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Old 11th Jan 2017, 14:05   #1 (permalink)
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Dubai EC130 accident report

Interesting read just published: https://gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublication/...L%20REPORT.pdf
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Old 11th Jan 2017, 21:50   #2 (permalink)
 
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The Pilot operated the Aircraft in negligent and reckless manner on the departure by turning the Aircraft rapidly, which was not in compliance with the CAR ,̶ Chapter 2, paragraph 2.2.1, regarding negligent and reckless pilot operations, and paragraph 2.8.1, regarding aerobatic flight.
Very interesting reading - this para seems to sum up their thoughts.
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Old 12th Jan 2017, 17:08   #3 (permalink)
 
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Safety actions taken by Helidubai
Employment is only offered after an extensive selection process and to
those with an instructional background
.
WTF?
I find this insulting...

Now an experienced pilot with no instructional background is dangerous pilot?
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Old 12th Jan 2017, 17:44   #4 (permalink)
 
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Pilots who have survived multiple students definitely have a higher luck factor!
SLB
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Old 12th Jan 2017, 19:33   #5 (permalink)
 
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Good one SLBear.

JD
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Old 14th Jan 2017, 08:12   #6 (permalink)
 
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Originally Posted by KiwiNedNZ View Post

Quote:
The Pilot operated the Aircraft in negligent and reckless manner on the departure by turning the Aircraft rapidly, which was not in compliance with the CAR ,̶ Chapter 2, paragraph 2.2.1, regarding negligent and reckless pilot operations, and paragraph 2.8.1, regarding aerobatic flight.

Very interesting reading - this para seems to sum up their thoughts.
Not so sure. Depends on what you consider 'interesting'. I rather found the report meaningless, 50 odd pages of platitudes. And if this summarises their thoughts, then we don't share their views.

God forbid a legal EASA definition of aerobatics based on the purpose of the flight.

I still don't know what really happened. Why would a high-time pilot with a light aircraft (1 pax, probably less than full fuel as it was end of the day) enter into a spin in the torque direction ("non-power" pedal) and then not be able to arrest the yaw? The report mentions that there is an iPad video of the whole take-off and subsequent accident. That probably would tell us more about what went wrong than the whole report. Unfortunately, I wasn't able to find this video anywhere on the Net.

What was worthwhile in the report though were the following two findings, which point out a conflict between having crashworthiness in the structure on one side, and new risks that pop up exactly when the crashworthy parts do what they have to:

- When the skids give in on a hard landing to absorb energy as designed and the ship comes to a rest on its belly, the under-belly fuel drain gets sheered off, and fuel spills in an uncontrolled way. Luckily in this case, there was no fire.

- When the crashworthy seats collapse under high G-forces as designed, the initially tight shoulder harnesses become completely loose (the shoulder harness being attached to the top, and the body moving downwards together with the collapsing seat). Thereby depriving the bodies of both pax from the restraint afforded by the shoulder harness. This had severe consequences for at least one crew members, as due to the centrifugal forces his body - while still restraint by the lap belt - was hanging out of the cockpit (doors had opened or fallen off) during the 5 minutes that the helicopter continued to spin with engine and rotor running while already on the ground.
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Old 14th Jan 2017, 09:53   #7 (permalink)
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God forbid a legal EASA definition of aerobatics based on the purpose of the flight.
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means an intentional manoeuvre involving an abrupt change in an aircraft’s attitude, an abnormal attitude, or abnormal acceleration, not necessary for normal flight
A high power vertical climb, with a high yaw rate, probably does meet this definition.
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Old 14th Jan 2017, 10:48   #8 (permalink)
 
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I also find it incredible that in this day and age we can design in crashworthiness yet fail to trigger an engine stop in those circumstances.
I would have thought it pretty obvious that if the skids have collapsed the engine should be stopped immediately. Surely an automatic fuel cutoff could be incorporated into the crashing aircraft. A g-shock can trigger an ELT so why not a fuel cutoff?
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Old 14th Jan 2017, 13:47   #9 (permalink)
 
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Originally Posted by EddieHeli View Post
I would have thought it pretty obvious that if the skids have collapsed the engine should be stopped immediately. Surely an automatic fuel cutoff could be incorporated into the crashing aircraft. A g-shock can trigger an ELT so why not a fuel cutoff?
Of course it could be done but the difference is that an ELT activating unintentionally poses no threat to flight safety. A device that is designed to shut off the engine automatically is something that I wouldn't be too comfortable flying around with.
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Old 14th Jan 2017, 17:13   #10 (permalink)
 
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Observed Ineffectiveness of Shoulder Harness

Upon re-reading the report: In Section 1 "Factual Information" on page 2 it indeed suggested that the collapsing seats under the occupants rendered the shoulder harnesses ineffective:

Quote:
The Pilot and HLO were both incapacitated from injuries resulting from the combination of the rapid vertical deceleration and that both crewmembers were unrestrained by their shoulder harnesses due to the crew seats lowering as the seats deformed under the load.
However, further down a different analysis is presented. The stills from the video included in the report seem to show that (at least) the pilots body is already leaning far forward (due to the high centrifugal forces from the "excessive yaw manoeuvre") on or before 8 seconds after the take-off:

Quote:
2.6: The shoulder harness has a locking mechanism that will lock the free play of the harness if the rate of acceleration is equal to or exceeds 1.5 g. If the acceleration is below 1.5 g, the shoulder harness is not locked allowing the body position of the crew to move forward. During the turn, the increasing rate of rotation was constant and approximately linear, up until the seven second mark.
...
The assumption is that for the Pilot to be inclined forward the rotational inertia has to be sufficient to propel the upper body position forward, all of which can only occur if the acceleration in the X-axis is equal to or less than 1.5 g.
This would not only have introduced considerable slag in the shoulder harness (allowing - together with the further 'play' added by the downwards collapsing seats - the pilots upper body upon impact to be first propelled forward onto the cyclic stick, and then out of the cockpit), but would also have caused...
Quote:
3.3.2 Spatial disorientation resulting from the rapid onset of the yaw/high speed rotation combined with the effects of the rotational inertia forcing the Pilot and HLO forward.
Maybe these 'automatic' inertia reel seat belts are not that ideal after all? In any case, one must assume that spatial disorientation would have rendered the pilot a mere passenger long before impact. And that the dumping of the collective (from second 7 or so) might not have been intentional. He may well have lowered the collective in the same movement that pushed his torso forward.

What I find remarkable is that the report doesn't mention what the 'pilot's story' is. After all, the crew survived and would in all generality be able to explain why the take-off was done without putting in anti-torque pedal, and why the pilot allowed the yaw rate to increase beyond (the possibly intended) 180 degrees pedal turn, seemingly without taking any corrective action. Is there is something about the UAE that I don't understand?
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