Helicopter accidents
Anyone able to give an input on the FAA requirements?
Insurers may set more stringent requirements - and do for turboprops for example, probably turbine helis also. And specifically for the Robbie an SFAR 73 ride is needed once per year.
I don't know what the rules are for Part 135 (fly for hire), not being a Part 135 pilot. I think it's established in the operator's Part 135 certificate.
Phil,
I think the issue here (as per the OP) is continuation training and checking rather than basic training of students/PPL(H) initial stuff.
Your point about TC standardisation is moot, since only the big companies follow such a practice. Or at least, used to follow unless the beancounters get involved?
I think the issue here (as per the OP) is continuation training and checking rather than basic training of students/PPL(H) initial stuff.
Your point about TC standardisation is moot, since only the big companies follow such a practice. Or at least, used to follow unless the beancounters get involved?
paco
Where does the FAA mandate 60 hours of ground school? Certainly not under part 61.
As for continued checking, under part 135 you have to undergo recurrent training and checking every 12 months.
Where does the FAA mandate 60 hours of ground school? Certainly not under part 61.
As for continued checking, under part 135 you have to undergo recurrent training and checking every 12 months.
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I think accident rates could be reduced if a greater proportion of initial and recurrent training involved dealing with issues that are actually causing most of the accidents. Someone with more spare time than me might do some research and summarise what these are, but training in poor visibility conditions, with aircraft near MTOW, high winds, difficult approaches, distracting cockpit environments, spurious distracting warnings, etc etc, would all be very useful in highlighting weaknesses for pilots and generating both more competence and more respect for the hazards of such things. I've long thought that too much training focus is often on dealing with mechanical emergencies - which very rarely occur. The vast majority of accidents involve perfectly serviceable aircraft.
Of course it's important (and not easy) to do this without adding significant risk getting involved in risky procedures, as with S/E EOLs. Just how competent the trainers are is also a significant issue - sometimes instructors have inadequate experience themselves of real world operational risks.
Pittsextra - you quite reasonably attach great importance to AAIB accident reports, but I am not sure how much help it would really be if they were produced in even half the time. Accuracy is critical. I think most of the time the basic causes of accidents are fairly obvious and indeed with regard to what can be learnt to avoid future acidents, often covered in a small range of hypotheses here on Pprune! If we consider a few examples, the Haughey 139 was almost certainly pilot disorentation manually flying in IMC, Kent S76similar, Sumburgh Super Puma probably dozy monitoring of an IMC approach, Glasgow 135 probably poor fuel managment, though less certain admittedly -I'm sure 135 pilots are more careful on transfer pump use now though.
Of course there are occasions where particularly say mechanical failure - and I think you're pretty hot on this, eg ? AS332 MGBX - are identifed and rapid industry awareness vital. There again, I suspect that even if the AAIB report isn't out, between the CAA and manufacturers preventative management is usually well underway.
Most importantly though as pilots we've got to take responsibility for our own actions - usually, but certainly not always, accidents are fundamentally our fault, not that of the "system". And let's not forget that the "system" ultimately relies on judgements of individuals - like pilots - and buck passing should be avoided. As helicopter pilots we enjoy greater freedom of making our own judgements, but with that comes more responsibility.
Of course it's important (and not easy) to do this without adding significant risk getting involved in risky procedures, as with S/E EOLs. Just how competent the trainers are is also a significant issue - sometimes instructors have inadequate experience themselves of real world operational risks.
Pittsextra - you quite reasonably attach great importance to AAIB accident reports, but I am not sure how much help it would really be if they were produced in even half the time. Accuracy is critical. I think most of the time the basic causes of accidents are fairly obvious and indeed with regard to what can be learnt to avoid future acidents, often covered in a small range of hypotheses here on Pprune! If we consider a few examples, the Haughey 139 was almost certainly pilot disorentation manually flying in IMC, Kent S76similar, Sumburgh Super Puma probably dozy monitoring of an IMC approach, Glasgow 135 probably poor fuel managment, though less certain admittedly -I'm sure 135 pilots are more careful on transfer pump use now though.
Of course there are occasions where particularly say mechanical failure - and I think you're pretty hot on this, eg ? AS332 MGBX - are identifed and rapid industry awareness vital. There again, I suspect that even if the AAIB report isn't out, between the CAA and manufacturers preventative management is usually well underway.
Most importantly though as pilots we've got to take responsibility for our own actions - usually, but certainly not always, accidents are fundamentally our fault, not that of the "system". And let's not forget that the "system" ultimately relies on judgements of individuals - like pilots - and buck passing should be avoided. As helicopter pilots we enjoy greater freedom of making our own judgements, but with that comes more responsibility.
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We had a CFII here not long ago (Miguel) and he gave us that information.
I take your point, John, but they are linked. Continuation and checking is fine if you get the standards right, but they are not necesasrily here in UK. I have mostly worked for small companies in Canada, over a space of over 6 years, and from TC inspector to DFTE I've had more consistent check rides than anywhere. But then, that was some years ago
.
Before JAA, base checks (6 monthlies) used to be done at 90% MAUW, and I think it's a shame that it stopped.
Phil
I take your point, John, but they are linked. Continuation and checking is fine if you get the standards right, but they are not necesasrily here in UK. I have mostly worked for small companies in Canada, over a space of over 6 years, and from TC inspector to DFTE I've had more consistent check rides than anywhere. But then, that was some years ago
.Before JAA, base checks (6 monthlies) used to be done at 90% MAUW, and I think it's a shame that it stopped.
Phil
UK AAIB reports 2010-2015
Here's some real data since 2010. Total of 44 reported accidents under "GA" with 23 PPL's, 5 student pilots, 14 CPL's and 2 ATPL's.
Of that lot there were 4 fatalities, which were 2 x CFIT (one a Gazelle driven by a PPL, the other a 109 driven by an ATPL). There was an R44 PPL inadvertent IMC and finally a new PPL mast bumping an R22.
Of the GA accidents there were 11 mechanical failures, 13 accidents through loss of yaw control/catch a skid/low speed mishadling, mostly in Robinson products and mainly very low currency.
So between the mechanicals, fatalities and low currency yaw control (which were hover taxi/landing/take off/parking events - I have been a little lazy lumping many of these together) that accounts for 28 of the 44 accidents. The balance were some flight instructor / student accidents, couple sling events and a couple of hitting bushes/tress whilst taxing.
In the same period there were 27 accidents reported under "Commercial Air Transport".
That also included 4 accidents with fatalities of which 3 (AW139 Norfolk, EC135 Glasgow and Sumburgh Puma) are yet to formally report and the other was the CFIT in central London.
There were 7 mechanical failures, 4 events of hitting objects on the ground a vortex ring heavy landing and a couple of loss of yaw controls.
You draw your own conclusions from that but personally I think it shows that there are actually more mechanical failures than anything else and the training to deal and recognise these failures seems to be effective as there were no fatalities as a result of them all across all licence holders and experiences.
It also shows that those most at risk of a CFIT are higher time pilots in more complex types and that if you take care of not hitting things on the ground and stay current such that you don't loose yaw authority you chances of rapping up a helicopter seem small!!
I guess the timings of AAIB reports seem important since any learning can be made sooner at the most simplistic level. For example if we believe the AW139 was a CFIT accident then it happened whilst waiting for the other report on the London accident. The formal report may have done nothing but it may also have been a timely reminder to owner and pilot..
If that is a stretch of the imagination too far then what about the odd example in 2012 where one company had two accidents inside a few weeks with slings - clearly the information flow wasn't happening internally so it was unlikely to be fed to other pilots doing similar tasks.
On the other end of things is the fact that whilst the events that end in fatalities certainly catch peoples attention regardless of the time scale between accident and report some of the other events may be lost in the mists of time.
Of that lot there were 4 fatalities, which were 2 x CFIT (one a Gazelle driven by a PPL, the other a 109 driven by an ATPL). There was an R44 PPL inadvertent IMC and finally a new PPL mast bumping an R22.
Of the GA accidents there were 11 mechanical failures, 13 accidents through loss of yaw control/catch a skid/low speed mishadling, mostly in Robinson products and mainly very low currency.
So between the mechanicals, fatalities and low currency yaw control (which were hover taxi/landing/take off/parking events - I have been a little lazy lumping many of these together) that accounts for 28 of the 44 accidents. The balance were some flight instructor / student accidents, couple sling events and a couple of hitting bushes/tress whilst taxing.
In the same period there were 27 accidents reported under "Commercial Air Transport".
That also included 4 accidents with fatalities of which 3 (AW139 Norfolk, EC135 Glasgow and Sumburgh Puma) are yet to formally report and the other was the CFIT in central London.
There were 7 mechanical failures, 4 events of hitting objects on the ground a vortex ring heavy landing and a couple of loss of yaw controls.
You draw your own conclusions from that but personally I think it shows that there are actually more mechanical failures than anything else and the training to deal and recognise these failures seems to be effective as there were no fatalities as a result of them all across all licence holders and experiences.
It also shows that those most at risk of a CFIT are higher time pilots in more complex types and that if you take care of not hitting things on the ground and stay current such that you don't loose yaw authority you chances of rapping up a helicopter seem small!!
I guess the timings of AAIB reports seem important since any learning can be made sooner at the most simplistic level. For example if we believe the AW139 was a CFIT accident then it happened whilst waiting for the other report on the London accident. The formal report may have done nothing but it may also have been a timely reminder to owner and pilot..
If that is a stretch of the imagination too far then what about the odd example in 2012 where one company had two accidents inside a few weeks with slings - clearly the information flow wasn't happening internally so it was unlikely to be fed to other pilots doing similar tasks.
On the other end of things is the fact that whilst the events that end in fatalities certainly catch peoples attention regardless of the time scale between accident and report some of the other events may be lost in the mists of time.
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I have to admit I do watch a lot of air crash investigation and read all the reports and you do get this common theme of not one but a number of unlikely events all lining up to cause the accident , and not one thing on its own and as each event unfolds you are screaming at those involved to figure out what comes next but they never do .
As these accidents have happened and will happen again I am a firm believer in new technology being designed and put into practice to try and eliminate some of the issues that pilots face, the new trials of light weight mode s transponders is one such idea and we should always look positively at new tech! How many people poo pood iPads in the cockpit and now they are everywhere
TCAD , synthetic vision , IR cameras , night vision goggles etc should all be looked at and if they are useful made available along with the training to use them . That said if it moves it can crash skate boreds , pushbikes , cars, planes , helicopters the only way to stop them all having accidents is not to use them but remember horses bite !
As these accidents have happened and will happen again I am a firm believer in new technology being designed and put into practice to try and eliminate some of the issues that pilots face, the new trials of light weight mode s transponders is one such idea and we should always look positively at new tech! How many people poo pood iPads in the cockpit and now they are everywhere
TCAD , synthetic vision , IR cameras , night vision goggles etc should all be looked at and if they are useful made available along with the training to use them . That said if it moves it can crash skate boreds , pushbikes , cars, planes , helicopters the only way to stop them all having accidents is not to use them but remember horses bite !
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Pittsextra, your second-to-last paragraph refers to two similar incidents at the same company within a few weeks.
The AAIB investigate, which takes time, but isn't responsible for enforcement. In your example, would the CAA be checking the company's procedures as soon as possible, or would that happen after the AAIB reports?
I'm comparing this with the situation in other industries where the HSE can immediately issue improvement notices or prohibitions.
The AAIB investigate, which takes time, but isn't responsible for enforcement. In your example, would the CAA be checking the company's procedures as soon as possible, or would that happen after the AAIB reports?
I'm comparing this with the situation in other industries where the HSE can immediately issue improvement notices or prohibitions.
Pozi - to answer your question honestly I don't know the full process of who talks to whom and when, but I'm sure someone on here would know.
However I used the accidents for those two sling load reports just as a convenient/ lazy way to demonstrate the need for timely AAIB reporting.
It was clear that the accident from G-ORKY just 8 days before made no impact on the pilot of the other machine (G-BXGA) in the same company, let alone the wider industry. One could i suppose fairly argue that he may not have felt anything needed changing with the huge experience the pilots had and so the specifics of these two accidents may have no lessons what-so-ever (and of course no one would expect a report inside two weeks). The point I was trying to make was that it is important that AAIB reports are timely because very often these are the only ways others can see the detail and its a cheap way to learn.
Actually with more time on my hands I looked at the AAIB reports for helicopters in GA all the way back to year 2000. 248 reports from 2000-date.
In the context of that the biggest accident group are students (66 total) and the bigger sub set of that are students with an instructor on board (39!). And with an eye to the instructor thread thats running of the 39 that shunted with an instructor aboard 26 had more than 1000hrs, 20 more than 2000hrs...
Then by far the next bigger group are those mis-handling events (61 reports) at low speed on the airfield (uncontrolled yaw, tail strikes, dynamic roll over, start-ups with the lever raised, hover taxi wobbles i.e. its a lazy catch all for all ball dropping at the airfield).
If you break that lot out then the biggest factor is flying a Robinson (35) which is ahead of currency, where 30 pilots had less than 200hrs TT, 20 pilots had less than 3 hours in the last 30 days.
Next biggest category is mechanical failure (43).
Without wishing to bash up robbos, they do feature alot and ironically of its a factor that could help to explain the improved GA accident rate since 2010, i.e. less robbo's. 126 reports of the 248 featured a Robinson.
There were 23 fatal GA helicopter events since 2000, 13 inadvertant IMC or weather related.
If you strip out the student/instructor and mechanical reports then of those doing it for themselves 48 had < 200hrs, 38 had >1000hrs of which 9 >10k hours. Interestingly the fatalities are clustered in the three bands, 6 circa 100hrs and less. Another 6 from 200-500hrs and 5 with experienced guys all IMC/CFIT.
However I used the accidents for those two sling load reports just as a convenient/ lazy way to demonstrate the need for timely AAIB reporting.
It was clear that the accident from G-ORKY just 8 days before made no impact on the pilot of the other machine (G-BXGA) in the same company, let alone the wider industry. One could i suppose fairly argue that he may not have felt anything needed changing with the huge experience the pilots had and so the specifics of these two accidents may have no lessons what-so-ever (and of course no one would expect a report inside two weeks). The point I was trying to make was that it is important that AAIB reports are timely because very often these are the only ways others can see the detail and its a cheap way to learn.
Actually with more time on my hands I looked at the AAIB reports for helicopters in GA all the way back to year 2000. 248 reports from 2000-date.
In the context of that the biggest accident group are students (66 total) and the bigger sub set of that are students with an instructor on board (39!). And with an eye to the instructor thread thats running of the 39 that shunted with an instructor aboard 26 had more than 1000hrs, 20 more than 2000hrs...
Then by far the next bigger group are those mis-handling events (61 reports) at low speed on the airfield (uncontrolled yaw, tail strikes, dynamic roll over, start-ups with the lever raised, hover taxi wobbles i.e. its a lazy catch all for all ball dropping at the airfield).
If you break that lot out then the biggest factor is flying a Robinson (35) which is ahead of currency, where 30 pilots had less than 200hrs TT, 20 pilots had less than 3 hours in the last 30 days.
Next biggest category is mechanical failure (43).
Without wishing to bash up robbos, they do feature alot and ironically of its a factor that could help to explain the improved GA accident rate since 2010, i.e. less robbo's. 126 reports of the 248 featured a Robinson.
There were 23 fatal GA helicopter events since 2000, 13 inadvertant IMC or weather related.
If you strip out the student/instructor and mechanical reports then of those doing it for themselves 48 had < 200hrs, 38 had >1000hrs of which 9 >10k hours. Interestingly the fatalities are clustered in the three bands, 6 circa 100hrs and less. Another 6 from 200-500hrs and 5 with experienced guys all IMC/CFIT.
Here is a link to a list of helicopter accidents involving aerial filming that I collated. Year 2000 to 2013.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/remxlz52pj...%20V7.xls?dl=0
The work to research these incidents was prompted by the realisation that aerial filming claims the lives and injures more Tv/film technecians than all other causes combined (excluding war zones)
A shocking record of failed industrial safety.
Since distributing the list the rate of fatalities declined, up until the recent mid air that claimed 5 media crew and 5 other souls
The rate of incidences has declined though, perhaps due to
1/ making crews more sware that their behaviour before and during the flight affects flight saftey
2/ increase use of drones in low budget shoots
3/ greater availability of nose mounted stabilised cameras
4/greater awareness by pilots of the hazards of "luvvie fever"
Mickjoebill
https://www.dropbox.com/s/remxlz52pj...%20V7.xls?dl=0
The work to research these incidents was prompted by the realisation that aerial filming claims the lives and injures more Tv/film technecians than all other causes combined (excluding war zones)
A shocking record of failed industrial safety.
Since distributing the list the rate of fatalities declined, up until the recent mid air that claimed 5 media crew and 5 other souls
The rate of incidences has declined though, perhaps due to
1/ making crews more sware that their behaviour before and during the flight affects flight saftey
2/ increase use of drones in low budget shoots
3/ greater availability of nose mounted stabilised cameras
4/greater awareness by pilots of the hazards of "luvvie fever"
Mickjoebill
On that Mickjoebill - to be fair this one looks like it was properly planned:-
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...pdf_502261.pdf
Yet it went wrong. The AAIB report doesn't indicate why it went wrong or the process that led to the pilot not seeing the wires, yet he stated he specifically chose that part of the river inc. exemption from the CAA.
Is the recce for these things physical or via a google earth or similar??
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...pdf_502261.pdf
Yet it went wrong. The AAIB report doesn't indicate why it went wrong or the process that led to the pilot not seeing the wires, yet he stated he specifically chose that part of the river inc. exemption from the CAA.
Is the recce for these things physical or via a google earth or similar??
Is the recce for these things physical or via a google earth or similar??
One aspect of aerial filming that requires particular diligence to counter is a change of plan by tv/film crew in the following ways:
1/ subtle alteration of a flight path that contravenes previous agreements.
2/ request to change the shot during the shot
3/ ground activity altered without informing pilot
4/ heated, lenghty, irrelevant or misleading requests which pilot has to decipher whilst airborn.
5/ after a successful "take" the pilot succumbs to the request to go lower, closer or slower.
6/ tracking uncoordinated ground action whilst maintaining ability of cameraman to get the shot.
In respect to number 6 this is far more difficult if the camera is side mounted than nose mounted. Not surprising that the incident of accidents is higher for side door flights than nose mounted flights.
Sadley the instances of crew being killed when shooting out a side door are significantly higher than when using nose mounts, for obvious reasons.
A pilot recieves instructions by "non pilots" to position the helicopter to very specific positions often without due regard to the capabilities of the aircraft or the pilot, the weather or rules of the air!
Pilots in all experience brackets succomb.
Accident investigations rarely give the pressures and distractions by the film crew enough weight.
Since the media crew are casual or freelancers one relys on social media, conferences, and the like to educate TV folk.
Mickjoebill
Last edited by mickjoebill; 24th Mar 2015 at 19:47.
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I wonder if this S76 C++ accident this week fits into the 94% of accidents which includes pilots not handling mechanical problems correctly.
Happily no fatalities this time but I hope the full report comes out quickly, so all can learn.
Happily no fatalities this time but I hope the full report comes out quickly, so all can learn.
For as long as I have been in aviation and undoubtedly before that, the overwhelming cause of ALL air accidents - globally (betwen 65-75% dependent on the source)are down to Human Factor or 'pilot' as we are colloquially known 
These stats are stable at this level and have been for many years. Automation is the only way forward from this day on and as soon as we have pilotless aircraft, you will notice a sizeable change in the stats.
To ERR is human......................................
These stats are stable at this level and have been for many years. Automation is the only way forward from this day on and as soon as we have pilotless aircraft, you will notice a sizeable change in the stats.
To ERR is human......................................
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Pittsextra, thanks for Post #30. Quite agree the benefits of timely reporting.
I have a particular interest in a couple of recent cases which have taken three or four years to come to court. So that's three or four years before the facts are in the "public domain" - facts as opposed to speculation and rumour. I suspect this is down to the lawyers, digging ever deeper, which all requires a response from the other side.
I have a particular interest in a couple of recent cases which have taken three or four years to come to court. So that's three or four years before the facts are in the "public domain" - facts as opposed to speculation and rumour. I suspect this is down to the lawyers, digging ever deeper, which all requires a response from the other side.
Pozidrive - stop being obtuse. You know what I mean. Computers will of course have been programmed by humans (initially anyway) but these computers will not have to err the way humans do - en route.
If we take AAIB reports since 2000 for both GA and commercial there were a total of 329 incidents.
However the 66 GA student training flights (there were 3 commercial "student" accidents) one assumes that they are flying for fun as a primary motivation so that's 20% of accidents automation is unlikely to capture.
There were 3 commercial "filming wire strikes" again unlikely to be captured by automation, likewise the 8 events where the machine ran out of fuel (excuse the crude term - inc. fuel mismanagement like (say) G-DPPH). There are 2 bird strikes, 3 where slings/sling loads hit the machine, 4 carb ice, 4 lightning strikes and 74 mechanical failures. So thats almost half of accidents since 2000 unlikely to be captured by automation.
However the 66 GA student training flights (there were 3 commercial "student" accidents) one assumes that they are flying for fun as a primary motivation so that's 20% of accidents automation is unlikely to capture.
There were 3 commercial "filming wire strikes" again unlikely to be captured by automation, likewise the 8 events where the machine ran out of fuel (excuse the crude term - inc. fuel mismanagement like (say) G-DPPH). There are 2 bird strikes, 3 where slings/sling loads hit the machine, 4 carb ice, 4 lightning strikes and 74 mechanical failures. So thats almost half of accidents since 2000 unlikely to be captured by automation.
