Spanair accident at Madrid

[philipat]

The recovered deployed reverser was activated by the pilot, but the right side reverser could not be deployed as it had been deactivated since August 17.

I think there is a need for great caution with media reports. Surely no Company's MEL would allow this?

[misd-agin]

philipat - 3 days for an open MEL item? Happens all the time.

[Airbubba]

I think there is a need for great caution with media reports. Surely no Company's MEL would allow this?

Yep, deactivated T/R's are not uncommon, many engine types have a tab or pin that sticks out of the nacelle to visually indicate deactivation.

Although the T/R's are usually not considered in runway performance (the SWA overrun at MDW pointed out some inconsistencies in this) some types of ops like LAHSO and Cat 3B may be be prohibited.

We'll know more soon but, as we discussed several pages ago, this crash seems to have a lot in common with NWA 255 at DTW including the failure to climb, wing waggling stall, (possibly?) survivable impact and the fire as the plane fell off the level area and broke apart.

There has been at least one airliner crash in recent years where the crew had the flaps up and the warning horn did sound but they ignored it and continued the takeoff with disatrous results:

30:58 - Sound of engines accelerating starts.
31:00 - Sound of maximum engine acceleration.
31:01 - Alarm begins to sound (Beep, Beep, Beep...).
31:05 - Pilot: "No, no, no, huh?"
31:12 - Pilot: "What the hell is that?"

31:16 - Cop.: "Take off thrust set, speed alive" (spoken in English)


31:20 - Pilot: "I don't know what's going on, old man, but everything is ok." (unclear).


31:23 - Cop.: "Eighty knots." (spoken in English)


31:36 - Cop.: "V 1."


31:37 - Cop.: "Rotate." (spoken in English)


31:39 - Cop.: "V 2."


31:41 - 31:45 - Continuous mechanical sound of the stick shaker.


31:45 - Sound of engines decelerating. Cuts out.


31:46.04 - Sound of impact.

LAPA Flight 3142 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

For perspective, an excerpt from the BBC's initial report of this LAPA 3142 crash:

Up to 80 people are reported to have died when a Boeing 737 airliner crashed in Argentina while taking off from the main domestic airport in the capital, Buenos Aires.

A spokeswoman for the airline - Lineas Aereas Privadas Argentinas (LAPA) said 95 passengers and six crew members were on board the plane when it went up in flames after crashing into a golf course near Jorge Newbery airport.

The pilot is reported to have radioed that one of the plane's engines caught fire as he tried to take off...

BBC News | Americas | Dozens die in plane inferno

[lomapaseo]

Escubic;

Very fine, skillful mathematical & graphic work indeed...tx.

We may see that the 'S' turns aren't nearly as violent as might be assumed from the fore-shortened view as taken by a strong telephoto lens. Also we may see that it doesn't take a large difference between heading and track to place the nosewheel outside the physical paths of the main gears. Such wide lateral "gyrations", (now far less so), while the nosewheel's track was straight, are realistic when considered as shown in this corrected photo.

I was searching all over for a program that would "know" that the perspective was in the original photo of the ground tracks and of course no program does - they only know pixels - it is us who interpret according to the rules of perspective...thanks for your excellent post.

Thanks to PJ2 for his assessment which is what I support as well. Accepting the foreshortening effect of the camera lens it now makes quite plausible even low side forces applied near the aircraft centerline such as rudder and/or thrust asymetry to explain the tire tracks.

[PJ2]

beechnut;

Try Airliners.net | Airplanes - Aviation - Aircraft- Aircraft Photos & News

Well, I don't think so. I tried AvWeb, AirDisaster etc as well, although I think it's shut down- anyone? Al Wheeler was there and a few others - good guys from AVSIG etc, (anyone know what became of Randy Sohn?).

The quality of the input here, even given the M-Factor so delicately put by an honorable member is without equal in terms of breadth/depth. Others may differ but it is here that experts in their aviation/technical fields come first; - I truly don't think many here are verbal or mental whatever's although there seems enough wet dreams to last for a while...

That fertile ground overgrows with weeds that drive out healthy plants is a fact of life everywhere - some seeds are lucky to find sunshine and flourish, others wither. I find patience is more rewarded than giving up in frustration although there are times...

[lomapaseo]

I'm a little bit apprehensive about straying into postulations (since posts have a way of haunting one) but just musing at the end of the day.

Accepting the reasonable explanation for one reverser deployed as stated in today's posts (one reverser MELed and the other deployed at first re-contact with the ground)

I am left with an aircraft either with insufficient speed or insufficient configuration to climb out of ground effect. A lack of speed has time to be noticed while a misconfiguration is a gotcha after you "set power" and if the gotcha is not annunciated during the takeoff roll then it is often a fatal flaw as NW255 and Delta at DFW demonstrated.

I do not yet see convincing evidence that too little speed was present (after all it did lift off in ground efect) although ground tract radar and/or useable DFDR data may answer this more positively

As in NW255 the DFDR would clearly show flap configuration and unlike NW255 it has not been leaked yet into the public domain.

Then there is the damage impact marks of the actuation for the flaps and slats and typically in spite of fire damage some of it remains on one side or the other to confirm their position at impact.

I suspect that people very close to the investigation allready have some very positive clues for and against many of the theories postulated on this board.

[PJ2]

lomapaseo;

I suspect that people very close to the investigation allready have some very positive clues for and against many of the theories postulated on this board.

I think so. And here we begin to enter the territory which Sidney Dekker discusses so well in his "Field Guide for Understanding Human Error"..."hindsight". In fact, the entire thread is a wonderful lesson in "determining cause" both in accidents and in human affairs, isn't it? We don't know, so we each draw on our experience, our prejudices, our history and our training. As you say, very soon, many posts will be seen as, "having been prescient", (very likely without good reason except luck and some good guessing!), and others will be dumped into file 13 and the next round of rabbit trails will begin..."Why did the crew....? etc" in terms of "attempted rejects", "retracted slats/flaps", etc, etc etc.

The key in the end is Dekker's point: What made sense to the crew at the time such that they made the decisions that they did? And if those who posited the various scenarios about returns to the gate, including some very poignant and bluntly honest posts I recall, how will, if shown to be the case, will "the killer items" be dealt with from here on in?

[lomapaseo]

PJ2

The quality of the input here, even given the M-Factor so delicately put by an honorable member is without equal in terms of breadth/depth

I have no trouble picking the berries from the vines, although I have gotten pricked from time to time. I agree that the depth (if you can draw it out) far surpasses any other forum listed so far.

That way if I happen to rub elbows with experienced investigators I can ask intelligent questions and actually understand their brief answers.

[lomapaseo]

if shown to be the case, will "the killer items" be dealt with from here on in?

I'm worried about this (general statement). These are very rare and engender a "it won't happen to me because I know better" In the NW and Delta events it was my strong conviction that it was human traits common to all of us that initiated the event. That's why we put in additional barriers.

For me, I'm going to ask most of my questions in the end, why did the barriers not work? It is very valuable teaching tool and I am going to stress it to a higher degree.

I have an extreme unliking of a machine that is not tollerant of the pilot to the point where it throws a "gotcha" at you.

[justme69]

Some more information thrown around by the press (a TV channel in this case). As usual, it shouldn't be taken as too accurate.

-First point of impact: 20m away (to the right) from runaway.
-Altitude reached by the airplane: no more than 15m (previous visual estimation of only 7m was given to the judge).
-After take-off, it "turned" (deviated from a straight line) 25º (previosuly thought to be more like 35º)
-It took two seconds since it started to go down until it hit the ground. (Consistent with prior reports that it took between 6 and 7 seconds from the moment the wheels left the ground til the plane touched it again, say 4s going up and 2s coming back down).
-As previously reported, the right engine reverser is now said to have been locked-out-of-service for 3 days (MEL, up to 10 days). The LEFT engine reverser seems to have been found properly deployed.

[philipat]

TR Deactivation

In the media reports regarding TR deactivation or in any other reports, has there been any mention of WHICH engine? If #2 the causal TR theories are less valid? However, if it was the #2 engine which seperated on initial impact, the pictures earlier in the thread show that the TR was deployed, suggesting the #1 engine was the one with deactivated TR. Although, of course, the TR could still have deployed on impact even if deactivated?

[justme69]

Media reporting the news speaks cathegorically of RIGHT engine reverser locked out of service for maintenance. But then only say that "AN engine" was found with the reverser properly (fully) deployed. That "an engine" does not imply it was only ONE engine nor that it was THE OTHER engine.

So nobody can tell for sure from that report, but casual reading of that article, in one of Spain's large TV stations web page, would lead you to believe that, i.e, the pilot could not possibly had deployed the right reverser because "it didn't work" and that he deployed the left one to try to brake (they actually go as far as claiming that that was the case).

Can someone positively ID which one is the engine shown on the picture with the reverser deployed?

Could the experts elaborate if a 25º "turn" to the right could be accomplished from a (hard-ish) roll (no yaw) of only a few (say 3) seconds? The witnesses speak of what possibly was a roll to the left followed by a "steep" roll to the right after becoming airborne and before hitting the ground. Airplane is said to have been airborne for 7s max total.

[chegarb]

Here is another tragic reverser deployment during takeoff!

ASN Aircraft accident Fokker 100 PT-MRK São Paulo, SP TAM F-100 in Conghonas, Brazil - 1996

[Spotlight]

A dreadful accident! As much as the Dr Reason stuff has made me want to reach for my gun in the past, this accident could be the poster for the next 10 years.

I fly a variant of the MD82. The members talking no flap and pilot commanded TR deployment (with one locked out) know what they are talking about.

A return to the gate and subsequent go go go from ground people are pressures.

Operators still using the aircraft (not sim) for training have mostly trended away from abbreviated checklists for circuits and make every landing a full stop

[Taxi2parking]

Several posters have mentioned that one of the TRs was locked out (and I guess MEL'd) some time prior to this flight. Is this normal practice with MD aircraft? I would have thought it more normal to lock both out if one is U/S.

[Ancient Mariner]

PJ2:

I tried AvWeb, AirDisaster etc as well, although I think it's shut down- anyone?

AirDisaster has been re-ignited as airdisaster.info by some former members. Wild speculations are the order of the day.
Per

[sevenstrokeroll]

Taxi2parking

no, we don't disable both TR's if only one is broken. we are however very careful when we use just ONE.

taxi2parking, consider, if we have an engine failure prior to V1 on an airplane with all thrust reversers working, and we elect to deploy thrust reversers to aid us in stopping, only ONE will be providing reverse thrust, as the other engine is already dead. to be sure, we get some drag by deploying even a dead engine reverser.

so one is better than none. but we are limited by controlability in the amount of reverse thrust used.

ALSO...AIRBUBBA, thanks for telling us about that bizare continued takeoff in the face of a blaring warning horn...yikes.

There is a terrible trend in modern airline training to just teach enough about a plane to get a pilot to pass a checkride. In depth knowledge of your plane seems to be an antiquated concept. And yes, its all about money.


I voiced a theory regarding ground shift, thinking the plane was airborne, etc many,many pages ago. I still think it is right (except for that brief phony cvr bit).

I encourage all pilots to make sure they practice safe flying and never trust a warning system to save them. Get paranoid if you have to, be "MR. MONK" and be compulsive and check your flaps a couple of times before takeoff (landing too)

[threemiles]

Certainly the LAPA and Helios accidents showed a lack in training concepts and methods as warning horn sounds (take-off config, cabin altitude) where never heard by either crew members before. This should be the first thing in the sim, how the horn sounds.

[philipat]

The 3 Killers

PJ2:

how will, if shown to be the case, will "the killer items" be dealt with from here on in?

I think I know where you are going with this. It is apparent from earlier posts by highly experienced pilots such as yourself, that the three killers at TO are already informally re-checked again immediately prior to takeoff. Given that confiuration related accidents are far from infrequent, would it be desirable and/or feasible to formalise this final check?

[Volume]

we don't disable both TR's if only one is broken. we are however very careful when we use just ONE.

This policy is also depending on local authority regulations. Since the S7 778 accident in Irkutsk, the Russian AR-IAC does no longer allow to disable T/R asymmetric. So either you disable two T/R, or you are not going to fly. Traditionally the Russians did not know an MMEL, so it is only possible for western type aircraft to disable anything and still fly.