Canada: Cormorant & Cyclone thread
TOTD: Given their propensity to be too damn nice all the time, the Canadians are (as ever) being taken for another ride. It's written in their history - they always accept 2nd best because they don't learn. I really really like Les Canadiennes (ooops sorry Canadians), lived there, flew with them - what's not to like.
BUT: They should have cut and run from this long ago. There is still time if 2018 is to be believed. Time to threaten Sikorsky and demand a replacement SAR cab that works (S92) and for massive discount, too. OR sue the living daylights out of them and buy elsewhere.
Clinging to this ridiculous pride thang and purchasing uber sophisticated white vans is ludicrous and appeasing no-one.
Step up to the plate Canada and knee the buggers in the underslung load area
BUT: They should have cut and run from this long ago. There is still time if 2018 is to be believed. Time to threaten Sikorsky and demand a replacement SAR cab that works (S92) and for massive discount, too. OR sue the living daylights out of them and buy elsewhere.
Clinging to this ridiculous pride thang and purchasing uber sophisticated white vans is ludicrous and appeasing no-one.
Step up to the plate Canada and knee the buggers in the underslung load area
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According to the October 2013 MHP RFI responses to Canada (which was the "secret" search for an alternative to the Cyclone) Canada would have begun receiving new build AW101s (i.e. 600 series naval variants with the AgustaWestland NFH-90 mission system+ installed) in full compliance with the Canadian MHP REQUIREMENTS SPEC, not later than 34 months after contract award (and much earlier if the Indian contract was to end up being cancelled - as it now has - rendering hulls available - and even earlier still if Canada greed to some pre-contract early long lead item avionics procurements). In other words, sometime during 2016 or 2017 at the very latest. That's a fact.
What's not fact is my conjecture..... All of the new milestones related to the latest Cyclone Rescue plan occur after the Canadian 2015 federal election. My view is that the Harper government has made this move solely to kick the Cyclone can down the road so that it does become an election football. We'll see. It appears that the can they have hoped to kick into a deep ditch has just bounced back onto the Canadian political football field much to their chagrin.
What's not fact is my conjecture..... All of the new milestones related to the latest Cyclone Rescue plan occur after the Canadian 2015 federal election. My view is that the Harper government has made this move solely to kick the Cyclone can down the road so that it does become an election football. We'll see. It appears that the can they have hoped to kick into a deep ditch has just bounced back onto the Canadian political football field much to their chagrin.
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The Cyclone rescue aftermath is starting to get a bit uglier:
Tories have spent $1.7 billion on troubled Cyclones, making them too big to fail (Navy-Helicopters-Poli) By **>Murray Brewster<**
THE CANADIAN PRESS
Murray Brewster
January 9, 2014
The Globe and Mail
OTTAWA _ More than $1.7 billion has already been spent on the elusive effort to upgrade Canada's helicopter fleet, internal documents show _ a clue as to why the Harper government is sticking with the troubled program.
The eye-popping figure _ about 30 per cent of the overall $5.3-billion budget _ could have meant a far worse political firestorm for the Conservatives than the one that accompanied the ill-fated plan to buy the F-35 stealth fighter.
In the aftermath of an independent report last fall on the beleaguered plan to buy the CH-148 Cyclone choppers as replacements for Canada's aging Sea King fleet, the government acknowledged it was looking at other aircraft _ even going so far as to meet with other manufacturers.
Documents obtained by The Canadian Press under the Access to Information Act show the money went towards ``acquisition progress payments'' and ``in-service support set-up.'' The nearly decade-long program has delivered just four test helicopters that National Defence has refused to formally accept.
The $1.7-billion figure is slightly higher than numbers that were buried deep in federal public accounts records released last fall.
Only about one-third of the total has been spent on aircraft. The bulk has gone towards developing mission systems, training facilities in Nova Scotia and B.C., flight-simulation equipment and support.
The briefing notes, prepared for a committee of deputy ministers, also paint a more detailed picture of the back room tug-of-war and building frustration in the military as missed delivery deadlines continued to pile up.
Cancelling the program was clearly not an option, say critics who accuse the Conservatives of perpetrating a charade with its consultations last fall.
Spending so much money and having virtually nothing to show for it would have caused untold political damage, especially among a frustrated Conservative base still reeling from the ongoing Senate expense scandal.
``It would have been a bigger blow to them, to their base, than the F-35 situation,'' said NDP defence critic Jack Harris.
``I am certain that politics was part of the calculations.''
The Conservative reputation for prudent management of the public purse took a hit in 2012 when the auditor general slammed the F-35 stealth fighter program, even though no money had been spent.
Regardless of whether Ottawa could have recouped some of the costs, cancelling the Cyclones would have triggered an ugly, protracted court battle in the run-up to the 2015 election, said Michael Byers, a political science professor and defence researcher at the University of British Columbia.
``I think this is a big, dark cloud that hangs over the Conservative government,'' said Byers, who has argued publicly for the deal to be scrapped.
``We saw some of this exposed during the scandal over the F-35, and the Sea King replacement is another story that speaks very loudly to the problems this government has managing multibillion-dollar military procurements.''
Byers said the government is rolling the dice on an unproven, developmental aircraft when it could have had an established maritime helicopter by 2018 _ the latest deadline set by Sikorsky, the Cyclone's manufacturer.
The Cyclones are meant to replace Canada's 50-year-old CH-124 Sea Kings. Conservatives often criticized Jean Chretien's Liberal government for cancelling the original program in 1993, to the tune of $478 million in penalties.
The Department of Public Works waited until after the close of business Friday _ ``take-out-the-garbage day'' in political communications circles _ to announce it would renegotiate the Cyclone contract, a clear sign to many the government was anxious to mitigate the political damage.
The government was sensitive to the bad optics even before last Friday's announcement. A briefing dated Dec. 13, 2012, noted that officials had leaned on Sikorsky to paint their ongoing meetings as ``discussions,'' not ``negotiations.''
Ottawa's relationship with the aircraft maker has been increasingly strained, especially after former defence minister Peter MacKay characterized the Cyclone program as the ``worst procurement in the history of Canada.''
The flight decks of a number of Canadian warships _ notably HMCS Regina _ were reconfigured to accommodate the Cyclones, only to be switched back because of the delays. Internal documents show National Defence wanted the contractor to foot the $700,000 bill for the modifications, a demand overruled by Public Works.
There was also table-thumping about who would pay for the fuel in the already-delivered test helicopters.
Eventually, National Defence decided to bill Sikorsky and tack on an extra $250 per fill-up ``to recover the direct personnel and equipment costs associated with the refuelling process and administrative overhead costs for accounting and invoicing.'' The Aug. 28, 2012, briefing insisted that the government wasn't making any money off the deal.
The government has set a deadline of the end of March to negotiate the new contract with the U.S.-based manufacturer and promises no further cheques will be cut until fully completed helicopters are delivered.
Flight training began in October on four Cyclones already at the military air base in Shearwater, N.S., said Public Works spokesman Pierre-Alain Bujold.
The air force is prepared to take ownership of up to eight test helicopters before the Cyclones are declared capable, Bujold said in an email.
That appears to be a concession; the government has said it would not formally accept the aircraft until Sikorsky had delivered a helicopter that's up to snuff.
The government's statement last Friday said it expected the Cyclones to be fully operational by 2018 and that the Sea Kings would begin retiring next year.
National Defence has not explained whether Canada would be short of helicopters during the time between the retirement of the Sea Kings and the arrival of the Cyclones.
Tories have spent $1.7 billion on troubled Cyclones, making them too big to fail (Navy-Helicopters-Poli) By **>Murray Brewster<**
THE CANADIAN PRESS
Murray Brewster
January 9, 2014
The Globe and Mail
OTTAWA _ More than $1.7 billion has already been spent on the elusive effort to upgrade Canada's helicopter fleet, internal documents show _ a clue as to why the Harper government is sticking with the troubled program.
The eye-popping figure _ about 30 per cent of the overall $5.3-billion budget _ could have meant a far worse political firestorm for the Conservatives than the one that accompanied the ill-fated plan to buy the F-35 stealth fighter.
In the aftermath of an independent report last fall on the beleaguered plan to buy the CH-148 Cyclone choppers as replacements for Canada's aging Sea King fleet, the government acknowledged it was looking at other aircraft _ even going so far as to meet with other manufacturers.
Documents obtained by The Canadian Press under the Access to Information Act show the money went towards ``acquisition progress payments'' and ``in-service support set-up.'' The nearly decade-long program has delivered just four test helicopters that National Defence has refused to formally accept.
The $1.7-billion figure is slightly higher than numbers that were buried deep in federal public accounts records released last fall.
Only about one-third of the total has been spent on aircraft. The bulk has gone towards developing mission systems, training facilities in Nova Scotia and B.C., flight-simulation equipment and support.
The briefing notes, prepared for a committee of deputy ministers, also paint a more detailed picture of the back room tug-of-war and building frustration in the military as missed delivery deadlines continued to pile up.
Cancelling the program was clearly not an option, say critics who accuse the Conservatives of perpetrating a charade with its consultations last fall.
Spending so much money and having virtually nothing to show for it would have caused untold political damage, especially among a frustrated Conservative base still reeling from the ongoing Senate expense scandal.
``It would have been a bigger blow to them, to their base, than the F-35 situation,'' said NDP defence critic Jack Harris.
``I am certain that politics was part of the calculations.''
The Conservative reputation for prudent management of the public purse took a hit in 2012 when the auditor general slammed the F-35 stealth fighter program, even though no money had been spent.
Regardless of whether Ottawa could have recouped some of the costs, cancelling the Cyclones would have triggered an ugly, protracted court battle in the run-up to the 2015 election, said Michael Byers, a political science professor and defence researcher at the University of British Columbia.
``I think this is a big, dark cloud that hangs over the Conservative government,'' said Byers, who has argued publicly for the deal to be scrapped.
``We saw some of this exposed during the scandal over the F-35, and the Sea King replacement is another story that speaks very loudly to the problems this government has managing multibillion-dollar military procurements.''
Byers said the government is rolling the dice on an unproven, developmental aircraft when it could have had an established maritime helicopter by 2018 _ the latest deadline set by Sikorsky, the Cyclone's manufacturer.
The Cyclones are meant to replace Canada's 50-year-old CH-124 Sea Kings. Conservatives often criticized Jean Chretien's Liberal government for cancelling the original program in 1993, to the tune of $478 million in penalties.
The Department of Public Works waited until after the close of business Friday _ ``take-out-the-garbage day'' in political communications circles _ to announce it would renegotiate the Cyclone contract, a clear sign to many the government was anxious to mitigate the political damage.
The government was sensitive to the bad optics even before last Friday's announcement. A briefing dated Dec. 13, 2012, noted that officials had leaned on Sikorsky to paint their ongoing meetings as ``discussions,'' not ``negotiations.''
Ottawa's relationship with the aircraft maker has been increasingly strained, especially after former defence minister Peter MacKay characterized the Cyclone program as the ``worst procurement in the history of Canada.''
The flight decks of a number of Canadian warships _ notably HMCS Regina _ were reconfigured to accommodate the Cyclones, only to be switched back because of the delays. Internal documents show National Defence wanted the contractor to foot the $700,000 bill for the modifications, a demand overruled by Public Works.
There was also table-thumping about who would pay for the fuel in the already-delivered test helicopters.
Eventually, National Defence decided to bill Sikorsky and tack on an extra $250 per fill-up ``to recover the direct personnel and equipment costs associated with the refuelling process and administrative overhead costs for accounting and invoicing.'' The Aug. 28, 2012, briefing insisted that the government wasn't making any money off the deal.
The government has set a deadline of the end of March to negotiate the new contract with the U.S.-based manufacturer and promises no further cheques will be cut until fully completed helicopters are delivered.
Flight training began in October on four Cyclones already at the military air base in Shearwater, N.S., said Public Works spokesman Pierre-Alain Bujold.
The air force is prepared to take ownership of up to eight test helicopters before the Cyclones are declared capable, Bujold said in an email.
That appears to be a concession; the government has said it would not formally accept the aircraft until Sikorsky had delivered a helicopter that's up to snuff.
The government's statement last Friday said it expected the Cyclones to be fully operational by 2018 and that the Sea Kings would begin retiring next year.
National Defence has not explained whether Canada would be short of helicopters during the time between the retirement of the Sea Kings and the arrival of the Cyclones.
What a (political) mess! TOO BIG to fail is on the money.
So with 50yr old Sea Kings disintegrating due to age - as we speak and supposedly being "retired" next year (
) what will they do without a Maritime Force until (at the earliest) 2018???
Are the 15 year old H92's (sorry "new") still going to be FBW?
Are the Canadian government talking to other 101 owners about running and maintenance costs?
Where are the public in all this?
So with 50yr old Sea Kings disintegrating due to age - as we speak and supposedly being "retired" next year (
) what will they do without a Maritime Force until (at the earliest) 2018???Are the 15 year old H92's (sorry "new") still going to be FBW?
Are the Canadian government talking to other 101 owners about running and maintenance costs?
Where are the public in all this?
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Originally Posted by Thomas coupling;8257768or uote)
What a (political) mess hopefully G to fail is on .
So with 50yr old Sea Kings dmore gutegrating due to age - as we speak and supposedly being "retired" next year (:uh what will they do without a Maritime Force until (at the earliest) 2018???
(/quote)
Probably the same as we've done without an MPA capability for four years. . . Sweep it under the carpet, claim everything's fine and sing kumbaya around a campfire.
(quote)
Are the 15 year old H92's (sorry "new") still going to be FBW?(/quote)
I doubt even Sikorsky know!
(quote) Are the Canadian government talking to other 101 owners about running and maintenance costs?(/quote)
Why would they need to? They don't have to go far to get that information. Or do you mean are they talking to other operators who DIDN'T make a monumental balls up of the support contracts and provisions, to see just how much more it costs when you DO make a balls up?
(quote)
Where are the public in all this?
So with 50yr old Sea Kings dmore gutegrating due to age - as we speak and supposedly being "retired" next year (
:uh what will they do without a Maritime Force until (at the earliest) 2018???(/quote)
Probably the same as we've done without an MPA capability for four years. . . Sweep it under the carpet, claim everything's fine and sing kumbaya around a campfire.
(quote)
Are the 15 year old H92's (sorry "new") still going to be FBW?(/quote)
I doubt even Sikorsky know!
(quote) Are the Canadian government talking to other 101 owners about running and maintenance costs?(/quote)
Why would they need to? They don't have to go far to get that information. Or do you mean are they talking to other operators who DIDN'T make a monumental balls up of the support contracts and provisions, to see just how much more it costs when you DO make a balls up?
(quote)
Where are the public in all this?
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Originally Posted by cdnnighthawk
That's a fact.
The temptation to think that switching [back] to 101s can't be worse than continuing with the 92 is an understandable one, though it has led to some bizarre claims in recent weeks, such as the suggestion made in the National Post that acquisition of the ex-Indian VIP aircraft would have provided Canada with "what is widely regarded as the best maritime helicopter in the world...deemed fully compliant with Canada’s requirements"!
Originally Posted by Thomas coupling
What a (political) mess! TOO BIG to fail is on the money.
Originally Posted by Thomas coupling
So with 50yr old Sea Kings disintegrating due to age - as we speak and supposedly being "retired" next year
Originally Posted by Thomas coupling
Are the 15 year old H92's (sorry "new") still going to be FBW?
Originally Posted by Thomas coupling
Where are the public in all this?
I/C
what will they do without a Maritime Force until (at the earliest) 2018???
Retirement of the CH-124s is only scheduled to begin in 2015
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I found the following response on a Canadian site responding to similar queries regarding the GE CT7-8C engine that many had believed had been proposed by Sikorsky for the Cyclone. I can vouch that the attached is an accurate account of the situation.
The FAA type certificate for the alternative Cyclone engine (to replace the current CT7-8A1) ondicates that it (the CT7-8A7) is still grossly underpowered and will not meet, by a large margin, the minimum OEI and cruise speed requirements specified in the 2004 MH contract. I suspect that these are just a few of the perforamance issues that Hitachi recommended be cast aside in order to rescue the Sikorsky Cyclone.
The fact is that Sikorsky never proposed the CT7-8C engine for MHP.
The confusion about Cyclone engines undoubtedly began when GEAE and Sikorsky made a joint press announcement at the Paris Air Show in 2003 stating that the triple turbine GE CT7-8C 3000+shp engine had been selected to power the H-92 (military variant of the yet-to-be-fielded S-92).
However, in 2004 Sikorsky proposed the GE CT7-8A (2500 shp) engine for MHP.
After contract award, it became apparent to Canada that the CT7-8A engine did not meet the minimum MH performance requirements and Sikorsky and GE subsequently agreed to modifications that resulted in the currently fitted CT7-8A1 engine (in the "interim" MH).
As time went on, it became apparent to Canada that Sikorsky had grossly understated the weight of its proposed MH (the Cyclone) and it was clear that more powerful engines such as the 3000+shp CT7-8C would be required in order to meet Canada's minimum one-engine-inoperative (OEI) performance requirements. Unfortunately, by then, President Obama and Defense Secretary Gates had mutually agreed to cancel the AW101 VH-71 program and, along with it, the development program for the super-charged CT7-8C engine that Sikorsky desperately needed for the Cyclone.
In response, Sikorsky and GEAE (at the latter's expense) agreed to a development program to squeeze every ounce of power from the existing CT7 twin turbine engine. GE eventually achieved off-aircraft FAA certification for a fully tweaked CT7 engine in late 2011 (the CT7-8A6 & CT7-8A7 -- the latter specifically designed for the orphan Cyclone fleet). Despite GE's valiant efforts, the CT7-8A7 was certified well short of the Cyclone's OEI power requirements.
The latter explains (but only partially) why HITACHI (in close consultation with Sikorsky) has recommended to PWGSC that Canada step back from its basic MH safety of flight requirements and agree to something less.
The FAA type certificate for the alternative Cyclone engine (to replace the current CT7-8A1) ondicates that it (the CT7-8A7) is still grossly underpowered and will not meet, by a large margin, the minimum OEI and cruise speed requirements specified in the 2004 MH contract. I suspect that these are just a few of the perforamance issues that Hitachi recommended be cast aside in order to rescue the Sikorsky Cyclone.
The fact is that Sikorsky never proposed the CT7-8C engine for MHP.
The confusion about Cyclone engines undoubtedly began when GEAE and Sikorsky made a joint press announcement at the Paris Air Show in 2003 stating that the triple turbine GE CT7-8C 3000+shp engine had been selected to power the H-92 (military variant of the yet-to-be-fielded S-92).
However, in 2004 Sikorsky proposed the GE CT7-8A (2500 shp) engine for MHP.
After contract award, it became apparent to Canada that the CT7-8A engine did not meet the minimum MH performance requirements and Sikorsky and GE subsequently agreed to modifications that resulted in the currently fitted CT7-8A1 engine (in the "interim" MH).
As time went on, it became apparent to Canada that Sikorsky had grossly understated the weight of its proposed MH (the Cyclone) and it was clear that more powerful engines such as the 3000+shp CT7-8C would be required in order to meet Canada's minimum one-engine-inoperative (OEI) performance requirements. Unfortunately, by then, President Obama and Defense Secretary Gates had mutually agreed to cancel the AW101 VH-71 program and, along with it, the development program for the super-charged CT7-8C engine that Sikorsky desperately needed for the Cyclone.
In response, Sikorsky and GEAE (at the latter's expense) agreed to a development program to squeeze every ounce of power from the existing CT7 twin turbine engine. GE eventually achieved off-aircraft FAA certification for a fully tweaked CT7 engine in late 2011 (the CT7-8A6 & CT7-8A7 -- the latter specifically designed for the orphan Cyclone fleet). Despite GE's valiant efforts, the CT7-8A7 was certified well short of the Cyclone's OEI power requirements.
The latter explains (but only partially) why HITACHI (in close consultation with Sikorsky) has recommended to PWGSC that Canada step back from its basic MH safety of flight requirements and agree to something less.
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United Tech sees end to Canada helicopter dispute
The Associated Press May. 20, 2014
2012? More like 2008. 
I/C
The Associated Press May. 20, 2014
A long and costly dispute over helicopters between UTC and Canada is nearing an end, the conglomerate's CEO said Tuesday.
Delivery of 28 helicopters was scheduled to begin in 2012. But Sikorsky and Canadian officials clashed over production, support and other issues.
Negotiations are almost complete and United Technologies has agreed to a "phased delivery" of the helicopters, CEO Louis Chenevert told investor analysts Tuesday. Details of the program, known as Canadian Maritime Helicopters, will be available in about 30 days.
"This project is moving along," he said. "I want to make it the last time we talk about CMH ever."
Delivery of 28 helicopters was scheduled to begin in 2012. But Sikorsky and Canadian officials clashed over production, support and other issues.
Negotiations are almost complete and United Technologies has agreed to a "phased delivery" of the helicopters, CEO Louis Chenevert told investor analysts Tuesday. Details of the program, known as Canadian Maritime Helicopters, will be available in about 30 days.
"This project is moving along," he said. "I want to make it the last time we talk about CMH ever."
I/C
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No new gearbox
Let the run dry argument begin... again.
Sea King replacements: $5.7B Cyclone maritime helicopters lack key safety requirement - Politics - CBC News
Sea King replacements: $5.7B Cyclone maritime helicopters lack key safety requirement - Politics - CBC News
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Okay, I'll kick it off again, as it's always my favorite subject. Surely the 'extremely remote' becomes less remote (i.e. more likely) when, if the aircraft ever sees active service in a war zone, nasty people are firing all sorts of projectile s**t at it?!? Are they going to cover the MGB with ballistic protection? Or does it withstand being hit with a 7.62 round? A 0.50 round? I don't know, but we're not talking a civil machine taking grease monkeys back and forth to a rig with 'just' mechanical problems and the weather to worry about.
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The CBC corrected the story you referred to with the following ~ it appears that Sikorsky has been awarded another CAD $2.3 Billion for its sterling performance to date:
Clarifications
Clarifications
- Earlier versions of this story placed the values of the Cyclone helicopter contract between the Canadian government and Sikorsky at $5.7 billion. In fact, the total budget is $7.6 billion - $5.7 billion for in-service support, including the amendments to the contract, and $1.9 billion for the acquisition of the helicopters.
At the risk of rehashing the run dry debate, what is the "record" for longest run dry time? Asking about real world examples- not bench testing. IIRC the S-92 tragedy took @11 minutes to unfold. Any real 101 examples or others? We have 30-minute requirments that the manufactures have been certified to and they say they can meet. I do recognize that loss of all oil is an immediate emergency, and no-one would push on casually- just trying to hear some real world examples of the system working as advertised.
The actual Sikorsky-run loss of lube test failure took 11 minutes on the S92.
This Bell 412 lasted at least 16 minutes in a real emergency, this one apparently lasted at least 12, and this one 18, however none to failure.
This Bell 412 lasted at least 16 minutes in a real emergency, this one apparently lasted at least 12, and this one 18, however none to failure.
Last edited by SansAnhedral; 25th Jun 2014 at 14:39.
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I have seen the Sikorsky S-92 gear box test report for the run-dry test conducted in 2002 and, to my recollection, the gear box suffered a catastrophic internal failure very shortly after the 10 minute point. I am not aware of any subsequent S-92 run-dry test except for the one conducted in 2003 using a cooler bypass feature (not run-dry) which culminated in the FAA decision to grant certification under the "extremely remote" provision.
I have heard many stories of short run-dry flights on pressurized transmissions (I have one myself) but the time from first indication of an oil loss to a successful landing or ditching has been quite brief in all cases that I'm aware of.
If a helicopter MGB is certified by a Technical Airworthiness Authority to run-dry for any length of time, it is not merely an "OEM claim"; it has actually passed the test under stringent conditions with follow-on strip down inspections witnessed by the TAA.
The EH101 was the first helicopter to pass the onerous FAA/JAA run-dry test (in 1993). A production version of the EH101's Advanced Technology Transmission was flown on a rig with loads simulating a max gross weight aircraft for a full thirty minutes after all oil (except residual oil that remained in the bearings) had drained from the box plus an additional 2 minutes of flight for approach and landing.
In 2013, the AW189 passed an identical run-dry test but demonstrated 50 minutes plus 2 minutes for approach and landing. In both cases, the strip inspections revealed some heat damage but nothing that might lead to a catastrophic internal failure.
I have heard many stories of short run-dry flights on pressurized transmissions (I have one myself) but the time from first indication of an oil loss to a successful landing or ditching has been quite brief in all cases that I'm aware of.
If a helicopter MGB is certified by a Technical Airworthiness Authority to run-dry for any length of time, it is not merely an "OEM claim"; it has actually passed the test under stringent conditions with follow-on strip down inspections witnessed by the TAA.
The EH101 was the first helicopter to pass the onerous FAA/JAA run-dry test (in 1993). A production version of the EH101's Advanced Technology Transmission was flown on a rig with loads simulating a max gross weight aircraft for a full thirty minutes after all oil (except residual oil that remained in the bearings) had drained from the box plus an additional 2 minutes of flight for approach and landing.
In 2013, the AW189 passed an identical run-dry test but demonstrated 50 minutes plus 2 minutes for approach and landing. In both cases, the strip inspections revealed some heat damage but nothing that might lead to a catastrophic internal failure.
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Originally Posted by cdnnighthawk
it appears that Sikorsky has been awarded another CAD $2.3 Billion for its sterling performance to date
However, the original C$3.2 Bn ISS contract was to provide support for the first 20 years of service through 2028, based on the full fleet of 28 aircraft being delivered by 2011. Given that it's now 2014, with the CH-148 still not yet in service, this means that Sikorsky will effectively get C$3.2 Bn for the first 14 years of support (even though the full fleet of 28 aircraft won't be in service until, who knows, 2018?), and another C$2.5 Bn for the next 10 years of support).
Not such a great deal. Methinks someone in the Government is trying to whitewash a poorly negotiated outcome. Why not hold Sikorsky to the original ISS contract from the actual achievement of EIS, and then add-on another 10-years (i.e. to 2044/45)?
I/C
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In the period since the first contract was signed in 2004, there have been two amendments to the ISS contract that brought it up to $3.4 billion from the original $3.2 billion. The new deal raises the ISS contract value to $5.7 billion (i.e. a $2.3 billion increase).
With that new math, I nevertheless agree that there is definitely the appearance of a whitewash especially when one considers that there has been nothing "in service" to support yet; delivery and acceptance of the first interim Block 1 aircraft is now not scheduled until June 2015 and, reading between the lines, Sikorsky will then presumably begin to start providing some limited ISS during the limited OT&E that can conducted with the interim capability.
With delivery of the first "full capability" (a reduced capability compared to the 2004 contract) aircraft now targeted for June 2018, that is when the full ISS is supposed to kick in.
So, in my view, the revised ISS deal is either a reward for Sikorsky's non-performance to date, or a carrot for Sikorsky so that it would not abandon what UTC has very publicly branded a money-losing contract.
And we were all told back in 2003 that this was to be a "lowest cost compliant off-the-shelf" procurement... if you check the news releases from 2004 you will find that the Cyclone was the lowest cost of the two contenders, had been determined to be 100% compliant with the Canadian performance and equipment requirements, required only minimal development to be navalized and that Sikorsky had demonstrated that it could easily deliver the product by 2008.
With that new math, I nevertheless agree that there is definitely the appearance of a whitewash especially when one considers that there has been nothing "in service" to support yet; delivery and acceptance of the first interim Block 1 aircraft is now not scheduled until June 2015 and, reading between the lines, Sikorsky will then presumably begin to start providing some limited ISS during the limited OT&E that can conducted with the interim capability.
With delivery of the first "full capability" (a reduced capability compared to the 2004 contract) aircraft now targeted for June 2018, that is when the full ISS is supposed to kick in.
So, in my view, the revised ISS deal is either a reward for Sikorsky's non-performance to date, or a carrot for Sikorsky so that it would not abandon what UTC has very publicly branded a money-losing contract.
And we were all told back in 2003 that this was to be a "lowest cost compliant off-the-shelf" procurement... if you check the news releases from 2004 you will find that the Cyclone was the lowest cost of the two contenders, had been determined to be 100% compliant with the Canadian performance and equipment requirements, required only minimal development to be navalized and that Sikorsky had demonstrated that it could easily deliver the product by 2008.
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Sikorsky is apparently extremely pleased with the new deal they have made with Canada. What is very odd about the following article is the DND comment in the last two paras. The original contract required all of the "enhanced" capabilities that are mentioned including overlayed sensor and navigation/tactical data on large MFDs in the cockpit and cabin, including digital moving map displays, etc as "basic" requirements. So it seems a bit outrageous to claim ten years later that that these are enhancements. Sounds like Canada's DND may be grasping at straws to justify what is now being viewed by some knowledgeable outsiders as a bad deal for Canada.
From DEFENSE NEWS
Canada, Sikorsky Amend Cyclone Support Terms
Jul. 4, 2014
By DAVID PUGLIESE
VICTORIA, BRITISH COLUMBIA — Sikorsky hopes to recoup some of the financial losses from the troubled Canadian maritime helicopter program through a contract amendment that assures it more money to maintain the new fleet.
Additional amendments, approved by the Canadian government, also provide for some of the stated requirements for the Cyclone helicopters to be dropped.
But Canadian procurement and military officials maintain that the June 18 deal is still good for the Royal Canadian Air Force and will produce a state-of-the art maritime helicopter.
Sikorsky, which was to have delivered all 28 Cyclones by 2011, has now agreed to provide helicopters starting in 2015. Those helicopters, however, will have reduced capabilities and will need to be upgraded between 2018 and 2021.
The amended contract will see the cost of in-service support for the fleet increase from CAN $3.2 billion (US $3 billion) to $5.7 billion. That contract will run until 2038.
Sikorsky spokesman Paul Jackson said the in-service support deal represents a “win-win-win situation” for the company and Canada. He noted that the cost for the support contract is based on the original 2004 pricing rates submitted by Sikorsky. Not only is that beneficial to Canada, but it provides certainty in support costs for an extended period, he added.
“The extension also provides Sikorsky the opportunity to offset some of the recently announced losses as it provides the Canadian defense forces with world-class support for the world’s most capable maritime helicopter,” Jackson said.
Sikorsky did not provide financial data on how much of the losses the new deal would allow it to recoup.
Sikorsky has yet to deliver any Cyclones to Canada under the original contract that has resulted in $88.6 million in damages to Canada for late delivery.
Sikorsky’s parent company, United Technologies, noted a loss of US $56 million in 2011 and another of US $157 million in 2012, both related to the Cyclone project.
Canada is the first customer for the Cyclone.
Sikorsky originally signed the contract in 2004 to build the Cyclones, a maritime variant of its S-92. But problems with the project surfaced shortly after work began in 2005-2006.
In a report on the status of the Cyclone project released in October 2010, Canada’s then-Auditor General Sheila Fraser pointed out that the Department of National Defence (DND) failed to assess the risks involved with what was a developmental aircraft.
The in-service support contract includes the construction of a new training facility equipped with simulators, associated logistical support and long-term maintenance, and ongoing support of the maritime helicopters.
Since Sikorsky owns the intellectual property for the helicopter, maintenance work can be done only by the company, said Pierre-Alain Bujold, spokesman for Public Works, the government department that handles procurement.
The new deal also contains other breaks for Sikorsky. It will not have to produce helicopters with a 30-minute run-dry capability. That capability means the aircraft must continue flying for that time even if it loses engine oil in flight.
A self-starting system for the helicopter in extreme cold conditions has been dropped, as well as a system to automatically deploy life rafts in emergency situations.
Tina Crouse, a DND spokeswoman, said Sikorsky has made modifications to the gear box of the Cyclone to safeguard against a total loss of lubrication. “This has been accepted by the [Air Force] as there is no impact to overall operational capabilities and will not risk crew safety,” she added.
The Air Force also noted that life rafts can be manually deployed and that the aircraft can be started in extreme cold conditions using an outside power source.
Under the new agreement, the Air Force says it will receive capability enhancements to give Cyclone crews better situational awareness and ensure the helicopter can effectively communicate with other aircraft and personnel on the ground.
Crouse said the capability improvements include new tactical displays that will allow for simultaneous displaying of sensor data and the tactical situation; a “moving map” which improves the presentation of geospatial information and map orientation; and radar video control in which radar information can be controlled at more than one crew station.
From DEFENSE NEWS
Canada, Sikorsky Amend Cyclone Support Terms
Jul. 4, 2014
By DAVID PUGLIESE
VICTORIA, BRITISH COLUMBIA — Sikorsky hopes to recoup some of the financial losses from the troubled Canadian maritime helicopter program through a contract amendment that assures it more money to maintain the new fleet.
Additional amendments, approved by the Canadian government, also provide for some of the stated requirements for the Cyclone helicopters to be dropped.
But Canadian procurement and military officials maintain that the June 18 deal is still good for the Royal Canadian Air Force and will produce a state-of-the art maritime helicopter.
Sikorsky, which was to have delivered all 28 Cyclones by 2011, has now agreed to provide helicopters starting in 2015. Those helicopters, however, will have reduced capabilities and will need to be upgraded between 2018 and 2021.
The amended contract will see the cost of in-service support for the fleet increase from CAN $3.2 billion (US $3 billion) to $5.7 billion. That contract will run until 2038.
Sikorsky spokesman Paul Jackson said the in-service support deal represents a “win-win-win situation” for the company and Canada. He noted that the cost for the support contract is based on the original 2004 pricing rates submitted by Sikorsky. Not only is that beneficial to Canada, but it provides certainty in support costs for an extended period, he added.
“The extension also provides Sikorsky the opportunity to offset some of the recently announced losses as it provides the Canadian defense forces with world-class support for the world’s most capable maritime helicopter,” Jackson said.
Sikorsky did not provide financial data on how much of the losses the new deal would allow it to recoup.
Sikorsky has yet to deliver any Cyclones to Canada under the original contract that has resulted in $88.6 million in damages to Canada for late delivery.
Sikorsky’s parent company, United Technologies, noted a loss of US $56 million in 2011 and another of US $157 million in 2012, both related to the Cyclone project.
Canada is the first customer for the Cyclone.
Sikorsky originally signed the contract in 2004 to build the Cyclones, a maritime variant of its S-92. But problems with the project surfaced shortly after work began in 2005-2006.
In a report on the status of the Cyclone project released in October 2010, Canada’s then-Auditor General Sheila Fraser pointed out that the Department of National Defence (DND) failed to assess the risks involved with what was a developmental aircraft.
The in-service support contract includes the construction of a new training facility equipped with simulators, associated logistical support and long-term maintenance, and ongoing support of the maritime helicopters.
Since Sikorsky owns the intellectual property for the helicopter, maintenance work can be done only by the company, said Pierre-Alain Bujold, spokesman for Public Works, the government department that handles procurement.
The new deal also contains other breaks for Sikorsky. It will not have to produce helicopters with a 30-minute run-dry capability. That capability means the aircraft must continue flying for that time even if it loses engine oil in flight.
A self-starting system for the helicopter in extreme cold conditions has been dropped, as well as a system to automatically deploy life rafts in emergency situations.
Tina Crouse, a DND spokeswoman, said Sikorsky has made modifications to the gear box of the Cyclone to safeguard against a total loss of lubrication. “This has been accepted by the [Air Force] as there is no impact to overall operational capabilities and will not risk crew safety,” she added.
The Air Force also noted that life rafts can be manually deployed and that the aircraft can be started in extreme cold conditions using an outside power source.
Under the new agreement, the Air Force says it will receive capability enhancements to give Cyclone crews better situational awareness and ensure the helicopter can effectively communicate with other aircraft and personnel on the ground.
Crouse said the capability improvements include new tactical displays that will allow for simultaneous displaying of sensor data and the tactical situation; a “moving map” which improves the presentation of geospatial information and map orientation; and radar video control in which radar information can be controlled at more than one crew station.