EC155 incident, SNS, 6 Nov 2013
Bob, I may have misunderstood your previous post but it seemed as though you were advocating manual flight when the pilot's understanding of what the software was doing eluded him because he didn't understand it. My point was that even in manual flight, you are interacting with the AP software and so you need to know how it behaves.
I thought you were proposing a sort of "when the going gets tough, disengage all the fancy hits and fly it manually" strategy, which is not the best philosophy and indeed has caused a recent crash in the N Sea. Re-reading your post you probably didn't mean that!
I thought you were proposing a sort of "when the going gets tough, disengage all the fancy hits and fly it manually" strategy, which is not the best philosophy and indeed has caused a recent crash in the N Sea. Re-reading your post you probably didn't mean that!
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Language strikes again! I fully agree with "not kicking George aside" and reverting to purely hands on flying. Quite the opposite. That being said, there might be some situations where that is the better method but it should be just one of the things in our Bag of Tricks and not the only one or the first one we grab.
I generally see the continuing pursuit of lofty descriptions of how Pilots function to sometimes cause far more problems than it solves as we find ourselves arguing about the labeling and ignoring the "problem" that prompted the discussion to begin with.
I see this "Resilience" thing as being yet another of those examples of not leaving well enough alone.
The discussions we have had about Training and other education about systems, procedures, standards, and methods to be far more beneficial than getting wrapped around axle over "Resilience" as a concept as the "new" cure.
I have watched folks do the immediate canceling of the autopilot in the Sim when the first Master Caution illuminates and the subsequent disasters that sometimes followed as a direct result. The Demo of watching the Autopilot cope with some failures and fly an absolutely beautiful coupled ILS Approach was lost on some as well.
The Sim is only representative and not a completely accurate duplicate of the actual aircraft in all cases but the Teaching Point was valid.
You and I agree far more than we disagree.
I generally see the continuing pursuit of lofty descriptions of how Pilots function to sometimes cause far more problems than it solves as we find ourselves arguing about the labeling and ignoring the "problem" that prompted the discussion to begin with.
I see this "Resilience" thing as being yet another of those examples of not leaving well enough alone.
The discussions we have had about Training and other education about systems, procedures, standards, and methods to be far more beneficial than getting wrapped around axle over "Resilience" as a concept as the "new" cure.
I have watched folks do the immediate canceling of the autopilot in the Sim when the first Master Caution illuminates and the subsequent disasters that sometimes followed as a direct result. The Demo of watching the Autopilot cope with some failures and fly an absolutely beautiful coupled ILS Approach was lost on some as well.
The Sim is only representative and not a completely accurate duplicate of the actual aircraft in all cases but the Teaching Point was valid.
You and I agree far more than we disagree.
Like JimL I'm a little surprised there are no recommendations at the end, which is sad given the severity of the incident. Bear in mind that at 184 ft ASL, the Clipper is a 'giant' in the SNS and a departure from most other decks with the same profile would almost certainly not have had the same outcome.
If I had access to the FDR data, one of the parameters I would like to look at is the FTR discrete to see how the FTR was being used in the initial take off. I carried out the first offshore night (and day) take-offs and landings in the EC-155, and came away from the session with a huge sense of how much safer an exercise it was with the built in AFCS attitude logic. From the hover the forward cyclic input is made using the follow-up trim, not using the FTR. During the subsequent acceleration the aircraft attitude changes automatically to an 80 KIAS climbing attitude. The follow-up trim moves to the long term attitude mode from 30 KIAS, with hysteresis, to 40 KIAS and the only pilot input required is a quick 'left beep' on the cyclic 'beep' trim to correct the roll attitude (4 degrees right wing low, in nil wind). Using the FTR cuts out this natural transition process and I can't think of any reason why it would be used in those circumstances. It also gives the sense of the aircraft being a little unstabilised - particularly in roll - and I wonder if the flight crew's comments reflect this?
I also created a set of offshore performance graphs, using the basic PC2 performance as the datum, but with a 250 kg delta from the MTOM (then 4,800 kg) to ensure adequate AEO performance. In other words, we were never above 4,550 kg on departure offshore - but could be lower when the raw PC2 mass was lower than 4,550 kg. When I look at the PC2DLE masses, I do wonder how much attention was given to the AEO performance.
If I had access to the FDR data, one of the parameters I would like to look at is the FTR discrete to see how the FTR was being used in the initial take off. I carried out the first offshore night (and day) take-offs and landings in the EC-155, and came away from the session with a huge sense of how much safer an exercise it was with the built in AFCS attitude logic. From the hover the forward cyclic input is made using the follow-up trim, not using the FTR. During the subsequent acceleration the aircraft attitude changes automatically to an 80 KIAS climbing attitude. The follow-up trim moves to the long term attitude mode from 30 KIAS, with hysteresis, to 40 KIAS and the only pilot input required is a quick 'left beep' on the cyclic 'beep' trim to correct the roll attitude (4 degrees right wing low, in nil wind). Using the FTR cuts out this natural transition process and I can't think of any reason why it would be used in those circumstances. It also gives the sense of the aircraft being a little unstabilised - particularly in roll - and I wonder if the flight crew's comments reflect this?
I also created a set of offshore performance graphs, using the basic PC2 performance as the datum, but with a 250 kg delta from the MTOM (then 4,800 kg) to ensure adequate AEO performance. In other words, we were never above 4,550 kg on departure offshore - but could be lower when the raw PC2 mass was lower than 4,550 kg. When I look at the PC2DLE masses, I do wonder how much attention was given to the AEO performance.
Bob, I am not one for buzzwords, management-BS-speak etc either, but sometimes it helps to crystallise what we already well know in our hearts, to have it put down in words precisely. Apart from anything else it makes for precise communication amongst people who all understand the buzzword. It is just another form of jargon if you likel but jargon is a good way of communicating concisely provided the terms are understood by all parties.
I will confess to finding a few of the presentations at the excellent conference JimL mentioned, "a little above my head" and was left wondering why it had to seem so complicated when it was clear that we were getting the most fundamental basics wrong, but I liked "Resilience" because it sums up the characteristics of the sort of pilot you and I would like to be flown around by.
I will confess to finding a few of the presentations at the excellent conference JimL mentioned, "a little above my head" and was left wondering why it had to seem so complicated when it was clear that we were getting the most fundamental basics wrong, but I liked "Resilience" because it sums up the characteristics of the sort of pilot you and I would like to be flown around by.
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I find myself agreeing with Bob for probably the first time.
There is no quick fix. Resilience only comes through knowledge, training and practice mixed with a little intelligence.
HC - I do not want to disagree with you but in my view, pressing the Trim release in IMC, especially during a dynamic manoeuvre like a night rig take off, is surely a poor alternative to using at least the ATT mode of the AFCS.
I accept the trim release can help when there are good visual references or instantaneously to remove trim forces when appropriate.
I would hope we are on the same page.
There is no quick fix. Resilience only comes through knowledge, training and practice mixed with a little intelligence.
HC - I do not want to disagree with you but in my view, pressing the Trim release in IMC, especially during a dynamic manoeuvre like a night rig take off, is surely a poor alternative to using at least the ATT mode of the AFCS.
I accept the trim release can help when there are good visual references or instantaneously to remove trim forces when appropriate.
I would hope we are on the same page.
HeliComparator, JimL;
What conference was this and is there a DVD or other source (web based?) where we can access the knowledge conveyed there and benefit from it?
Thanks,
Finalchecksplease
What conference was this and is there a DVD or other source (web based?) where we can access the knowledge conveyed there and benefit from it?
Thanks,
Finalchecksplease
FCP,
http://aerosociety.com/Assets/Docs/E...mme_June24.pdf
I think the proceedings will be available this week.
http://aerosociety.com/Assets/Docs/E...mme_June24.pdf
I think the proceedings will be available this week.
For a night rig takeoff (in an EC225, which I think is what we are both talking about?), pressing GA around rotation time and letting go of the cyclic is, I suspect we both agree, the best way of flying it.
But presuming we want to fly it manually for some reason:
Case 1: no pressing of Trim release. Cyclic is moved forwards to rotate. Hover follow-up trim auto-trims the cyclic so as to maintain in-trim. If you eventually press GA and let go, everything is hunky dory. BUT that presumes not much wind.
If there is 40kts wind (not that uncommon!) no more follow up trim. Now you move the cyclic forward to rotate, airspeed increases so flap back requires the cyclic to be moved further forward. At say 80kts you decide to press GA and let go. The cyclic jumps back to its hover position, the aircraft rears up starts to lose speed. You then start to fight it and a Dancopter EC155 - like scenario ensues. If you operate the beep trim, you beep the IAS datum not the stick position or attitude datum. This is a dreadful way to operate.
Case 2: you rotate whilst pressing trim release. The aircraft is more stable in this mode*, there is no non-linearity of feel associated with the cyclic breakout forces. You can press GA at any time, under any wind conditions, and let go. The AFCS will smoothly take over and carry out its GA function. This technique works every time.
You mention not wishing to lose ATT mode, but the purpose of ATT mode is to hold a previously selected attitude. How can this be a useful feature during a dynamic manoeuvre such as a rig takeoff?
*It's important to bear in mind that the behaviour of an EC225 vs an AS332L when flown against the spring trim, is completely different. With an AS332L operated against the spring trim, there are 2 components acting - a SAS type function, and also a function trying to return the aircraft to the datum attitude. Therefore the deviation in pitch or roll is roughly proportional to the stick deflection away from its trimmed position.
It's quite different on the 225 and hence I suspect on the 155. As soon as override detection occurs any attempt to maintain the datum attitude is disabled. The axis reverts to SAS and a fairly wobbly SAS at that. It is therefore quite difficult to maintain say 30 deg bank flying against the trim in an EC225 - it is wobbly and you typically find the stick back within a few mm of its trimmed position in that non-linear breakout force area.
By contrast if you bank to 30 deg with cyclic trim release depressed, it is a doddle to hold it steady. Plus you can let go to scratch your nose at any time, and nothing happens.
The idea that pressing trim release in IMC is a heinous crime is a hang-up from the 332L and is therefore not relevant. But old habits are so hard to kill!
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John Dixson just posted something interesting in the HH-60 thread about the Sikorsky S-67 AFCS system using a variable rate Beep Trim system that was installed on the Blackhawk Prototype but was nixed by the US Army Test Pilots.
No doubt they had probably all grown up on Bell's and perhaps Chinooks with the standard old Force Trim Release system that incorporated a Thumb Release Button.
A lot of different helicopters used the same concept as did the old Huey.
Hopefully, he will be along to explain in better detail how that Variable Rate Coolie Hat thing functioned.
No doubt they had probably all grown up on Bell's and perhaps Chinooks with the standard old Force Trim Release system that incorporated a Thumb Release Button.
A lot of different helicopters used the same concept as did the old Huey.
Hopefully, he will be along to explain in better detail how that Variable Rate Coolie Hat thing functioned.
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Clarity
HC, DB. This is the problem. I am assuming, by your attendance at conferences that you are either very enthusiastic line pilots or training/senior pilots. However, even with your training roles, you are discussing different ways of carrying out a critical flight phase using an autopilot. This should not be a discussion point, it should be clear. There should be no 'choice' here, just the right way or the wrong way. Not only this, if it is an automatic system then it should be automatic. You should not have to 'help' an automatic system otherwise it is pointless automation.
The fact there is ambiguity about ways of handling a critical flight phase is shocking. From my own experience the ambiguity is widespread. Without wanting to sound melodramatic, this is a situation that needs to be resolved or it will lead to further loss of life.
Frankly, I think resilience or manual handling practice or whatever is diverting attention away from the fact that many new helicopters are rolling off the production line without adequate instructions or training packages. This leads to ambiguous and dangerous training. Instead of making the end user resilient shouldn't we be making the training and equipment user resilient?
The fact there is ambiguity about ways of handling a critical flight phase is shocking. From my own experience the ambiguity is widespread. Without wanting to sound melodramatic, this is a situation that needs to be resolved or it will lead to further loss of life.
Frankly, I think resilience or manual handling practice or whatever is diverting attention away from the fact that many new helicopters are rolling off the production line without adequate instructions or training packages. This leads to ambiguous and dangerous training. Instead of making the end user resilient shouldn't we be making the training and equipment user resilient?
There is no doubt that the trim system is complex and results in many automation upset incidents. Although the trim mismanagement was not implicated in the EC155 incident, it was in Cougar 851! There is an interesting point in HC's discourse above:
because it appears to describe the sequence of events in the Cougar 851 incident (as we saw from the video replay at the conference): the pilot takes off from the platform using the published S92 Cat A profile but does not press the trim release trigger. As the aircraft passes through 60kts (the lower limit of the autopilot at that time was 50kts) the pilot selects Go Around (GA) and releases the controls. From that point the autopilot is programmed to accelerate to (the Vy of) 80kts, achieve a vertical speed target of 750ft/min and maintain heading. However, the trim system is of necessity (certification rules on hard-over tolerence) limited in authority and cannot overcome the trim forces that remained when the controls were released. The trim actuators never overcome the back force and the aircraft decelerates through 50kts and the autopilot disconnects. It is likely that the deceleration and autopilot disconnect is not anticipated because of lack of knowledge/awareness and a very serious incident (resembling the EC155 incident) ensues.
(I'm sure someone will correct me if the following is not accurate)
We are presently in a situation where, in (at least) one of the latest generation aircraft there are trim releases on the cyclic and collective as well as 'coolie hat' beepers on both. These functions are 'overloaded' in the sense that they result in different actions according to the mode engaged (SAS, ATT, two-cue/three-axis coupled and three-cue/four-axis coupled); both coolie hat trims have longitudinal and lateral functions. As most who fly these aircraft will know, when the aircraft is in two-cue/three axis mode, the aircraft trajectory is controlled by pitch attitude (i.e. holding airspeed or vertical speed by changing pitch attitude) control over the active parameter is provided by the cyclic trim function (release or beeper trim). If the three-cue/four axis mode is engaged - in the simplest form the IAS and VS are both engaged (by the pilot or, under envelope protection, by the system) - control of the VS moves from the cyclic beeper to the collective beeper. Not exactly 'simples' is it!
If this does not describe the autopilot system in your current aircraft perhaps we should ask the question why - is there not a common certification criteria for all Aircraft Guidance Systems (AGS)? This brings us on to another topic covered at the conference and that is the absence of two very important rules for certification of displays, HMIs and AGS - XX.1302 and XX.1329 - and why? However, enough for now; we will no doubt move to these subjects later.
Jim
If there is 40kts wind (not that uncommon!) no more follow up trim. Now you move the cyclic forward to rotate, airspeed increases so flap back requires the cyclic to be moved further forward. At say 80kts you decide to press GA and let go. The cyclic jumps back to its hover position, the aircraft rears up starts to lose speed. You then start to fight it and a Dancopter EC155 - like scenario ensues. If you operate the beep trim, you beep the IAS datum not the stick position or attitude datum. This is a dreadful way to operate.
(I'm sure someone will correct me if the following is not accurate)
We are presently in a situation where, in (at least) one of the latest generation aircraft there are trim releases on the cyclic and collective as well as 'coolie hat' beepers on both. These functions are 'overloaded' in the sense that they result in different actions according to the mode engaged (SAS, ATT, two-cue/three-axis coupled and three-cue/four-axis coupled); both coolie hat trims have longitudinal and lateral functions. As most who fly these aircraft will know, when the aircraft is in two-cue/three axis mode, the aircraft trajectory is controlled by pitch attitude (i.e. holding airspeed or vertical speed by changing pitch attitude) control over the active parameter is provided by the cyclic trim function (release or beeper trim). If the three-cue/four axis mode is engaged - in the simplest form the IAS and VS are both engaged (by the pilot or, under envelope protection, by the system) - control of the VS moves from the cyclic beeper to the collective beeper. Not exactly 'simples' is it!
If this does not describe the autopilot system in your current aircraft perhaps we should ask the question why - is there not a common certification criteria for all Aircraft Guidance Systems (AGS)? This brings us on to another topic covered at the conference and that is the absence of two very important rules for certification of displays, HMIs and AGS - XX.1302 and XX.1329 - and why? However, enough for now; we will no doubt move to these subjects later.
Jim
Hompy yes, and this is kind of my reason for banging on about the trim release issue. Firstly because it seems to me to be an important issue that the AAIB report didn't mention, and secondly because yes, there is no clarity of operational procedures. I think most regulars here know that one of us is the manufacturer's UK person in charge of training, the other is the operator who first introduced the EC225 into oil and gas service's person in charge of that introduction and author of its operating procedures.
The question is, who should be the authority on such matters - the OEM (who builds but doesn't operate the type) or the folk with the most real-world operational experience?
We had numerous cases in the early days, of pilots (who were new to automation and thus suspicious of it) complaining that it reared up on them during a rig takeoff and in every case it was due to them giving control to the autopilot when it was not in trim. You wouldn't give control to you fellow pilot with the stick out of trim surely, so why do it to the autopilot?
The question is, who should be the authority on such matters - the OEM (who builds but doesn't operate the type) or the folk with the most real-world operational experience?
We had numerous cases in the early days, of pilots (who were new to automation and thus suspicious of it) complaining that it reared up on them during a rig takeoff and in every case it was due to them giving control to the autopilot when it was not in trim. You wouldn't give control to you fellow pilot with the stick out of trim surely, so why do it to the autopilot?
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Responsibility
It is both parties' responsibility. As an end user, I don't care who does it as long as somebody grabs the reigns and sorts it out. Give me clear instructions and descriptions and I will follow them and believe. Give me ambiguity and choice coupled with a bad safety record and I will mistrust and make the wrong choice. These things should not be released until adequate training packages have been devised and IMHO for something as complex as the new generation autopilot this means an app or online training so I can practice and learn to my heart's content. Instead of this I have limited sim time with ambiguous instruction and poorly translated and formatted written instruction. Pas bien!
Hi All
I have a few questions here in reference to the incident??
1) When did the Commanders standards drop from 3000 hours to 2000.
2) Why in this day and age of so called "safety" are
A) Oil companies allowing reduced logbook time to fly as P1
B) Oil companies allowing foreign (and I'm not being racist before you all kick off) operators to fly for them
C) Oil companies not paying top dollar AND investing in this industry
Theres always a knee jury reaction to incidents and accidents offshore by the Oil companies that over time are scaled back, reduced or forgotten about until the next incident or accident.
It's about time more money was put into training and equipment that make a real difference
ITI
I have a few questions here in reference to the incident??
1) When did the Commanders standards drop from 3000 hours to 2000.
2) Why in this day and age of so called "safety" are
A) Oil companies allowing reduced logbook time to fly as P1
B) Oil companies allowing foreign (and I'm not being racist before you all kick off) operators to fly for them
C) Oil companies not paying top dollar AND investing in this industry
Theres always a knee jury reaction to incidents and accidents offshore by the Oil companies that over time are scaled back, reduced or forgotten about until the next incident or accident.
It's about time more money was put into training and equipment that make a real difference
ITI
The minimum hours for an OGP Commander haven't dropped recently. Helicopters <5700kgs (which includes the EC155) is 2000hrs. >5700kgs is 3000hrs (although this can be reduced under specific circumstances).
there is no force trim release on the EC155's collective
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JimL, DB, HC, and 212Man all bear listening to as they all have a lot of experience and background in the topics under discussion.
Even if the debate gets spirited as it does at times.....they all bring a lot to the table even if we do not always agree with everything they say. That difference is usually the result of how they say it rather than the content and is always relatively minor.
HC,
The answer is "Neither" and "Both".
The OEM should be the Technical Authority and the Operators (perhaps working in unison with each other) should be the Operational Authority and through a collaborative effort arrive at the Industry Best Practice Standard for the particular aircraft.
As I have said before, the folks who design, build, and certify the aircraft "should" be the best source for Technical Information but as you point out they do not have the "Operational" expertise the Operators do.
An Operator might have the preponderance of experience and background re Operating the Aircraft but may not always have a complete exposure to all the different climatic or environmental conditions the aircraft is flown in. If the Operators joined together in a collaborative manner and draw from multiple sources the final product at each Operator would be far better.
An example, a well known Operator had its own EOP re Engine Starter Generators that varied greatly from the OEM's Standard Procedure and did so years long after the cause of the changed procedure had been resolved when the OEM, through Operator Reports of Bearing failures had determined a bad batch of Bearings had been produced. One that Batch had been located, removed from service, the problem went away.
Without a joint effort by the OEM and the Operator, such things can happen that adversely affect the operation of the aircraft. Thus, my view the OEM and Operators must be involved in the process of developing, monitoring, and producing Operational Procedures but each should focus where they are best suited to do so.
As to Jim's idea of a single Certification Standard.....if we look at the Big Airplane World, it is well know that Boeing and Air Bus have two different approaches to how their AFCS systems operate yet both are Certified.
Does that constitute a single standard capable of providing for differences or is it two different standards in your view?
We know the 92 and 225 are similar but different.
Are you suggesting in the future all the OEM's have to design systems that are the same in design and function or just in function? Are you suggesting Pilots should be able to move from Aircraft Type to Aircraft Type built by different OEM's and all the buttons and switches and controls operate exactly the same in every flight condition?
Even if the debate gets spirited as it does at times.....they all bring a lot to the table even if we do not always agree with everything they say. That difference is usually the result of how they say it rather than the content and is always relatively minor.
HC,
The question is, who should be the authority on such matters - the OEM (who builds but doesn't operate the type) or the folk with the most real-world operational experience?
The OEM should be the Technical Authority and the Operators (perhaps working in unison with each other) should be the Operational Authority and through a collaborative effort arrive at the Industry Best Practice Standard for the particular aircraft.
As I have said before, the folks who design, build, and certify the aircraft "should" be the best source for Technical Information but as you point out they do not have the "Operational" expertise the Operators do.
An Operator might have the preponderance of experience and background re Operating the Aircraft but may not always have a complete exposure to all the different climatic or environmental conditions the aircraft is flown in. If the Operators joined together in a collaborative manner and draw from multiple sources the final product at each Operator would be far better.
An example, a well known Operator had its own EOP re Engine Starter Generators that varied greatly from the OEM's Standard Procedure and did so years long after the cause of the changed procedure had been resolved when the OEM, through Operator Reports of Bearing failures had determined a bad batch of Bearings had been produced. One that Batch had been located, removed from service, the problem went away.
Without a joint effort by the OEM and the Operator, such things can happen that adversely affect the operation of the aircraft. Thus, my view the OEM and Operators must be involved in the process of developing, monitoring, and producing Operational Procedures but each should focus where they are best suited to do so.
As to Jim's idea of a single Certification Standard.....if we look at the Big Airplane World, it is well know that Boeing and Air Bus have two different approaches to how their AFCS systems operate yet both are Certified.
Does that constitute a single standard capable of providing for differences or is it two different standards in your view?
We know the 92 and 225 are similar but different.
Are you suggesting in the future all the OEM's have to design systems that are the same in design and function or just in function? Are you suggesting Pilots should be able to move from Aircraft Type to Aircraft Type built by different OEM's and all the buttons and switches and controls operate exactly the same in every flight condition?
I'm not going to hog this so I will just address the point that was directed to me.
All aeroplanes that are produced by Boeing and Airbus have to comply with 25.1302 Installed systems and equipment for use by the flightcrew:
and 25.1329 - Flight guidance systems.
In themselves, these two rules are objective - i.e. they state the objective and leave the methods of compliance to the applicant/regulator.
With respect to both of them, the advisory material contains a great deal of information which is rightfully in the human factors domain. This guidance includes the requirement to meet human-centric design methods. As such it fully considers the pilot-in-the-loop.
During the recent conference we put a number of flips on the wall which contained the questions we needed to answer in the presentations and in the following discussion. On the flips was contained the mantra:
This was posted to constantly remind attendees - during the conference - that we should not tolerate deficient designs.
Also around the walls of the conference theatre were pictures of the AH225, AH175, AW139, AW169, AW189, S92 and S76D; these were there to show those who were not aware (our presenters from the fixed wing world) of the complexity of more recent helicopter cockpits. Those presenters remarked on the complexity of the displays, integrated systems and HMIs - more complex than the A380 or the B787.
The fact is that these two rules are necessary to ensure that the standard of certification is appropriate; for, without them, it is not clear to us mere observers, what standards are being applied and why. There is no good reason why the rules are not in Parts 27/29.
In a recent EASA Discussion Document on automation, the Working Group made the same recommendation. However, we were informed that, during consultation, comments were received in opposition to such a recommendation.
This is not a request for something that is not recognised as being logical or necessary.
Jim
All aeroplanes that are produced by Boeing and Airbus have to comply with 25.1302 Installed systems and equipment for use by the flightcrew:
Installed systems and equipment for use by the flightcrew.
This section applies to installed systems and equipment intended for flightcrew members' use in operating the airplane from their normally seated positions on the flight deck. The applicant must show that these systems and installed equipment, individually and in combination with other such systems and equipment, are designed so that qualified flightcrew members trained in their use can safely perform all of the tasks associated with the systems' and equipment's intended functions.
This section applies to installed systems and equipment intended for flightcrew members' use in operating the airplane from their normally seated positions on the flight deck. The applicant must show that these systems and installed equipment, individually and in combination with other such systems and equipment, are designed so that qualified flightcrew members trained in their use can safely perform all of the tasks associated with the systems' and equipment's intended functions.
In themselves, these two rules are objective - i.e. they state the objective and leave the methods of compliance to the applicant/regulator.
With respect to both of them, the advisory material contains a great deal of information which is rightfully in the human factors domain. This guidance includes the requirement to meet human-centric design methods. As such it fully considers the pilot-in-the-loop.
During the recent conference we put a number of flips on the wall which contained the questions we needed to answer in the presentations and in the following discussion. On the flips was contained the mantra:
It is important that synergy is achieved in a ‘design’ / ‘training’ / ‘operations’ system solution but no one area should dominate. Extra training and complex procedures must not be used to mask a poor design. The flight crew should not be expected to compensate for poor design to achieve the desired flight path, or monitor effectively.
Also around the walls of the conference theatre were pictures of the AH225, AH175, AW139, AW169, AW189, S92 and S76D; these were there to show those who were not aware (our presenters from the fixed wing world) of the complexity of more recent helicopter cockpits. Those presenters remarked on the complexity of the displays, integrated systems and HMIs - more complex than the A380 or the B787.
The fact is that these two rules are necessary to ensure that the standard of certification is appropriate; for, without them, it is not clear to us mere observers, what standards are being applied and why. There is no good reason why the rules are not in Parts 27/29.
In a recent EASA Discussion Document on automation, the Working Group made the same recommendation. However, we were informed that, during consultation, comments were received in opposition to such a recommendation.
This is not a request for something that is not recognised as being logical or necessary.
Jim