Spanair accident at Madrid
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Pulling CB's during ground activities...........
I absolutely agree with desk jockey. We do it so often.
Personally I take a piece of paper from my pocket or flight deck, write in big fat letters which CB(s) I have pulled and hang it off the glareshield.
Just a gentle reminder - belt and braces.
I absolutely agree with desk jockey. We do it so often.
Personally I take a piece of paper from my pocket or flight deck, write in big fat letters which CB(s) I have pulled and hang it off the glareshield.
Just a gentle reminder - belt and braces.
From my 1st post it could easily be construed that I believe the accident was due to a CB being pulled. That would be a very unfair assumption from my part. However from Wing1011s excellent post it seems there is a workaround to complete a daily which very nearly helped write off a serviceable aircraft with the loss of all onboard. Thats why those aircraft should be modified. In this accident my gut feeling is that there will be a lot of human factor issues involved. (I truely hope not). It is down to us & the authorities/manufacturers to learn & improve safety from them!
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pichu17. Weight on Wheels is in the Main Landing Gear. Ground sensing is in the Nose Gear. The Take Off Configuration Warning depends on the ground sensing – of the Nose Gear.
The only reason I can think of is that this arrangement allows disabling of the TOCW audios (ground checks etc.) with the least affect on other systems. I’ll bet there’s an interesting design history on this; and I suspect the first DC9/MD80 TOCW was originally wired to the WOW switch.
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Accident investigation is supposed to eliminate the possibility of ascenario being repeated.Only way to do that is through data dissemination via AD's/SB's and company safety programs.
Though OE-LMM is registered in Austria the investigation is led and the final report is to be issued by ....Spanish Civil Aviation Accidents and Incidents Investigation Commission (CIAIAC)
XPMorten;
Yes, the Airbus A320/A340 series fleet types indicate open CB's on the lower ECAM display. These messages come on when the event occurs, or are otherwise hidden from the crew until the "STATUS" button is pushed during the cockpit check to inform crews of these and other messages as to the status of the aircraft. These messages may be recalled at any time and reviewed.
That said, there are very few CB's in this fleet type's cockpits. Most are downstairs in the E&E Bay.
The Air-Ground sensing on the Airbus is substantially different than previous types and has no CB's as such to "interrupt" sensing and is instead controlled and monitored by 2 "LGCIUs"...Landing Gear Control Interface Units. These two computers alternate between 1 and 2 on each leg. The receive inputs from proximity and position detectors on the gear shock absorbers, gear doors, cargo door components and locking mechanisms, door sills and 4 flap attachments (slat attachments are not mentioned). In other words it is not a single-point failure design such as one which senses nosewheel oleo compression. Keep in mind that the latter design philosophy was sufficient at the time and that the Airbus technology was developed long after. In other words, this isn't a "Boeing vs Airbus" thing, please.
Do modern EICAS systems in any way warn you if a CB has been pulled?
That said, there are very few CB's in this fleet type's cockpits. Most are downstairs in the E&E Bay.
The Air-Ground sensing on the Airbus is substantially different than previous types and has no CB's as such to "interrupt" sensing and is instead controlled and monitored by 2 "LGCIUs"...Landing Gear Control Interface Units. These two computers alternate between 1 and 2 on each leg. The receive inputs from proximity and position detectors on the gear shock absorbers, gear doors, cargo door components and locking mechanisms, door sills and 4 flap attachments (slat attachments are not mentioned). In other words it is not a single-point failure design such as one which senses nosewheel oleo compression. Keep in mind that the latter design philosophy was sufficient at the time and that the Airbus technology was developed long after. In other words, this isn't a "Boeing vs Airbus" thing, please.
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Hoping the guys up front have got things right certainly occurs to regular SLFs at certain hot high locations like HRE.
Quite a few years ago, it was most reassuring to get a PA from the front
saying " For those of you who are regular guests of our airline the take of run is much longer than usual so please do not have any concerns"
( some SLFs do visibly time the roll )
Quite a few years ago, it was most reassuring to get a PA from the front
saying " For those of you who are regular guests of our airline the take of run is much longer than usual so please do not have any concerns"
( some SLFs do visibly time the roll )
And, What Do They DO?
( some SLFs do visibly time the roll )
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Perhaps officially introduce an additional role for the senior F/A. "Check slats and flaps". By some designated point in the taxi out, if the slats and flaps aren't visibly set then notify the flight deck. This takes the onus off aware passengers and removes any stigma involved in the F/A "telling the pilots how to do their job" or for that matter the aware passenger/s telling the cabin crew. After all, the flight crew already tell the cabin crew to "arm door and prepare for take-off" so why not the other way around as well?
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If all the current assumption become confirmed, it will be interesting to see whether the Spanish Civil Aviation Accidents and Incidents Investigation Commission (CIAIAC) will admit as an contributing factor, that an earlier release of the final report of the almost accident of OE-LMM (ACE June 07) may have found its way into Belgrano or an Alert SB or a Spanair company safety program, thus early enough to increase the chance to save JKK5022. Though OE-LMM is registered in Austria the investigation is led and the final report is to be issued by ....Spanish Civil Aviation Accidents and Incidents Investigation Commission (CIAIAC)
But no. They have to be 99.999% sure of the cause of the accident even if it takes them 2 years and they have to produce all the pretty pictures and review all the information from every source and every blueprint from every manufacturer.
Meanwhile, 2 years down the road, another airplane falls victim of the same (or similar) cause.
Reports HAVE to be both, fast and accurate. Since they usually can not be both things at the same time, PRELIMINARY INNACCURATE REPORTS should be made available, just detailing that those are not PROVEN FACTS YET and reminding that it's all speculative until a final report comes out.
But keeping NEAR TOTAL TIGHT-LIP SILENCE for 2 years and then detailing to the last tiny fact exactly what happened in 100 pages when actually 4 paragraphs are enough in most cases, is NOT the best way to conduct this investigation "business".
So yes. I do blame the CIAIAC lack of preliminary and constant information for contributing to this or other (potential, theoretical, speculative) cause for the accident.
Because I knew about OE-LMM first hand, I always wanted to find out what caused that near catastrophy. It had to be through an informal forum like this and over 1 year later that I have finally reached "peace" with myself on the (likely) cause.
And I applaud the idea of cabin crew checking for visual wing configuration and function early on take-off. After all, they are familiar with the aircraft and their lives are at stake as much as anyone elses and perhaps a call on their side alerting the cockpit of potential problems could be valuable, if indeed a number of "false alarms" are bound to happen (better safe than sorry).
Last edited by justme69; 7th Sep 2008 at 00:06.
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it makes me wonder whether someone down the back, with a bit more courage, might have made a difference.
At the end of the day, I've pretty much concluded that I have to count on the professionalism of the crew to keep the odds of this sort of accident very low indeed (and the record does seem to bear that out).
Perhaps you pros might think otherwise; if so, feel free to whip me in public...
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It does make me mad that they have to be so picky about putting out an impeccable and good looking report that it takes them for freeking ever to make when, with the information they have already, they could easily by now, only a few weeks after the accident, put out a WHOLE LIST OF LIKELY SCENARIOS that may or MAY NOT have been the cause of this accident but that MAY shed light on THEORETICAL but plausible situations on how it could've been.
But no. They have to be 99.999% sure of the cause of the accident even if it takes them 2 years and they have to produce all the pretty pictures and review all the information from every source and every blueprint from every manufacturer.
Meanwhile, 2 years down the road, another airplane falls victim of the same (or similar) cause.
Reports HAVE to be both, fast and accurate. Since they usually can not be both things at the same time, PRELIMINARY INNACCURATE REPORTS should be made available, just detailing that those are not PROVEN FACTS YET and reminding that it's all speculative until a final report comes out.
But keeping NEAR TOTAL TIGHT-LIP SILENCE for 2 years and then detailing to the last tiny fact exactly what happened in 100 pages when actually 4 paragraphs are enough in most cases, is NOT the best way to conduct this investigation "business".
So yes. I do blame the CIAIAC lack of preliminary and constant information for contributing to this or other (potential, theoretical, speculative) cause for the accident.
Because I knew about OE-LMM first hand, I always wanted to find out what caused that near catastrophy. It had to be through an informal forum like this and over 1 year later that I have finally reached "peace" with myself on the (likely) cause.
And I applaud the idea of cabin crew checking for visual wing configuration and function early on take-off. After all, they are familiar with the aircraft and their lives are at stake as much as anyone elses and perhaps a call on their side alerting the cockpit of potential problems could be valuable, if indeed a number of "false alarms" are bound to happen (better safe than sorry).
But no. They have to be 99.999% sure of the cause of the accident even if it takes them 2 years and they have to produce all the pretty pictures and review all the information from every source and every blueprint from every manufacturer.
Meanwhile, 2 years down the road, another airplane falls victim of the same (or similar) cause.
Reports HAVE to be both, fast and accurate. Since they usually can not be both things at the same time, PRELIMINARY INNACCURATE REPORTS should be made available, just detailing that those are not PROVEN FACTS YET and reminding that it's all speculative until a final report comes out.
But keeping NEAR TOTAL TIGHT-LIP SILENCE for 2 years and then detailing to the last tiny fact exactly what happened in 100 pages when actually 4 paragraphs are enough in most cases, is NOT the best way to conduct this investigation "business".
So yes. I do blame the CIAIAC lack of preliminary and constant information for contributing to this or other (potential, theoretical, speculative) cause for the accident.
Because I knew about OE-LMM first hand, I always wanted to find out what caused that near catastrophy. It had to be through an informal forum like this and over 1 year later that I have finally reached "peace" with myself on the (likely) cause.
And I applaud the idea of cabin crew checking for visual wing configuration and function early on take-off. After all, they are familiar with the aircraft and their lives are at stake as much as anyone elses and perhaps a call on their side alerting the cockpit of potential problems could be valuable, if indeed a number of "false alarms" are bound to happen (better safe than sorry).
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But keeping NEAR TOTAL TIGHT-LIP SILENCE for 2 years and then detailing to the last tiny fact exactly what happened in 100 pages when actually 4 paragraphs are enough in most cases, is NOT the best way to conduct this investigation "business".
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In the event that in the Spanair accident No Flaps/Slats was a factor.. and also the OE-LMM incident (?) out of interest, what does/can the latter add to the well documented and reported Northwest accident?
NoD
NoD
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IF, a big if, this scenario proves to be correct, would it not suggest that overall, there has been too much reliance on volountary operational and maintenance practices rather than mandatory ones... yes I know, I haven't worded that correctly, as far as airline procedures and certificating/licensing bodies work together, but hopefully you get my drift.
I'm saying, that if there's a loaded gun lying around, everyone near it must be aware (it's loaded), and that awareness not left to chance.
I'm saying, that if there's a loaded gun lying around, everyone near it must be aware (it's loaded), and that awareness not left to chance.
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Flying depends on everyone doing things right and not being cheap about anything.
Whether it is servicing the nose strut frequently and properly, or changing procedures to include a configuration check by an outside authority at the runway threshold, things have to be done to insure this type of accident doesn't happen again.
Whether it is servicing the nose strut frequently and properly, or changing procedures to include a configuration check by an outside authority at the runway threshold, things have to be done to insure this type of accident doesn't happen again.
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what does/can the latter add to the well documented and reported Northwest accident?
The C/B panel on OE-LMM was not destroyed.
3NM