B737 over-run New York October 2016. Poor Airmanship.
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B737 over-run New York October 2016. Poor Airmanship.
NTSB News - Report on LaGuardia Airport Incident
Pilot Actions, Decision Making, "Lack of Command Authority" Led to New York LaGuardia Runway Excursion
9/21/2017
Several failures in close succession by a jetliner's flight crew were the probable cause of Oct. 27, 2016, runway excursion at LaGuardia Airport, according to the National Transportation Safety Board's final report issued Thursday.
The Eastern Air Lines Boeing 737-700, a chartered flight carrying then vice-presidential candidate Mike Pence and campaign staff, overran Runway 22 during landing on the rainy evening. The airplane departed the runway and partially transited an arrester bed of crushable concrete before coming to a stop about 170 feet past the end of the runway. None of the 11 crewmembers or 37 passengers were hurt in the incident. The plane sustained minor damage.
NTSB investigators document information and gather evidence the morning after the Oct. 27, 2016, runway excursion of a chartered Eastern Air Lines Boeing 737-700 at New York LaGuardia Airport (NTSB photo by Peter Knudson)
Data from the flight recorder and post-incident interviews with the flight crew indicated the 737 was on a stabilized approach to Runway 22 until the landing flare, when it "floated" for thousands of feet, finally touching down more than 4,200 feet past the threshold of the 7,001-foot runway, leaving less than 2,800 feet of runway surface for the 737 to decelerate and stop.
The NTSB said when the first officer, who was at the controls, failed to get the jet's wheels on the ground within the first third of the runway, or 2,300 feet, he should have executed a go-around maneuver instead of continuing the landing attempt.
During the landing roll, contrary to procedures, the captain didn't announce he was assuming control of the airplane, which resulted in each pilot attempting directional inputs that were at odds with the other. This breakdown of basic crew resource management along with the captain's failure to call for a go-around demonstrated, "a lack of command authority." This, along with pilot actions, including starting the flare at an altitude almost twice as high as Boeing recommends, delays in reducing throttles and manually deploying the speed brakes, all contributed to the excursion, the NTSB said.
Eastern Air Lines management told the NTSB that it has since developed specific flight crew training to address the safety issues identified during the investigation.
The 24-page final report is available at https://go.usa.gov/xRJ4v.
NTSB News - Report on LaGuardia Airport Incident
Data from the flight recorder and post-incident interviews with the flight crew indicated the 737 was on a stabilized approach to Runway 22 until the landing flare, when it "floated" for thousands of feet, finally touching down more than 4,200 feet past the threshold of the 7,001-foot runway, leaving less than 2,800 feet of runway surface for the 737 to decelerate and stop.
The NTSB said when the first officer, who was at the controls, failed to get the jet's wheels on the ground within the first third of the runway, or 2,300 feet, he should have executed a go-around maneuver instead of continuing the landing attempt.
During the landing roll, contrary to procedures, the captain didn't announce he was assuming control of the airplane, which resulted in each pilot attempting directional inputs that were at odds with the other. This breakdown of basic crew resource management along with the captain's failure to call for a go-around demonstrated, "a lack of command authority." This, along with pilot actions, including starting the flare at an altitude almost twice as high as Boeing recommends, delays in reducing throttles and manually deploying the speed brakes, all contributed to the excursion, the NTSB said.
Eastern Air Lines management told the NTSB that it has since developed specific flight crew training to address the safety issues identified during the investigation.
The 24-page final report is available at https://go.usa.gov/xRJ4v.
............................................................ ..........................................
EMAS: Engineered Materials Arresting System.
See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engine...rrestor_system
A 272-ft-long by 170-ft-wide EMAS was set back about 30 ft from the end of runway 22; it was
originally installed in 2005 and replaced in 2014. The EMAS used crushable material designed
to decelerate and stop an aircraft, traveling up to 80 mph (about 69.5 knots), that overruns the
runway. This technology was developed and implemented to improve safety at airports where
the full 1,000-ft runway safety area beyond a runway's end could not be obtained due to a lack
of available land or obstacles, such as bodies of water, highways, railroads, populated areas, or
terrain with a severe dropoff.
According to an FAA fact sheet
(https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets...?newsId=13754; accessed June 6,
2017), as of November 2016, there have been 11 incidents in the United States—in addition to
the event involving flight 3452—in which an EMAS has safely stopped an overrunning aircraft,
with a total 247 passengers and crewmembers on board.
............................................................ ............................................
Centaurus comment. Several years ago, this writer wrote to Essendon Airport (Australia) management suggesting a feasibility study into the installation of EMAS or its equivalent at the end of Essendon Runway 26 and 17 because of the proximity of the Tullamarine Freeway and associated traffic - especially at peak hour - as well as tram lines parallel to Matthews Avenue.
There was no reply. A verbal follow-up also elicited no interest. In the LaGuardia incident described above, the flight safety value of EMAS was once again obvious. The recent accident to a KingAir that crashed after take off from Essendon Runway 17 highlighted the extreme danger of any over-run on that runway from a high speed rejected take off especially if the runway was wet. Large corporate jets as well as other jet transports use Essendon and the current runway end safety areas could possibly improved if EMAS was available. With Essendon set to operate for many years yet, and with its proximity to close in built up areas and Freeways, a feasibility study might still be worth while. But I won't hold my breath.
Pilot Actions, Decision Making, "Lack of Command Authority" Led to New York LaGuardia Runway Excursion
9/21/2017
Several failures in close succession by a jetliner's flight crew were the probable cause of Oct. 27, 2016, runway excursion at LaGuardia Airport, according to the National Transportation Safety Board's final report issued Thursday.
The Eastern Air Lines Boeing 737-700, a chartered flight carrying then vice-presidential candidate Mike Pence and campaign staff, overran Runway 22 during landing on the rainy evening. The airplane departed the runway and partially transited an arrester bed of crushable concrete before coming to a stop about 170 feet past the end of the runway. None of the 11 crewmembers or 37 passengers were hurt in the incident. The plane sustained minor damage.
NTSB investigators document information and gather evidence the morning after the Oct. 27, 2016, runway excursion of a chartered Eastern Air Lines Boeing 737-700 at New York LaGuardia Airport (NTSB photo by Peter Knudson)
Data from the flight recorder and post-incident interviews with the flight crew indicated the 737 was on a stabilized approach to Runway 22 until the landing flare, when it "floated" for thousands of feet, finally touching down more than 4,200 feet past the threshold of the 7,001-foot runway, leaving less than 2,800 feet of runway surface for the 737 to decelerate and stop.
The NTSB said when the first officer, who was at the controls, failed to get the jet's wheels on the ground within the first third of the runway, or 2,300 feet, he should have executed a go-around maneuver instead of continuing the landing attempt.
During the landing roll, contrary to procedures, the captain didn't announce he was assuming control of the airplane, which resulted in each pilot attempting directional inputs that were at odds with the other. This breakdown of basic crew resource management along with the captain's failure to call for a go-around demonstrated, "a lack of command authority." This, along with pilot actions, including starting the flare at an altitude almost twice as high as Boeing recommends, delays in reducing throttles and manually deploying the speed brakes, all contributed to the excursion, the NTSB said.
Eastern Air Lines management told the NTSB that it has since developed specific flight crew training to address the safety issues identified during the investigation.
The 24-page final report is available at https://go.usa.gov/xRJ4v.
NTSB News - Report on LaGuardia Airport Incident
Data from the flight recorder and post-incident interviews with the flight crew indicated the 737 was on a stabilized approach to Runway 22 until the landing flare, when it "floated" for thousands of feet, finally touching down more than 4,200 feet past the threshold of the 7,001-foot runway, leaving less than 2,800 feet of runway surface for the 737 to decelerate and stop.
The NTSB said when the first officer, who was at the controls, failed to get the jet's wheels on the ground within the first third of the runway, or 2,300 feet, he should have executed a go-around maneuver instead of continuing the landing attempt.
During the landing roll, contrary to procedures, the captain didn't announce he was assuming control of the airplane, which resulted in each pilot attempting directional inputs that were at odds with the other. This breakdown of basic crew resource management along with the captain's failure to call for a go-around demonstrated, "a lack of command authority." This, along with pilot actions, including starting the flare at an altitude almost twice as high as Boeing recommends, delays in reducing throttles and manually deploying the speed brakes, all contributed to the excursion, the NTSB said.
Eastern Air Lines management told the NTSB that it has since developed specific flight crew training to address the safety issues identified during the investigation.
The 24-page final report is available at https://go.usa.gov/xRJ4v.
............................................................ ..........................................
EMAS: Engineered Materials Arresting System.
See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Engine...rrestor_system
A 272-ft-long by 170-ft-wide EMAS was set back about 30 ft from the end of runway 22; it was
originally installed in 2005 and replaced in 2014. The EMAS used crushable material designed
to decelerate and stop an aircraft, traveling up to 80 mph (about 69.5 knots), that overruns the
runway. This technology was developed and implemented to improve safety at airports where
the full 1,000-ft runway safety area beyond a runway's end could not be obtained due to a lack
of available land or obstacles, such as bodies of water, highways, railroads, populated areas, or
terrain with a severe dropoff.
According to an FAA fact sheet
(https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets...?newsId=13754; accessed June 6,
2017), as of November 2016, there have been 11 incidents in the United States—in addition to
the event involving flight 3452—in which an EMAS has safely stopped an overrunning aircraft,
with a total 247 passengers and crewmembers on board.
............................................................ ............................................
Centaurus comment. Several years ago, this writer wrote to Essendon Airport (Australia) management suggesting a feasibility study into the installation of EMAS or its equivalent at the end of Essendon Runway 26 and 17 because of the proximity of the Tullamarine Freeway and associated traffic - especially at peak hour - as well as tram lines parallel to Matthews Avenue.
There was no reply. A verbal follow-up also elicited no interest. In the LaGuardia incident described above, the flight safety value of EMAS was once again obvious. The recent accident to a KingAir that crashed after take off from Essendon Runway 17 highlighted the extreme danger of any over-run on that runway from a high speed rejected take off especially if the runway was wet. Large corporate jets as well as other jet transports use Essendon and the current runway end safety areas could possibly improved if EMAS was available. With Essendon set to operate for many years yet, and with its proximity to close in built up areas and Freeways, a feasibility study might still be worth while. But I won't hold my breath.
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I've never been on a "stabilized approach" and floated "thousands of feet" - this headline is garbage (now going to read the full report to see what the journos missed).
30 seconds later:
** Simply, they forgot to reduce thrust and **** happened.
News articles are crap.
30 seconds later:
** Simply, they forgot to reduce thrust and **** happened.
News articles are crap.
now going to read the full report to see what the journos missed
News articles are crap
https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-rele...20170921b.aspx
PS: an approach is not a landing. The approach was fine and stabilised. The landing was messed up. Let's not get too unstable on our approach to this...
Centaurus, well done for bringing the EMAS issue to the attention of Australian airport authorities. One way of making sure they take your letter seriously is to prominently add cc's to eg the minister, leader of opposition, and press. This will make you unpopular, but as someone who takes a principled stand you know that life isn't a popularity competition. The other way of making our lazy bureaucrats do their job, as you're also doubtless aware, is to emphasize THEIR risk. Make them believe that the status quo puts them at risk.
Thread Starter
Good website here. Comments on wet runway operations pertinent to Australian operations too.
The Wet Runway Trap: An Insidious Challenge | Business Aviation content from Aviation Week
Full Report: Aviation Investigation Report A15Q0075 - Transportation Safety Board of Canada
The Wet Runway Trap: An Insidious Challenge | Business Aviation content from Aviation Week
Full Report: Aviation Investigation Report A15Q0075 - Transportation Safety Board of Canada
