EC155 incident, SNS, 6 Nov 2013
Tactile Cueing
212, your note reminded of some personal non-success in this area:
You all might recall that Stewart-Hughes got together with the Westland Lynx people, and installed a system for evaluation which, as I recall their brief to SA sounded awfully like the Bell new system. This was when the S-92 was in the design stage. In fact, Stewart-Hughes was proposing what they called carefree handling, and essentially used flight envelope/blade stall algorithms based upon flight test data, tp command appropriate stick forces etc etc. Our project pilot ( Bob Spaulding ) and I lobbied very hard to include that in the S-92 basic flight controls. Unfortunately, it was way ahead of the technical/business criteria for that design, and a good idea went down the tube.
Tactile cueing remains a very valid, and especially with re to FBW, a really intelligent tool to use in keeping the machine where it is intended to be, both by the pilot accomplishing his mission tasks, and the operator/OEM Mfgr, keeping the machine within the design envelope, and within the envelope upon which the component replacement times have been established.
Thanks for the mental push.
John
You all might recall that Stewart-Hughes got together with the Westland Lynx people, and installed a system for evaluation which, as I recall their brief to SA sounded awfully like the Bell new system. This was when the S-92 was in the design stage. In fact, Stewart-Hughes was proposing what they called carefree handling, and essentially used flight envelope/blade stall algorithms based upon flight test data, tp command appropriate stick forces etc etc. Our project pilot ( Bob Spaulding ) and I lobbied very hard to include that in the S-92 basic flight controls. Unfortunately, it was way ahead of the technical/business criteria for that design, and a good idea went down the tube.
Tactile cueing remains a very valid, and especially with re to FBW, a really intelligent tool to use in keeping the machine where it is intended to be, both by the pilot accomplishing his mission tasks, and the operator/OEM Mfgr, keeping the machine within the design envelope, and within the envelope upon which the component replacement times have been established.
Thanks for the mental push.
John
Last edited by JohnDixson; 21st Jul 2014 at 16:06. Reason: grammar?
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JimL, I don't think we differ very much in our views. However, when I see the virtually uncriticised adoption of procedures meant for far heavier, faster FW a/c into the offshore environment (like the criteria for a stabilised approach for instance), I have to ask myself why. 500 ft above threshold on a VFR approach is not much on a 747 but it is lots on a medium helicopter. Especially if we're then required to fly a visual approach at 200 ft from 0.75NM away at the end of an ARA in crappy weather. To me it is much more a "cover your behind" action from bureaucrats than a well thought out improvement of safety. I'm not a luddite, but I am a critical customer of "improvements".
As an LTC myself I will take the monitoring role every time when we are getting close to limits or have an unusual situation (stuff breaks, occasionally). It frees my mind to consider other things further down the road and make sure we as a crew are prepared to deal with those.
To me the PiC needs to be a few steps ahead of the a/c every single second of the flight, and when you literally have your hands full, that becomes very difficult.
However, there is still a real requirement to handfly a helicopter, much more than there is in FW. Simply because we are not always able to fly coupled approaches into wind onto large surfaces but sometimes have to manoeuvre low level out of an ARA to minima onto a deck that is surrounded by obstacles. It takes practice to become proficient and confident. All well within OM parameters but challenging nonetheless. So there is a place and time for handflying as well as for full automatics.
To me, the PiC needs to (be able to) manage the flight, using all the equipment available including all the automation to the level appropriate for every stage of flight. But that can only be achieved through learning how to control the flight first, and then learning to allow the automation control the flight while monitoring its correct functioning.
Reading about the tactile feedback from controls I find them very interesting. It would be great to have the feedback without having to scan instruments. It will aid SA enormously. Looking forward to that.
As an LTC myself I will take the monitoring role every time when we are getting close to limits or have an unusual situation (stuff breaks, occasionally). It frees my mind to consider other things further down the road and make sure we as a crew are prepared to deal with those.
To me the PiC needs to be a few steps ahead of the a/c every single second of the flight, and when you literally have your hands full, that becomes very difficult.
However, there is still a real requirement to handfly a helicopter, much more than there is in FW. Simply because we are not always able to fly coupled approaches into wind onto large surfaces but sometimes have to manoeuvre low level out of an ARA to minima onto a deck that is surrounded by obstacles. It takes practice to become proficient and confident. All well within OM parameters but challenging nonetheless. So there is a place and time for handflying as well as for full automatics.
To me, the PiC needs to (be able to) manage the flight, using all the equipment available including all the automation to the level appropriate for every stage of flight. But that can only be achieved through learning how to control the flight first, and then learning to allow the automation control the flight while monitoring its correct functioning.
Reading about the tactile feedback from controls I find them very interesting. It would be great to have the feedback without having to scan instruments. It will aid SA enormously. Looking forward to that.
It must have real benefit for the pilot and for safety, not be a "look what we can do!" technology for technology's sake. And I don't count a bit of weight or cost saving as a benefit in that context!
It must have a good HMI and be intuitive. Human-centred design is the relevant buzzword.
It must take on board all lessons learnt in fixed-wing FBW. Helicopter manufacturers can prone to existing in a bubble and starting with a blank sheet of paper, thus repeating all the mistakes that were made 20 years ago in fixed -wing. You only have to look at some of the current generation of helicopters' HMI to see how prevalent the bubble-think is!
It must fully embrace the 2-crew concept (or if you like, make allowances for it!)
There must be full disclosure about its behaviour, including all it's reversionary and fallback modes. In other words, the detailed information that will mean a properly trained pilot never having to say "what's it doing now?" or "what will happen when I ..."?
Manufacturers must not only say how it behaves, but why it behaves that way and how they envisage it being operated.
An adequate supply of approved full flight simulators must be available for pilot training prior to the first sales.
So not much then!
FBW
HC, actually, assuming that the design group is smart enough to NOT simply design a digital copy of the present electro-mechanical/hydraulic system, the new system should address the very issues you raised in the first paragraph. To properly respond to this item is probably a three page term paper!
While using FW FBW experience, there is also now a body of RW experience to take into consideration. Just a small example: the three axis Comanche cyclic. Could it be flown? Sure, and it wasn't that bad ( in fact that machine had excellent flying qualities ), but note that the newer helo FBW configurations have pedals ( an " I told you so " from the old CH-54 back seat community ). There are some remaining conceptual differences in the FW cockpit design approach between Airbus and Boeing, that have implications when thinking about RW standards.
Cannot but agree with your last three paragraphs. The challenge will not be getting the design data made available to the ground schools, but getting the operator/piloting community to buy into that level of education. We went that high road way in training the initial IP cadre for the UH-60A, only to find that 5 years later, the FT Rucker folks had dumbed it all down, with the excuse that it had been decided to do all but the very basics in the units ( and who, pray tell, was going to impart all that knowledge to the unit IP's? ). But you are absolutely correct that the pilot must be well schooled in the how and why, in detail, when it comes to increasingly capable controls.
While using FW FBW experience, there is also now a body of RW experience to take into consideration. Just a small example: the three axis Comanche cyclic. Could it be flown? Sure, and it wasn't that bad ( in fact that machine had excellent flying qualities ), but note that the newer helo FBW configurations have pedals ( an " I told you so " from the old CH-54 back seat community ). There are some remaining conceptual differences in the FW cockpit design approach between Airbus and Boeing, that have implications when thinking about RW standards.
Cannot but agree with your last three paragraphs. The challenge will not be getting the design data made available to the ground schools, but getting the operator/piloting community to buy into that level of education. We went that high road way in training the initial IP cadre for the UH-60A, only to find that 5 years later, the FT Rucker folks had dumbed it all down, with the excuse that it had been decided to do all but the very basics in the units ( and who, pray tell, was going to impart all that knowledge to the unit IP's? ). But you are absolutely correct that the pilot must be well schooled in the how and why, in detail, when it comes to increasingly capable controls.
As JD says, "an excellent discussion". As long as it remains so, I'd like to join in. Not all pPrune debates are so well conducted.
I know HC and 212man, I see from the input of others that they are well informed and qualified to debate this. My perspective, as a current RW sim instructor and retired FW pilot, is that of someone tasked with training both the automation and the intervention it sometimes requires.
The expertise of many of the contributors is, as I see it, part of the problem. They are company test pilots, CTCs, senior people. The technophiles love the automation and want to use it to the full. They just KNOW that all the protections are built in and can be relied on. The trouble is, the "average line pilots" I see every day find it simpler to fly around on HDG and ALT. That's why I fully agree with HC's wish list. But in it's absence, the "dumbing down" that JD referred to is what is actually necessary to keep pilots confident (and that's important, right?) that they are in control and know what's going on.
This discussion started with talk of trim release buttons and handling. It has drifted into "Automation: Friend or Foe?" I think the latter is the real debate. Should we start another thread?
I know HC and 212man, I see from the input of others that they are well informed and qualified to debate this. My perspective, as a current RW sim instructor and retired FW pilot, is that of someone tasked with training both the automation and the intervention it sometimes requires.
The expertise of many of the contributors is, as I see it, part of the problem. They are company test pilots, CTCs, senior people. The technophiles love the automation and want to use it to the full. They just KNOW that all the protections are built in and can be relied on. The trouble is, the "average line pilots" I see every day find it simpler to fly around on HDG and ALT. That's why I fully agree with HC's wish list. But in it's absence, the "dumbing down" that JD referred to is what is actually necessary to keep pilots confident (and that's important, right?) that they are in control and know what's going on.
This discussion started with talk of trim release buttons and handling. It has drifted into "Automation: Friend or Foe?" I think the latter is the real debate. Should we start another thread?
The expertise of many of the contributors is, as I see it, part of the problem. They are company test pilots, CTCs, senior people. The technophiles love the automation and want to use it to the full. They just KNOW that all the protections are built in and can be relied on. The trouble is, the "average line pilots" I see every day find it simpler to fly around on HDG and ALT. That's why I fully agree with HC's wish list. But in it's absence, the "dumbing down" that JD referred to is what is actually necessary to keep pilots confident (and that's important, right?) that they are in control and know what's going on.
You are right, the participants on here are knowledgeable about the detail of how it all behaves. That is because they have bothered to find out about it, not because they were born with the knowledge!
I just don't see how "dumbing down" could work. OK it will work for 99% of the time but then, inevitably, circumstances will conspire to cause some automation behaviour to pop up that was hitherto "unknown" due to the dumbing down. Then we have the makings of an accident.
I'm sorry but I really don't see any alternative to pilots being fully aware of all the behaviours that are lurking there and could surface. If they can't hack it they shouldn't be flying these types of helicopters, although in my experience the chances are they could hack it if they just put a bit of time and effort into learning about it and thinking about it during the 6 month gaps between training sessions. I generally found that the folk who really couldn't hack it, couldn't hack manual flying either!
These days pilots get plenty of days off, but there is the rub: With the equal time roster each day on is a pretty long day usually, so no inclination to do any studying after a long double flight. But a day off is a day off and "why should I have to do homework on my days off?". Consequently I do think that the equal time roster, much as I liked it when I was working, is conspiring against pilots attaining and retaining good knowledge of their complex aircraft.
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In light of what Keith suggests about Pilots liking to fly using ALT and HDG, or some very simple utilization of the Automation, perhaps we should first decide just how much automation is needed, desired, and sufficient.
Do we need "Stick Shakers", "Cyclic Wigglers", Collective 'Stiffeners", auto-hover and all that kind of super cooper magic stuff or can we be better served by sticking to simpler systems?
I admit I would love to have enjoyed the SA system of offshore approaches where I punch the numbers into the FMS and watch the AFCS/FMS fly the approach right down to the barest of minimums, but do I really need that for my standard ol' offshore flying?
We should also decide what we want the Pilot(s) to do in the "Flying" of the machine. Or, is it too late to figure out "what" we want to do and then sort out the details of how to build, test, certify, and implement the system(s) to do that?
Or.....is that what we are really doing now with the discussion extant?
HC,
Professionalism is motivated from within, not without. Either One is driven to be "professional" or One is not. I flew with lots of Pilots but very few real "Professionals".
Do we need "Stick Shakers", "Cyclic Wigglers", Collective 'Stiffeners", auto-hover and all that kind of super cooper magic stuff or can we be better served by sticking to simpler systems?
I admit I would love to have enjoyed the SA system of offshore approaches where I punch the numbers into the FMS and watch the AFCS/FMS fly the approach right down to the barest of minimums, but do I really need that for my standard ol' offshore flying?
We should also decide what we want the Pilot(s) to do in the "Flying" of the machine. Or, is it too late to figure out "what" we want to do and then sort out the details of how to build, test, certify, and implement the system(s) to do that?
Or.....is that what we are really doing now with the discussion extant?
HC,
Professionalism is motivated from within, not without. Either One is driven to be "professional" or One is not. I flew with lots of Pilots but very few real "Professionals".
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HeliComparator, thanks for being a voice of reason and experience. I am a 3000+ hour fixed wing pilot with multiple "hairy recoveries" several on instruments in bad weather. All of them required being the "master of my aircraft".
I'm no Sullenberger, just a guy who grew up with old school pilots who taught me how to be the master of my aircraft. How you get there has been extensively discussed here and I have little to add except "cowboy flying" has its place. Let me put it this way: When I taught my kids to drive we went out on dirt roads with plenty of grass on the sides and drove faster and faster till things got squirrely around the curves. Just enough for them to recover or loop the car. We also learned to surprise brake in the shortest distance on pavement and dirt, no ABS allowed. I encouraged them to regularly go out and push the envelope within reasonable safety limits (judgement required).
I just got into rotary (yes at my advanced age!) and am flying only manual in the OH-58 and 407. I get the push button aviation problem. It has been around in fixed wing for a long time, way before glass.
My experience is missing the "keep passengers comfortable or risk losing your job, even it it means dying". If this is really common, and "flying the rails" is driven by that mentality, then it's a giant safety problem created by management holding the threat of termination or demotion over pilots' heads. I know people who, when confronted with serious s**t, will think twice about squawking 7700. Amazing, since that is the declaration of emergency they should make before even opening their mike, and it immediately removes one worry from their plate -- deviation issues or worse on instruments. They are thinking "Oh s**t the Feds are gonna pull my ticket". Ridiculous.
It is much easier to fly around on autopilot, but doing it when not really necessary (CAVU weather, etc.) is stupid unless the aircraft requires it for all ops (e.g. SAS). Fly the aircraft and do your own navigation as a rule. Then when things get really tough, you can fall back on the autopilot and create a safety and workload buffer. But some day that fresh flying skill will save your a**.
I'm no Sullenberger, just a guy who grew up with old school pilots who taught me how to be the master of my aircraft. How you get there has been extensively discussed here and I have little to add except "cowboy flying" has its place. Let me put it this way: When I taught my kids to drive we went out on dirt roads with plenty of grass on the sides and drove faster and faster till things got squirrely around the curves. Just enough for them to recover or loop the car. We also learned to surprise brake in the shortest distance on pavement and dirt, no ABS allowed. I encouraged them to regularly go out and push the envelope within reasonable safety limits (judgement required).
I just got into rotary (yes at my advanced age!) and am flying only manual in the OH-58 and 407. I get the push button aviation problem. It has been around in fixed wing for a long time, way before glass.
My experience is missing the "keep passengers comfortable or risk losing your job, even it it means dying". If this is really common, and "flying the rails" is driven by that mentality, then it's a giant safety problem created by management holding the threat of termination or demotion over pilots' heads. I know people who, when confronted with serious s**t, will think twice about squawking 7700. Amazing, since that is the declaration of emergency they should make before even opening their mike, and it immediately removes one worry from their plate -- deviation issues or worse on instruments. They are thinking "Oh s**t the Feds are gonna pull my ticket". Ridiculous.
It is much easier to fly around on autopilot, but doing it when not really necessary (CAVU weather, etc.) is stupid unless the aircraft requires it for all ops (e.g. SAS). Fly the aircraft and do your own navigation as a rule. Then when things get really tough, you can fall back on the autopilot and create a safety and workload buffer. But some day that fresh flying skill will save your a**.
But secondly, the "line pilot" is not perhaps best placed to decide how much automation is needed or wanted because, as a general rule, they are a very conservative bunch and like to keep things within the bounds of what they understand, how they flew in the past and what they need to do 99.5% of the time.
When we first got the EC225, the pilots were happy with ALT, HDG, IAS and coupling the FMS en-route, since these were all things that they did on the AS332L (well, maybe not ALT and IAS at the same time).
Two of the main hurdles were:
To trust the GA mode to be used at low speed, near the ground/sea. They wanted to get to the sort of speed where the AFCS worked adequately in the 332L - ie a point they were comfortable with based on their previous experience, Vy or so. Eventually (once a Sim was available), we could take them into the sim and practice engine failures just after rotation on a rig takeoff. In general they flew it badly, dived to get unnecessary speed and flew into the sea, failed to dive enough and fell into the sea etc, and this was with them knowing the failure was going to occur. So then we said "rotate, press GA and then don't touch the controls" at which point the AFCS flew an immaculate OEI departure diving to get speed and then raising the nose so that it was on the horizon just as Vtoss was reached. They soon realised that it was much better than flying the manoeuvre that they were, and of course it wouldn't suffer from "startle" when the unthinkable engine failure actually happened. That battle was eventually won, and now they love it, especially on a nasty dark night.
Then there was the whole "overlay approach" thing. They were quite happy to have the FMS fly them out to the rig and back, but oh dear, all those STARS, transitions and approaches built into the FMS for an onshore instrument approach was all far too difficult. When I wanted to make it SOP to always put the instrument approach into the FMS they said "we always have radar vectored ILSs at Aberdeen, so what's the point?". And the answer was probably "not a huge amount of point on a radar vectored approach at Aberdeen (although situational awareness is helped by seeing the final approach track on the NAVD)" - but surely we do use other airports as alternates, they do have procedural approaches, DME arcs etc and even though we very rarely have to go there, when we do have to go there surely the FMS is a great boon as it totally looks after the horizontal profile of the initial, intermediate, final approach and missed approach of an approach we are not familiar with. We can sit back and monitor against the plate. Easy - if you know how it works!
Anyway, the battle was mostly won when we got our simulator and were able to take them to all sorts of airports that they had used as alternates but never actually been to. They realised that once you knew how it worked, it was fantastic! Of course we got a lot of "uphill" from the CAA too, who thought this was all cheating and we should be flying NDB approaches on some wandering needle that was probably pointing at a CB anyway!
Just as an example, ferry flight from the factory in new 225, had to divert to Carcassone due to appalling weather in the Massif Centrale. Next day was drizzly and definitely IFR departure. Never mind, the SIDs (the French love their SIDS and STARS) were all in the FMS so the one given by ATC was duly loaded in, and jolly complicated it was too. We got airborne and literally passing about Vy going IMC, Mr ATC man say "Change of SID due traffic, its now xyz" (the delights of Class E airspace). To trawl through our pile of plates to find the right SID at that stage would have been pandemonium but instead it was I think 4 button presses on the FMS to load the new SID, going in a substantially different direction, which then promptly unfolded on the NAVD and all the altitudes etc were on the FMS screen. A doddle.
So a potentially very difficult situation was a complete non-event because we knew how to use the kit fluently.
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You are right, the participants on here are knowledgeable about the detail of how it all behaves. That is because they have bothered to find out about it, not because they were born with the knowledge!
I just don't see how "dumbing down" could work. OK it will work for 99% of the time but then, inevitably, circumstances will conspire to cause some automation behaviour to pop up that was hitherto "unknown" due to the dumbing down. Then we have the makings of an accident.
I'm sorry but I really don't see any alternative to pilots being fully aware of all the behaviours that are lurking there and could surface. If they can't hack it they shouldn't be flying these types of helicopters, although in my experience the chances are they could hack it if they just put a bit of time and effort into learning about it and thinking about it during the 6 month gaps between training sessions. I generally found that the folk who really couldn't hack it, couldn't hack manual flying either!
These days pilots get plenty of days off, but there is the rub: With the equal time roster each day on is a pretty long day usually, so no inclination to do any studying after a long double flight. But a day off is a day off and "why should I have to do homework on my days off?". Consequently I do think that the equal time roster, much as I liked it when I was working, is conspiring against pilots attaining and retaining good knowledge of their complex aircraft.
I just don't see how "dumbing down" could work. OK it will work for 99% of the time but then, inevitably, circumstances will conspire to cause some automation behaviour to pop up that was hitherto "unknown" due to the dumbing down. Then we have the makings of an accident.
I'm sorry but I really don't see any alternative to pilots being fully aware of all the behaviours that are lurking there and could surface. If they can't hack it they shouldn't be flying these types of helicopters, although in my experience the chances are they could hack it if they just put a bit of time and effort into learning about it and thinking about it during the 6 month gaps between training sessions. I generally found that the folk who really couldn't hack it, couldn't hack manual flying either!
These days pilots get plenty of days off, but there is the rub: With the equal time roster each day on is a pretty long day usually, so no inclination to do any studying after a long double flight. But a day off is a day off and "why should I have to do homework on my days off?". Consequently I do think that the equal time roster, much as I liked it when I was working, is conspiring against pilots attaining and retaining good knowledge of their complex aircraft.
As for all the discussion about trim releases: I would say understand what you are doing, why you chose to do/use what you did, and act accordingly.
For instance: in a cruise at higher speeds in a 76, if we encounter turbulence there is a risk of breaking Vne (or whatever magic number the FDM guys have programmed in for a bollocking that isn't really a bollocking because we are a 'just culture' company). I see all kinds of contradictory responses to handling this simple situation. First, this indicates the guy driving wasn't really paying attention. Second, he isn't sure, because he hasn't considered it, what to do. Personally I just fly against the trim in pitch (contrary to what you were suggesting HC) to contain the speed. I am aware enough to know that if I release the cyclic it will jump so I gently allow it move back to trimmed position when appropriate. I'm also aware that pressing the release will reset the datums for the AP, which is why I chose not to.
And there are other ways to deal with it, and it is situation dependant. Of course.
My point is that all these suggestions for the 'right' way to do it are assuming that the pilot is incapable of understanding the system and making a judgement. My contention is that they are capable, but have chosen not to make the effort. Your final thoughts seem to agree with me HC.
So I think I most agree with 76Heavy. Put aside the absolutes, the one SOP fits all, and just demand professionalism.
BTW HC, I agree completely with your directions about using the kit when you don't need to so that you will be capable when you really need to!!
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HC fantastic last post hitting at the heart of the matter - competence leading to confidence all facilitated through sound and enthusiastic training.
HC, please please PLEASE come and help us deliver that kind of training in AH and let the next generation of pilots and our Instructors take benefit from your experience. You must be properly bored by now! The SIM door is always open for you!
DB
HC, please please PLEASE come and help us deliver that kind of training in AH and let the next generation of pilots and our Instructors take benefit from your experience. You must be properly bored by now! The SIM door is always open for you!
DB
'Pilot and apprentice',
Your example of the S76 ALT hold might not have been the best one to introduce into this thread; the control of speed in a three axis ALT mode resides with the use of the collective, not by flying through and overriding the function of the AP - which I'm sure you know!
One of the functions of the HFDM system is to monitor the observance of aircraft limitations; if the practice of using the ALT mode with excessive power is leading to exceedance of the limitations, it is the responsibility of the HFDM manager to raise it with the crew members (how this is done is one of the aspects of the company culture). If it is subsequently decided that this is a trend, it is up to operators to ensure that this trend is addressed by: bringing it to the attention of all; increasing the coverage of autopilots in training; and, auditing the system to ensure that the actions have had the required effect.
Your point in favour of increased professionalism has already had the support of everyone (who would have argued against it?); the question is - how is that achieved? HC and I have constantly bemoaned the lack of crew-room discussion in which the matters we are considering here would have been the subject of heated debate. I think that HC might be correct that the change in work patterns have resulted in the demise of this valuable forum (it certainly was part of my education when I first operated on the North Sea). In some sense it has been reproduced in boards such as PPRune - but with far less restraint because of the remoteness of the medium.
During the preceding pages has been argued the necessity for training based upon competence (not tick-box items and hours allocation) and the facilitation of 'resilience' by exposure to normal scenarios with seeded occurrences. Evidence Based Training (EBT) makes these changes but we must not forget that EBT consists of three phases: the evaluation phase; the manoeuvres phase; and the scenario-based training phase. The assessment phase takes note of the competence of the pilots; in particular the demonstration of knowledge, skills and attitude. I think that 'pilot and apprentice' has already mentioned that in Canada, pilots who are assessed as not 'suited' for this type of operation are offered other opportunities (that certainly happened in Bristow Aberdeen in the early days).
The changing of the culture offshore will take some time to achieve but change it must. Whilst it would be nice for this to be achieved with all pilots remaining in their comfort zone, that will not be the case. Yes, we must ensure that the basic flying skills are not eroded by ensuring that the SOPs permit flight to be undertaken without AP assistance in the appropriate weather conditions (as was shown in the Shell Brunei presentation). Whilst making these changes, it must be made clear that there is a substantial difference between 'flying the aircraft' and 'managing the flight' as quoted earlier:
Hopefully, this first revolution will have been achieved before the advent of fly-by-wire.
Jim
PS Whilst we are all motivated to ensure that HC stays involved; it should be at the system level and not at the coal face. We should be mindful of Confucius and fish.
Your example of the S76 ALT hold might not have been the best one to introduce into this thread; the control of speed in a three axis ALT mode resides with the use of the collective, not by flying through and overriding the function of the AP - which I'm sure you know!
One of the functions of the HFDM system is to monitor the observance of aircraft limitations; if the practice of using the ALT mode with excessive power is leading to exceedance of the limitations, it is the responsibility of the HFDM manager to raise it with the crew members (how this is done is one of the aspects of the company culture). If it is subsequently decided that this is a trend, it is up to operators to ensure that this trend is addressed by: bringing it to the attention of all; increasing the coverage of autopilots in training; and, auditing the system to ensure that the actions have had the required effect.
Your point in favour of increased professionalism has already had the support of everyone (who would have argued against it?); the question is - how is that achieved? HC and I have constantly bemoaned the lack of crew-room discussion in which the matters we are considering here would have been the subject of heated debate. I think that HC might be correct that the change in work patterns have resulted in the demise of this valuable forum (it certainly was part of my education when I first operated on the North Sea). In some sense it has been reproduced in boards such as PPRune - but with far less restraint because of the remoteness of the medium.
During the preceding pages has been argued the necessity for training based upon competence (not tick-box items and hours allocation) and the facilitation of 'resilience' by exposure to normal scenarios with seeded occurrences. Evidence Based Training (EBT) makes these changes but we must not forget that EBT consists of three phases: the evaluation phase; the manoeuvres phase; and the scenario-based training phase. The assessment phase takes note of the competence of the pilots; in particular the demonstration of knowledge, skills and attitude. I think that 'pilot and apprentice' has already mentioned that in Canada, pilots who are assessed as not 'suited' for this type of operation are offered other opportunities (that certainly happened in Bristow Aberdeen in the early days).
The changing of the culture offshore will take some time to achieve but change it must. Whilst it would be nice for this to be achieved with all pilots remaining in their comfort zone, that will not be the case. Yes, we must ensure that the basic flying skills are not eroded by ensuring that the SOPs permit flight to be undertaken without AP assistance in the appropriate weather conditions (as was shown in the Shell Brunei presentation). Whilst making these changes, it must be made clear that there is a substantial difference between 'flying the aircraft' and 'managing the flight' as quoted earlier:
Necessary changes required in piloting skills when converting from flying with basic instruments and stabilisation, to managing the on-board systems, have not been fully recognised and implemented; there was ample evidence that the necessity for managed transition had not been understood (by regulators or operators) or put in place.
Jim
PS Whilst we are all motivated to ensure that HC stays involved; it should be at the system level and not at the coal face. We should be mindful of Confucius and fish.
I don't think I ever disagreed with you, but I would just say that there are 2 sides to it - yes each of us is responsible for our own professionalism, but also the information must be "out there" for us to absorb, something that has not been the case up to now, and with a good company culture to support it all.
As for all the discussion about trim releases: I would say understand what you are doing, why you chose to do/use what you did, and act accordingly.
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Personally I just fly against the trim in pitch (contrary to what you were suggesting HC) to contain the speed. I am aware enough to know that if I release the cyclic it will jump so I gently allow it move back to trimmed position when appropriate. I'm also aware that pressing the release will reset the datums for the AP, which is why I chose not to.
And there are other ways to deal with it, and it is situation dependant. Of course.
...
Personally I just fly against the trim in pitch (contrary to what you were suggesting HC) to contain the speed. I am aware enough to know that if I release the cyclic it will jump so I gently allow it move back to trimmed position when appropriate. I'm also aware that pressing the release will reset the datums for the AP, which is why I chose not to.
And there are other ways to deal with it, and it is situation dependant. Of course.
Anyway, thanks but there is far too much to do in summer. Maybe winter...
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It can be appropriate to fly against the trims in the 225 in some circumstances, but definintely not during some dynamic (IAS-changing) manoeuvre whereby the cyclic will no longer be in the right place when released to trimmed position.
Yes of course it is. However it is not necessarily quite that simple - on the EC225 and 155 with their cyclic follow-up trim, say a rig departure can be flown "against the trims" because the follow-up trim motors the trims to keep the cyclic in trim (although personally, I don't like flying it like that). So a pilot can happily fly a rig departure "against the trims" and it all works out because by the time they get to 40kts they have stopped bothering to fly it and engaged GA. However on the first day when they have 40kts of wind offshore, same profile flown in the same way, the IAS is already above 40kts and so no follow-up trim and a resultant unexpected rearing up when they let go, unless they remember that "This time, I must press the FTR before letting go". That's why a prefer a "1 technique that always works" which is to always press the FTR . Unfortunately I am not in the majority.
AFCS/Autopilot Failure Mode Training
I imagine that the training sims available to the pilots posting to this thread all include pretty complete training with various modes off.
Question: Is there much ( any? ) failure mode training involving runaways of the various parts/pieces of the system, i.e., series actuator/parallel actuator failures, and the like? Failure modes when you are down to one AFCS/Autopilot, i.e., a for example, 10-15% series actuator runaway ( assuming the actuator runs at 100% of full control per second, but the authority is limited to 10-15 % of full control ). Trim failures wherein the trim runs away at whatever its rate limited value is, and the pilot has to wait the requisite 3 seconds before reacting. That whole repertoire of "fun"?
Just checked with an old friend on the SA side of this question, and his take on the sim training was that a lot of systems off training was done, but little/no " hardover* " training. (* US English for runaways).
Question: Is there much ( any? ) failure mode training involving runaways of the various parts/pieces of the system, i.e., series actuator/parallel actuator failures, and the like? Failure modes when you are down to one AFCS/Autopilot, i.e., a for example, 10-15% series actuator runaway ( assuming the actuator runs at 100% of full control per second, but the authority is limited to 10-15 % of full control ). Trim failures wherein the trim runs away at whatever its rate limited value is, and the pilot has to wait the requisite 3 seconds before reacting. That whole repertoire of "fun"?
Just checked with an old friend on the SA side of this question, and his take on the sim training was that a lot of systems off training was done, but little/no " hardover* " training. (* US English for runaways).
John,
we used to incorporate all three hardover possibilities in the S92 simulator - SAS actuator, parrallel actuator and boost actuator. (I say 'used to' meaning they still do, but I'm no longer in that function.) SAS can more or less be discounted as there is only 5% authority and it is normally cancelled out before the crew notice, but the other two failure had markedly different outcomes depending on whether in VMC or IMC, the specific axis and the crew competence. I was always curious how the boost actuators got through certification as they clearly don't comply with the normal 29.1329 requirements (in terms of pilot recognition and reaction times), so I assume they were deemed separate from the main AFCS control system - despite being required for the AFCS to function.
Sometimes the failures were given for their own right, sometimes as a means of generating an unusual attitude and sometimes to create a particular situation - especially removing the ability to use some or all upper modes. They are also good tools for communications skills, as initially only the PF knows what is going on and he has to communicate it to the PM who only knows that there has been a control upset (with a collective boost hard-up, accompanied by overtorque and low Nr if not caught quickly). If having difficulties controlling the aircraft, the PF can find it difficult to say clearly what is happening and what he'd like doing about it!
Of course, in training the expectation is the pilot will react as quickly as they can - not sit and wait like in certification. I remember Ron telling me about the joys of the triple axis hardover testing - he especially liked the nose down/yaw left/roll right combo, with the 3 second wait.....
we used to incorporate all three hardover possibilities in the S92 simulator - SAS actuator, parrallel actuator and boost actuator. (I say 'used to' meaning they still do, but I'm no longer in that function.) SAS can more or less be discounted as there is only 5% authority and it is normally cancelled out before the crew notice, but the other two failure had markedly different outcomes depending on whether in VMC or IMC, the specific axis and the crew competence. I was always curious how the boost actuators got through certification as they clearly don't comply with the normal 29.1329 requirements (in terms of pilot recognition and reaction times), so I assume they were deemed separate from the main AFCS control system - despite being required for the AFCS to function.
Sometimes the failures were given for their own right, sometimes as a means of generating an unusual attitude and sometimes to create a particular situation - especially removing the ability to use some or all upper modes. They are also good tools for communications skills, as initially only the PF knows what is going on and he has to communicate it to the PM who only knows that there has been a control upset (with a collective boost hard-up, accompanied by overtorque and low Nr if not caught quickly). If having difficulties controlling the aircraft, the PF can find it difficult to say clearly what is happening and what he'd like doing about it!
Trim failures wherein the trim runs away at whatever its rate limited value is, and the pilot has to wait the requisite 3 seconds before reacting. That whole repertoire of "fun"?
Last edited by 212man; 23rd Jul 2014 at 17:07.
Failure Modes
Thanks for the update, 212. The thought behind my question, which your response somewhat reinforced, was whether this sort of training would force the discussion as to what was really in the control system, how it was possible to misbehave, and get pilots feeling comfortable and confident that, no matter the failure, they could take over manually, fly the basic machine, and THEN address the AFCS/Autopilot issue.
In a bit of now ancient history, the introduction of the UH-60 posed a particular dilemma as to how to train up the AFCS/Stabilator system so as to instill confidence, as opposed to fear. Sidebar for a moment: upon assignment to the Aviation Test Board out of flight school, I had the opportunity to get checked out in everything they owned, and one was a CH-34C ( I'd gone thru the H-19 in school ). The IP I had for the 34 was afraid to turn the AFCS on, and imparted a horror story re the " Hardovers can kill you ".
All of the initial IP's were UH-1 guys, thus without any SAS etc experience. To confront that situation, I asked SA Engr to make us a version of the hardover box that was portable and could be passed from machine to machine with a robust but simple cabling setup. That was done and all of that initial group was trained, in flight, at max weight, max speed etc, in all of the failure modes. That was a redundant SAS, single AFCS type system, dual electronics and dual actuator for the stabilator, so there was a good list of things to do on those flights, and it worked out pretty well. As I've mentioned previously, however, that level of training did not endure. It did force a lot of conversation and shall I say, expanded ground school type on the wing instruction.
In a bit of now ancient history, the introduction of the UH-60 posed a particular dilemma as to how to train up the AFCS/Stabilator system so as to instill confidence, as opposed to fear. Sidebar for a moment: upon assignment to the Aviation Test Board out of flight school, I had the opportunity to get checked out in everything they owned, and one was a CH-34C ( I'd gone thru the H-19 in school ). The IP I had for the 34 was afraid to turn the AFCS on, and imparted a horror story re the " Hardovers can kill you ".
All of the initial IP's were UH-1 guys, thus without any SAS etc experience. To confront that situation, I asked SA Engr to make us a version of the hardover box that was portable and could be passed from machine to machine with a robust but simple cabling setup. That was done and all of that initial group was trained, in flight, at max weight, max speed etc, in all of the failure modes. That was a redundant SAS, single AFCS type system, dual electronics and dual actuator for the stabilator, so there was a good list of things to do on those flights, and it worked out pretty well. As I've mentioned previously, however, that level of training did not endure. It did force a lot of conversation and shall I say, expanded ground school type on the wing instruction.
