Helijet S-76C Loss of Control November 2015
"NVGs are an option.... should the government decide to pay for them, as its a provincial contract"
No NVGs but under the provincial contract approaches to flame rings at blacked out airports are ok??? I must be missing something but that sounds ludicrous??
No NVGs but under the provincial contract approaches to flame rings at blacked out airports are ok??? I must be missing something but that sounds ludicrous??
If ground support was in attendance why can't they just do a runway inspection, lay the flares down the edge of the runway, and use the aircraft controllable search light to supplement the ground illumination? Much safer than getting succoured into a black hole approach. Unless the local operating rules dictate otherwise?
The power train replacement must have cost at least $1 million USD. Much cheaper me thinks just to lay the flares down the edge of the runway and execute a normal runway landing. To me it's just crazy landing into a flare circle when you have a 5000' runway that might otherwise be available.
The power train replacement must have cost at least $1 million USD. Much cheaper me thinks just to lay the flares down the edge of the runway and execute a normal runway landing. To me it's just crazy landing into a flare circle when you have a 5000' runway that might otherwise be available.
TSB Canada Investigation Report
Here is the full investigation report Aviation Investigation Report A15P0217 - Transportation Safety Board of Canada
The first 40 pages is good reading, then it becomes a bit repetitive: Unfortunately, the final analysis chapter is a mere repetition of the facts established upfront. No real judgement passed.
How could the incident happen? Two ATP's, two engines, autopilot, IFR ratings, thousands of hours each. The biggest single problem the report highlights is the low crew gradient: Professional curtesy prevents scrutiny. Or rather, each pilot may have thought the other pilot should well be able to do the job on his own. Right they were. What one would expect a PPL holder to get right: speed, sink rate, attitude.
But if it can happen do the best, if might happen to any of us. As such it serves as a good learning.
The first 40 pages is good reading, then it becomes a bit repetitive: Unfortunately, the final analysis chapter is a mere repetition of the facts established upfront. No real judgement passed.
How could the incident happen? Two ATP's, two engines, autopilot, IFR ratings, thousands of hours each. The biggest single problem the report highlights is the low crew gradient: Professional curtesy prevents scrutiny. Or rather, each pilot may have thought the other pilot should well be able to do the job on his own. Right they were. What one would expect a PPL holder to get right: speed, sink rate, attitude.
But if it can happen do the best, if might happen to any of us. As such it serves as a good learning.
I'm a bit rusty on S76C+ as I haven't flown one in about 20 years, but some of my reading of the report thus far doesn't gel with my vague memory...about blowaway power (para 1.6.3.1)...I thought the most the DECU would give you under blowaway logic is 115% TQ...the report says if NR drops below 90% the DECU will give you 140% TQ, really?? And (para 1.6.4.1) "..The system is designed to limit fuel flow when either the all-engines-operating torque limit or the temperature limit is reached..." Doesn't the DECU only look at T5 for engine starting?...the DECU limits fuel flow to maintain T5 limit during blowaway logic event, really? Maybe I'm setting myself up to look stupid here, and I don't have any manuals at hand to look up the answers for myself, so if any S76 gurus out there could enlighten me on these aspects, thanks.
Last edited by gulliBell; 23rd Dec 2017 at 12:29.
Of course the DECU controls engine starts...it is the box that sends the control signals to the stepper motor that is attached to the AFCU that regulates engine fuel flow during start, operation, and shutdown.
Sorry about my post..my error...I was refering to still monitoring to ensure no overtemp..just very badly worded...I will go stand in the corner with my dunce cap firmly in place.
I think I was having a 76A, A+ or ++ moment.
I think I was having a 76A, A+ or ++ moment.
Some might say, monitoring the sink rate and other performance parameters with the Mk1 eye ball and call any deviations during the approach would also have prevented everything. For sure NVG would have given them better visual clues that they were flying backwards/sideways at the bottom of the approach.
Helijet & B.C. Ambulance Service to install Night Vison Imaging Technology on Air Ambulance Aelicopters - Helijet.com
It took a while, and almost the loss of life, but the government has seen the light.
It took a while, and almost the loss of life, but the government has seen the light.
If you fly a black hole approach without absolute attention to the numbers then you are simply asking for trouble. In my view it is 10% eyeball and 90% instrument. Plot a distance to run/altitude scale and set up a constant GS/ROD to match and it should fall into place with minor corrections. Those that fly it all eyeball will get disorientated.
the Universal FMS has the VNAV function. You can't couple, but you set the ROD and you'll get SA guidance to any fix your choice. We'd use it a lot going into black holes.
Don't they have a nightsun to light up the landing area like a Christmas tree? If not, the pilot controllable searchlight on a S76 provides reasonable ground illumination below about 300'. Certainly enough light to provide visual reference at the bottom of an approach. When you are close to the ground the pilot has to be looking outside...
