Prang at mudgee 14/9/14, 2 dead
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A Question: If one experiences an engine failure is not the correct procedure to establish the correct gliding speed whilst looking for somewhere to land?
One should remember from basic training and recurrent practice attempting to `stretch the glide' is not good procedure fraught with danger.
From the photos an option would appear to have been to land on the road?
How well does this aircraft glide with loss of power?
One should remember from basic training and recurrent practice attempting to `stretch the glide' is not good procedure fraught with danger.
From the photos an option would appear to have been to land on the road?
How well does this aircraft glide with loss of power?
The aircraft ended up at the point marked in red. You may wish to consider the options available since the approach would have been over the built up area to the left. Full flap seems to have been selected judging from photos.
DK, we are all acutely aware that the procedure for an engine failure is to keep flying the aircraft, search for a suitable area and fly the aircraft to safely land, whilst avoiding stalling of the aircraft and possibly a subsequent wing-drop.
Clearly one of some of those actions did not occur on this occasion, resulting in a trajic outcome. We don't know why, because we weren't there. Hopefully the aircraft was fitted with a Dynon or similar EFIS so information can be analysed on what transpired so we can all learn from it.
Clearly one of some of those actions did not occur on this occasion, resulting in a trajic outcome. We don't know why, because we weren't there. Hopefully the aircraft was fitted with a Dynon or similar EFIS so information can be analysed on what transpired so we can all learn from it.
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Whether or not we are all aware of the procedures in the event of an engine failure does appear to be questionable viewing some of the comments here.
Additionally just how often is engine failure practice contemplated by your average GA Pilot?
The practice of landing on the piano keys raises additional questions perhaps a change to aim & land further down the runway would enhance safer operation? (the exception is, of course, short runway operations when other considerations should be factored)
Additionally just how often is engine failure practice contemplated by your average GA Pilot?
The practice of landing on the piano keys raises additional questions perhaps a change to aim & land further down the runway would enhance safer operation? (the exception is, of course, short runway operations when other considerations should be factored)
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Looks like the engine failed due to carbie icing followed by the pilot loosing control then stalling at low level.
I would say that he has been preoccupied with the engine failure and let the aircraft get slow resulting in the stall. Maybe a stall warning device may prevented the fatal outcome, who knows? Lots of interesting lessons can be learn from this accident.
I would say that he has been preoccupied with the engine failure and let the aircraft get slow resulting in the stall. Maybe a stall warning device may prevented the fatal outcome, who knows? Lots of interesting lessons can be learn from this accident.
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Or sorry to say, the Pilot allowed carby icing to occur at a low and slow speed - all this info was for years available to him.
A altitude of that, it was never possible to recover from, ever full stop.
A altitude of that, it was never possible to recover from, ever full stop.
When you live....
The ATSB also found that the aeroplane’s weight was higher than the design limits. However, the effect of this weight on aircraft performance was not considered to have contributed to the accident.
Also this:
The review found that on 18 occasions, the aeroplane was below 500 ft at the beginning of the final approach and, on 11 of the 22 final approaches, below the target approach speed of 63 kt (see Aeroplane approach speed considerations) on joining the final leg of the circuit.
I suspect their conclusions are correct especially if the bank angle calculations are correct (and with a northerly he would have been banking harder to align with 04) but the implications that the pilot was regularly below target speed would seem a bit off unless they also reviewed met data for every one of those and corrected for wind.
UTR
Last edited by UnderneathTheRadar; 15th Jan 2016 at 16:12.
UTR, the ATSB stated the added GW would have caused 0.5 knot increase in stall speed and they surmise that the guy would have stalled in even if he had not been above MTOW.
When you live....
Clearly I shouldn't read ATSB reports at 4 in the morning......
However 'met data' for correctionis going to be, at best, a METAR taken sometime in the last 30 minutes?
However 'met data' for correctionis going to be, at best, a METAR taken sometime in the last 30 minutes?
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Megan wrote:
That's a possibility given the apparent abrupt stall characteristics referred to earlier.
The ATSB report makes reference to consistent final approaches below target approach speed and altitude turning final. It would have been more informative had the data been tabulated to see whether he'd been 1 kt slow at 499 ft or 10 kt slow at 200 ft.
I was quite close to Terry way back in our youth when we both went to Newborough Tech and we went on to being apprentices together (IM+R), and I remember him as capable, intelligent and exacting, and certainly not a risk taker as could be implied from the ATSB report.
Think I'd be questioning airspeed calibration given the facts presented.
The ATSB report makes reference to consistent final approaches below target approach speed and altitude turning final. It would have been more informative had the data been tabulated to see whether he'd been 1 kt slow at 499 ft or 10 kt slow at 200 ft.
I was quite close to Terry way back in our youth when we both went to Newborough Tech and we went on to being apprentices together (IM+R), and I remember him as capable, intelligent and exacting, and certainly not a risk taker as could be implied from the ATSB report.
It would be hard to believe that someone would deliberately fly at such low airspeeds under the banner of a risk taker. A risk taker would be joining the circuit at 150 knots, holding that till late down-wind and wiping off the airspeed on base and final and side slipping in for a landing.
Look at the graphic on page 6. https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/574763...nal_report.pdf
- 147 knots inbound to the airfield
- 97 knots in the figure-eight orbit
- 87 knots on the mid-field crosswind join
- 72 knots on downwind
- 57 knots on base
- 59 knots on final
Those numbers sound to me like someone flying smoothly and sedately with their loving wife on board.
You'd have to believe that nobody would consciously fly that slow on so many occasions if they knew that they were so close to stalling speed. That would be the sort of thing that should get picked up in an AFR. It sounds more like that he either didn't realise he was so close to the stall or his instrumentation was over-reading. As for the regular low circuits? That one is a bit of a mystery.
Too little margin, too many times.
Look at the graphic on page 6. https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/574763...nal_report.pdf
- 147 knots inbound to the airfield
- 97 knots in the figure-eight orbit
- 87 knots on the mid-field crosswind join
- 72 knots on downwind
- 57 knots on base
- 59 knots on final
Those numbers sound to me like someone flying smoothly and sedately with their loving wife on board.
You'd have to believe that nobody would consciously fly that slow on so many occasions if they knew that they were so close to stalling speed. That would be the sort of thing that should get picked up in an AFR. It sounds more like that he either didn't realise he was so close to the stall or his instrumentation was over-reading. As for the regular low circuits? That one is a bit of a mystery.
Too little margin, too many times.
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Re the wind. A METAR is produced every thirty minutes and SPECIs as required, however, all information is sampled and recorded at one minute intervals thereby making available for investigations.