating procedures then I'll believe it.
I do not discount disorientation during a missed approach but that is not an indication of improper management. That is something that will, sadly and almost inevitably, be put down to pilot error.
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