"Sorry it Shell Aircraft, not the helicopter industry, that invented HUMS and every other major helicopter safety improvement"
My previous comment was perhaps a little provocative I grant you! However, I'm close enough to this to know which organization did what in the development of HUMS in the late 80's and throughout the 90's and equally I know who's doing what today in terms of systems like TCAS2. Indeed, Shell does get behind these developments and funds a lot of the work. Noting however that Shell has no Design approval for these types, the use of the word "invented" is perhaps a little strong and any suggestion that you did this all on your own is pure fiction isn't it now?
Scotsheli
I believe in credit where it is due and that is clearly with Shell Aircraft for ultimately inventing, inspiring, directing, funding and introducing HUMS, TCAS, Safety Cases, HFDM, QA etc etc. Yes, a few contractors may have done some detail work but that hardly counts and technically any innovations made during the term of Shell contracts belong to Shell. You are also incorrect on this issue of design approval as the aircraft equipment you mention has all been approved by Shell Aircraft.
SASless
The Nigerian competition was rigorously run, including a unique fly-off as you mention, and the best option, based on a complex series of evaluation criteria was selected. That aircraft, the EC155B was smoothly introduced to service by Shell as a clear demonstration of Shell's focus on safety as you say. This was the first use of a modern helicopter in the offshore business and was a great success as evidenced by Shell's excellent safety record in Nigeria since.
FH1100:
Sorry for not spotting your earlier post on the AA accident-
Full rudder was in fact applied - the problem was the mechanical characteristics of the pedals. 25lb to start the rudder moving, and then 35 lb would give you maximum deflection. This was a PIO waiting to happen, and it did.
Here's how to envision it - you start applying some force to the left rudder pedal - it doesn't begin to move till you've applied 25 lbs of force, which is a bit high, and then it only takes another 10 lb of force to get to maximum travel (and maximum rudder deflection).
"...innovations made during the term of Shell contracts belong to Shell" - I am aware that contractually this is correct; but it doesn't mean Shell originated the design and it does assume that there are no other stakeholders in the process.
"You are also incorrect on this issue of design approval as the aircraft equipment you mention has all been approved by Shell Aircraft." Sorry, I meant real approvals. Where are you on the EASA Part 21 list of approved design organisations? I don't seem to be able to find you. The helicopter operators seem to be there though....how strange. Anyone would think they were in the business of designing aircraft systems!
In 39 years of working within the SA Engr. Dept. I never did see those people from Shell doing all that work. Look, Shell has always been a very positive safety influence on the industry, but some of the recent postings seem reminiscent of the internet invention claim by Al Gore, don't you think?
SASless
You are simply being uncharitable and picking on some minor difficulties (hangar rash, baggage bay confusion & aircon - what piffiling nonsense). No doubt an unadventurous and short sighted keeness to simply / lazily move from a B212 to B412 is colouring your judgement.
Scotsheli
Correct - lets return to the S-92 (with its FAA certified MRGB and its slightly more serious issues).
JohnDixon
Pehaps if Shell Aircraft were more active and based advisors full time at Sikorksy advising and supervising during the S-92 design process then perhaps the S-92 would have been a much better design without the repeated drama and fatalities. With workers on both sides of the Atlantic asking serious questions about the safety of the S-92 it is clear the S-92 has been a major disappointment and could go the way of the BV234 unless there is soon a miracle of product improvement.
Perhaps maxNG would like to comment but no doubt the chances of the tragic accident off Canada would have been less if Shell was one of the operators there and Shell's industry leading standards were applied rather than the rather weak minima of Canadian laws which I'm sure JimL will confirm have none of the rigour of JAR-OPS 3 when it comes to offshore operations.
Perhaps maxNG would like to comment but no doubt the chances of the tragic accident off Canada would have been less if Shell was one of the operators there and Shell's industry leading standards were applied rather than the rather weak minima of Canadian laws which I'm sure JimL will confirm have none of the rigour of JAR-OPS 3 when it comes to offshore operations.
SM, IMO Cougar 491 would most likely not have happened if the S-92 had been designed to cope with failure of the titanium filter mounting bowl studs and/or had a true 30-minute MGB run-dry capability. Whether the interpretation of the applicable design standards was the root cause of this tragic failure will no doubt be an argument for the lawyers and manufacturers to debate, although if the case is as I believe possibly going to be settled out of court we will probably never know. Would Shell have made a difference to the S-92 design, I would like to hope so, but I would also hope that the helo manufacturer's design team would have looked at all possible failure modes and addressed them in the various systems and component's design. Or is this a "build what the current client is asking for and hope we can win more orders later" market? It will be interesting to see what SAC changes in the MGB design for the CH-148, no doubt all will be hush-hush and us lowly civilian PAX will never get to know the improvements...
How many other helo MGB designs are out there with titanium studs and only 3 mounting bolts on the filter housing bolts? Were there other mitigating factors that caused the failure of the S-92 stud(s) such as excessive vibration etc. that made it impossible to predict the moment of failure, or even pick up via visual inspections during filter change outs? These questions are for the experts to answer, how this gets relayed to PAX is critical if you want to win our confidence in this helo. Based on the current track record of the S-92 the information relaying leads a lot to be desired and certainly has much room for improvement.
Now we have MGB feet cracks from apparently an as-yet unknown cause and my fellow UK citizens along with my Canadian co-workers are up in arms with the whole thing. So, in hindsight it is good to be honest and transparent, but only if all operators follow the same approach. That means that EASA and the FAA must work together better to ensure a global standard is developed and maintained.
I knew when I was in a Puma that the MGB liked eating metal (one of the many reasons why Cougar opted for the S-92), but I also knew that the operators were doing the required preventative maintenance to ensure that the helo was fit for use. That view sadly changed when the Miller flight's MGB failed and from what I've read on the incident IMHO the HUMS data was not used to ground the helo until the MGB was changed out. So who's to blame?
I believe that someone said a while back on this thread "never fly the 'A' model of anything over hostile terrain" or words to that effect. When will the S-92b come out then, and how will we know that it is a proven design?
Sorry for not spotting your earlier post on the AA accident-
Full rudder was in fact applied.
I never said it wasn't. We've all seen the NTSB recreation. You can "see" the SIC wrestling with the controls. He was doing was what he *thought* was safe. Nobody told him that the "protection" provided by being below maneuvering speed did not apply to the rudder. Frankly, it was a shock to me, and I've been flying fixed-wing since 1973.
The question posed was re whether Shell ever flew the 412 offered up by Bell at Redhill......equipped to the Shell Spec that was put out for the competition.
You ignored that.....and took issue with something I said we would not consider a Shell problem. The Bishop probably felt otherwise but that is for another day.
So....tell us....did or did not Shell take a professional look at the 412 offered by Bristow and Bell?
SM,
your recent posts are extremely crass, overtly and childishly provocative, and come as a disappointment when viewed against your other contributions.
To somehow imply the Cougar accident was due to inferior national safety standards, and to then try and imply JimL shares your standpoint, simply beggars belief.
I come late to this item, but feel I must comment on some of the comments on HUMS and EC155.
As somebody who was directly involved in both issues, I must say I felt some annoyance at the comments made.
Although now some time ago, it would be criminal not to mention the enormous contribution made by Alastair Gordon of Bristow to the start, definition and implementation of HUMS. Whilst all due credit must go to Shell Aircraft for their financial support, encouragement and research, the ACTUAL practical implementation and installation of the very new and unproven concepts and techniques was driven by Bristow and Capt. Gordon's enthusiasm. It was he for instance who came up with the idea of combining the CVR,FDR and HUMS which enabled this to be a practical proposition on weight alone. To forget this is to devalue the enormous effort put in by a team of over twenty people at that operator's Design office. This topic may be worth a thread of it's own!
On the 155 issue and Nigeria, I can only say that there was no 'fly off' or proper evaluation with the 412. Many other factors were present at the time, and I have heard even people at ECF admit that the 155 was the "wrong aircraft in the wrong place at the wrong time". I'll say no more.
"Pehaps if Shell Aircraft were more active and based advisors full time at Sikorksy advising and supervising during the S-92 design process then perhaps the S-92 would have been a much better design..."
Its a global economy, and with Shell having clearly superior talent in the design and qualification of new helicopters, SA clearly wouldn't have a chance competing, so have a go.
Spot on, Alistair Gordon was the true father of HUMS.
Shell bought the EC155 for purely commercial reasons, there was no real fly off. I have copies of most of the documents pertaining to the decision and NNPC at the time just agreed with Shell's decision.
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