Originally Posted by KiwiNedNZ
The Pilot operated the Aircraft in negligent and reckless manner on the departure by turning the Aircraft rapidly, which was not in compliance with the CAR ,̶ Chapter 2, paragraph 2.2.1, regarding negligent and reckless pilot operations, and paragraph 2.8.1, regarding aerobatic flight.
Very interesting reading - this para seems to sum up their thoughts.
Not so sure. Depends on what you consider 'interesting'. I rather found the report meaningless, 50 odd pages of platitudes. And if this summarises their thoughts, then we don't share their views.
God forbid a legal EASA definition of aerobatics based on the purpose of the flight.
I still don't know what really happened. Why would a high-time pilot with a light aircraft (1 pax, probably less than full fuel as it was end of the day) enter into a spin in the torque direction ("non-power" pedal) and then not be able to arrest the yaw? The report mentions that there is an iPad video of the whole take-off and subsequent accident. That probably would tell us more about what went wrong than the whole report. Unfortunately, I wasn't able to find this video anywhere on the Net.
What was worthwhile in the report though were the following two findings, which point out a conflict between having crashworthiness in the structure on one side, and new risks that pop up exactly when the crashworthy parts do what they have to:
- When the skids give in on a hard landing to absorb energy as designed and the ship comes to a rest on its belly, the under-belly fuel drain gets sheered off, and fuel spills in an uncontrolled way. Luckily in this case, there was no fire.
- When the crashworthy seats collapse under high G-forces as designed, the initially tight shoulder harnesses become completely loose (the shoulder harness being attached to the top, and the body moving downwards together with the collapsing seat). Thereby depriving the bodies of both pax from the restraint afforded by the shoulder harness. This had severe consequences for at least one crew members, as due to the centrifugal forces his body - while still restraint by the lap belt - was hanging out of the cockpit (doors had opened or fallen off) during the 5 minutes that the helicopter continued to spin with engine and rotor running while already on the ground.