Police helicopter crashes onto Glasgow pub: final AAIB report
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Had that been my driver, he would have been getting his head pecked to RTB from the moment that first caption went off. I am aware that different units and even crews have a different level of CRM some are less interested in the aircraft side than others.
I still cannot comprehend how this accident actually came about. I just pray it doesn't happen again.
I still cannot comprehend how this accident actually came about. I just pray it doesn't happen again.
With so much emphasis on the position of the fuel pump switches, I hope some tests were done to determine whether a 70g impact would be sufficient for them to move from ON to OFF.
A 70g impact would also shake up the tank contents a good deal, so any water that was in the tank, for instance as droplets on the capacitance fuel probes, would have been washed off and could conceivably have been in suspension in the drained fuel.
A 70g impact would also shake up the tank contents a good deal, so any water that was in the tank, for instance as droplets on the capacitance fuel probes, would have been washed off and could conceivably have been in suspension in the drained fuel.
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But the point is that if there were no communications or any communications that took place gave no indication that they had any relevance then that has to be specifically stated and not just left inferrred or assumed.
I'm sure this report was a very emotional time for all those affected and you have to feel for them given the timescales involved.
With the final report building upon the same themes as the special bulletin published in Feb 2014 what is not very well understood here is 1) why the AAIB couldn't communicate to that effect at the earliest 2) what elements took so long to conclude from the draft final report that was highlighted way back in May 2015. Was that mere process (i.e. draft final to published final always take circa 6 months?) or was there some element of debate?
With the final report building upon the same themes as the special bulletin published in Feb 2014 what is not very well understood here is 1) why the AAIB couldn't communicate to that effect at the earliest 2) what elements took so long to conclude from the draft final report that was highlighted way back in May 2015. Was that mere process (i.e. draft final to published final always take circa 6 months?) or was there some element of debate?
Pitts,
The AAIB research process does not just involve AAIB staff. They need to make appoinments with others and line up any facilites needed - and then react to any potential findings that may lead to more appointments - and then react to.....along the way.
I'm sure the AAIB did a perfectly good job within their rules and practices.
The AAIB research process does not just involve AAIB staff. They need to make appoinments with others and line up any facilites needed - and then react to any potential findings that may lead to more appointments - and then react to.....along the way.
I'm sure the AAIB did a perfectly good job within their rules and practices.
I find it weird that apparently noone considered, that on the way back to base G-SPAO's CAD looked exactly like Figure 11, p.53 (G-NWEM during test) of the final report:
a) Both supply tanks indicated as full,
b) the main tank is seen gradually draining,
c) yet the LOW FUEL 1 and LOW FUEL 2 warning light comming on, time and again.
a) + b) are exactly what normally would happen,
when fwd. xfr pump is on, as I'm sure it typically was on other flights.
When presented with such grossly contradicting information
one might easily tend to trust the graphics and
regard them warning "lamps" as faulty.
a) Both supply tanks indicated as full,
b) the main tank is seen gradually draining,
c) yet the LOW FUEL 1 and LOW FUEL 2 warning light comming on, time and again.
a) + b) are exactly what normally would happen,
when fwd. xfr pump is on, as I'm sure it typically was on other flights.
When presented with such grossly contradicting information
one might easily tend to trust the graphics and
regard them warning "lamps" as faulty.
Last edited by Reely340; 23rd Oct 2015 at 20:19.
Human Factors thoughts
I am intrigued, and somewhat surprised, by the emphasis by some on the Flight Manual information error, in which a stated 3-4 minutes difference in fuel starvation times actually became around 30 seconds.
Surely to reach that point and expect to make use of it is the last desperate hope. I find it hard to believe that anyone views that error as significant in any real flight safety sense - given the quite clear 'land within ten minutes' (after low fuel warning) instruction, also in the FM. I really can't believe that was in any way in the pilot's mind.
To my mind much more significant is the way that the pilot could be expected at intervals during flight to switch on and off the fuel transfer pumps to cope with occasional run dry events due to flight conditions and fuel levels.
Although there was a 'pump run dry' warning, there was no corresponding, 'pump now flooded OK to switch on' advisory. In a busy operational cockpit environment, especially at night, where many other tasks are involved, it would be very easy to overlook the necessary switching back on of the pump(s). Would having an advisory flag and/or bleep be viewed as additional distraction, better avoided?
The possibility of confusion between adjacent switches also seems worth commenting on; I'm intrigued that was not taken further. Ensuring clear tactile distinction between switches, especially when some are vital for in-flight use, would seem sensible to me.
Those potential human behaviour factors I feel could have been further explored. What do other, more experienced, folk think?
Surely to reach that point and expect to make use of it is the last desperate hope. I find it hard to believe that anyone views that error as significant in any real flight safety sense - given the quite clear 'land within ten minutes' (after low fuel warning) instruction, also in the FM. I really can't believe that was in any way in the pilot's mind.
To my mind much more significant is the way that the pilot could be expected at intervals during flight to switch on and off the fuel transfer pumps to cope with occasional run dry events due to flight conditions and fuel levels.
Although there was a 'pump run dry' warning, there was no corresponding, 'pump now flooded OK to switch on' advisory. In a busy operational cockpit environment, especially at night, where many other tasks are involved, it would be very easy to overlook the necessary switching back on of the pump(s). Would having an advisory flag and/or bleep be viewed as additional distraction, better avoided?
The possibility of confusion between adjacent switches also seems worth commenting on; I'm intrigued that was not taken further. Ensuring clear tactile distinction between switches, especially when some are vital for in-flight use, would seem sensible to me.
Those potential human behaviour factors I feel could have been further explored. What do other, more experienced, folk think?
Last edited by biscuit74; 23rd Oct 2015 at 20:49.
does it assume everything works perfectly?
But, does the required reserve anticipate the possibility of stranded fuel due to malfunction or pilot error,
Had that been my driver, he would have been getting his head pecked to RTB from the moment that first caption went off.
I still cannot comprehend how this accident actually came about.
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So, how much would you allow for that?
Depends on the design of the fuel system. In this case, not clear if the pilot would have ever turned the transfer switches back on. However, an earlier low fuel caution may have allowed a little more time to figure out what was happening.
Been airborne a while maybe the warnings are correct ?
The fact the pilot had 20 audio or visual warnings of his low fuel state, prior to engines shutting down, (table 3, page 33), leads me to believe that he thought they were spurious warnings and decided to carry on with taskings.
Biscuit,
Right after this tragedy occurred I asked the question why the Transfer Pumps were switched on and off at various stages of flight in the 135.
I have flown the 105 and 117 and once we turned the Transfer Pumps ON....they stayed ON until the Shutdown Procedure after landing.
Are there any real reason that could not be the policy for the 135?
I accept there might be additional wear on the Pumps over time but as they do have OverTemp protection....is there any absolute need to shut them off?
Had those Pumps been turned on at Engine Start and left on until the After Landing/Shut Down procedure....would that have had any effect upon the outcome of this accident?
Right after this tragedy occurred I asked the question why the Transfer Pumps were switched on and off at various stages of flight in the 135.
I have flown the 105 and 117 and once we turned the Transfer Pumps ON....they stayed ON until the Shutdown Procedure after landing.
Are there any real reason that could not be the policy for the 135?
I accept there might be additional wear on the Pumps over time but as they do have OverTemp protection....is there any absolute need to shut them off?
Had those Pumps been turned on at Engine Start and left on until the After Landing/Shut Down procedure....would that have had any effect upon the outcome of this accident?
Not much in the report that was not already known.
Of interest and not mentioned in the report was the point that the aircraft being in the state it was in (double engine failure),
and if there was enough altitude to recover from the problem i.e. turn the transfer pumps back on and initiate a restart,
in a least ROD Autorotation speed of 60 knots, without having the SHED BUS SW in EMER, you would not
be able to get the fuel to transfer as the AFT TRANSFER pump is on the SHED BUS II unless you switched the SHED BUS SW to EMER.
On the point of shed bus logic and use - for me an Ops Manual change to operate at Night or IMC with it in EMER as the norm
could be appropriate.
Moons a go when operating a B205 in remote areas we operated with it in EMER all the time. Reason being - engine failure =
no HF - which was the only means of Comms = SOP.
There is also a hint that the prospect of an engine failure was not prepared for. When the first engine stopped the second
went into OEI limits. Normal prep for an impending engine failure or prior to stopping one intentionally is to reduce power.
The 135 like all other twins (except the single engine derivatives) have low inertia rotors inherent in the design.
I may have mentioned this before but the FADEC is so good it masks this characteristic.
If you have a failure of the remaining engine from high OEI which in this aircraft is plenty then you possibly need to be a bit sharper
than your SE brethren at entry to autorotation.
Old style Globe pumps and the characteristics of the tanks in the 135 may be different. New TESTFUCHS pumps are up for it and that was mentioned
in the report as a future change which will require Software, RFM changes and certification.
This accident is hard to fathom and somewhere there is more to it. If all things were operating as normal which they appear
to have been it would have been lit up like a Xmas tree and barking at you.
As to fitting FDR's CVR's etc. It may have helped fathom a few things but possibly not the reasons for them.
I don't think they are as effective in this case as most would believe but agree that they are better than nothing.
Of interest and not mentioned in the report was the point that the aircraft being in the state it was in (double engine failure),
and if there was enough altitude to recover from the problem i.e. turn the transfer pumps back on and initiate a restart,
in a least ROD Autorotation speed of 60 knots, without having the SHED BUS SW in EMER, you would not
be able to get the fuel to transfer as the AFT TRANSFER pump is on the SHED BUS II unless you switched the SHED BUS SW to EMER.
On the point of shed bus logic and use - for me an Ops Manual change to operate at Night or IMC with it in EMER as the norm
could be appropriate.
Moons a go when operating a B205 in remote areas we operated with it in EMER all the time. Reason being - engine failure =
no HF - which was the only means of Comms = SOP.
There is also a hint that the prospect of an engine failure was not prepared for. When the first engine stopped the second
went into OEI limits. Normal prep for an impending engine failure or prior to stopping one intentionally is to reduce power.
The 135 like all other twins (except the single engine derivatives) have low inertia rotors inherent in the design.
I may have mentioned this before but the FADEC is so good it masks this characteristic.
If you have a failure of the remaining engine from high OEI which in this aircraft is plenty then you possibly need to be a bit sharper
than your SE brethren at entry to autorotation.
I have flown the 105 and 117 and once we turned the Transfer Pumps ON....they stayed ON until the Shutdown Procedure after landing.
Are there any real reason that could not be the policy for the 135?
Are there any real reason that could not be the policy for the 135?
in the report as a future change which will require Software, RFM changes and certification.
This accident is hard to fathom and somewhere there is more to it. If all things were operating as normal which they appear
to have been it would have been lit up like a Xmas tree and barking at you.
As to fitting FDR's CVR's etc. It may have helped fathom a few things but possibly not the reasons for them.
I don't think they are as effective in this case as most would believe but agree that they are better than nothing.
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I am intrigued, and somewhat surprised, by the emphasis by some on the Flight Manual information error, in which a stated 3-4 minutes difference in fuel starvation times actually became around 30 seconds.
Surely to reach that point and expect to make use of it is the last desperate hope. I find it hard to believe that anyone views that error as significant in any real flight safety sense - given the quite clear 'land within ten minutes' (after low fuel warning) instruction, also in the FM. I really can't believe that was in any way in the pilot's mind.
Surely to reach that point and expect to make use of it is the last desperate hope. I find it hard to believe that anyone views that error as significant in any real flight safety sense - given the quite clear 'land within ten minutes' (after low fuel warning) instruction, also in the FM. I really can't believe that was in any way in the pilot's mind.
There is another point that has not been commented on. In the Feb 14th 2014 special bulletin the AAIB stated that both prime pumps were ON. They have now back tracked on that and say on P46:
"There was significant displacement of the cockpit overhead switch panel
which appeared to have been driven downwards on to the upper surface of
the instrument panel coaming. Photographs taken by the first responders
appeared to show at least one of the prime pump switches in the off position.
When examined by the AAIB after the accident site had been stabilised, both
the No 1 and No 2 prime pump switches were found to be in the on position."
Now to me that calls into question the reliability of the assessment of the position of all switches, particularly in the overhead cockpit that has sustained serious damage and potentially been interfered with by untrained first arrivals. It also potentially blows out of the water the gathering consensus that PRIME and TRANSFER switches were mixed up by the pilot.
Take a completely different scenario where the pilot realised at the very last second, perhaps at the moment the first or even second engine flamed out, that he had the transfer switches OFF and switched the transfer switches back to 'ON' but too late to recover the situation and too late to stop the engines flaming out. And suppose when the scene is examined they were indeed found to be ON. Would we ever have known that they were OFF right until the very last moment? Relying on switch positions after a 100G event seems a leap of faith.
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Well that was a disappointment. Nothing new to be learned, but a great deal of back covering by the manufacturers.
The fuel sensors were not faulty, the compressor washing procedure caused water ingress to the fuel system - operator error.
The overly complicated fuel system was fully functional but the switches were in the wrong position - operator error.
The pilot ignored visual and audible low fuel warnings and departed from SOPs - operator error.
None of the crew reported any issues with the helicopter despite conditions being appropriate for PAN and later MAYDAY calls - operator error.
Auto rotation from a relatively low altitude and speed with a low inertia rotor not completed successfully within two seconds of second engine spooling down - operator error.
Human factors and cockpit gradient not even mentioned in the report other than a description of each crew members role. An interesting omission as it clearly has some bearing on subsequent events.
Even the most reserved of crew members would surely express concern at two low fuel captions illuminated after a fairly lengthy flight rather than accept another quick tasking? Definitely something not right going on. Of course the pilot could point to the main tank quantity as being more than adequate, and they were only a couple of miles from base, but still...
Well Eurocopter are not at fault, so that's the main thing.
The fuel sensors were not faulty, the compressor washing procedure caused water ingress to the fuel system - operator error.
The overly complicated fuel system was fully functional but the switches were in the wrong position - operator error.
The pilot ignored visual and audible low fuel warnings and departed from SOPs - operator error.
None of the crew reported any issues with the helicopter despite conditions being appropriate for PAN and later MAYDAY calls - operator error.
Auto rotation from a relatively low altitude and speed with a low inertia rotor not completed successfully within two seconds of second engine spooling down - operator error.
Human factors and cockpit gradient not even mentioned in the report other than a description of each crew members role. An interesting omission as it clearly has some bearing on subsequent events.
Even the most reserved of crew members would surely express concern at two low fuel captions illuminated after a fairly lengthy flight rather than accept another quick tasking? Definitely something not right going on. Of course the pilot could point to the main tank quantity as being more than adequate, and they were only a couple of miles from base, but still...
Well Eurocopter are not at fault, so that's the main thing.
Some things the AAIB could have said more about
NTSB reports where human factors are potentially relevant tend to discuss the pilot[s]' activity in the days before the flight: Did they sleep well ? Did they appear to be in a normal emotional state ? Could they have been fatigued by off-duty activities ?
Perhaps the answers are yes,yes, and no - but these are relevant factors, and it would be helpful for the AAIB to report on them in a little more detail.
How did other Police Observers regard the pilot ? - They have some role in CRM. What was the authority gradient ?
How did other pilots regard the pilot ? [recent experience, not on Chinook]
What was the motivation for the detour to Bargeddie ? Was it planned / considered in flight planning ? Was it authorised ? What was the significance of the target ? What was the authority gradient ?
I find it unfortunate that the report doesn't seem to comment on Police responses - or lack thereof - to such questions.
Without the Bargeddie detour, the aircraft might have made it back to base, even on remaining supply tank fuel, and would perhaps have landed with total remaining fuel exceeding night/IFR reserve - though in a dangerous state..
Perhaps the answers are yes,yes, and no - but these are relevant factors, and it would be helpful for the AAIB to report on them in a little more detail.
Originally Posted by AAIB
1.
The pilot was properly licensed and qualified to conduct the flight, and was well rested.
The pilot was properly licensed and qualified to conduct the flight, and was well rested.
How did other pilots regard the pilot ? [recent experience, not on Chinook]
What was the motivation for the detour to Bargeddie ? Was it planned / considered in flight planning ? Was it authorised ? What was the significance of the target ? What was the authority gradient ?
I find it unfortunate that the report doesn't seem to comment on Police responses - or lack thereof - to such questions.
Originally Posted by AAIB
On completion, the helicopter appeared to route back towards GCH [Glasgow City Heliport] but, after nearly a minute, it turned from a west-south-westerly track onto a north-easterly track, towards Bargeddie. Once more, no radio transmissions were received from the crew and, without a cockpit voice recording, it is not possible to know what conversations and discussions took place between the crew members, to explain why the task at Bargeddie was undertaken, with the low fuel warnings having been active for at least eight minutes
Sky,
As the switches were next to one another....and they were found in positions opposite of what they should have been in....Prime Switches ON....Transfer Switches OFF....would your 100G event (apparently nose down when that 100G event loaded the Switches) would that cause the Switches to be in the wrong positions?
I have to assume "Forward" is ON....and Aft is OFF.....and unless I am mistaken they are not gated switches....it would seem all four would have been ON if the G Forces of the impact were to have shifted those switches forward.
Would we ever have known that they were OFF right until the very last moment? Relying on switch positions after a 100G event seems a leap of faith.
I have to assume "Forward" is ON....and Aft is OFF.....and unless I am mistaken they are not gated switches....it would seem all four would have been ON if the G Forces of the impact were to have shifted those switches forward.
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I'm sure that (almost) all of the above is extremely valid and should be considered/implemented in order to minimise risk in the future. However, whatever happened to the relatively basic mental gymnastics that most of us use on a daily basis? My understanding of the extant SOPs was that Night/IFR final reserve was to be 30 minutes, about 85kg. So, the sortie commenced with 315kg of task fuel available which, at the historical burn rate of 3.3kg, gives 95 minutes of flight time.
I'm a bluff old traditionalist and in my world I would have imprinted 95 minutes on my mind before getting airborne. Any fuel warning, especially beyond the 90 minute point, and I would be going straight home.
It is extremely annoying to know that there was actually enough fuel in the aircraft to safely make it home and, for the sake of some (more ergonomically designed) switchery, we would probably have been left reading a GA occurrence bulletin. However, regardless of the technology, there is no escaping the fact that this aircraft was being operated at (beyond?) the limit of the prescribed procedures.
..... and before anyone shouts me down, I spend much of my life wondering about how many more minutes on-task-time I've got left in a very thirsty Piper Chieftain.
I'm a bluff old traditionalist and in my world I would have imprinted 95 minutes on my mind before getting airborne. Any fuel warning, especially beyond the 90 minute point, and I would be going straight home.
It is extremely annoying to know that there was actually enough fuel in the aircraft to safely make it home and, for the sake of some (more ergonomically designed) switchery, we would probably have been left reading a GA occurrence bulletin. However, regardless of the technology, there is no escaping the fact that this aircraft was being operated at (beyond?) the limit of the prescribed procedures.
..... and before anyone shouts me down, I spend much of my life wondering about how many more minutes on-task-time I've got left in a very thirsty Piper Chieftain.
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I don't think anyone will try to shout you down Mr Cows. I don't think anyone disagrees with the fact that the pilot made some poor decisions. All we are saying is that things are not Black and White here. This man was not a risk taker, if he was airborne at night with empty supply tanks and two red lights on, he would not have gone off to complete that last ROUTINE task. There was no pressure on him.
SOMETHING must have confused him into believing that all was well in the fuel world. Note my wording, confused him. Even with warning lights and captions, he didn't spot his predicament. No evidence in the memory of a FUEL amber CAD caution is the one that keeps raising my alarm bells. That is triggered by the supply tank indications reaching a certain level on the gauges, NOT by a sensor. If the gauges showed permanent full like G-NWEM, that caption would not have illuminated. And it seems that it didn't.
Whilst that is no excuse for not looking at the clock, no excuse for incorrect drills, no excuse for a poor autorotation, it IS a contributing factor (if it happened of course).
However, what is done is done, we can't take it all back. What we CAN do, is make sure this never happens again. This is a problem, because changing components and procedures is seen as indirectly admitting responsibility. That would be financially catastrophic, so don't flame people for talking about money here, it is actually very relevant to the investigation. Everyone is talking about cockpit voice recorders. Great!! That allows us to see why it happened, but it STILL WOULD HAVE HAPPENED. That leaves education, every new EC135 pilot gets better teaching right now, but in 5 years time, this will be a distant memory. The fact that nothing in the aircraft has changed means that all the holes could line up again.....................
SOMETHING must have confused him into believing that all was well in the fuel world. Note my wording, confused him. Even with warning lights and captions, he didn't spot his predicament. No evidence in the memory of a FUEL amber CAD caution is the one that keeps raising my alarm bells. That is triggered by the supply tank indications reaching a certain level on the gauges, NOT by a sensor. If the gauges showed permanent full like G-NWEM, that caption would not have illuminated. And it seems that it didn't.
Whilst that is no excuse for not looking at the clock, no excuse for incorrect drills, no excuse for a poor autorotation, it IS a contributing factor (if it happened of course).
However, what is done is done, we can't take it all back. What we CAN do, is make sure this never happens again. This is a problem, because changing components and procedures is seen as indirectly admitting responsibility. That would be financially catastrophic, so don't flame people for talking about money here, it is actually very relevant to the investigation. Everyone is talking about cockpit voice recorders. Great!! That allows us to see why it happened, but it STILL WOULD HAVE HAPPENED. That leaves education, every new EC135 pilot gets better teaching right now, but in 5 years time, this will be a distant memory. The fact that nothing in the aircraft has changed means that all the holes could line up again.....................
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As a local, I have took a bit of interest in this, and from the start it has nagged at me that if the pilot knew there was a serious problem, why did he overfly a flat park when it could have landed, been easily secured and refuelled, it is only a few hundred yards east of the crash site.
Although not an aviator, I am an engineering designer so understand the fuel system having read through the report and old thread in here.
What is not clear to me, and that you pilots of these machines may know, is that is it really that difficult to establish that one turbine has flamed out, the report seems to indicate that the annunciation are not that clear (might just be me).
A FAI has been mooted politically, it's not hard to see where this will look:
1) The report is silent on why Police Scotland set the tasks to the crew.
2) Is airwave not recorded?, so little on this or the traffic in there.
3) Have other duty pilots assigned to police Scotland been interviewed regarding pressure to fly longer missions than are comfortable and perhaps a culture of exceeding fuel minima's?
Police Scotland are in real trouble, having let two people die by the side of the road and also killed a man during breach of the peace arrest, the chief constable has resigned, and of course the amalgamation of the Scots forces is a political decision.
Surely the Police must assess the risk of putting air support into situations instead of just tasking all sorts and leaving it to the pilot.
I fear scapegoating here, after the farce of the other Glasgow FAI where another vehicle in public service killed members of the public, but from the outset it was clear that the Council were never going to get sanctioned.
Finally,on the engineering, a system I designed that almost killed people when mis-managed by the operator. Several experts criticised the complexity of the system, yet each one had recommendations that made it even more complicated to operate. I must say that I wouldn't from an engineering perspective like to rely on sensors to stop and start overheating/dry pumps from and always on perspective, and if they operated automatically on level sensors, my personal belief is that this would be prone to malfunction.
The bus coupler device to operate the essential instruments does seem ridiculous in this instance, not having this in an accessible location in a single pilot operation. I would have thought (and I don't know if aviation permits the approach) that essential instruments circuits automatically transfer and let the circuit breakers do their job in case it's the instrument circuit itself that's faulty.
Very sad situation all round.
Although not an aviator, I am an engineering designer so understand the fuel system having read through the report and old thread in here.
What is not clear to me, and that you pilots of these machines may know, is that is it really that difficult to establish that one turbine has flamed out, the report seems to indicate that the annunciation are not that clear (might just be me).
A FAI has been mooted politically, it's not hard to see where this will look:
1) The report is silent on why Police Scotland set the tasks to the crew.
2) Is airwave not recorded?, so little on this or the traffic in there.
3) Have other duty pilots assigned to police Scotland been interviewed regarding pressure to fly longer missions than are comfortable and perhaps a culture of exceeding fuel minima's?
Police Scotland are in real trouble, having let two people die by the side of the road and also killed a man during breach of the peace arrest, the chief constable has resigned, and of course the amalgamation of the Scots forces is a political decision.
Surely the Police must assess the risk of putting air support into situations instead of just tasking all sorts and leaving it to the pilot.
I fear scapegoating here, after the farce of the other Glasgow FAI where another vehicle in public service killed members of the public, but from the outset it was clear that the Council were never going to get sanctioned.
Finally,on the engineering, a system I designed that almost killed people when mis-managed by the operator. Several experts criticised the complexity of the system, yet each one had recommendations that made it even more complicated to operate. I must say that I wouldn't from an engineering perspective like to rely on sensors to stop and start overheating/dry pumps from and always on perspective, and if they operated automatically on level sensors, my personal belief is that this would be prone to malfunction.
The bus coupler device to operate the essential instruments does seem ridiculous in this instance, not having this in an accessible location in a single pilot operation. I would have thought (and I don't know if aviation permits the approach) that essential instruments circuits automatically transfer and let the circuit breakers do their job in case it's the instrument circuit itself that's faulty.
Very sad situation all round.