USMC UH-1Y Crash Report Results
Thread Starter
USMC UH-1Y Crash Report Results
Media obtained a copy of the USMC Accident Investigation Report for the Fatal UH-1Y Crash near 29 Palms.
Many gross errors were discovered.
When you start taking short cuts....others might start paying with their Lives.
At least for Pilots they at least have the decency to put their own lives at risk in the process of taking shortcuts.
Investigation: Faulty filter cover, pilot error caused fatal Marine helicopter crash
Many gross errors were discovered.
When you start taking short cuts....others might start paying with their Lives.
At least for Pilots they at least have the decency to put their own lives at risk in the process of taking shortcuts.
Investigation: Faulty filter cover, pilot error caused fatal Marine helicopter crash
Media obtained a copy of the USMC Accident Investigation Report for the Fatal UH-1Y Crash near 29 Palms.
Many gross errors were discovered.
When you start taking short cuts....others might start paying with their Lives.
At least for Pilots they at least have the decency to put their own lives at risk in the process of taking shortcuts.
Investigation: Faulty filter cover, pilot error caused fatal Marine helicopter crash
Many gross errors were discovered.
When you start taking short cuts....others might start paying with their Lives.
At least for Pilots they at least have the decency to put their own lives at risk in the process of taking shortcuts.
Investigation: Faulty filter cover, pilot error caused fatal Marine helicopter crash
If the former, someone needs to go down ... and go down hard.
Thread Starter
Improper aircraft maintenance and pilot misjudgment contributed to the fatal Jan. 23 UH-1Y Venom helicopter crash near Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, investigators wrote in the accident report.
Per this LA Times Article....Maj. Gen. Rocco USMC accepted the recommendation for no Punitive Action. That must mean the JAG Report.
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/l...026-story.html
How does one get postumously promoted? A new one on me.
In addition, how does one get promoted for failing to follow the correct process for a malfunction, thereby putting the lives of themselves and possibly others in jeapardy?
In addition, how does one get promoted for failing to follow the correct process for a malfunction, thereby putting the lives of themselves and possibly others in jeapardy?
Thread Starter
NO -ONE is infallible. WE ARE NOT COMPUTERS
The US Military has a tradition of promoting those killed on Active Service following their Death. Quaint custom I know....but that is the way we do it on this side of the Salt Water Divide.
They paid for their mistake by being killed.....I suppose they might also have been deprived of that Posthumous Promotion but no Punitive Action towards anyone was recommended and the nice General accepted that.
Perhaps he felt the two Pilots had been harmed enough already.
From the Article....so I am assuming it is not the JAG Report. For an Accident Report to so declarative the situation must have been really bad.
Per this LA Times Article....Maj. Gen. Rocco USMC accepted the recommendation for no Punitive Action. That must mean the JAG Report.
Helicopter crash that killed 2 Marines caused by improper maintenance, inquiry shows - LA Times
Per this LA Times Article....Maj. Gen. Rocco USMC accepted the recommendation for no Punitive Action. That must mean the JAG Report.
Helicopter crash that killed 2 Marines caused by improper maintenance, inquiry shows - LA Times
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If you believe that article linked by SASless, this tragedy was the results of numerous failures to follow basic procedure. And it never should have happened.
Seriously, did maintenance personnel actually use epoxy to seal an oil filter housing? And did other maintenance personnel later issue several waivers when the epoxied housing could not be removed to replace the oil filter? It boggles the mind to think this could happen. These military personnel are provided excellent training to service these aircraft. And there was no reason for them to cut corners in a situation like this.
Lastly, I can't imagine why the pilot of this aircraft chose not to immediately set down after the warning display. She was an experienced officer and there is nothing but flat desert in the 29 Palms area. I feel for the two Marine pilots that lost their lives, but they apparently made a poor decision. I also think the USMC should have disciplined the personnel involved with the original maintenance issue and the associated waivers. Their names don't need to be made public, but they should have been held accountable.
The situation is very similar to the 2009 S-92 accident. Maintenance problems resulted in the oil filter housing coming loose in flight and causing loss of all main gearbox oil.
Seriously, did maintenance personnel actually use epoxy to seal an oil filter housing? And did other maintenance personnel later issue several waivers when the epoxied housing could not be removed to replace the oil filter? It boggles the mind to think this could happen. These military personnel are provided excellent training to service these aircraft. And there was no reason for them to cut corners in a situation like this.
Lastly, I can't imagine why the pilot of this aircraft chose not to immediately set down after the warning display. She was an experienced officer and there is nothing but flat desert in the 29 Palms area. I feel for the two Marine pilots that lost their lives, but they apparently made a poor decision. I also think the USMC should have disciplined the personnel involved with the original maintenance issue and the associated waivers. Their names don't need to be made public, but they should have been held accountable.
The situation is very similar to the 2009 S-92 accident. Maintenance problems resulted in the oil filter housing coming loose in flight and causing loss of all main gearbox oil.
Last edited by riff_raff; 28th Oct 2015 at 04:25.
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I think the main point here is:
Trust the instruments.
I am pretty sure we all have been in a situation where a gauge is flickering, or the needle drops to zero...then comes up again..then zero..
Fact is: In most cases a landing followed by a proper check could avoid a possible crash.
But fact is also that in most (european) countries a "precautionary" landing is investigated by the CAAīs like a crime.....
I have had hourlong discussions with people from the CAA after landing several times due to numerous indications, from low fuel (flying in extreme weather conditions resulting in the light coming on early, landing only 3 Km away from the airport), to loss of oil pressure indication, to complete electrical failure.
In ALL cases i was forced to stay on the ground for hours until maintenance had checked the aircraft (understandable), and also until the CAA had checked all books (including my logbook).......but donīt think i was allowed to take-off again......they told me to load the helo on a truck and haul it back home, as i had carried out an "unscheduled landing", and would therefor not be allowed to take-off again!
Donīt be surprised if pilots continue to fly if they have to go through that much struggle....
Let them land-check their books, and if everything is all right-let them fly again goddamnit!
Trust the instruments.
I am pretty sure we all have been in a situation where a gauge is flickering, or the needle drops to zero...then comes up again..then zero..
Fact is: In most cases a landing followed by a proper check could avoid a possible crash.
But fact is also that in most (european) countries a "precautionary" landing is investigated by the CAAīs like a crime.....
I have had hourlong discussions with people from the CAA after landing several times due to numerous indications, from low fuel (flying in extreme weather conditions resulting in the light coming on early, landing only 3 Km away from the airport), to loss of oil pressure indication, to complete electrical failure.
In ALL cases i was forced to stay on the ground for hours until maintenance had checked the aircraft (understandable), and also until the CAA had checked all books (including my logbook).......but donīt think i was allowed to take-off again......they told me to load the helo on a truck and haul it back home, as i had carried out an "unscheduled landing", and would therefor not be allowed to take-off again!
Donīt be surprised if pilots continue to fly if they have to go through that much struggle....
Let them land-check their books, and if everything is all right-let them fly again goddamnit!
I think the main point here is:
Trust the instruments.
I am pretty sure we all have been in a situation where a gauge is flickering, or the needle drops to zero...then comes up again..then zero..
Fact is: In most cases a landing followed by a proper check could avoid a possible crash.
But fact is also that in most (european) countries a "precautionary" landing is investigated by the CAAīs like a crime.....
I have had hourlong discussions with people from the CAA after landing several times due to numerous indications, from low fuel (flying in extreme weather conditions resulting in the light coming on early, landing only 3 Km away from the airport), to loss of oil pressure indication, to complete electrical failure.
In ALL cases i was forced to stay on the ground for hours until maintenance had checked the aircraft (understandable), and also until the CAA had checked all books (including my logbook).......but donīt think i was allowed to take-off again......they told me to load the helo on a truck and haul it back home, as i had carried out an "unscheduled landing", and would therefor not be allowed to take-off again!
Donīt be surprised if pilots continue to fly if they have to go through that much struggle....
Let them land-check their books, and if everything is all right-let them fly again goddamnit!
Trust the instruments.
I am pretty sure we all have been in a situation where a gauge is flickering, or the needle drops to zero...then comes up again..then zero..
Fact is: In most cases a landing followed by a proper check could avoid a possible crash.
But fact is also that in most (european) countries a "precautionary" landing is investigated by the CAAīs like a crime.....
I have had hourlong discussions with people from the CAA after landing several times due to numerous indications, from low fuel (flying in extreme weather conditions resulting in the light coming on early, landing only 3 Km away from the airport), to loss of oil pressure indication, to complete electrical failure.
In ALL cases i was forced to stay on the ground for hours until maintenance had checked the aircraft (understandable), and also until the CAA had checked all books (including my logbook).......but donīt think i was allowed to take-off again......they told me to load the helo on a truck and haul it back home, as i had carried out an "unscheduled landing", and would therefor not be allowed to take-off again!
Donīt be surprised if pilots continue to fly if they have to go through that much struggle....
Let them land-check their books, and if everything is all right-let them fly again goddamnit!
Riff wrote:
Riff
There is no similarity to the 92. There was no maintenance error in that accident. It was a defective design:
- Oil filter housing with insufficient number of fasteners with the fasteners of a material not suited for the multiple maintenance actions.
- Maintenance required at much higher frequency on said defective installation due to filter bypass messages making the joint vulnerable.
- Sikorsky originally claiming a 30 minute loss of lube capability which was never corrected after testing showed it was at most 12 minutes. (Canadian conclusions).
On the Y the NATOPS was clear to land with no uncorrected marketing material to give the crew false confidence. There were multiple indications of oil loss which provided plenty of time to land within the expected duration of the transmission according to the NATOPS. The 92's crew's decision was tainted by the false marketing "data" and no really safe place to land.
The Sultan
The situation is very similar to the 2009 S-92 accident. Maintenance problems resulted in the oil filter housing coming loose in flight and causing loss of all main gearbox oil.
There is no similarity to the 92. There was no maintenance error in that accident. It was a defective design:
- Oil filter housing with insufficient number of fasteners with the fasteners of a material not suited for the multiple maintenance actions.
- Maintenance required at much higher frequency on said defective installation due to filter bypass messages making the joint vulnerable.
- Sikorsky originally claiming a 30 minute loss of lube capability which was never corrected after testing showed it was at most 12 minutes. (Canadian conclusions).
On the Y the NATOPS was clear to land with no uncorrected marketing material to give the crew false confidence. There were multiple indications of oil loss which provided plenty of time to land within the expected duration of the transmission according to the NATOPS. The 92's crew's decision was tainted by the false marketing "data" and no really safe place to land.
The Sultan
Thread Starter
As much as folks in the UK have to pay the CAA....I am surprised to hear any complaints about the CAA doing too much for their money!
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Riff, There is no similarity to the 92. There was no maintenance error in that accident. It was a defective design:
- Oil filter housing with insufficient number of fasteners with the fasteners of a material not suited for the multiple maintenance actions.......
- Oil filter housing with insufficient number of fasteners with the fasteners of a material not suited for the multiple maintenance actions.......
I agree that the oil filter housing on the S-92 MGB had some design issues, and I pointed these out in detail on another thread. But I would also argue that the root cause of the 2009 S-92 failure (filter housing locknuts not seated due to thread galling) could have been prevented with strict adherence to established maintenance procedures used in the aerospace industry.
I design aircraft mechanical systems, and I also write detailed procedures for assembling, installing and servicing these systems. One thing I pay particular attention to with these written procedures is verifying the condition of self-locking threaded fasteners at every installation, especially fasteners like all metal locknuts that are being re-used. The instructions I typically write for installation of a metal locknut require first checking the prevailing torque is within specified limits by using a dial torque wrench to thread the locknut onto the stud/bolt until it is seated. The reason for this is that the materials and locking features used on aerospace fasteners have a tendency to gall threads, and this is a reliable method to check for this condition. In my opinion, if the procedure I described were used for installing the locknuts on the S-92 MGB filter housing, it's quite possible the techs would have caught the problem.
Where I work, rather than simply demanding that techs blindly follow a procedure, I always make sure the techs understand the reason behind every step in a work procedure. This way they are much more likely to do a thorough job.
