S92 "unexpected control responses"
Problem is, if something goes wrong, as a pilot you need to be able to, firstly, keep focussed on flying the aircraft, and then note the symptoms, make sense of the symptoms, arrive at a likely diagnosis and proceed with an initial course of action. All that before you look at any manual. No room in any of that for consultation with anybody who is not sitting immediately to your left or right. You just can't be diluting that fundamental aspect of piloting.
Something is fundamentally wrong in the North Sea. Why do accidents happen in the NS at the rate they do but, by way of comparison, in 50 years of operational O&G flying in Bass Strait Australia - which has its fair share of bad weather and all those other things - not a single accident in all that time. Just saying.
Something is fundamentally wrong in the North Sea. Why do accidents happen in the NS at the rate they do but, by way of comparison, in 50 years of operational O&G flying in Bass Strait Australia - which has its fair share of bad weather and all those other things - not a single accident in all that time. Just saying.
Don't know. The only fundamental difference I can think of is the oil company has always directly owned and operated all the helicopters and physical infrastructure and management structures etc to support them. And for the most part they are pretty much left alone by the regulator to run their own show without too much external oversight.
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The short version is that nowadays oil and gas crews are examined at OPC time mostly, not completely, but mostly by TRE’s with only the knowledge of what it says in the big book and no actual common sense. Examinations are all procedural. So neither the captain or copilot in this case really had that much to go on training wise. Add to this that the company in question have been pushed to promote people by virtue of time served and not actual ability which is all that matters to the unions in U.K. and Ireland, jobs for the boys (and girls), which may not be the case in this instance but overall as a result the ethos for captaincy is then degraded in terms of actual ‘CAPTAINCY’ as Julie is suggesting. Combine this with the question of copilot CRM and I can tell you from personal experience in 2 out of the big 3 North Sea companies that CRM stopped when certain captains decided. It is still the case that those who choose to bully their way in the cockpit exist as much as they did 30 years ago, therefore copilot CRM and the ability to interject suffers.
Of course, there is a growing feeling that everything Sikorsky is good and everything Airbus is bad.
My opinion with over thirty five years of flying Pumas of different types is that they are trying to stuff too much wine into the bottle.
As far as pilot ability is concerned I was once called a dinosaur on this forum because I said that I used to like to fly the odd sector without the autopilot so as to keep in practice.
Last edited by Fareastdriver; 31st Mar 2018 at 09:06.
Lack of Captaincy and information
Aknowledging the lack of Captaincy, maybe this information could be useful to 'today' crews:
"Additionally, the helicopter manufacturer reviewed their archive of flight data records to determine whether it is an unusual event for a pilot to use full pedal travel in flight. The analysis showed that the use of full pedal was very rare but had occurred in each of the previous events of TRPCS bearing failure(see paragraph 1.18.2). Conclusions from the review were that this cue is available to flight crew prior to bearing failure, but is indicative of a bearing that is already in an advanced state of degradation. Thus, the use of full pedal travel could indicate a need for prompt action to abort a flight and the helicopter manufacturer is considering whether changes to the RFM could be introduced." (Accident Report, pg.52)
"Additionally, the helicopter manufacturer reviewed their archive of flight data records to determine whether it is an unusual event for a pilot to use full pedal travel in flight. The analysis showed that the use of full pedal was very rare but had occurred in each of the previous events of TRPCS bearing failure(see paragraph 1.18.2). Conclusions from the review were that this cue is available to flight crew prior to bearing failure, but is indicative of a bearing that is already in an advanced state of degradation. Thus, the use of full pedal travel could indicate a need for prompt action to abort a flight and the helicopter manufacturer is considering whether changes to the RFM could be introduced." (Accident Report, pg.52)
Last edited by Jimmy.; 13th Apr 2018 at 01:33. Reason: Typo
There is a huge difference between checking and training!
It is not the “union” pressure that saw “snot noses” shoved up the food chain by at least one major North Sea Operator.
A wave of newly blessed kids with scant experience found themselves the standards setters and it did not always end up in Wine and Roses.
It is not the “union” pressure that saw “snot noses” shoved up the food chain by at least one major North Sea Operator.
A wave of newly blessed kids with scant experience found themselves the standards setters and it did not always end up in Wine and Roses.
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So the reason this accident happened is down to the crew and their training ?? How do you train pilots and program simulators for something that’s not supposed to happen ? That bearing could give up in a variety of different ways and of course at any flight phase.
Unless Sikorsky can assimilate all the TRPCS event data and confirm that they all failed in exactly the same way and same time frame I don’t see how you can ‘train’ for this event .There are a million different ways a helicopter can have mechanical failure that leads to loss of Main and/ or Tail rotor control ...e.g MR Servo bolt failure or Scissor bearing failure (See recent Sikorsky Safety advisory).Why don’t Sikorsky actually FIX the TRPCS bearing problem ....? Because they still have no root cause for the failure.
In the meantime we are all ‘happily’ flying around in them because HUMS ‘might’ pick up on it 😂. Ironic that the 225 is canned because of as yet no proof of root cause meanwhile we are happy to accept this issue on the S92 when the manufacture has done nothing to resolve it. Personally I can’t see why this thread has descended in to a ‘Crew fault/Crap training/‘snot nose’ debate , surely we should remember we are all human and that this crew in the end saved everyone on board and potentially another Facebook campaign to ‘keep the N.Sea 92 free’.
Unless Sikorsky can assimilate all the TRPCS event data and confirm that they all failed in exactly the same way and same time frame I don’t see how you can ‘train’ for this event .There are a million different ways a helicopter can have mechanical failure that leads to loss of Main and/ or Tail rotor control ...e.g MR Servo bolt failure or Scissor bearing failure (See recent Sikorsky Safety advisory).Why don’t Sikorsky actually FIX the TRPCS bearing problem ....? Because they still have no root cause for the failure.
In the meantime we are all ‘happily’ flying around in them because HUMS ‘might’ pick up on it 😂. Ironic that the 225 is canned because of as yet no proof of root cause meanwhile we are happy to accept this issue on the S92 when the manufacture has done nothing to resolve it. Personally I can’t see why this thread has descended in to a ‘Crew fault/Crap training/‘snot nose’ debate , surely we should remember we are all human and that this crew in the end saved everyone on board and potentially another Facebook campaign to ‘keep the N.Sea 92 free’.
How does one learn what is abnormal control responses are, how they are manifested, and recognized and a proper action to take upon encountering such abnormal control responses?
Training, experience, combination of both perhaps?
How do you set a minimum standard for that especially for new Types?
I would suggest the tail rotor control response issue is several orders of magnitude different than that of the 225 shucking the entire main rotor system.
Training, experience, combination of both perhaps?
How do you set a minimum standard for that especially for new Types?
I would suggest the tail rotor control response issue is several orders of magnitude different than that of the 225 shucking the entire main rotor system.
So the reason this accident happened is down to the crew and their training ?? How do you train pilots and program simulators for something that’s not supposed to happen ? That bearing could give up in a variety of different ways and of course at any flight phase.
Unless Sikorsky can assimilate all the TRPCS event data and confirm that they all failed in exactly the same way and same time frame I don’t see how you can ‘train’ for this event .There are a million different ways a helicopter can have mechanical failure that leads to loss of Main and/ or Tail rotor control ...e.g MR Servo bolt failure or Scissor bearing failure (See recent Sikorsky Safety advisory).Why don’t Sikorsky actually FIX the TRPCS bearing problem ....? Because they still have no root cause for the failure.
In the meantime we are all ‘happily’ flying around in them because HUMS ‘might’ pick up on it 😂. Ironic that the 225 is canned because of as yet no proof of root cause meanwhile we are happy to accept this issue on the S92 when the manufacture has done nothing to resolve it. Personally I can’t see why this thread has descended in to a ‘Crew fault/Crap training/‘snot nose’ debate , surely we should remember we are all human and that this crew in the end saved everyone on board and potentially another Facebook campaign to ‘keep the N.Sea 92 free’.
Unless Sikorsky can assimilate all the TRPCS event data and confirm that they all failed in exactly the same way and same time frame I don’t see how you can ‘train’ for this event .There are a million different ways a helicopter can have mechanical failure that leads to loss of Main and/ or Tail rotor control ...e.g MR Servo bolt failure or Scissor bearing failure (See recent Sikorsky Safety advisory).Why don’t Sikorsky actually FIX the TRPCS bearing problem ....? Because they still have no root cause for the failure.
In the meantime we are all ‘happily’ flying around in them because HUMS ‘might’ pick up on it 😂. Ironic that the 225 is canned because of as yet no proof of root cause meanwhile we are happy to accept this issue on the S92 when the manufacture has done nothing to resolve it. Personally I can’t see why this thread has descended in to a ‘Crew fault/Crap training/‘snot nose’ debate , surely we should remember we are all human and that this crew in the end saved everyone on board and potentially another Facebook campaign to ‘keep the N.Sea 92 free’.
Last edited by Jimmy.; 13th Apr 2018 at 21:41. Reason: Typo
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“I would suggest the tail rotor control response issue is several orders of magnitude different than that of the 225 shucking the entire main rotor system.”
And I would suggest that it wasn’t just a ‘tail rotor control response’ issue. It was a mechanical failure of the Tail rotor pitch control shaft bearing.
It’s not just the fact you lose control of the Tail rotor but more importantly the forces involved . Imagine the damage done to the TGB and the vibration to the whole assembly if this had happened in the cruise on the way home . Could these forces have led to eventual break up of the TGB due to heat and vibes if sustained ? Leading to loss of the TGB/TRH and blades ? In my opinion in all the instances of this failure the crews and A/C got lucky as they were all on final approach or close to a landing site . Even titling this as an ‘Unexpected Control response’ was underplaying it in my opinion, and I was shocked this was the title of the news flash distributed to N.Sea operators when it happened. Which ever way you want to view it this is a Nasty accident and for a problem that hasn’t gone away. Hums is only as good as the people deciphering it.
But if people want to continue thinking this aircraft is somehow safer than a 225 then carry on ! I fly it every day and I know it’s just another helicopter...
And I would suggest that it wasn’t just a ‘tail rotor control response’ issue. It was a mechanical failure of the Tail rotor pitch control shaft bearing.
It’s not just the fact you lose control of the Tail rotor but more importantly the forces involved . Imagine the damage done to the TGB and the vibration to the whole assembly if this had happened in the cruise on the way home . Could these forces have led to eventual break up of the TGB due to heat and vibes if sustained ? Leading to loss of the TGB/TRH and blades ? In my opinion in all the instances of this failure the crews and A/C got lucky as they were all on final approach or close to a landing site . Even titling this as an ‘Unexpected Control response’ was underplaying it in my opinion, and I was shocked this was the title of the news flash distributed to N.Sea operators when it happened. Which ever way you want to view it this is a Nasty accident and for a problem that hasn’t gone away. Hums is only as good as the people deciphering it.
But if people want to continue thinking this aircraft is somehow safer than a 225 then carry on ! I fly it every day and I know it’s just another helicopter...
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I think we may be comparing apples and oranges here. The report is clear about the human error on interpreting the HUMS data (available the night before the accident). Now, a HUMS download and analysis is made after each flight. Despite the gravity of a TR control failure, it was detectable (4.75hrs and the full left pedal) and quite different than loosing the MR without warning.
Last edited by chance it; 13th Apr 2018 at 22:33. Reason: Spelling
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If you’ve read the AAIB reports on G-REDL and the other two bevel gear failures in the 225’s in 2012 you would also note that HUMS actually picked up these failures several hours before too
The EC225 bevel gear debacle is not why they are currently not being used (although it didn't help!), it is because LN-OJF suffered a catastrophic failure of the MGB that was not and cannot be detected by HUMS or any maintenance practice. This is compounded by no definitive root cause being identified.
Airbus did themselves no favours during all of the EC225 woes with their public denial and mud slinging, rather than being open and honest or even just saying very little.
With the current S92 issue, we have a HUMS process that has been shown to work. The HUMS did it's job, but the alert was missed (not for the first time by CHC UK). HUMS itself has been subsequently modified to make it more "user friendly".
As mentioned earlier, Sikorsky are now working on a suitable modification.
Chance It - the general negative tone of your messages are worrying. I suspect you are in the wrong job if this is carried into the cockpit every day! Or perhaps you just need to sober up on a Saturday morning and take a deep breath
Airbus did themselves no favours during all of the EC225 woes with their public denial and mud slinging, rather than being open and honest or even just saying very little.
With the current S92 issue, we have a HUMS process that has been shown to work. The HUMS did it's job, but the alert was missed (not for the first time by CHC UK). HUMS itself has been subsequently modified to make it more "user friendly".
As mentioned earlier, Sikorsky are now working on a suitable modification.
Chance It - the general negative tone of your messages are worrying. I suspect you are in the wrong job if this is carried into the cockpit every day! Or perhaps you just need to sober up on a Saturday morning and take a deep breath
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The EC225 bevel gear debacle is not why they are currently not being used (although it didn't help!), it is because LN-OJF suffered a catastrophic failure of the MGB that was not and cannot be detected by HUMS or any maintenance practice. This is compounded by no definitive root cause being identified.
Airbus did themselves no favours during all of the EC225 woes with their public denial and mud slinging, rather than being open and honest or even just saying very little.
With the current S92 issue, we have a HUMS process that has been shown to work. The HUMS did it's job, but the alert was missed (not for the first time by CHC UK). HUMS itself has been subsequently modified to make it more "user friendly".
As mentioned earlier, Sikorsky are now working on a suitable modification.
“Chance It - the general negative tone of your messages are worrying. I suspect you are in the wrong job if this is carried into the cockpit every day! Or perhaps you just need to sober up on a Saturday morning and take a deep breath”
Airbus did themselves no favours during all of the EC225 woes with their public denial and mud slinging, rather than being open and honest or even just saying very little.
With the current S92 issue, we have a HUMS process that has been shown to work. The HUMS did it's job, but the alert was missed (not for the first time by CHC UK). HUMS itself has been subsequently modified to make it more "user friendly".
As mentioned earlier, Sikorsky are now working on a suitable modification.
“Chance It - the general negative tone of your messages are worrying. I suspect you are in the wrong job if this is carried into the cockpit every day! Or perhaps you just need to sober up on a Saturday morning and take a deep breath”
Apate , for negativity read realism. It seems ok to berate the Puma on this forum but to even question the S92 one gets accused of being drunk ?
the argument is moot when the norwegian themselves called the fault on EC before even finding evident and EC duly complied with demonstration that it is very unlikely the few early theories the norwegian thought were the root cause to the event. The continuing no finding only proof that it has nothing to do with the design and build. Only people with agenda is pushing such idea till today.
talking about HUMS, it is not as easy as some people here would like it to be. It is until today still a brilliant idea that never been reliable in actual operation. No matter the system from which OEM attached with which OEM's frame, they are all plague with noise and fault reading. It is very easy for the OEM and top expert in the investigation to point out the "obvious". But to the people on the floor with all kinds of factor in effect, human factor just bound to happen.
talking about HUMS, it is not as easy as some people here would like it to be. It is until today still a brilliant idea that never been reliable in actual operation. No matter the system from which OEM attached with which OEM's frame, they are all plague with noise and fault reading. It is very easy for the OEM and top expert in the investigation to point out the "obvious". But to the people on the floor with all kinds of factor in effect, human factor just bound to happen.
What is missing from HUMS is something that we wanted to have when it first started in the 1980s. A light in the cockpit which would say.
DO NOT FLY THIS HELICOPTER
or
LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
DO NOT FLY THIS HELICOPTER
or
LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
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What is missing from HUMS is something that we wanted to have when it first started in the 1980s. A light in the cockpit which would say.
DO NOT FLY THIS HELICOPTER
or
LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
DO NOT FLY THIS HELICOPTER
or
LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
