Flight - Should airline pilots have more/better/different upset recovery training?
Join Date: Jul 2008
Location: tacoma, WA USA
Age: 61
Posts: 20
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
UPRT part three
These are just several examples to make the point that industry, and instructor pilots, need to clearly understand the training objectives, and in how to accurately and effectively utilize simulators and ALL training infrastructure to ensure accurate transfer of training.
Other gains can be made in simply HOW we train in the simulator. Many have expressed here how most simulator training is just rote unusual attitude training. First, we cannot assume that when an airline hires a new pilot that they have the requisite knowledge of aerodynamics in all flight regimes (high and low) or the handling characteristics of their aircraft (ICATEE recommendations are to enhance the academic requirements at both the licensing level and the airline/operator level, which should produce more knowledgeable pilots in the future). There is still a need for what we call "maneuvers-based training (MOFT), but it should be broken down to basic levels on the initial type specific training in the FFS. The pilots should be introduced to the basic manual handling characteristics of their aircraft, with an emphasis on the information available on their flight displays, and how it relates to energy management and trends. Handling should be related to a practical demonstration of aircraft performance, and how it is related to the basic aerodynamic principals involved. And then this demonstration should be repeated to show the tremendous difference related to high altitude flight. For the AF 447 pilots, they likely never hand flew at high altitude, nor in the simulator environment, let alone in degraded flight protection modes.
As an aside, you may have noticed that the industry verbiage is changing from Upset Recovery Training (URT) to Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT). This is based on our analysis that the best gain in risk reduction in LOC-I is to deploy a dual strategy of emphasizing both Prevention and Recovery. Prevention is leveraged by enhanced aerodynamic academics and appropriate use of simulators. The goal is that through improved pilot knowledge and awareness of their specific threat environments, pilots will undertake risk avoidance strategies, or at the least recognize increasing risk threats and take early action before an actual "recovery" is required.
I will address the benefits of "on-aircraft" training later, but our research has indicated that pilots need the exposure to "real aircraft" g-maneuvering to acquire the actual recovery skills required to recover from Upsets. However, those pilots who do complete some form of "on-aircraft" UPRT not only benefit from greatly enhanced recovery skills, but also show tremendous gains in appreciating and utilizing the benefits of using prevention strategies in their line flying activities for avoiding and preventing upsets.
Going back to MOFT or maneuvers-based training, the FFS are excellent for baseline training of this sort. And as "recovery skills" can at times be counter intuitive (" I need to "push" to recovery when my nose is low or I am inverted?"), they will need to be re-visited in recurrent training at appropriate intervals. But industry will need to evolve from better and more thorough MOFT, to more realistic scenario based training, or LOFT if you will. MOFT can be rote, and is usually delivered to one pilot at a time to build up essential pilot competencies. But it needs to evolve to a context in replicating how upsets will be experienced on the line; as a surprise, and in the shared crew responsibility requiring effective CRM, hence LOFT style UPRT training.
LOFT should be used by an airline or training provider to evaluate how effective their flight crews are in upset prevention, by tasking flight crews on their effectiveness in employing avoidance strategies, and then in monitoring aircraft performance and taking effective action before an aircraft departs the normal flight envelope (any upset by definition starts within the normal envelope. Most but not all upset/stall scenarios can be prevented by flight crews employing early monitoring or prevention strategies).
MOFT will continue to be required however, as these skills are perishable and do need re-visiting at appropriate intervals. So the near future will likely see a combination of on-going MOFT and LOFT.
End Part three
Other gains can be made in simply HOW we train in the simulator. Many have expressed here how most simulator training is just rote unusual attitude training. First, we cannot assume that when an airline hires a new pilot that they have the requisite knowledge of aerodynamics in all flight regimes (high and low) or the handling characteristics of their aircraft (ICATEE recommendations are to enhance the academic requirements at both the licensing level and the airline/operator level, which should produce more knowledgeable pilots in the future). There is still a need for what we call "maneuvers-based training (MOFT), but it should be broken down to basic levels on the initial type specific training in the FFS. The pilots should be introduced to the basic manual handling characteristics of their aircraft, with an emphasis on the information available on their flight displays, and how it relates to energy management and trends. Handling should be related to a practical demonstration of aircraft performance, and how it is related to the basic aerodynamic principals involved. And then this demonstration should be repeated to show the tremendous difference related to high altitude flight. For the AF 447 pilots, they likely never hand flew at high altitude, nor in the simulator environment, let alone in degraded flight protection modes.
As an aside, you may have noticed that the industry verbiage is changing from Upset Recovery Training (URT) to Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT). This is based on our analysis that the best gain in risk reduction in LOC-I is to deploy a dual strategy of emphasizing both Prevention and Recovery. Prevention is leveraged by enhanced aerodynamic academics and appropriate use of simulators. The goal is that through improved pilot knowledge and awareness of their specific threat environments, pilots will undertake risk avoidance strategies, or at the least recognize increasing risk threats and take early action before an actual "recovery" is required.
I will address the benefits of "on-aircraft" training later, but our research has indicated that pilots need the exposure to "real aircraft" g-maneuvering to acquire the actual recovery skills required to recover from Upsets. However, those pilots who do complete some form of "on-aircraft" UPRT not only benefit from greatly enhanced recovery skills, but also show tremendous gains in appreciating and utilizing the benefits of using prevention strategies in their line flying activities for avoiding and preventing upsets.
Going back to MOFT or maneuvers-based training, the FFS are excellent for baseline training of this sort. And as "recovery skills" can at times be counter intuitive (" I need to "push" to recovery when my nose is low or I am inverted?"), they will need to be re-visited in recurrent training at appropriate intervals. But industry will need to evolve from better and more thorough MOFT, to more realistic scenario based training, or LOFT if you will. MOFT can be rote, and is usually delivered to one pilot at a time to build up essential pilot competencies. But it needs to evolve to a context in replicating how upsets will be experienced on the line; as a surprise, and in the shared crew responsibility requiring effective CRM, hence LOFT style UPRT training.
LOFT should be used by an airline or training provider to evaluate how effective their flight crews are in upset prevention, by tasking flight crews on their effectiveness in employing avoidance strategies, and then in monitoring aircraft performance and taking effective action before an aircraft departs the normal flight envelope (any upset by definition starts within the normal envelope. Most but not all upset/stall scenarios can be prevented by flight crews employing early monitoring or prevention strategies).
MOFT will continue to be required however, as these skills are perishable and do need re-visiting at appropriate intervals. So the near future will likely see a combination of on-going MOFT and LOFT.
End Part three
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: LHS
Posts: 70
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It is simple, just hire expats to fly the air france flights until their pilots complete basic flight training, which includes recognition and recovery from a stall. This after all is not rocket science.
Bryan, 4Greens, et al, whilst ICATEE is a laudable effort, it is only one contribution amongst many required to address the ‘LOC problem’. It is a much needed bottom up initiative which could, or has had some impact, but the approach via ICAO (who only recommend) is likely to slow any timely effectiveness. Even then action depends on national authorities for rule making, operators to train, and individuals to learn, remember and respond.
The addition of ‘prevention’ in the ICATEE strategy perhaps acknowledges the scope of the problem and that LOC recovery is subsequent to identification and avoidance of hazardous situations.
There are varied and wide ranging views of ‘the problem’. In some incidents the crew created the LOC, or it involved weaknesses in the man-machine interface, and other (most) accidents involved the failure to understand the situation. Previous discussions homed in on the man or the machine depending on point of view; but with evolving understanding of human behaviour and the changing need for automation in complex operating situations, a wider systematic view is required.
Systems thinking and problem solving can be complicated, but with a generic (abstract) view, some key aspects can be identified.
Fundamental human behaviour isn’t changing, or the difficulty in shaping it. However, the world social and professional climate is changing, and this may (adversely) affect the human.
Automation will always have weaknesses; design and training can help, but these have variable effectiveness. Redesign may take years; but specifics like stall warning and aircraft trim might warrant urgent action.
Training depends on memory and understanding, and ultimately on the human to assess a situation, to recall actions, and then act.
All of the activities in these areas require some remedial action; the key question is which are the more important, which will be effective, which can be afforded, etc. This requires overall co-ordination, at least at national authority level. However, I suspect that this will become fragmented – design / certification, training, checking / licencing, etc, such that at the operator level any effectiveness might be ‘lost’ within the generally ‘over documented’ regulations or ‘jump through the hoop’ cultures.
The above might be a sceptical view – subject to many biases, particularly hindsight, but I wonder if LOC recovery training (based on historical accidents and hindsight) is really what the industry requires to maintain future safety.
My bet is on avoidance; training and improved technology to aid awareness, and provision of additional situational safety margins to help protect humans from themselves. Priority technical changes would include stall warning and the need for auto-trim / trim follow-up systems to provide the crew with appropriate cues for aircraft control.
In a rapidly changing commercial environment, we may not see (or need) much training specifically relating to recent high profile LOC accidents.
The addition of ‘prevention’ in the ICATEE strategy perhaps acknowledges the scope of the problem and that LOC recovery is subsequent to identification and avoidance of hazardous situations.
There are varied and wide ranging views of ‘the problem’. In some incidents the crew created the LOC, or it involved weaknesses in the man-machine interface, and other (most) accidents involved the failure to understand the situation. Previous discussions homed in on the man or the machine depending on point of view; but with evolving understanding of human behaviour and the changing need for automation in complex operating situations, a wider systematic view is required.
Systems thinking and problem solving can be complicated, but with a generic (abstract) view, some key aspects can be identified.
Fundamental human behaviour isn’t changing, or the difficulty in shaping it. However, the world social and professional climate is changing, and this may (adversely) affect the human.
Automation will always have weaknesses; design and training can help, but these have variable effectiveness. Redesign may take years; but specifics like stall warning and aircraft trim might warrant urgent action.
Training depends on memory and understanding, and ultimately on the human to assess a situation, to recall actions, and then act.
All of the activities in these areas require some remedial action; the key question is which are the more important, which will be effective, which can be afforded, etc. This requires overall co-ordination, at least at national authority level. However, I suspect that this will become fragmented – design / certification, training, checking / licencing, etc, such that at the operator level any effectiveness might be ‘lost’ within the generally ‘over documented’ regulations or ‘jump through the hoop’ cultures.
The above might be a sceptical view – subject to many biases, particularly hindsight, but I wonder if LOC recovery training (based on historical accidents and hindsight) is really what the industry requires to maintain future safety.
My bet is on avoidance; training and improved technology to aid awareness, and provision of additional situational safety margins to help protect humans from themselves. Priority technical changes would include stall warning and the need for auto-trim / trim follow-up systems to provide the crew with appropriate cues for aircraft control.
In a rapidly changing commercial environment, we may not see (or need) much training specifically relating to recent high profile LOC accidents.
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: fl
Posts: 2,525
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sully saved the day because he did not use automation. He did not touch down at 750 fpm as one post indicated because the video shows he was flared into a normal touchdown at less then 20 fpm. I hope we all could do this but he did.
Unfortunately automatic airplanes make pilots dependant upon automation as SOP's by a lot of airlines require using it. When I was flying you could fly with automation or without unless it was a Cat 2 or lower approach.
Unfortunately automatic airplanes make pilots dependant upon automation as SOP's by a lot of airlines require using it. When I was flying you could fly with automation or without unless it was a Cat 2 or lower approach.
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: Australia
Posts: 1,414
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Previous discussions homed in on the man or the machine depending on point of view; but with evolving understanding of human behaviour and the changing need for automation in complex operating situations, a wider systematic view is required
I am staggered at the amount of bumpf written on the subject of unusual attitude recoveries. Christ Almighty - we learned this stuff on Tiger Moths years ago. And that was real limited panel recoveries with no ADI. The whole problem in the first place is surely unassailable evidence that almost every jet transport accident put down to loss of control in IMC were caused primarily by the pilots piss-poor hand flying instrument flying ability. They were the product of our age - automatic monkeys.
Having got themselves for whatever reason into an unusual attitude in IMC, the evidence showed they had no idea how to recover on instruments; and even if they could understand what the flight instruments were telling them, they did not have the basic instrument flying skills to get out of trouble.
What a shocking indictment on the airline and simulator provider training systems that have permiited this state of affairs to continue. It will get worse as the new breed of MPL cadets hit the RH seat to with no hands on basic instrument flying skills.
The time is well overdue for State regulators to use their authority and demand airline operators face up to the fact that LOC accidents will continue to occur periodically, unless steps are taken to re-inforce more meaningful raw data IMC hands on flying in simulators and during appropriate times in line flying.
Last edited by A37575; 17th Dec 2012 at 12:20.
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: nowhere
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
For the benefit of those of us not experts on unusual attitude recovery, I found this interesting.....
"The second benefit of unloading the wing is that the aircraft’s roll rate improves dramatically. You will lose less altitude when recovering an inverted, nose-low airplane by pushing to near 0 g, rolling crisply to right-side up, and then pulling to level flight. This holds true even when you are significantly nose low. Where a typical business jet can take 5 sec. or more to roll upright with 1 g or more on the wing, the roll can be completed in 1 or 2 sec. when closer to 0 g."
"The second benefit of unloading the wing is that the aircraft’s roll rate improves dramatically. You will lose less altitude when recovering an inverted, nose-low airplane by pushing to near 0 g, rolling crisply to right-side up, and then pulling to level flight. This holds true even when you are significantly nose low. Where a typical business jet can take 5 sec. or more to roll upright with 1 g or more on the wing, the roll can be completed in 1 or 2 sec. when closer to 0 g."
Join Date: Mar 2014
Location: Brussels
Posts: 131
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Should airline pilots have more/better/different upset recovery training?
The answer is Yeeeeeees
But when I put that to xxxxx airline, the answer was an emphatic NO. In fact, I was treated like a Neanderthal for even raising the question. And that, I have to say, is the cause of the problem that the industry now faces. But I don't suppose these managers will ever apologise for thier error - managers never do.
Join Date: Aug 2014
Location: Kemi,Finland
Age: 69
Posts: 68
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
upset recovery
Just joining in to read,but thank You greeners to take this issue for conversation. Maybe some of us with mil-background have much to tell. I just read the first page of this all,so don.t shoot me. Staying in the sky,is an issue here.
Join Date: Aug 2014
Location: Kemi,Finland
Age: 69
Posts: 68
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Reading more,bburks gives also much to to think about. Thanks,both of You. We had aerobatics,about six hours at basic,and then some more at the next course. And getting to basics,it was one of the most important training in my career. Though the nausea at first,i learned a kind of like,being it alone, trying this and that. So with many different mishandlings it gave me some confidence of understanding how a wing behaves. I would suggest that training to anyone who wants to fly. But for sure,pro,s who fly a supercritical wing these days,are sometimes , not even aware of how it behaves at the altitude. If You stall it there,you may never get the airflow back. so it will inevitably be pancaking till You hit something. That,s why i still like hydraulics more than elec,tricks. They give me at least some back-ups because we know they are vulnerable to saying goodbye. Electrics at any control,-be it wing icing or any state of the airplane,are not really giving the info what You can understand. Just data of different sources. Maybe an imaginary Person could handle all that. Airplanes should not be designed for those who build and sell them.
Last edited by Naali; 21st May 2015 at 01:22. Reason: add,ons.
Join Date: Aug 2014
Location: Kemi,Finland
Age: 69
Posts: 68
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
For a bit of lightness for this issue. My first spin was with our Course Main Instructor,-or however anyone would like to call him,he did not care. In first lesson with climbing to 5 thousand feet with very lax and tired Cessna, He had told me almost all he had,making maths and curves to the frozen window as we climbed,with his finger. so with Him,i had no time to think anything else than just to observe what is happening. He -hahaa talked me over from all my fears. "see,you can stop the spin in any direction you want to,it,s only about timing" -This flies,whenever few basic things are taken into account. It will not fly,if You try to extend it,s boundaries beyond it,s abilities. So be wary of thinking," i know." So i am very much an advocate for training of just unusual situations,first visual,and then really mixing You with differing indications with the plane You fly. Accidents do not happen with normal operations,so some extremes may be better tried with sims. ps.Accidents are those,where no one had the idea that this could happen.
Last edited by Naali; 21st May 2015 at 02:53.
