Sikorsky S-92: From Design to Operations

[ThomasSt]

I'm not too sure why I am replying, but here goes....

Thanks for replying. I appreciate it :-).

Each company probably has different ways of loading people in their helicopters.
The CHC Denmark way is: Front to back, no matter what!
And now also the Cougar way.

The argument for the Danish way has some thing to do with the helicopter being too tail heavy if the PAX aren't filled from the front.

[Variable Load]

ThomasSt,

I have just looked at the Danish loading instructions and they are basically as I indicated in my previous post i.e. each window seat is loaded first from front to back, then the "centre" seat is loaded front to back.

If the HLOs are not being told this then it should be raised with CHC Denmark for clarification.

HTH?

[fjrmurph]

Variable Load
This topic could be a joke to you, but for some of us it is very important. This is one of the few avenues to get information, to find out the SOP'S of other operators.I am an HLO and i don't agree with the front to back loading of passengers, leaving window seats (primary egress seats) empty.

[maxwelg2]

On the east coast off Newfoundland, we have a new procedure here wich calls for loading all passengers from front to back filling all forward seats due to weight distribution issues. Anyone else loading this way? Can someone explain why after all these years of flying in the S92 all of a sudden we have to crowd all passengers up in front of the Chopper? This leaves the primary evacuation exits (windows) unavaible to a lot of passengers.

Must be a GofG issue. I've been told that the aux fuel tank is emptied within the first 20 minutes of flight. I also heard of PAX getting wet at the back of the cabin when there is a lot of tail-end weight. Don't know where the H20 is coming from, perhaps the A/C unit? Who knows, we've certainly not been told what the source is yet.

I recall in the old Tigers and Pumas back in the 90s we were always loaded in the middle, then the front, and lastly the back. If you were 100kg+ PAX they generally didn't seat you in the back. Same weight distribution issue with the 76s. Only the 61s didn't seem to mind, but they're real helos and not flimsy "heavy-duty" POS that we have now.

There was also an incident recently over here with a low tail rotor/steep flare noted on approach by PAX, perhaps that's why the GofG has been looked at more closely now...

Safe Flying

Max

[Horror box]

The loading of the S92 is a very important factor every time, as it is for any aircraft, and it is important to note that the CG is different for all aircraft. Just because you could do something in an S61, does not necessarily mean it can be done the same way in a Puma or a S92 or any other type for that matter. I understand the desire for knowledge here form HLOs and pax, but I am a little concerned when someone working as an HLO openly claims to disagree with an operators procedure. Without intending to be patronising, I expect HLOs do not have a full understanding of the CG, and indeed are not responsible for calculating it on each flight, the aircraft commander is.
The longitudinal CG datum is 341.2 inches forward of the rotor centroid. The aft limit is 360.8 inches aft of datum for all masses above 17,300 lbs (7845 kg). The forward limit is 341.8 inches aft of datum for masses from 17,300 lbs (7845 kg) to 20,850 lbs (9455 kg), thereafter decreasing linearly to 346.8 inches aft at 26,500 lbs (12,020 kg).
The issues and dangers of being out of limits of CG are very real, and can cause very serious control issues, and this will directly manifest itself most likely at critical points such as take off and landing when flaring. The CG limit effectively varies in the S92 according to all up mass and dry operating index - which itself is in part a function of the type of fit the operator is using. Therefore the number of pax, the amount of fuel and the mass of the baggage all has a part to play in determining the loading. It is certainly possible to load the S92 beyond its rear CG limit in normal operations if the calculations are not performed. The commander will do these calculations for every flight, even though they are time consuming, so if you are being asked to load from the front, it is because the commander has calculated the load , and requires you to enable him to keep the CG forward to remain within limits. To simply state you disagree with this policy, is, in my opinion a rather uneducated view, so if you do require further clarification, I suggest you contact the operator and ask for a full explanation of all of the CG graphs and tables used, but please understand that it is an entirely controlled process and not just a case of "oh well, just load 'em up from the front"

[fjrmurph]

I understand the concept of having proper weight weight distribution. Never did i think it was a case of"oh well, just load 'em up from the front",what i am asking is "WHY" after all these years of flying with the S92 has this become an issue?

[Loquatious]

The Danish Way

Some aircraft are operated on standard load plans, which alleviates the need to recalculate Cof G for every take off, subject to certain conditions being met.

This is probably the case with the S92 in Denmark and it is very possibly a condition of the standard load plan that loading takes place from the front.

The alternative would be to calculate the Cof G before every take off resulting most likely in.... yes you guessed it, the HLO being instructed to move a precise number of passengers from the rear rows to the front of the aircraft.

(Imagine the delay and distraction and confusion in the cabin on an average shuttle program)

Let's focus on keeping the thing out of the water in the first place...

[Dan Reno]

MGB Oil Filter AD 2009-25] (Final?)

1
[Federal Register: December 4, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 232)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 63563-63565]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr04de09-6]
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2009-1130; Directorate Identifier 2009-SW-40-AD; Amendment 39-16130;
AD 2009-25-10]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) Model S-92A Helicopters
AGENCY:

Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION:

Final rule; request for comments.
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

SUMMARY:

This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the Sikorsky Model S-
92A helicopters. This action requires a one-time visual inspection of the main gearbox (MGB) lube
system filter assembly for oil filter damage. This action also requires if either the primary or
secondary oil filter is damaged, replacing both filters, all packings, and the studs before further flight.
This AD also requires replacing the oil filter bowl within 30 days after replacing a damaged filter and
a daily leak inspection for an oil leak (no oil leaks allowed) during that 30-day interim period. This
amendment is prompted by three reports of damaged oil filters or packings resulting from installing
the filter assembly with an oversized packing possibly because of incorrect part numbers in the
maintenance manual. Based on a previous accident investigation, failure of the oil filter bowl or
mounting studs can result in sudden and complete loss of oil from the MGB. The actions specified in
this AD are intended to prevent complete loss of oil from the MGB, failure of the MGB, and
subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

DATES:

Effective December 21, 2009.
The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the
Director of the Federal Register as of December 21, 2009.
Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before February 2, 2010.

ADDRESSES:

Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on this AD:

•

Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to Regulations.gov. Follow the instructions
for submitting comments.

•

Fax: [phone].

•

Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building
Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
2

•

Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West
Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington,
DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
You may get the service information identified in this AD from Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation,
Attn: Manager, Commercial Technical Support, mailstop s581a, 6900 Main Street, Stratford, CT,
telephone [phone], e-mail address [email protected], or at Home.
Examining the Docket: You may examine the docket that contains the AD, any comments, and
other information on the Internet at Regulations.gov, or in person at the Docket
Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The
Docket Operations office (telephone [phone]) is located in Room W12-140 on the ground
floor of the West Building at the street address stated in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be
available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Kirk Gustafson, Aviation Safety Engineer,
Boston Aircraft Certification Office, Engine and Propeller Directorate, FAA, 12 New England
Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803, telephone [phone], fax [phone].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

This amendment adopts a new AD for the Sikorsky Model
S-92A helicopters. This action requires a one-time visual inspection of the MGB lube system filter
assembly for oil filter damage. This action also requires if either the primary or secondary oil filter is
damaged, replacing both filters, all packings, and the studs before further flight. This action also
requires replacing the oil filter bowl within 30 days after replacing a damaged filter and a daily
inspection for an oil leak (no oil leaks allowed) during that 30-day interim period. This amendment is
prompted by three reports of damaged oil filters or packings resulting from operating with an
oversized packing possibly because of incorrect part numbers in the maintenance manual. Sikorsky
has issued a temporary revision, T-Rev 63-19, to the maintenance manual to correct any errors.
Installing the filter assembly with an oversized packing (also known as an O-ring) in the oil filter
double bypass valve can produce excessive assembly and fatigue loads in the oil filter bowl or the
mounting studs that secure the oil filter bowl to the MGB. Based on rig testing, these conditions can
result in reduced fatigue life in the studs and the oil filter bowl. Based on information from a previous
accident investigation, failure of the oil filter bowl or mounting studs can result in sudden and
complete loss of oil from the MGB. This condition, if not corrected, could result in complete loss of
oil from the MGB, failure of the MGB, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
We have reviewed Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) No. 92-63-018, dated July 1, 2009,
and No. 92-63-019, dated July 14, 2009. ASB No. 92-63-018 specifies a one-time visual inspection
for a damaged oil filter element. ASB No. 92-63-019 specifies replacing the MGB filter bowl on
those helicopters that have previously been found to have a damaged MGB oil filter. ASB No. 92-63-
019 also requires a daily visual inspection of the MGB lube system filter assembly for oil leaks (no
leaks allowed) until the oil filter bowl is replaced.
This unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of the same type design.
Therefore, this AD is being issued to prevent complete loss of oil from the MGB, failure of the MGB,
and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. This AD requires visually inspecting the oil filter for
damage and replacing any filter, packings, and mounting studs before further flight if the filter is
damaged. The AD also requires replacing the oil filter bowl within 30 days after a damaged filter has
been replaced. Do the actions by following specified portions of the service bulletin described
previously.
The short compliance time involved is required because the previously described critical unsafe
condition can adversely affect the controllability or structural integrity of the helicopter. Therefore, a
one-time visual inspection of the oil filter within 7 days is required. If the visual inspection finds a
damaged filter, replacing the damaged filter, packings, and filter bowl mounting studs before further
flight are also required. Also, a one-time replacement of the oil filter bowl is required within 30 days
3
after replacing a damaged oil filter. All of these are very short compliance times. Therefore, this AD
must be issued immediately.
Since a situation exists that requires the immediate adoption of this regulation, it is found that
notice and opportunity for prior public comment hereon are impracticable, and that good cause exists
for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.
We estimate that this AD will affect 44 helicopters. Assuming a one-time inspection shows no
damage to 39 of the helicopters, it will take about 1.5 work hours to remove, inspect, and reinstall
each oil filter assembly and packing for 39 helicopters. Assuming oil filter damage is discovered in 5
helicopters, the additional required actions will take about:

•

1.5 work hours to remove, inspect, and reinstall each filter assembly and packing, and

•

3 work hours to replace the mounting studs.
Assuming the bowl replacement is deferred on all 5 helicopters for 30 days, it will take about:

•

15 work hours for 30 daily (.5 work hour each) inspections for leakage, and

•

1 work hour to replace the oil filter bowl.
The average labor rate is $80 per work hour. Required parts will cost about $817 for the oil filter
assembly, $81 for the filter bowl mounting studs, and $4,568 for the filter bowl per helicopter. Based
on these figures, we estimate the total cost impact of the AD on U.S. operators to be $40,210.

Comments Invited

This AD is a final rule that involves requirements that affect flight safety and was not preceded
by notice and an opportunity for public comment; however, we invite you to submit any written data,
views, or arguments regarding this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under
ADDRESSES. Include ‘‘Docket No. FAA-2009-1130; Directorate Identifier 2009-SW-40-AD'' at the
beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic,
environmental, and energy aspects of the AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing
date and may amend the AD in light of those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to Regulations.gov, including
any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive
verbal contact with FAA personnel concerning this AD. Using the search function of our docket Web
site, you can find and read the comments to any of our dockets, including the name of the individual
who sent the comment. You may review the DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal
Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78).

Regulatory Findings

We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the
national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the regulation:
1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034,
February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of
small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared an economic evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this AD. See the AD
docket to examine the economic evaluation.
4

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety.
Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation
Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III,
Section 44701, ‘‘General requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices,
methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This
regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely
to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation
Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority:

49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding a new airworthiness directive to read as follows:
5

FAA

Aircraft Certification Service

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

Aircraft Safety Alerts

Federal Register: Advanced Search

2009-25-10 Sikorsky Aircraft Corp.:

Amendment 39-16130. Docket No. FAA-2009-1130;
Directorate Identifier 2009-SW-40-AD.

Applicability:

Model S-92A helicopters, serial numbers 920006 through 920109, certificated in
any category.

Compliance:

Required as indicated, unless done previously.
To prevent complete loss of oil from the main gearbox (MGB), failure of the MGB, and
subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, do the following:
(a) Within 7 days, inspect the MGB lube system filter assembly for damage to the primary and
secondary oil filters by following the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs 3.A.(4) and through
3.A.(6) of Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) No. 92-63-018, dated July 1, 2009 (ASB No. 92-
63-018). For purposes of this AD, ‘‘damage'' is the presence of those conditions described in
paragraphs 3.A.(5) and 3.A.(8) of the Accomplishment Instructions of ASB No. 92-63-018.
(b) If you find damage in the primary oil filter element (part number (P/N) 70351-38801-102) as
follows: ‘‘wavy pleats'' as depicted in Figure 1, internal buckling or a crack as depicted in Figure 2,
or indented dimples as depicted in Figure 3 of ASB No. 92-63-018 or damage in the secondary oil
filter element (P/N 70351-38801-103) as follows: ‘‘wavy pleats'' as depicted in Figure 4 or an
elongated cup as depicted in Figure 5 of ASB No. 92-63-018, replace both the primary and secondary
filters, packings, and filter bowl mounting studs, service the transmission and perform a functional
test before further flight by following the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs 3.C.(1) through
3.C.(23), of ASB No. 92-63-018, except this AD does not require you to return removed studs to HSI
nor does it require you to contact the manufacturer. If you find damage in the tapped holes or in the
MGB housing lockring counterbore, contact the Boston Aircraft Certification Office for an approved
repair.
(c) If you find no damage in the primary or secondary oil filter element, before further flight,
replace the packings, service the transmission, and perform a functional test by following the
Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs 3.B.(1) through 3.B.(4) of ASB No. 92-63-018.
(d) For those helicopters on which the primary or secondary oil filter element and filter bowl
mounting studs were replaced as required by paragraph (b) of this AD:
(1) Before the first flight of each day until the oil filter bowl, P/N AAC367-16D2A, is replaced,
inspect the MGB lube system filter assembly for any oil leak.
(2) Before further flight after any oil leak is detected as required by paragraph (d)(1) of this AD
or within 30 days, whichever is earlier, replace the oil filter bowl.

Note:

Sikorsky ASB No. 92-63-019, dated July 1, 2009, pertains to the subject of this AD.
(e) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD,
follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Contact the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office,
FAA, ATTN: Kirk Gustafson, Aviation Safety Engineer, Engine and Propeller Directorate, FAA, 12
New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803, telephone [phone], fax (781) 238-
7170, for information about previously approved alternative methods of compliance.
(f) The Joint Aircraft System/Component (JASC) Code is 6300: Main Rotor System.
6
(g) Inspecting and replacing the main gearbox lube system assembly parts shall be done by
following the specified portions of Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) No. 92-63-018, dated July
1, 2009. The Director of the Federal Register approved this incorporation by reference under 5 U.S.C.
552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Attn:
Manager, Commercial Technical Support, mailstop s581a, 6900 Main Street, Stratford, CT, telephone
[phone], e-mail address [email protected], or at Home. Copies may
be inspected at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd.,
Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For
information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to:
Code of Federal Regulations Incorporation by Reference.
(h) This amendment becomes effective on December 21, 2009.
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on November 25, 2009.
Lance T. Gant,
Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E9-28863 Filed 12-3-09; 8:45 am]

[rotormatic]

Proposed AD

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2009-1088; Directorate Identifier 2008-SW-76-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation
(Sikorsky) Model S-92A Helicopters

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This document proposes adopting a new airworthiness directive
(AD) for the Sikorsky Model S-92A helicopters. The AD would require
revising the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM), Operating Limitations
section, to make it clear to operators that this model helicopter was
not certificated to the standards that allow for the carriage of human
external cargo. This proposal is prompted by a mistake in the RFM,
which allows ``Class D'' rotorcraft load combinations for human
external cargo load (HEC) operations for this model. The Model S-92A
RFM does not include the required one-engine inoperative (OEI) hover
performance and procedures. The actions specified by the proposed AD
are intended to correct the Limitations section of the RFM to prevent
HEC operations, which could result in injury or loss of life.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before February 8, 2010.

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on
this proposed AD:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://
Regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: [phone].
Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
You may get the service information identified in this proposed AD
from Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Attn: Manager, Commercial Technical
Support, mailstop s581a, 6900 Main Street, Stratford, CT, telephone
[phone], e-mail address [email protected], or at http://
Home.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Coffey, Flight Test Engineer,
Boston Aircraft Certification Office, 12 New England Executive Park,
Burlington, MA 01803, telephone [phone], fax [phone].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

We invite you to submit any written data, views, or arguments
regarding this proposed AD. Send your comments to the address listed
under the caption ADDRESSES. Include the docket number ``FAA-2009-1088,
Directorate Identifier 2008-SW-76-AD'' at the beginning of your
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed AD. We will
consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend the
proposed AD in light of those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://
Regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact
with FAA personnel concerning this proposed rulemaking. Using the
search function of our docket Web site, you can find and read the
comments to any of our dockets, including the name of the individual
who sent or signed the comment. You may review the DOT's complete
Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11,
2000.

Examining the Docket

You may examine the docket that contains the proposed AD, any
comments, and other information in person at the Docket Operations
office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The Docket Operations office (telephone [phone]) is
located in Room W12-140 on the ground floor of the West Building at the
street address stated in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be
available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

Discussion

This document proposes adopting a new AD for the Sikorsky Model S-
92A helicopters. The AD would require revising the RFM SA S92A-RFM-003,
Part 1, Section 1, Operating Limitations, Types of Operation, by
removing the statement ``RESCUE HOIST: Category `A' only External load
operations with Class `D' external loads.'' The AD would require
replacing that statement with ``HOIST: Class D external loads
PROHIBITED.'' Also, the AD would require revising the RFM by removing
all instances of the terms ``RESCUE HOIST'' and replacing them with the
term ``HOIST.'' This proposal is prompted by a review of the RFM, in
which a mistake was discovered. The RFM states that ``Class D''
external loads are approved for external load operations for this
model. However, the Model S-92A does not comply with the requirements
of 14 CFR 29.865(c)(6) because, for HEC applications requiring use of
Category A rotorcraft, that rotorcraft must have OEI hover performance
and procedures in the RFM for the weights, altitudes and temperatures
for which that external load approval is requested. The Model

[[Page 65497]]

S-92A RFM does not contain that information. For conducting external
load operations under 14 CFR 133, the FAA has defined HEC to be a
rotorcraft-load combination ``Class D'' operation. The actions in the
proposed AD are intended to correct this mistake and to prevent HEC
operation in noncompliance with the requirements, which could result in
injury or loss of life.
This unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop on other
helicopters of the same type design. Therefore, the proposed AD would
require revising the RFM SA S92A-RFM-003 in accordance with the
statements in the previous paragraph.
We estimate that this proposed AD would affect 65 helicopters of
U.S. registry. Correcting the wording in the RFM would take a minimal
amount of time resulting in minimal cost.

Regulatory Findings

We have determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. Additionally, this proposed
AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the
relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the proposed
regulation:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend
part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as
follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding a new airworthiness directive
to read as follows:

Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation: Docket No. FAA-2009-1088; Directorate
Identifier 2008-SW-76-AD.

Applicability: Model S-92A helicopters, certificated in any
category.
Compliance: Required within 90 days, unless accomplished
previously.
To correct a mistake in the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) to
prevent human external cargo (HEC) operations, which could result in
injury or loss of life, do the following:
(a) Revise the RFM SA S92A-RFM-003, Part 1, Section 1, Operating
Limitations, Types of Operation, by removing the statement ``RESCUE
HOIST: Category `A' only External load operations with Class `D'
external loads.'' Replace that statement with ``HOIST: Class D
external loads PROHIBITED.'' Also, throughout the entire RFM, remove
the term ``RESCUE HOIST,'' and replace it with the term ``HOIST.''
These revisions may be made by inserting a copy of this AD into the
RFM, by making the changes in pen and ink, or by inserting a copy of
the Sikorsky RFM revision containing these requirements into the
RFM.
(b) To request a different method of compliance or a different
compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19.
Contact the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, FAA,
ATTN: John Coffey, Flight Test Engineer, 12 New England Executive
Park, Burlington, MA 01803, telephone [phone], fax (781) 238-
7170, for information about previously approved alternative methods
of compliance.

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on October 23, 2009.
Mark R. Schilling,
Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E9-29430 Filed 12-9-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

[[email protected]]

So how does that affect the S-92 in SAR role then - it looks on the face of it to prohibit any winching at all

[JimL]

This raises an interesting point: the only deficiency pointed to by the AD is 29.863(c)(6):

"(c) For rotorcraft-load combination to be used for human external cargo applications, the rotorcraft must:"

"(6) For human external cargo applications requiring the use of Category A rotorcraft, have one-engine-inoperative hover performance data and procedures in the flight manual for the weights, altitudes, and temperatures for which external load approval has been requested."

HEC Class D being defined (from AC 29-2C) as being:

"Class D rotorcraft-load combination means one in which the external load is other than a Class A, B, or C and has been specifically approved by the
Administrator for that operation (i.e., HEC operations for which the operator is receiving compensation from the person being transported)."

European regulations (JARs) - to this point - have not been concerned with other than CAT; therefore when the HHO Appendix was put into JAR-OPS 3, we were only concerned with CAT - i.e. HEC Class D - and the requirement stated above was contained in that Appendix. (For European HEMS, the requirement that is mentioned in the AD is specifically alleviated for HHO at the HEMS Operating Site (the accident site).)

SAR has been excluded from regulations that specify requirements for CAT (in the UK Public Transport) and each State is left to prescribe its own requirements (this is unlikely to change with EASA Ops). Some States regulate this activity by specifying the CAT requirements and then provide the necessary derogation (from engine failure accountability).

Where this may become interesting is in the area of training; although for some States (the US for example) this area is not regulated under Part 133 - i.e. it can be done without requiring the one-engine-inoperative hover performance, some States do require this protection for the crew members during training.

It is not difficult to understand how this would have happened; most manufacturers would rely upon the wording seen above (rescue hoist = SAR) and not provide the specified data for HEC Class D operations (if it was not specified by the customer). What might be found surprising is that the operator did not ensure this data was included in the RFM if operating in the UK and if the training limitation was still extant.

Jim

[Variable Load]

On an initial look it seems like a very strange stance for the FAA to take. Part 2 of the RFM does have graphs for Q required to hover IGE and OGE, it also has graphs for Q available per engine at various conditions i.e. 30 sec power, 2 minute power, max continuous. Combining the two gives the answers required by the regulations?

Perhaps they think it should be in Part 1?

[JimL]

It's not quite that simple; the compliance text for Part 29.865 is extensively described in AC 29.865B. Here an extract which describes (part of) the compliance check for 29.865(c)(6):

(i) In determining OEI hover performance, dynamic engine failures should be considered. Each hover verification test should begin from a stabilized hover at the maximum OEI hover weight, at the requested in-ground-effect (IGE) or OGE skid or wheel height, and with all engines operating. At this point the critical engine should be failed and the aircraft should remain in a stabilized hover condition without exceeding any rotor limits or engine limits for the operating engine(s). As with all performance testing, engine power should be limited to minimum specification power. Engine failures may be simulated by rapidly moving the throttle to idle provided a ‘needle split’ is obtained between the rotor and engine RPM.

(ii) Normal pilot reaction time should be used following the engine failure to maintain the stabilized hover flight condition. When hovering OGE or IGE at maximum OEI hover weight, an engine failure should not result in an altitude loss of more than 10 percent or four (4) feet, whichever is greater, of the altitude established at the time of engine failure. In either case, sufficient power margin should be available from the operating engine(s) to regain the altitude lost during the dynamic engine failure and to transition to forward flight.

(iii) Consideration should also be given to the time required to recover (winch up and bring aboard) the Class D external load and to transition to forward flight. This time increment may limit the use of short duration OEI power ratings. For example, for a helicopter that sustains an engine failure at a height of 40 feet, the time required to restabilize in a hover, recover the external load (given the hoist speed limitations), and then transition to forward flight (with minimal altitude loss) would likely preclude the use of 30-second engine ratings and may encroach upon the 2 ½ -minute ratings. Such encroachment into the 2 ½ - ratings is not acceptable.

(iv) For helicopters that incorporate engine driven generators, the hoist should remain operational following an engine or generator failure. A hoist should not be powered from a bus that is automatically shed following the loss of an engine or generator. Maximum two-engine generator loads should be established so that when one engine or generator fails, the remaining generator can assume the entire rotorcraft electrical load (including the maximum hoist electrical load) without exceeding approved limitations.

(v) The Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) should contain information that describes the expected altitude loss, any special recovery techniques, and the time increment used for recovery of the external load when establishing maximum weights and wheel or skid heights. The OEI hover chart should be placed in the performance section of the RFM or RFM supplement. Allowable altitude extrapolation for the hover data should not exceed 2000 feet.

I have underlined the critical part; it is difficult to see how this could be extrapolated from other graphs - it requires a flight test procedure; I would guess that is should be in Part I. To my knowledge, these graphs have been produced by EC and AW for their SAR contenders.

I must say that when this was considered some time ago, the use of the wording "an engine failure should not result in an altitude loss of more than 10 percent" did cause more than a little chuckle.

Jim

[Hullaballoo]

I have underlined the critical part; it is difficult to see how this could be extrapolated from other graphs - it requires a flight test procedure

Exactly...I couldn't agree more with JimL. During an engine failure, the rotorcraft's performance is not a static condition (which most performance charts assume); for HEC, 29.865 requires the transient altitude loss be considered (that results whilst the good engine picks up the load following the OEI condition). This could only be shown with flight test.

The other key point: 29.865(c)(6) requires OEI performance and procedures in the flight manual. That is, the pilot must know what steps to take following the engine failure, just like when operating under PC-1 (ie, using scheduled takeoff and landing procedures). These procedures would have to be developed in flight test, taking into consideration the transient conditions, reel-up time, fly-away, etc.

[FH1100 Pilot]

Lord, we keep finding more and more ways in which the S-92 fails to meet some aspect of the requirements of FAR Part 29. What's next? And Sikorsky wanted our President to ride around in this thing? When-oh-when will the FAA just yank the CoA and do a thorough airworthiness review of this aircraft?

I mean, you'd think that this was Sikorsky's first Part 29 helicopter!

[NonSAC]

No, putting the President into a 92 derivative was an ancillary objective of the VH-92.

The main idea is to resolve some of the shortcomings of the original machine with government cash - sort of an objective oriented subsidy program. SAC would then be able to sell derivatives of the improved machine into other markets. Think UTTAS.

The non-select for the VH-X and Air Force CSRX programs bodes badly given the need for a 'B' version and an 'A' upgrade kit. I still hope that there are some positive developments with respect to the current 'A' issues that come out of the Canadian project.

[Shawn Coyle]

It must be remembered that the Advisory Circular is just that- an advisory. It is not a regulation.
The preamble will say - 'This is one way, but not the only way, to demonstrate compliance with the requirements.'
I'm surprised Sikorsky hasn't been able to fight this one successfully, as I'm sure at the weights that are proposed for hoisting it has the necessary HOGE OEI performance.

[JimL]

Shawn,

as I'm sure at the weights that are proposed for hoisting it has the necessary HOGE OEI performance.

I don't know how you can possibly make that statement without substantiation of the operational conditions. As has already been pointed out, compliance with Part 29.865(c)(6) is not just a matter of raw performance, it requires 'OEI hover performance and procedures in the RFM for the weights, altitudes and temperatures for which that external load approval is requested'.

The AD does not question the ability of the S92A to perform hoist missions it merely points out that that:

...the Model S-92A does not comply with the requirements of 14 CFR 29.865(c)(6) because, for HEC applications requiring use of Category A rotorcraft, that rotorcraft must have OEI hover performance and procedures in the RFM for the weights, altitudes and temperatures for which that external load approval is requested. The Model S-92A RFM does not contain that information. For conducting external load operations under 14 CFR 133, the FAA has defined HEC to be a rotorcraft-load combination "Class D'' operation. The actions in the proposed AD are intended to correct this mistake and to prevent HEC operation in noncompliance with the requirements, which could result in injury or loss of life.

Jim

[Shawn Coyle]

Jim:
I would find it very unusual to do a hoisting (rescue) exercise with much beyond an airframe, fuel and a small crew. If an S-92 has Category A perf with a full load of pax and fuel, it would stand to reason (and I'm more than willing to be corrected) that it would have a HOGE OEI capability for enough duration to complete the hoist.
Sounds like someone at Sikorsky needs to do the performance charts that way.
This sort of thing has happened before - perf charts need to catch up with the operations.

[Geoffersincornwall]

Cat A - v - Hoist Ops

It may be crucial that the 2.5 minute rating may not be available during the supposed hoist operations (as is contemplated in the AD). That's the big difference between a Cat A reject or fly-away and hoist recovery post OEI.

It will be interesting to see how it pans out.

G.