What's the latest news of the V22 Osprey?
FH.....give Pave a break....he was just making a joke! There are times I want to "kill" you too...but only in a figurative sense. Ned told us he knew and respected McPave and that as I have said in the past, is good enough for me.
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Hysterical? Hardly. I don't think many pilots, from a 747 captain to the guy with a PPL taking out a C-152 would appreciate someone calling their aircraft a POS. There are lots of aircraft that have had very rough starts, then gone on to good things. The F-14 comes to mind, as does the CH-46, for that matter.
Moreover, most of those commenting and throwing darts at the V-22 have not flown assault support missions at all, much less actually been in a V-22. Most of those spouting their knowledge on the topic have little to go on, other than conspiracy-minded internet sites. They've even gone so far as to disregard the opinions of those who've actually flown the machine.
I thought this website was fairly interesting at first glance, since it has a wide audience and international aviation on it as well. I'm a little worn out dealing with people just ****ting on each other, though.
Moreover, most of those commenting and throwing darts at the V-22 have not flown assault support missions at all, much less actually been in a V-22. Most of those spouting their knowledge on the topic have little to go on, other than conspiracy-minded internet sites. They've even gone so far as to disregard the opinions of those who've actually flown the machine.
I thought this website was fairly interesting at first glance, since it has a wide audience and international aviation on it as well. I'm a little worn out dealing with people just ****ting on each other, though.
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Perhaps it hasn't dawned on you why there has not been ONE
discouraging word about the V-22 from anyone in the military or V-22 management.
V-22 lap dogs pay the rent, send the kids through college and buy vehicles on the backs of the V-22. If they should say just ONE thing bad about it and they would be history and your career flushed. I cannot believe that you have to be reminded of that! You could tell us you just got back from Antartica non-stop without any problems and how could anyone dispute it?
Your program has very little credability because there is no ONE ever able to dispute the obvious. It is no wonder V-22 crews are jittery about the airframe. Civilians who know the V-22's track record get the same jitters whenever one passes overhead.
BTW, did the AF ever drop that ludicrus idea that technically, the V-22 could qualify as a fighter with the pilot controlled belly turret? Only in the AF can a bomber be designated as a fighter so why not an aircraft with a belly machine gun? Amazing!
discouraging word about the V-22 from anyone in the military or V-22 management.
V-22 lap dogs pay the rent, send the kids through college and buy vehicles on the backs of the V-22. If they should say just ONE thing bad about it and they would be history and your career flushed. I cannot believe that you have to be reminded of that! You could tell us you just got back from Antartica non-stop without any problems and how could anyone dispute it?
Your program has very little credability because there is no ONE ever able to dispute the obvious. It is no wonder V-22 crews are jittery about the airframe. Civilians who know the V-22's track record get the same jitters whenever one passes overhead.
BTW, did the AF ever drop that ludicrus idea that technically, the V-22 could qualify as a fighter with the pilot controlled belly turret? Only in the AF can a bomber be designated as a fighter so why not an aircraft with a belly machine gun? Amazing!
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Still squeeking helonorth about nothing V-22 huh? Here's a place a lot of the Osprey folks visit when down: ttp://www.angelfire.com/ok5/we_listen/
Last edited by Dan Reno; 9th Jan 2011 at 03:04.
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Bull****. You can think whatever you want. I fly it. I trust my life to it. I don't give a **** about my career. I'm a 2P major. Take that for what you will. I've been DIFOP since the day I left TBS, i.e. CH-46 assault support, then 1000 hours of B206 time, then another 1000 hours of V-22. There is NO aircraft better than the V-22 at medium-lift assault support. Take that to the bank. Believe it. If you don't then **** you. I'm out.
ospreydriver
To get back to a more technical discussion:
I have a question regarding these points when comparing it to a normal Helo.
Speed: Ok!
Maneuverability: What are the differences concerning maneuverability?
Are g limits, turn rates, roll limits or roll onset limits different? Wherein lies the maneuverability advantage of the V-22 ?
Altitude: Techincally: OK!! But: Can it operationally fly higher that 10k without pressurization?
Range: Compared to a CH-46 OK, compared to a CH-53E, is there really an advantage for the V-22?
Personally I would rather compare it to a CH-53. Its cost, power and footprint put it rather in that category than that of the much smaller/cheaper/lighter/weaker CH-46.
There's nothing "lowly" about helicopters, but they have a lot of inherent limitations (e.g. speed, maneuverability, altitude, and range) that the tiltrotor addresses.
I have a question regarding these points when comparing it to a normal Helo.
Speed: Ok!
Maneuverability: What are the differences concerning maneuverability?
Are g limits, turn rates, roll limits or roll onset limits different? Wherein lies the maneuverability advantage of the V-22 ?
Altitude: Techincally: OK!! But: Can it operationally fly higher that 10k without pressurization?
Range: Compared to a CH-46 OK, compared to a CH-53E, is there really an advantage for the V-22?
Personally I would rather compare it to a CH-53. Its cost, power and footprint put it rather in that category than that of the much smaller/cheaper/lighter/weaker CH-46.
I know which aircraft I want to be in when Hadji shoots his SA-18 at me.
Anyway, enough thread creep - let's get back to willy waving......
212man.....always picking fights you cannot win as you come to the fight completely under armed!
Osprey driver....by 2P do you mean twice passed over for promotion?
As to comparing the 22 to 53's....one should use the D model 53 variant as that is the 53 comparable to the 46's the 22 is supposed to be replacing in terms of improvements. The original PR by the Marines was the 22 would replace the 46 and 53D fleet. The 53E has three engines and much more capability than the D model.
In my view the 53E and now K and UH-60's are what the Marines should have gone with instead of the 22.
Now that the DOD has cut the high speed Amphibious Tractor which was another sink hole for Tax money....that undercuts the premise of the need for the 22 for over the horizion amphibious assault. As the LHA's and other Amphib ships will have to close the shore so the existing Amtracs can reach the beach that means the sector lengths for the aircraft will be shorter as well.
I see that is removing one more leg from the stool that the 22 sets upon.
Osprey driver....by 2P do you mean twice passed over for promotion?
As to comparing the 22 to 53's....one should use the D model 53 variant as that is the 53 comparable to the 46's the 22 is supposed to be replacing in terms of improvements. The original PR by the Marines was the 22 would replace the 46 and 53D fleet. The 53E has three engines and much more capability than the D model.
In my view the 53E and now K and UH-60's are what the Marines should have gone with instead of the 22.
Now that the DOD has cut the high speed Amphibious Tractor which was another sink hole for Tax money....that undercuts the premise of the need for the 22 for over the horizion amphibious assault. As the LHA's and other Amphib ships will have to close the shore so the existing Amtracs can reach the beach that means the sector lengths for the aircraft will be shorter as well.
I see that is removing one more leg from the stool that the 22 sets upon.
Last edited by SASless; 9th Jan 2011 at 12:28.
SAS,
Really? You miss my point - deliberately or otherwise - about the Saudi Visa reference. They were trying to stymie the Taliban because of their protection of some guy (number one most wanted terrorist) called Bin Laden. That was in the nineties. Maybe if the US had given more credence to that threat then we wouldn't be discussing V-22 accidents 10 years later! Even Andy McNabb was using Osama as an anti-hero in his novels before 2001!
Anyway, sorry to come to the party unarmed. Judging by some of the posts here, I'm not the first!
Really? You miss my point - deliberately or otherwise - about the Saudi Visa reference. They were trying to stymie the Taliban because of their protection of some guy (number one most wanted terrorist) called Bin Laden. That was in the nineties. Maybe if the US had given more credence to that threat then we wouldn't be discussing V-22 accidents 10 years later! Even Andy McNabb was using Osama as an anti-hero in his novels before 2001!
Anyway, sorry to come to the party unarmed. Judging by some of the posts here, I'm not the first!
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To big Dan:I see you subscribe to the FH1100 school of posting: when cornered on your lack of experience and knowledge, attack. You have nothing to bring to the table, either. I'd just like to see some real discourse.
The question I keep asking is this: What is going to replace the CH-46? The V-22 was intended to be the answer for that question, but through the achingly long development process, so many KPP's were unmet and subsequently changed that it no longer is required to be capable of doing the things the CH-46 could do, and did, in combat.
Lt. General Trautman denies that we did these hairy maneuvers in combat. Au contraire!! He was not there and does not know. The '46 was described as a medium transport and compared to the V-22. But the maneuvering that could be done by the '46 is not in the performance envelope of the V-22. And, to give tactics its due, maybe those maneuvers will never again be required. But 80% of combat losses in helicopters in Viet Nam occurred during final to a zone. That's where we did windup spirals, sideflares, and all the intensive maneuvering required to survive.
When you test an aircraft, you heavily instrument it. It is covered with strain gauges that measure tension, structural loads, etc. With the V-22, in early testing, it was found that those loads were so high that the structural life of the aircraft would be cripplingly reduced if those maneuvers were practiced, so no testing has ever been done in those areas and the V-22 NATOPS manual prohibits such maneuvering.
As I said before, if there is never again a requirement for strenuous combat maneuvering, the V-22 will probably fit the bill. There are still problems, however, if today, the V-22 was required to evacuate the American Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, it could go in and land inside the compound. But in those high/hot conditions, in order to lift a standard load of passengers out, the fuel would have to be so restricted that the V-22 would have to land within 60 miles of Kabul to refuel. I consider that a safety issue.
Lt. General Trautman denies that we did these hairy maneuvers in combat. Au contraire!! He was not there and does not know. The '46 was described as a medium transport and compared to the V-22. But the maneuvering that could be done by the '46 is not in the performance envelope of the V-22. And, to give tactics its due, maybe those maneuvers will never again be required. But 80% of combat losses in helicopters in Viet Nam occurred during final to a zone. That's where we did windup spirals, sideflares, and all the intensive maneuvering required to survive.
When you test an aircraft, you heavily instrument it. It is covered with strain gauges that measure tension, structural loads, etc. With the V-22, in early testing, it was found that those loads were so high that the structural life of the aircraft would be cripplingly reduced if those maneuvers were practiced, so no testing has ever been done in those areas and the V-22 NATOPS manual prohibits such maneuvering.
As I said before, if there is never again a requirement for strenuous combat maneuvering, the V-22 will probably fit the bill. There are still problems, however, if today, the V-22 was required to evacuate the American Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, it could go in and land inside the compound. But in those high/hot conditions, in order to lift a standard load of passengers out, the fuel would have to be so restricted that the V-22 would have to land within 60 miles of Kabul to refuel. I consider that a safety issue.
Now who would say such blasphemous things?! Must be some know-nothing person who's never flown a V-22, right?
Umm, wrong. Sorry, try again.
Could it have been Col. William Lawrence, USMC (Ret.) who just happened to be the commanding officer of one of the first V-22 test squadrons?
DING-DING-DING! Correctamundo!
You'd think that Col. Lawrence would know a thing or two about the V-22, wouldn't you?
Then again...
Col. Lawrence is of the Viet Nam era. So he's "old school." He disagrees with the new school who say that modern tactics eliminate the need for the V-22 to maneuver...(how did he put it?)..."intensively" - which it cannot do anyway.
Lawrence was roundly criticized and rebuked for his views on the V-22. For one thing, his claim that it could not evacuate an embassy in Kabul was refuted. However, we should note that Kabul is up at 5,900 feet msl. From the accident report recently issued by the Air Force on that V-22 that crashed last April we learned that when the mission calls for a landing *above* 5,000 feet, they send a helicopter - not an Osprey. So that theoretical Kabul evac might be a problem after all.
Obviously, not everyone is in love with the Osprey - like that Lawrence fellow for instance. Right now, there are calls within the government to cancel the bloated V-22 program (as well as others) and cut our losses. We should get behind that movement. I mean, really.
The U.S. cannot keep throwing money at any and all weapons systems to counter every conceivable threat that could ever surface anywhere in the world. All that will do is make us go broke. Oh wait- we're already there! What's the deficit again? (Anyone wanna take a stab at it? Helonorth?) We cannot protect the world from every "bad guy" that might be out there. Nor should we try.
I sure wish the U.S. was as good at waging peace as we are at waging war.
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helonorth
Unlike most here I cannot devulge my aircraft experience because like the V-22, most of it is in the so-called shadow of security, you know...classified, hush, hush and all.
I can tell you this though, Antartica was sunny and 'mild' last week though I certainly didn't think so.
Unlike most here I cannot devulge my aircraft experience because like the V-22, most of it is in the so-called shadow of security, you know...classified, hush, hush and all.
I can tell you this though, Antartica was sunny and 'mild' last week though I certainly didn't think so.
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Still a Dog
Textron-Boeing V-22 Still Dogged By Bad Parts
Jan. 12 (Bloomberg) -- The V-22 tilt-rotor Osprey, five years after it was cleared for full-production, remains dogged by unreliable parts that reduce its availability for missions, according to the Pentagon's top tester.
The Textron Inc. and Boeing Co. V-22, in its most recent testing to evaluate upgrades, was available only 57 percent of the time it was required to fly, rather than the specification of 82 percent, according to a new report by Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon's director of operational test and evaluation. The testing took place between May and July 2009.
"Major contributors to this low mission capable rate included cracking or prematurely failing hinges and access doors, engine and drive components within the nacelle structure, flight control system failures, wiring and swashplate actuators," which help the main rotors turn, the report said.
"Mission-capable rate" is a standard standard metric for aircraft combat reliability.
Gilmore assessed that when the aircraft was flying it "met or exceeded" all but one reliability and maintenance requirement.
The aircraft "demonstrated effectiveness in a wide range of approved high-altitude scenarios reflecting current Marines Corps operations," wrote Gilmore, in a section on the V-22 in the annual report from the testing unit issued today.
The Pentagon test office and U.S. Government Accountability Office have consistently highlighted problems with V-22 parts since 2000. The V-22 is a fixed-wing plane with rotors that tilt so it can take off and land like a helicopter.
Bell Helicopter Textron spokesman William Schroeder and Naval Air Systems Command spokesman Victor Chen had no immediate comment on the test report because they had not seen it.
Improvements
Gilmore recommended that the Marines and Air Force, which is buying a version for to fly U.S. commandos, "aggressively continue integrated development and testing" to improve the aircraft's braking system, engine and drive-train reliability.
The V-22 has been deployed to Iraq and is in Afghanistan, where it transported Defense Secretary Robert Gates during a March 2010 trip.
Congress through fiscal 2010 has approved spending $32 billion on the $52.8 billion program. The Navy plans to spend $20 billion more on upgrades and the purchase of the remaining planes in the 458-aircraft program for the Marine Corps and Air Force Special Operations Command.
The program was approved for full-production in September 2005 after four years of additional development to demonstrate it overcame a host of deficiencies, including problems with its design, safety and reliability uncovered after two crashes in 2000 killed 23 Marines.
Maintenance Problems
The GAO in a June 2009 report that evaluated the V-22's initial Iraq deployment concluded that, while the aircraft flew its assigned missions successfully, maintenance problems left the planes available for flight at rates "significantly below minimum required levels."
During three periods studied during the V-22's deployment from October 2007 through April 2009, the planes were available for combat operations on average 68 percent, 57 percent and 61 percent of the time, "while the minimum requirement" is 82 percent, said the GAO.
These low rates "were not unique to the Iraq deployment" and were on par with other V-22 squadrons in the U.S., the GAO said.
The Textron Inc. and Boeing Co. V-22, in its most recent testing to evaluate upgrades, was available only 57 percent of the time it was required to fly, rather than the specification of 82 percent, according to a new report by Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon's director of operational test and evaluation. The testing took place between May and July 2009.
"Major contributors to this low mission capable rate included cracking or prematurely failing hinges and access doors, engine and drive components within the nacelle structure, flight control system failures, wiring and swashplate actuators," which help the main rotors turn, the report said.
"Mission-capable rate" is a standard standard metric for aircraft combat reliability.
Gilmore assessed that when the aircraft was flying it "met or exceeded" all but one reliability and maintenance requirement.
The aircraft "demonstrated effectiveness in a wide range of approved high-altitude scenarios reflecting current Marines Corps operations," wrote Gilmore, in a section on the V-22 in the annual report from the testing unit issued today.
The Pentagon test office and U.S. Government Accountability Office have consistently highlighted problems with V-22 parts since 2000. The V-22 is a fixed-wing plane with rotors that tilt so it can take off and land like a helicopter.
Bell Helicopter Textron spokesman William Schroeder and Naval Air Systems Command spokesman Victor Chen had no immediate comment on the test report because they had not seen it.
Improvements
Gilmore recommended that the Marines and Air Force, which is buying a version for to fly U.S. commandos, "aggressively continue integrated development and testing" to improve the aircraft's braking system, engine and drive-train reliability.
The V-22 has been deployed to Iraq and is in Afghanistan, where it transported Defense Secretary Robert Gates during a March 2010 trip.
Congress through fiscal 2010 has approved spending $32 billion on the $52.8 billion program. The Navy plans to spend $20 billion more on upgrades and the purchase of the remaining planes in the 458-aircraft program for the Marine Corps and Air Force Special Operations Command.
The program was approved for full-production in September 2005 after four years of additional development to demonstrate it overcame a host of deficiencies, including problems with its design, safety and reliability uncovered after two crashes in 2000 killed 23 Marines.
Maintenance Problems
The GAO in a June 2009 report that evaluated the V-22's initial Iraq deployment concluded that, while the aircraft flew its assigned missions successfully, maintenance problems left the planes available for flight at rates "significantly below minimum required levels."
During three periods studied during the V-22's deployment from October 2007 through April 2009, the planes were available for combat operations on average 68 percent, 57 percent and 61 percent of the time, "while the minimum requirement" is 82 percent, said the GAO.
These low rates "were not unique to the Iraq deployment" and were on par with other V-22 squadrons in the U.S., the GAO said.
The US Navy/Marine Corps Over-The-Horizion (OTH) Amphibious Assault Strategy was pinned on three pieces of mutually supportive vehicles. The LCAC ( a hover craft), the MV-22 Osprey, and the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. The concept calls for the Assault fleet of ships to remain more than twenty five nautical miles from the beach thus allowing for increased safety for the fleet of ships and facilitate surprising the defending forces.
The EFV program was cancelled by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrenced of the Commandant fo the Marine Corps on January 5, 2011. The Commandant called for the development of yet another new amphibious assault vehicle to replace the current fleet of amphibious armored tractors.
The question arises.....without the ability to land assault troops from over the horizion in the current fleet of armored tractors ( sea speed....Seven Knots) and the LCAC (too large and vulnerable for assault landings).....just what does the Marine Corps do now?
Can the Osprey carry the total Assault role.....to a defended beach area? If they continue to use the UH-1/CH-46/CH-53 fleet....how does that affect their ability to carry out and suport a significant amphibious assault?
Or....is the OTH Strategy fatally flawed?
The EFV program was cancelled by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrenced of the Commandant fo the Marine Corps on January 5, 2011. The Commandant called for the development of yet another new amphibious assault vehicle to replace the current fleet of amphibious armored tractors.
The question arises.....without the ability to land assault troops from over the horizion in the current fleet of armored tractors ( sea speed....Seven Knots) and the LCAC (too large and vulnerable for assault landings).....just what does the Marine Corps do now?
Can the Osprey carry the total Assault role.....to a defended beach area? If they continue to use the UH-1/CH-46/CH-53 fleet....how does that affect their ability to carry out and suport a significant amphibious assault?
Or....is the OTH Strategy fatally flawed?
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Whether there is a continuing need for a seperate Marine Corps is a question that periodically resurfaces.
A nice summary of the 1947 'Corps Crisis' can be found here:
The Challenge Of The Post-World War II Era: The Marine Corps, 1945-1957
The real issue, IMO, is that while there is really no need for a seperate and distinct Marine Corps now, you can't say that this will always be the case going forward. Hence, the folks who lobby to axe it never quite acquire the energy state to overcome the inertia of the existing structure.
It is a fair question though, and you're right to question it.
A nice summary of the 1947 'Corps Crisis' can be found here:
The Challenge Of The Post-World War II Era: The Marine Corps, 1945-1957
The real issue, IMO, is that while there is really no need for a seperate and distinct Marine Corps now, you can't say that this will always be the case going forward. Hence, the folks who lobby to axe it never quite acquire the energy state to overcome the inertia of the existing structure.
It is a fair question though, and you're right to question it.
I am not questioning whether we need a Marine Corps.....but just the OTH concept. The Marines are needed and do a darn good job.
There is an argument within the Marine Corps regard their organizational ability for Amphibious Assault....fleet capacity, gunfire support, and sheer numbers of personnel. With the loss of the EFV....there should be some soul searching on the ability of the Marines to operate to the level the "strategy" requires.....or admit the OTH strategy just does not work with the current equipment. If the OTH concept is canned....there would be a call to dump the Osprey as well I would bet.
There is an argument within the Marine Corps regard their organizational ability for Amphibious Assault....fleet capacity, gunfire support, and sheer numbers of personnel. With the loss of the EFV....there should be some soul searching on the ability of the Marines to operate to the level the "strategy" requires.....or admit the OTH strategy just does not work with the current equipment. If the OTH concept is canned....there would be a call to dump the Osprey as well I would bet.
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Ah, I understand.
It's not to suggest that someone is doing a bad job, but rather that the tool, ie. the structure of the force to which they belong, is too specialized to be useful.
Nevertheless, it's a fair question - and logical given the advantage that axing the Corp's costly, specialized kit would bring. The Osprey, the 53K, the turbocharged LAV, the next generation urban assault vehicle, and what have you - these thing all cost money. At some buying special kit within the paradigm of having a service able to conduct a modern day island hopping campaign becomes too silly to perpetuate.
In my view, the Corps' need to distinguish itself from the other services explains its fetish with the Osprey contraption. And the Osprey itself, while technologically interesting, seems more like one of the more outlandish (and ineffective) Nazi technologies that one can find in a history book footnote, ie. Dora, the V1, ect. than a meaningful tool for projecting power.
So the quandry today for the Corps leadership is that the more the Corps seeks to distinguish itself from the other services through specialized kit like the Osprey, the bigger target the Corps becomes due to the associated expense, distraction, and duplication of overhead - and the more vulnerable it becomes to rehash of the 'Do we need a seperate Corps?' question that caused so much kerfuffle between 1945 and 1957.
The only real question is how strong the movement will be in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan retrenchments. America also reflects after conflict, and changes to the force generally follow.
Personally, I doubt a movement to eliminate the Corps will have enough traction this go around, even the current popularity of 'austerity' and smaller government - whatever ultimately turns out to mean. But stranger things have happened.
Cheers!
It's not to suggest that someone is doing a bad job, but rather that the tool, ie. the structure of the force to which they belong, is too specialized to be useful.
Nevertheless, it's a fair question - and logical given the advantage that axing the Corp's costly, specialized kit would bring. The Osprey, the 53K, the turbocharged LAV, the next generation urban assault vehicle, and what have you - these thing all cost money. At some buying special kit within the paradigm of having a service able to conduct a modern day island hopping campaign becomes too silly to perpetuate.
In my view, the Corps' need to distinguish itself from the other services explains its fetish with the Osprey contraption. And the Osprey itself, while technologically interesting, seems more like one of the more outlandish (and ineffective) Nazi technologies that one can find in a history book footnote, ie. Dora, the V1, ect. than a meaningful tool for projecting power.
So the quandry today for the Corps leadership is that the more the Corps seeks to distinguish itself from the other services through specialized kit like the Osprey, the bigger target the Corps becomes due to the associated expense, distraction, and duplication of overhead - and the more vulnerable it becomes to rehash of the 'Do we need a seperate Corps?' question that caused so much kerfuffle between 1945 and 1957.
The only real question is how strong the movement will be in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan retrenchments. America also reflects after conflict, and changes to the force generally follow.
Personally, I doubt a movement to eliminate the Corps will have enough traction this go around, even the current popularity of 'austerity' and smaller government - whatever ultimately turns out to mean. But stranger things have happened.
Cheers!
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