I should have put 'public domain' in inverted commas because it was a qoute from above.
HC's 'gutter press' could read this notice as being 225 specific based on the limited circulation. Is there any relavence to other types, the 155 in particular?
I would like to know more on what was meant above by the comment:
Quote:
I really hope the CAA tear into the culture that currently exists, in spite of operational crew, on the NS.
Although there will no doubt be some type specific elements in the final report, this accident is not type specific. I think it could happen in any offshore helicopter. There have been a number of accidents over the years when helicopters pilots have lost vertical situational awareness for various reasons and descended into the water.
The task will be to produce improved procedures and techniques to prevent it happening.
The intial statement issued to us as operational pilots on NS is that nothing was wrong with the helicopter before it hit the sea.
The Commander has given his account of what happened and the crux of the incident is as follows:
The crew were attempting to approach the ETAP in marginal conditions, having descended to 300 feet.
They turned onto a final whereupon they became surprised that the platform was much closer than they thought. At this point the HP pitched the nose up (presumably to reduce speed). and the next thing they both knew was they had hit the water.
The impact seemingly does not seem to have been that great. However, the report goes on to say that the tail rotor, on contact with the sea, stopped almost instantly causing the TRDS to shear close to the transport joint. The driven end of which then flailed in the housing and all but severed the tailboom.
It is clear from some of the postings on this site that some people still believe it is a good idea to fly at night, without using automatics, relying instead on the superior flying skills to remain safe.
It is also clear that some NS pilots, flying older variants and types do not have the benefit of automatics at all.
It is also clear in the CAA Offshore sector, that once a descent has commenced VMC, there are no further rules to prevent the crew from descending as low as they like.
It is also clear that in many AOC Organisations OM procedures there is scant regard for the mandating the use of automatics at night.
It is also clear that on the ILS, the absolute minimum DH for a helicopter is 200 feet, this been the limit, stabilised, with full lead in lights, and the machine flying at a sensible, but more than adequate speed to maintain a stable vertical profile.
The absolute limit for an approach at night (MDH) is "Deck height +50 feet".
Here in lies the crux of the problem.
At the end of an ARA conducted in marginal conditions the crew, theoretically, have 50 feet of cloud free air in which to operate. This means that the point in space, where full visual references are available, ie "The fully formed rugby ball" is very very close to the helideck.
This means that to make a stable descent from this point the Groundspeed and therefore the airspeed has to be very low......OR the crew reaction, as seems to have been in this case, is to desperatly shed that speed, way to late, resulting in instability and loss of control and visual cues.
A SIMPLE BUT EFFECTIVE PROCEDURE
In my view....if we accept that the only point in space, where full visual flight can begin, is the "Rugby Ball", (Lets call this point "Calling the Ball" or CTB) the current regulations of "Helideck +50 feet" is way too low.
In my view, to gaurentee a stable final approach, this figure should be "Helideck + 200 feet" - and absolute minimum of 400 feet.
If, we accept this for a moment, we now have the makings of a sipmple, effective and safe procedure that would, if flown within parameters, ensure a stable final descent.
The piece of airspace underneath the MDH (Helideck + 200 feet or 400 feet), leading up to the CTB should not be available to the crew, ie no descent below that imaginary line drawn horizontally from MDH to the CTB should ever take place.
Finally we need to control the entry speeds for such a procedure. There are plenty of options but how about "Established at MDH, into wind @ 1.5Nm @Vy" as an absolute minimum.
Further reduction in KIAS, (to provide a sensible G/S) shall only be permitted in level flight at MDH, and to an absolute minimum of 50 KIAS at the CTB.
In summary, what I am proposing is to move the point in space where the rugby ball is fully developed, higher and further away, so that a stable airspeed can be maintained until the true transition to visual flight can take place..at the CTB.
Finally, and this is the most important point of all...INTERVENTION. By specifying this procedure and mandating the minima, both MDH and airspeeds at the Gate and CTB, the NHP now FOR THE VERY FIRST TIME will have a defintive intervention policy when the HP is not confroming to the profile, (ie descends below MDH before the CTB, or the airspeed drops below 50 kias between the Gate and the CTB).
USE OF AUTOMATICS OR OTHERWISE
For those aicraft fitted with couplers, the use of the coupler during this procedure should be mandatory (forget the argument for when it is broken the MEL says VFR only).
For those without couplers adherence to the profile and the intervention policy in provides the NHP puts them in a much better place than we all are right now.
What I have suggested above, before you rip into me, is safer, easier and simple.
It is not the full ARA procedure and would be suitable for shuttling. For the shuttle, for those fitted with it, the Alt Aquire prior to take off is set to the MDH for the next platform and once at that MDH, after take-off, the airspace beneath it, leading right up to the next CTB is not avaiable to the crew.
It may mean we do not fly some of the flights that we currently accept, but it will not be many and quite frankly we should welcome not having to push the to the current limits.
ANSWER THIS QUESTION
For those of you who still wish to fly a fully capable helicopter, manually, at night, during an offshore approach because you feel your skills might deteriote, I pose you the simple connudrum below:
FLIGHT ONE
Crew Operates the AC (IAW Double Bogies profile), making full use of the automatics. the NHP has a clearly defined intervention parameters and policy, and the crew follow the procedures, monitoring all parameters until the HP "Calls the Ball" whereupon they de-couple, gently reduce speed (couple of beeps back) lower the lever slightly and descend fully stable with a nice fat rugby ball to guide the HP to the deck. If at any time the helicopter descends below MDH, or the speed drops below 50 KIAS, before the CTB, the new co-pilot (trained and breifed) knows exactly what to say, and in extermis what to do. Up to the CTB, the crew rely on the £1m set of instruments displays and automatics to ensure that the helicopter follows the pre-designated profile, Both pilots effectively monitor the machine doing it work.
FLIGHT TWO
Crew, despite operating a fully capable helicopter, elect at 600 feet to de-couple and fly manually to the platform. The HP descends to 300 feet, the WX is marginal but the platform is vsiual and they begin to manouvre to try and find the helideck. The deck is 245 feet off the sea. They have to be within 200 metres of the deck before CTB is available. To get there, and still make a landing the airspeed has to be around 30 KIAS (Think of the LDP speed for a CAT helipad landing). From the point they elected to de-couple, the crew and the pax they carry rely on the physical flying skills of the crew and the optical illusions that flying over the sea at night provide. The NHP has no intervention parameters (apart form his common sense) and there is no intervention policy in place.
Now........which of the above flights would like your Wife and Kids to be on.....
DB has not gone quiet....he was thinking.
P.S> All I have written above is fag packet stuff, intended to give food for thought,. I do not have a very large brain so any proposal like my suggestion needs careful consideration to ensure that Type specific issues are addressed, shuttling is not overly compromised and all the other bits and bobs like RADALT bug policys, resolving QFF over sea and so forth need overlaying.
However, at face value, it is unbelieveable that none of what I have described above exists today other than out own perosnal ideas and procedures that we have developed over the sea at night. Most of which being the result of giving ourselves a good scare.
I have over 8000 hours of offshore flight experience of which neary 1500 has been conducted at night. I have flown S61, L and L2 pumas. I am convinced that the development and adoptionsof procedures such as I have described above is the key to preventing incidents from happening like that poor BOND crew have suffered.
I am sure right now they are sat in their houses feeling really bad about what happened and maybe some guilt. In my veiw they are completely blameless as all that happened to them is the very last hole in the swiss cheese lined up, all the other cheese holes, (lack of procedures, non-mandated automatics, lack of intervention policy, MDH way too low, culture of manually flying) had already lined up!!!!!!!!
DB
Last edited by DOUBLE BOGEY : 28th February 2009 at 17:07.
For those aicraft fitted with couplers, the use of the coupler during this procedure should be mandatory (forget the argument for when it is broken the MEL says VFR only).
Now what if we put one of the antique 76's next to a brand spanking new one with all the toys.....why is the new limited to VFR without the coupler and the Antique is not?
Are you suggesting only coupled machines should be out there in the dark?
As anyone knows....there is a lot of black in front of the wind screen between take off and CTB....no matter whether you are in a coupled or non-coupled machine.
Think back to the North Scottish guys doing this single pilot in BO-105's and Bristow doing it with S-58T's and 212's without autopilots using the old style Decca. It can be done.....but it does produce a lot of white hair!
You notice a nearly universal appreciation for what the Bond crew was facing that night and those that have walked in their shoes are very supportive and to the person state they have had very similar experiences shy of hitting the water! I for one stand in their corner on this one and know except for a train load of luck it did not happen to me while doing such work.
The sequence of events described sounds depressingly like the string of similar accidents we had in the RN when Wasps and later Lynxs dropped into the oggin at half a mile on a ship controlled approach or SCA.
The investigators diagnosed a syndrome that highlighted the problems associated with transferring from instruments to visual at night. The SCA required the radar controller to say at half a mile "Look up for sight". the pilot then came off the dials and tried to pick out the gyro-stabilised landing aid which should be showing green. When he saw the green he called "On sight". He then descended from the 200 feet approach height and simultaneously decellerated from the approach speed to the hover alongside the ship. The problem was that it took a few second to understand what you were looking at when you first looked outside. The over-riding feeling when you did aquire enough cues was that you were going too fast and/or you were closer than you thought. Natural reaction was to lower the lever and a few seconds later ...... plop, you're in the drink. Happened so often it was getting boring.... not to say expensive.
And a pretty big thinks bubble it was too - good stuff though!
Just a couple of points:
1) as far as I know they were not coming in off an ARA, they made an en-route descent (or at least not a normal ARA), so your points about the ARA minima, whilst maybe valid, are not relevant to this accident.
2) We in BHL have something like your gate in with specified parameters, to run in at until we see the helideck ovality indicating the correct site picture. It certainly empowers PNF to intervene early if you go off the parameters.
3) Be careful not to specify too high a minimum height for the level sector. In an automated aircraft, its all fine and dandy whilst you are running in coupled, the trouble starts when you decouple and fly manually. The higher you are, the further out you are and so the smaller the installation is. At 400' going into a ship with a 50' deck, that's getting on to being too high IMHO. In a 225 its better to be lower and slower coupled, that way when you decouple, the helideck is getting fairly big and visual references are better. I would prefer deck height + 200 for all approaches - keeps the scary bit where its being flown manually to a minimum!
4) If you make me say "call the ball" I shall stop liking you
I know they wer not on an ARA and that is not the point of my procedure. The point is, by flying a pre-defined, stabilised approach, VMC or otherwise, they key change that needs to be made is moved the CTB further back and higher, so that a stable airspeed can be mainatined until FULL visual refrences are obtained, these being, the fully developed rugby ball.
To illustrate the point, drwa a line at approx 7- -9 degrees up and away from the helideck. (The angle that the rugby ball is present)
Now draw the flight path intesections at 50 foot above the deck and 200 feet above the deck.
Now decide at what airpseed you need to be at to make a stable final descent to the deck.
I would suggest that at 50 feet ADH (which isless than 1/2 the LDP of 130 feet/35 knots groundspeed, for a CAT A Helipad, (AS332L2) - try to imagine what your airspeed might be, especially in benign goldfish bowl conditions we all know exist with slack winds and no moonlight. It is airspeed (of lack it) that leads to instability.
As regards boats, yes there may need to be some work done but ideally we want a procedure that is simple and fits all cases, if that can be achieved.
400 feet above the sea for a boat is what I currently teach line pilots to do and it works fine.
Also why not "Call the Ball" it says exactly what it means. (We can abbreviate if to "CTB" if you like).
KEY COMPONENTS ARE:
DEFINED FLIGHT PROFILE leading to: DEFINED INTERVENTION PARAMETERS providing: STABLE AIRSPEED UNTIL FULLY VISUAL REFERENCES ARE IN PLACE (CTB) provinding: A SAFE FLIGHT REGIME and a: CULTURE OF COMPLIANCE.
SASLESS, the reason is that without the regulators adopting a punitive policy expressed in the alleviations afforded by MMELs the safety advantage afforded to the CAT PAX is lost in translation.
The AS332L2 is a bitch to fly with AP out and even if offered one with degraded coupler functions, for a night flight, I would refuse to take it as is our right as Commander.
In the NS we do not have a problem getting the AC fixed in relatively double quick time thanks to the quality of our engineers and the availability of spares.
Older machines may have older concepts within their MMELs as that was the standard at the time.
I was suggesting the older aircraft without the AP fell more into the category of the new ones without the AP being fully functional....meaning it should be time to retire or modify those aircraft to embrace the advent of modern avionics and the increased safety they provide.
Having read your post again re "ARA Minima are not valid in this case"....
What I am proposing is that "MDH" is valid in ALL CASES VMC or IMC (ARA)
It is the complete lack of minima applicable once VMC has been gained that leads to these and other incidents.
Forget the ARA......I am not aware of any incidents like this one happening during an ARA...WHY....becasue the ARA provides an intrinstcly stable approach, albeit to (what is my opinion) in extremis at night (Ie at absolute minima)......an MDH that is far too low to GUARENTEE a safe final descent from the CTB.
Think about the ILS 200 DH and then try to justify to yourself why you should only have effectivley a 50 foot DH when approaching a deck, bearing in mind there are no lead in lights, no horizon and a shit load of sodiums producing utter confusion right up to the point where you reach the CTB (less than 100m from the deck).
This was a visual flight and two trained and checked crew, with a very experienced and competent P1 hit the sea. It is the procedures that were wrong, not them!!!
BOND, BHL and CHC have all made massive progress with new AC over the last few years.
I would suggest that is has been us, the crews, that have probably failed to recognise the true value of the safety these machines provide, and make procedures to exploit these safety features to the max.
It is not a Senior Management issue......it is much closer to home. We are the Line Pilots, we know how its done and so we know would needs to be done.
You can see from some of the resistance to change....posted on this website in the past few days, exactly where the true problems lie.
For any driver of 332L2, 225, S92 & 139 who still thinks that they want to fly manually, at night, their PAX and their families have my sympathy.
Shape up or ship out. The winds of change are blowing!!!!!
DB I for one am all for an improved/safer profile for night flying, we do not do enough of it on a regular basis in Aberdeen (i know Scatsta and SNS do alot more and are therefore better trained for it).
Points. 1."It is also clear in the CAA Offshore sector, that once a descent has commenced VMC, there are no further rules to prevent the crew from descending as low as they like."
It is my understanding that decending VMC day or night does have not below limits, certainly does in our OM and in the event that enroute you cannot becom VMC at these limits then an ARA must be conducted.
2."Finally we need to control the entry speeds for such a procedure. There are plenty of options but how about "Established at MDH, into wind @ 1.5Nm @Vy" as an absolute minimum."
Take Vy in 332L 70Kts against a 45 Kt headwind on finalls which is not unusual on the North Sea. Your ground speed would be 25Kts. I have found that there is more chance of people becoming disorientated with low ground speed trucking in from a long distance because your visual cues and depth perseption are not as good at night.....would suggest a ground speed equivilant to Vy that way you always have the same rate of closure and each approach would be similar instead of the possability of varying closing speeds in diffferent wind conditions.
My simple solution IMHO would be 1 nm 500' 70 Kts ground speed/ Vy until you have the sight picture , Ball, What ever you want to call it. From there a controlled and monitored approach to the deck Any large changes in Speed Height ROD should immediatley be called by NHP. If this procedure was followed day or night then you would have the same sight picture every time. It would not be the most expeditious approach but certainly safer.
Coming of an ARA.... then change the minima of the ARA to 1nm 500' followed by a visual approach following the above. (or if not visual a turn 45 degrees away and climb to MESA) Instead of offsetting 10 degrees at 1.5 nm and having the rig offest by 15 degrees the rig should appear at 1 nm right in front therefore no need for a turn at .75 nm to get you back on the correct sight picture.
Same procedure day or night..... means easier to teach, easy to follow and, yes it might mean a bit more time in the air for the Oil companies and the odd lost/ adhoc flight ( lets face it they can afford it!!)but would lead to a safer environment.
Once your are VMC....how low can you then fly.....get the picture. Nothing in our OM and Rule 5 does not apply ...as we are landing!!.
Thanks for your input...like I said we all have our own ideas...what we need is a mandatory profile...aligned to INTERVENTION policy.
Try to forget the ARA issue....or if you like...add the ARA to the top of the "GATE...you are dead right...one procedure for all conditions..... easy to teach, remember and fly.
Linear Mode
