Sea Jet
Pr00ne are you a member, supporter or employee of New Labour by any chance? Your remarks do seem to give that impression - they do to me anyway.
On the "Flying to the Falklands" thread you mention that JSF will arrive "in 2011". I thought the planned date for entry to service for JSF was 2012, likewise for CVF. However, CVF is already getting delayed so we may well be talking about a gap for more than six years. The capability of the Sea Harrier has been discussed here and on other threads so I won't talk about it any more, although the following may be of interest....
http://www.navynews.co.uk/articles/2...0003072802.asp
You say that naval air defence is not a prority. In that case, why are our European allies Italy and Spain busy equipping the Navies with AMRAAM capable aircraft? And don't forget France and the Aeronavale. Could it be because of the lessons of the Falklands in defending a naval/maritime task group from enemy aircraft and air launched missiles?
Wasn't they key lesson from 1982 that defending a task group from the air launched missile threat requires organic AEW AND organic air defence AND ship based defences?
The only reliable defence for surface units is a flexible combination of carrier base early warning aircraft and combat air patrols to engage any firing platform before it gets within missile launch range.
Most modern air launched anti ship missiles have ranges in excess of that of the next line of defence, Sea Dart. Once again we would be relying on Type 42 destroyers acting as anti air pickets as the first line of defence. There would be a high probability that they would not be able to engage the enemy before they fired their missiles. If you imagine that a number of aircraft (four say) fired a salvo of missiles (say eight, assuming two per aircraft) you can see the danger of this strategy. Multi layered defence in depth is the only answer. Relying too much on last ditch systems such as Phalanx or Goalkeeper is not good either, apart from the danger of being saturated missile fragments would still hit/damage the ship, and injure/kill exposed personnel.
In a previous posting I posted a link to a URL about the loss of HMS Coventry. In their books, both Sandy Woodward and Sharkey Ward mention that their had been a pair of Sea Harriers on their way to deal with the incoming Skyhawks but these had been called off. If they had engaged them they may have shot own all, or perhaps one of the pairs, or just one, or they may have caused them to abort the attack. Whatever, it would have broken the chain of events which led to the loss of Coventry and nineteen lives. Who can say that similar events (problems with radar due to operating close to land, computer malfunction, ships obstructing each other) will not occur again?
The fact that the organic air defence has not been been used in real combat since 1982 does not mean that this capabity is not a useful one, nor does it mean it won't be needed in the near future. I believe that the Sea Harrier, and the capacity of the UK to mount major expeditionary operations without third party support has acted as a real deterent to potential aggressors. When John Nott (spit) announced his 1981 Defence White Paper he effectively remove this deterent. The invasion of the Falkland Islands, and the resulting conflict which cost a thousand lives (on both sides) was a consequence. What will be the consequences of losing the Sea Harrier before the JSF enters service?
On the "Flying to the Falklands" thread you mention that JSF will arrive "in 2011". I thought the planned date for entry to service for JSF was 2012, likewise for CVF. However, CVF is already getting delayed so we may well be talking about a gap for more than six years. The capability of the Sea Harrier has been discussed here and on other threads so I won't talk about it any more, although the following may be of interest....
http://www.navynews.co.uk/articles/2...0003072802.asp
You say that naval air defence is not a prority. In that case, why are our European allies Italy and Spain busy equipping the Navies with AMRAAM capable aircraft? And don't forget France and the Aeronavale. Could it be because of the lessons of the Falklands in defending a naval/maritime task group from enemy aircraft and air launched missiles?
Wasn't they key lesson from 1982 that defending a task group from the air launched missile threat requires organic AEW AND organic air defence AND ship based defences?
The only reliable defence for surface units is a flexible combination of carrier base early warning aircraft and combat air patrols to engage any firing platform before it gets within missile launch range.
Most modern air launched anti ship missiles have ranges in excess of that of the next line of defence, Sea Dart. Once again we would be relying on Type 42 destroyers acting as anti air pickets as the first line of defence. There would be a high probability that they would not be able to engage the enemy before they fired their missiles. If you imagine that a number of aircraft (four say) fired a salvo of missiles (say eight, assuming two per aircraft) you can see the danger of this strategy. Multi layered defence in depth is the only answer. Relying too much on last ditch systems such as Phalanx or Goalkeeper is not good either, apart from the danger of being saturated missile fragments would still hit/damage the ship, and injure/kill exposed personnel.
In a previous posting I posted a link to a URL about the loss of HMS Coventry. In their books, both Sandy Woodward and Sharkey Ward mention that their had been a pair of Sea Harriers on their way to deal with the incoming Skyhawks but these had been called off. If they had engaged them they may have shot own all, or perhaps one of the pairs, or just one, or they may have caused them to abort the attack. Whatever, it would have broken the chain of events which led to the loss of Coventry and nineteen lives. Who can say that similar events (problems with radar due to operating close to land, computer malfunction, ships obstructing each other) will not occur again?
The fact that the organic air defence has not been been used in real combat since 1982 does not mean that this capabity is not a useful one, nor does it mean it won't be needed in the near future. I believe that the Sea Harrier, and the capacity of the UK to mount major expeditionary operations without third party support has acted as a real deterent to potential aggressors. When John Nott (spit) announced his 1981 Defence White Paper he effectively remove this deterent. The invasion of the Falkland Islands, and the resulting conflict which cost a thousand lives (on both sides) was a consequence. What will be the consequences of losing the Sea Harrier before the JSF enters service?
WEBF,
If you asked the question at a Gymkhana, I daresay the big defence 'must have' would be the cavalry. In Devon, it's clear that the Royal Navy (and carriers) seem more valid, viable and relevant than they do to others, in less inbred areas of the country.
(Just so you know I'm half-joking).
With regard to PrOOne's assessment of the difference between Tory talk and Tory action on defence spending, it's a matter of historical fact that the Conservative Govts since the war have been responsible for some of the biggest and most damaging defence cuts since 1945. To admit that in no way makes one a New Labour stooge.
With regard to the supposedly catastrophic gap in our defences which will be left by the early retirement of the SHar, you should stop beating your chest for a moment and consider the following.
1) Britain cannot afford a full 'Golf Bag' and must concentrate its resources on those capabilities which are most relevant to today's situation. I'd suggest that that infers light, flexible, mobile forces which deliver capability affordably. I'd suggest to you that the relative lack of use of the RN's Sea Harriers in recent conflicts and campaigns indicates that they are perhaps a little bit more specialised and 'niche' than other air power assets.
2) Whether you or I like it or not (I know that you don't, and I don't much either) today's armed forces are tailored according to the defence assumptions drawn up by the Government and the Chiefs of Staff. It is no longer an assumption that we will conduct major operations autonomously. Since our allies (the US, France, Spain and Italy) can all offer carrier-based air defence (in those rare occasions that land based air defence cover is not available) the decision has been taken that a temporary loss of capability in this area is an acceptable risk. In my view, it's not radical enough. With ever-shrinking budgets I'd have got out of the carrier game altogether, and spent the money on cheaper, more useful land based assets. But they haven't done that. They've decided to retire an ageing, increasingly expensive, increasingly difficult to support asset about six or seven years before it can be replaced. The RN will remain in the fast jet carrier business through the Harrier GR7/9. Retiring the Shar will provide huge savings in logistics and support costs, at the expense of temporarily relinquishing a capability which hasn't been uniquely needed since 1982 (and then only in extraordinary circumstances which would not be repeated). They might even screw some money out of the Indians, Thais or Japs for these ancient airframes.
I'm not saying that the SHar hasn't proved itself capable. In the Adriatic its radar and AMRAAM capabilities drew praise and admiration. But only in the Falklands did the RN need the SHar because no-one else was there to provide an alternative source of fleet air defence.
If you asked the question at a Gymkhana, I daresay the big defence 'must have' would be the cavalry. In Devon, it's clear that the Royal Navy (and carriers) seem more valid, viable and relevant than they do to others, in less inbred areas of the country.
(Just so you know I'm half-joking).With regard to PrOOne's assessment of the difference between Tory talk and Tory action on defence spending, it's a matter of historical fact that the Conservative Govts since the war have been responsible for some of the biggest and most damaging defence cuts since 1945. To admit that in no way makes one a New Labour stooge.
With regard to the supposedly catastrophic gap in our defences which will be left by the early retirement of the SHar, you should stop beating your chest for a moment and consider the following.
1) Britain cannot afford a full 'Golf Bag' and must concentrate its resources on those capabilities which are most relevant to today's situation. I'd suggest that that infers light, flexible, mobile forces which deliver capability affordably. I'd suggest to you that the relative lack of use of the RN's Sea Harriers in recent conflicts and campaigns indicates that they are perhaps a little bit more specialised and 'niche' than other air power assets.
2) Whether you or I like it or not (I know that you don't, and I don't much either) today's armed forces are tailored according to the defence assumptions drawn up by the Government and the Chiefs of Staff. It is no longer an assumption that we will conduct major operations autonomously. Since our allies (the US, France, Spain and Italy) can all offer carrier-based air defence (in those rare occasions that land based air defence cover is not available) the decision has been taken that a temporary loss of capability in this area is an acceptable risk. In my view, it's not radical enough. With ever-shrinking budgets I'd have got out of the carrier game altogether, and spent the money on cheaper, more useful land based assets. But they haven't done that. They've decided to retire an ageing, increasingly expensive, increasingly difficult to support asset about six or seven years before it can be replaced. The RN will remain in the fast jet carrier business through the Harrier GR7/9. Retiring the Shar will provide huge savings in logistics and support costs, at the expense of temporarily relinquishing a capability which hasn't been uniquely needed since 1982 (and then only in extraordinary circumstances which would not be repeated). They might even screw some money out of the Indians, Thais or Japs for these ancient airframes.
I'm not saying that the SHar hasn't proved itself capable. In the Adriatic its radar and AMRAAM capabilities drew praise and admiration. But only in the Falklands did the RN need the SHar because no-one else was there to provide an alternative source of fleet air defence.
WEBF,
Just because I am anti-Tory does NOT mean that I am pro Labour.
I am ex-RAF GD (FGR2 woo hoo!) and am now employed in the Aerospace industry, not by BAES.
I do not see what relevance the procurement antics of the Italian and Spanish naval air arms has here, have they EVER been employed operationally?
Your lessons from the Falklands were learnt, absorbed into our procurement plans and tactics amended accordingly, TWENTY ONE YEARS ago!
They are no longer relevant, the world has changed. Fully formed naval task forces and task groups no longer face a sophicticated over the horizon threat, there is no-one out there who has the technology, nor, more importantly, the desire or the motive, to pose such a threat.
A modern western naval task group sailing hundreds of miles off shore is simply not threatened by anyone these days, but more importantly, it would also be a useless irrelevant force in todays world. Naval warfare these days is a close in littoral affair, providing support to land forces, something the GR9A will be rather good at, and something the SHAR is c**p at.
The threat we face these days is from Suicide bombers, hijackers, car bombers, explosive laden high speed boats, e-threats and improvised Bio and chem bombs. All of which are a deadly foe, none of which could the SHAR defend against.
The world has changed, and it could change again, if it does and organic AD becomes a vital attribute once again, then the F-35 ( and no I am not Lochkeed Martin) will be an excellent solution. If we are still in the same strategic scenario then as we are now then the F-35 will still; have a very useful ability as a stealth strike attack assett, something the SHAR could never be.
We are no longer in the business of defending super sophisticated Naval Task groups or Convoys from hordes of sea skimming missiles.
FACT.
Just because I am anti-Tory does NOT mean that I am pro Labour.
I am ex-RAF GD (FGR2 woo hoo!) and am now employed in the Aerospace industry, not by BAES.
I do not see what relevance the procurement antics of the Italian and Spanish naval air arms has here, have they EVER been employed operationally?
Your lessons from the Falklands were learnt, absorbed into our procurement plans and tactics amended accordingly, TWENTY ONE YEARS ago!
They are no longer relevant, the world has changed. Fully formed naval task forces and task groups no longer face a sophicticated over the horizon threat, there is no-one out there who has the technology, nor, more importantly, the desire or the motive, to pose such a threat.
A modern western naval task group sailing hundreds of miles off shore is simply not threatened by anyone these days, but more importantly, it would also be a useless irrelevant force in todays world. Naval warfare these days is a close in littoral affair, providing support to land forces, something the GR9A will be rather good at, and something the SHAR is c**p at.
The threat we face these days is from Suicide bombers, hijackers, car bombers, explosive laden high speed boats, e-threats and improvised Bio and chem bombs. All of which are a deadly foe, none of which could the SHAR defend against.
The world has changed, and it could change again, if it does and organic AD becomes a vital attribute once again, then the F-35 ( and no I am not Lochkeed Martin) will be an excellent solution. If we are still in the same strategic scenario then as we are now then the F-35 will still; have a very useful ability as a stealth strike attack assett, something the SHAR could never be.
We are no longer in the business of defending super sophisticated Naval Task groups or Convoys from hordes of sea skimming missiles.
FACT.
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The threat we face these days is from Suicide bombers, hijackers, car bombers, explosive laden high speed boats, e-threats and improvised Bio and chem bombs. All of which are a deadly foe, none of which could the SHAR defend against.
The major concern of this thread, which is shared by the admiralty, is the interim between Harrier and F35. In sales, track records are of vital importance. Why do you dismiss the track record of the Shar through hypothesis as to it's relevance to the future. I agree with you that the Shar is long in the tooth but it's still a deterrent. Quit the histrionics and give us a straight answer please.
FEBA
FEBA,
You say:
"The major concern of this thread, which is shared by the admiralty"
Rollocks, it was the "admiralty" that took the decision, the same people who removed Sea Eagle from the inventory and even now are reviewing the need for Sub-Harpoon in the SSN fleet.
The future? Well, all planning is done on forecasts, based on those forecasts you do budgeting, based on those budgets you decise what you need and what you want. The head sheds in the RN have decided that they don't NEED the SHAR between 2006 and 2012.
Jackonicko puts it rather well in his piece a a few posts down, it's a question of priorities.
We face no threat now that needs the SHAR, it'll be around till 2006, crystal ball gazing is all matter of priorities.
You say:
"The major concern of this thread, which is shared by the admiralty"
Rollocks, it was the "admiralty" that took the decision, the same people who removed Sea Eagle from the inventory and even now are reviewing the need for Sub-Harpoon in the SSN fleet.
The future? Well, all planning is done on forecasts, based on those forecasts you do budgeting, based on those budgets you decise what you need and what you want. The head sheds in the RN have decided that they don't NEED the SHAR between 2006 and 2012.
Jackonicko puts it rather well in his piece a a few posts down, it's a question of priorities.
We face no threat now that needs the SHAR, it'll be around till 2006, crystal ball gazing is all matter of priorities.
I'd rather have decent SEAD, sufficient tanker hoses, sufficient recce, a Canberra replacement, a proper light PGM/L/MCDW etc (all assets we've needed every time we've had to do anything) than the Sea Harrier.
It's a relatively unimportant capability gap. It's a short term capability gap. It's a gap which can easily be filled by our allies.
It's a relatively unimportant capability gap. It's a short term capability gap. It's a gap which can easily be filled by our allies.
Pr00ne let me firstly apolegise. But since you seemed to advocate things such as the RAF having no air defence aircraft I suspected that you might have been acting on some less than honest politicians.....
Rollocks, it was the "admiralty" that took the decision, the same people who removed Sea Eagle from the inventory and even now are reviewing the need for Sub-Harpoon in the SSN fleet.
If I may be allowed to comment on that statment...
In early/mid 2001, the then CINCFLEET, Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh, wrote a report called the Fleet Risks Register. In it he made a number of worrying remarks, most notable of these was that ships of the Fleet were at a greater risk of being hit by sea skimming missiles than at any other time since the Falklands war, due to various problems with ship based defences. He was First Sea Lord when the Sea Harrier decision was made. He left the post early....
His replacement, Admiral Sir Alan West, who had been CINCFLEET at the time of the decision, had experience of being on the receiving end of an air attack when his ship, Ardent, was sunk during the Falklands campaign. On the first page of this thread I provided a link to a recent interview with him, in which he says that from 2006 until the time JSF enters the Royal Navy will be unable to conduct a major operation against an opponent with a significant air force without the support of the US, in other words the Navy doesn't need air defence as long as it isn't required to go to war without Uncle Sam. Remember that he too has to just go along the company line in public.
Also since the SDR the Sea Harrier units have come under the command of 3 Group (RAF), part of Strike Command. This may or may not be relevent, but it is worth remembering.
Jacko you may well wonder about the importance of naval/maritime forces - but you might want to think about the commitment of naval forces to UN and NATO operations off of Bosnia. For several years we permantly had a carrier commited to that theatre of operations, with Sea Harriers (initially FRS1 but later FA2) flying air defence, attack and reece sorties, sometimes all three roles in the same mission. Before you start harping on about escorts, the CVS was in general supported by one or two frigates. We also contributed to the NATO Operation Sharp Gaurd, over the time it ran the UK contribution had involved something like twenty frigates and destroyers and four or five SSNs. Then there were several stand offs with Iraq in the late '90s, then Kosovo, then Sierra Leone (whether or not land based aircraft could have got there faster naval forces would have been involved), Sierra Leone again in late 2000 (the Amphibious Ready Group sent to deter the rebels), then Operation Veritas, then Telic.... Plus routine operations at the same time.
The following two links may interest you....
http://www.parliament.the-stationery...38we/13828.htm
http://navyleag.customer.netspace.net.au/fc_07jop.htm
As pr00ne says, terrorism is a major threat. However, it is not the only one, indeed when the Sea Harrier was discussed on Newsnight last year Lewis Moonie himself said that sea skimming missiles are the most serious threat to naval forces. Also see....
http://www.navalofficer.com.au/missiles.htm
http://www.global-defence.com/2001/MSpart4.html
http://www.aeronautics.ru/moskit01.htm
http://homepage.tinet.ie/~steven/anti_ship.htm
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/m...row/index.html
Rollocks, it was the "admiralty" that took the decision, the same people who removed Sea Eagle from the inventory and even now are reviewing the need for Sub-Harpoon in the SSN fleet.
If I may be allowed to comment on that statment...
In early/mid 2001, the then CINCFLEET, Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh, wrote a report called the Fleet Risks Register. In it he made a number of worrying remarks, most notable of these was that ships of the Fleet were at a greater risk of being hit by sea skimming missiles than at any other time since the Falklands war, due to various problems with ship based defences. He was First Sea Lord when the Sea Harrier decision was made. He left the post early....
His replacement, Admiral Sir Alan West, who had been CINCFLEET at the time of the decision, had experience of being on the receiving end of an air attack when his ship, Ardent, was sunk during the Falklands campaign. On the first page of this thread I provided a link to a recent interview with him, in which he says that from 2006 until the time JSF enters the Royal Navy will be unable to conduct a major operation against an opponent with a significant air force without the support of the US, in other words the Navy doesn't need air defence as long as it isn't required to go to war without Uncle Sam. Remember that he too has to just go along the company line in public.
Also since the SDR the Sea Harrier units have come under the command of 3 Group (RAF), part of Strike Command. This may or may not be relevent, but it is worth remembering.
Jacko you may well wonder about the importance of naval/maritime forces - but you might want to think about the commitment of naval forces to UN and NATO operations off of Bosnia. For several years we permantly had a carrier commited to that theatre of operations, with Sea Harriers (initially FRS1 but later FA2) flying air defence, attack and reece sorties, sometimes all three roles in the same mission. Before you start harping on about escorts, the CVS was in general supported by one or two frigates. We also contributed to the NATO Operation Sharp Gaurd, over the time it ran the UK contribution had involved something like twenty frigates and destroyers and four or five SSNs. Then there were several stand offs with Iraq in the late '90s, then Kosovo, then Sierra Leone (whether or not land based aircraft could have got there faster naval forces would have been involved), Sierra Leone again in late 2000 (the Amphibious Ready Group sent to deter the rebels), then Operation Veritas, then Telic.... Plus routine operations at the same time.
The following two links may interest you....
http://www.parliament.the-stationery...38we/13828.htm
http://navyleag.customer.netspace.net.au/fc_07jop.htm
As pr00ne says, terrorism is a major threat. However, it is not the only one, indeed when the Sea Harrier was discussed on Newsnight last year Lewis Moonie himself said that sea skimming missiles are the most serious threat to naval forces. Also see....
http://www.navalofficer.com.au/missiles.htm
http://www.global-defence.com/2001/MSpart4.html
http://www.aeronautics.ru/moskit01.htm
http://homepage.tinet.ie/~steven/anti_ship.htm
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/m...row/index.html
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
WEBF,
With reference to Admiral West's point, he was being disingenuous. With the present SHAR force the Royal Navy would already be unable to conduct a major operation against an opponent with a significant air force. They would be overwhelmed in any significant attack by sheer numbers. They might inflict some losses, but it would be a Pyrrhic victory.
With regards to operations in the Adriatic and the Gulf, there were more than sufficient AD forces available both from land bases and the USN. And I hardly think Sierra Leone provided an AD threat.
I am afraid that, since the Falklands, there hasn't been an operation where the SHAR has been militarily required, rather than being deployed to justify it's own existence.
That doesn't mean that there aren't any scenarios in which it's unique capabilities would not be required. Just that they are far rarer than you claim, and not considered sufficiently likely to justify diverting funding from other programmes.
With reference to Admiral West's point, he was being disingenuous. With the present SHAR force the Royal Navy would already be unable to conduct a major operation against an opponent with a significant air force. They would be overwhelmed in any significant attack by sheer numbers. They might inflict some losses, but it would be a Pyrrhic victory.
With regards to operations in the Adriatic and the Gulf, there were more than sufficient AD forces available both from land bases and the USN. And I hardly think Sierra Leone provided an AD threat.
I am afraid that, since the Falklands, there hasn't been an operation where the SHAR has been militarily required, rather than being deployed to justify it's own existence.
That doesn't mean that there aren't any scenarios in which it's unique capabilities would not be required. Just that they are far rarer than you claim, and not considered sufficiently likely to justify diverting funding from other programmes.
Last edited by ORAC; 18th Aug 2003 at 17:45.
Exactly! Orac has summed it up precisely.
If the Sea Harrier's AD capability (its OS/BAI/Recce capabilities will all be retained by the carrier wing through the GR9) is to be judged as vital as you would wish, in today's financial climate, with competing demands on resources it would have to have been used regularly (it hasn't) and in circumstances where no alternative was available or even possible. In the Adriatic, Sierra Leone, and Telic, this was not the case.
So, in summary:
1) It's a rarely needed capability which can be provided effectively using land based air power and/or allied assets
2) It's increasingly irrelevant to post Cold War and littoral operations
3) The capability gap you're whining about will be exceptionally brief
If the Sea Harrier's AD capability (its OS/BAI/Recce capabilities will all be retained by the carrier wing through the GR9) is to be judged as vital as you would wish, in today's financial climate, with competing demands on resources it would have to have been used regularly (it hasn't) and in circumstances where no alternative was available or even possible. In the Adriatic, Sierra Leone, and Telic, this was not the case.
So, in summary:
1) It's a rarely needed capability which can be provided effectively using land based air power and/or allied assets
2) It's increasingly irrelevant to post Cold War and littoral operations
3) The capability gap you're whining about will be exceptionally brief
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But North Korea and Iran aren't remote islands that have a credible air threat that can't be countered by land based assets, that should remove the no AD problem until the JSF comes in 
Rivetjoint,
Are you SERIOUSLY suggesting that the UK would ever even remotely contemplate taking on North Korea or Iran WITHOUT the US between 2006 and 2012.
If you are then I think the lack of SHAR would be the very least of our worries!
Are you SERIOUSLY suggesting that the UK would ever even remotely contemplate taking on North Korea or Iran WITHOUT the US between 2006 and 2012.
If you are then I think the lack of SHAR would be the very least of our worries!
And even if formations of pigs flapped past, that we'd do it by sea power alone, without ensuring that we had basing in neighbouring countries?
And the real question is "what would you do without to pay for SHar?"
And the real question is "what would you do without to pay for SHar?"
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WEBF,
Firstly,let me state that I believe that the passing of an organic maritime AMRAAM capability for the RN (as opposed to the SHAR per se), IS a dangerous capability gap.
I highlight the difference because if there had been more vision and less inter service rivalry, then perhaps the GR7/9 could have been procured with a radar 10 years ago. The Blue Vixen would have been the obvious choice, although I suggest that integration costs would have been prohibitative. Alternatively, we could have followed the lead of the Italians, Spaniards and USMC in adding the APG-65 to the airframe. Then the SHAR could have been retired gracefully.
Frankly however, the SHAR airframe is of little value. I have read your regular posts about how useful the FRS1 and FA2 was in the Balkans. Rubbish! As an AWACS operator who flew many long hours coordinating the full spectrum of air assets over Croatia, BH, Serbia, Kosovo, Albania and the Adriatic between 93 and 99, the SHAR brought very little to the table.
It had no PGM capability (unless a Jag or GR7 lased for it), it's recce capability was extremely limited, and it's endurance even more so. When Invincible pitched up for a couple of weeks during ALLIED FORCE in 99, they refused to disembark the SHARS to Italy, thereby reducing it's endurance considerably. The SHARS would then pop up once or twice a day to do a 20 min DCA CAP. This compared to the 2-4 hrs which most useful assets did. Such endurance over Afghanistan would have made it next to useless given the distances involved.
The RAF/FAA GR7/9 will soon get the excellent ASRAAM, which will close the gap between AIM-9 and AMRAAM. Moreover, the GR7/9, whilst not having an AI radar, will at least have Sea King ASaC7 support. While the AMRAAM capability is a loss, please stop harping about how useful the SHAR is. Don't get me wrong, I'm a believer in naval air power (although they always rely heavily on land based ISTAR and AAR support). But the SHAR is not a major loss. There are FAR more important things for the MoD to be spending dosh on.
Regards,
M2
Firstly,let me state that I believe that the passing of an organic maritime AMRAAM capability for the RN (as opposed to the SHAR per se), IS a dangerous capability gap.
I highlight the difference because if there had been more vision and less inter service rivalry, then perhaps the GR7/9 could have been procured with a radar 10 years ago. The Blue Vixen would have been the obvious choice, although I suggest that integration costs would have been prohibitative. Alternatively, we could have followed the lead of the Italians, Spaniards and USMC in adding the APG-65 to the airframe. Then the SHAR could have been retired gracefully.
Frankly however, the SHAR airframe is of little value. I have read your regular posts about how useful the FRS1 and FA2 was in the Balkans. Rubbish! As an AWACS operator who flew many long hours coordinating the full spectrum of air assets over Croatia, BH, Serbia, Kosovo, Albania and the Adriatic between 93 and 99, the SHAR brought very little to the table.
It had no PGM capability (unless a Jag or GR7 lased for it), it's recce capability was extremely limited, and it's endurance even more so. When Invincible pitched up for a couple of weeks during ALLIED FORCE in 99, they refused to disembark the SHARS to Italy, thereby reducing it's endurance considerably. The SHARS would then pop up once or twice a day to do a 20 min DCA CAP. This compared to the 2-4 hrs which most useful assets did. Such endurance over Afghanistan would have made it next to useless given the distances involved.
The RAF/FAA GR7/9 will soon get the excellent ASRAAM, which will close the gap between AIM-9 and AMRAAM. Moreover, the GR7/9, whilst not having an AI radar, will at least have Sea King ASaC7 support. While the AMRAAM capability is a loss, please stop harping about how useful the SHAR is. Don't get me wrong, I'm a believer in naval air power (although they always rely heavily on land based ISTAR and AAR support). But the SHAR is not a major loss. There are FAR more important things for the MoD to be spending dosh on.
Regards,
M2
This reply was written before M2's post
And may well contain errors.....any FAA guys (or girls) gong to join in?
The list I put in the above posting was a list of events which involved the deployment of naval/maritime forces, in response to Jacko's suggestion that the Navy is no longer important. Perhaps I should also have included Granby as well, or East Timor, or patrols in the Med and Indian Ocean as part of the "War Against Terror"? It was not meant to be a list of places where the Sea Harrier was deployed, although it was deployed in some of them.
Saying that the involvement of the Sea Harrier was for political reasons instead of military ones, and therefore it should go seems like a dangerous and illogical argument. What precentage of coalition aircraft did the RAF provide in the Gulf? 6% wasn't it? Perhaps the involvement was political? I'm not saying the RAF should be cutback, in fact I think the opposite, it needs boosting up, but if you apply the "scrap it as it seems insignificant compared to the Americans" argument then you would scrap the entire Armed Forces!
Yes, there were no hostile aircraft in Sierra Leone - but what if there had been? Imagine for a minute that a neighbouring African country had been involved in the civil war, and did not take too kindly to the presence of British forces. "You think you can come here and fly around in your big helicopters do you? We'll show you". If they had started using MiGs, armed helicopters or whatever to interfere with our helicopters then would you not agree the Sea Harrier would have been very useful in putting an end to those sort of antics?
pr00ne In a previous post you said that you consider that fact that France, Italy and Spain have organic air defence, and have taken the troble to acquire a shipborne BVR capability to be irelevant. Don't you think that the fact that they consider it a "must have" tells you something? An don't you think that this might be because they studied the lessons of the Falklands?
ORAC I think Admiral West made a fair point. If we find ourselves at war without the US it will probably be against a nation with a capable, but not huge, air force. (I'm using lower case as I'm also including naval and army air arms.) The Sea Harrier was vastly outnumbered in the Falklands, yet we won, despite the predictions of the doom and gloom merchants. Today the Sea Harrier is more capable, with Blue Vixen and AMRAAM, and has the adavantage of working with AEW, either from the Sea King Mk7s of 849 NAS or from land based RAF AWACS aircraft. The ships of the fleet are better armed too, with all RN frigates having Sea Wolf, shipborne radar being better, better decoys, Phlalanx/Goalkeeper systems and so on.
I think you are thinking that only five or six (or eight) Sea Harriers would be deployed. It could be many more than that (more than one CVS could be deployed) - at least until the cuts start next year. Extra pilots coul be found doing other duties elsewhere in the RN, and the RNR Air Branch would no doubt provide much needed back up.
Also we are not talkng about totally defeating the enemy air capability and completely dominating the air space over their territory, just providing a reasonable degree of air defence (to prevent ship base defences being saturated by sheer numbers of enemy aircraft or air launched missiles - ie multi layered defence) in the area around/over a naval task group or amphibious landing, or until an expeditionary air base can be secured from which land based aircraft can be operated.
Who can say where British forces will need to be deployed? There is trouble and strife all over the world, relying on Uncle Sam all the time is probably not a good idea.
Only the dead have seen the end of war Plato
If on the 10th September 2001 you had posted on PPRuNe saying that you were worried about terrorists hijacking airliners and crashing them into buildings you would probably have been laughed at, and told that you had been writing too many Tom Clancy style novels. Yet that did happen the following day.
In 1980 a study was conducted at the Maritime Tactical School that consiered the defence of a task group. One of the recommendations was that organic Airborne Early Warning was neeed. John Nott (spit) ignored this, and drew up his 1981 Defence White Paper on the basis that we would not need to go to war without the Americans or outside the NATO theatre. We all know what happened next.....
As Jacko says it is a matter of paying for it. Is there any truth in the rumour that the cutbacks of early 2002 happened because the Trasury refused to underwrite the costs involved in the initial phases of Operation Veritas?
Will it once again take major loss of life to convince the Government that it has made a mistake?
M2 - I've only read your post quickly, can I suggest that you read some of Nozzles' (ex SHAR pilot) posts. Anyway I thought the idea of Joint Force Harrier was that the FA2 did air defence, and the GR7/9 did the ground attack? And wasn't the GR9 ASRAAM integration scrapped?
The list I put in the above posting was a list of events which involved the deployment of naval/maritime forces, in response to Jacko's suggestion that the Navy is no longer important. Perhaps I should also have included Granby as well, or East Timor, or patrols in the Med and Indian Ocean as part of the "War Against Terror"? It was not meant to be a list of places where the Sea Harrier was deployed, although it was deployed in some of them.
Saying that the involvement of the Sea Harrier was for political reasons instead of military ones, and therefore it should go seems like a dangerous and illogical argument. What precentage of coalition aircraft did the RAF provide in the Gulf? 6% wasn't it? Perhaps the involvement was political? I'm not saying the RAF should be cutback, in fact I think the opposite, it needs boosting up, but if you apply the "scrap it as it seems insignificant compared to the Americans" argument then you would scrap the entire Armed Forces!
Yes, there were no hostile aircraft in Sierra Leone - but what if there had been? Imagine for a minute that a neighbouring African country had been involved in the civil war, and did not take too kindly to the presence of British forces. "You think you can come here and fly around in your big helicopters do you? We'll show you". If they had started using MiGs, armed helicopters or whatever to interfere with our helicopters then would you not agree the Sea Harrier would have been very useful in putting an end to those sort of antics?
pr00ne In a previous post you said that you consider that fact that France, Italy and Spain have organic air defence, and have taken the troble to acquire a shipborne BVR capability to be irelevant. Don't you think that the fact that they consider it a "must have" tells you something? An don't you think that this might be because they studied the lessons of the Falklands?
ORAC I think Admiral West made a fair point. If we find ourselves at war without the US it will probably be against a nation with a capable, but not huge, air force. (I'm using lower case as I'm also including naval and army air arms.) The Sea Harrier was vastly outnumbered in the Falklands, yet we won, despite the predictions of the doom and gloom merchants. Today the Sea Harrier is more capable, with Blue Vixen and AMRAAM, and has the adavantage of working with AEW, either from the Sea King Mk7s of 849 NAS or from land based RAF AWACS aircraft. The ships of the fleet are better armed too, with all RN frigates having Sea Wolf, shipborne radar being better, better decoys, Phlalanx/Goalkeeper systems and so on.
I think you are thinking that only five or six (or eight) Sea Harriers would be deployed. It could be many more than that (more than one CVS could be deployed) - at least until the cuts start next year. Extra pilots coul be found doing other duties elsewhere in the RN, and the RNR Air Branch would no doubt provide much needed back up.
Also we are not talkng about totally defeating the enemy air capability and completely dominating the air space over their territory, just providing a reasonable degree of air defence (to prevent ship base defences being saturated by sheer numbers of enemy aircraft or air launched missiles - ie multi layered defence) in the area around/over a naval task group or amphibious landing, or until an expeditionary air base can be secured from which land based aircraft can be operated.
Who can say where British forces will need to be deployed? There is trouble and strife all over the world, relying on Uncle Sam all the time is probably not a good idea.
Only the dead have seen the end of war Plato
If on the 10th September 2001 you had posted on PPRuNe saying that you were worried about terrorists hijacking airliners and crashing them into buildings you would probably have been laughed at, and told that you had been writing too many Tom Clancy style novels. Yet that did happen the following day.
In 1980 a study was conducted at the Maritime Tactical School that consiered the defence of a task group. One of the recommendations was that organic Airborne Early Warning was neeed. John Nott (spit) ignored this, and drew up his 1981 Defence White Paper on the basis that we would not need to go to war without the Americans or outside the NATO theatre. We all know what happened next.....
As Jacko says it is a matter of paying for it. Is there any truth in the rumour that the cutbacks of early 2002 happened because the Trasury refused to underwrite the costs involved in the initial phases of Operation Veritas?
Will it once again take major loss of life to convince the Government that it has made a mistake?
M2 - I've only read your post quickly, can I suggest that you read some of Nozzles' (ex SHAR pilot) posts. Anyway I thought the idea of Joint Force Harrier was that the FA2 did air defence, and the GR7/9 did the ground attack? And wasn't the GR9 ASRAAM integration scrapped?
Rather than lecturing our betters (they're my betters as well as yours) on whose posts they should read, young WEBF, and rather than larding your posts with endless links, perhaps you should read the posts made by M2, who has direct experience of the SHar's contribution and capabilities in recent real world ops, and those of Proone, who succinctly and lucidly explained to you how the world has changed. It's great that our contribution to these debates is tolerated, but let's not lose sight of the fact that they are professionals. You're posting on the basis of admirable sentiment and an enthusiasm based on your reading of history, and there's nothing wrong with that. I don't have your courage (and I don't have the military experience) to make my own mind up on issues like this, and I merely re-present what seems to be the consensus among those pros I've spoken to.
The air threat you outline ("what if it had happened in Sierra Leone") would not require a radar/BVRAAM capability. RoE nowadays often force a reliance on shorter range weapons, like AIM-9 and ASRAAM. Where a radar/BVRAAM capability is required it can be provided by land based assets or by allied aircraft.
It's all about priorities and spending limited resources wisely. It's a harsh world with no room for sentiment and historical gratitude. We must spend limited money on the core, 'must have' capabilities - which SHar may have been when the Cold War raged, and ASW groups needed to operate in Blue Water, threatened by 'Backfires' and missile launching 'Bears' and 'Badgers'. It's not in an age of littoral warfare and coalition ops, any more than Sea Eagle was, or WE177. Retaining these big ticket Cold War relics is not the way forward when budgets start being trimmed. Retaining the SHar does not NOW represent a wise use of resources.
As a POI, I believe that ASRAAM hasn't yet been reinstated on the GR9, though this would be relatively easy.
The air threat you outline ("what if it had happened in Sierra Leone") would not require a radar/BVRAAM capability. RoE nowadays often force a reliance on shorter range weapons, like AIM-9 and ASRAAM. Where a radar/BVRAAM capability is required it can be provided by land based assets or by allied aircraft.
It's all about priorities and spending limited resources wisely. It's a harsh world with no room for sentiment and historical gratitude. We must spend limited money on the core, 'must have' capabilities - which SHar may have been when the Cold War raged, and ASW groups needed to operate in Blue Water, threatened by 'Backfires' and missile launching 'Bears' and 'Badgers'. It's not in an age of littoral warfare and coalition ops, any more than Sea Eagle was, or WE177. Retaining these big ticket Cold War relics is not the way forward when budgets start being trimmed. Retaining the SHar does not NOW represent a wise use of resources.
As a POI, I believe that ASRAAM hasn't yet been reinstated on the GR9, though this would be relatively easy.
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WEBF,
I've read many of Nozzles posts. Clearly he has first hand experience of operating the SHAR. I do not. However, I do have experience of the wider C2 picture, and of working as a Liaison Officer in the Vicenzia CAOC during the Balkans conflicts various. I've tasked and been involved in the employment of virtually every NATO ac type in service, and seen how flexible and how useful different aircraft are.
It is only natural that nozzles defends his ac. Just as Navy News articles will always place a very one sided view.
But I stand by my comments: SHAR FRS1 or FA2 contributed very little.
Jacko,
WRT use of short range vice BVR AAMs during recent conflicts, modern ROE often palces the emphasis upon AMRAAM. Experience from OAF (where all kills were AMRAAM), and more recent ops in Afganistan and Iraq reinforce this. However, the SHAR cannot employ the missile in the same way as an F-15 or F-16. As I say, I believe that AMRAAM is a loss for the fleet, the SHAR is not.
Regards,
M2
I've read many of Nozzles posts. Clearly he has first hand experience of operating the SHAR. I do not. However, I do have experience of the wider C2 picture, and of working as a Liaison Officer in the Vicenzia CAOC during the Balkans conflicts various. I've tasked and been involved in the employment of virtually every NATO ac type in service, and seen how flexible and how useful different aircraft are.
It is only natural that nozzles defends his ac. Just as Navy News articles will always place a very one sided view.
But I stand by my comments: SHAR FRS1 or FA2 contributed very little.
Jacko,
WRT use of short range vice BVR AAMs during recent conflicts, modern ROE often palces the emphasis upon AMRAAM. Experience from OAF (where all kills were AMRAAM), and more recent ops in Afganistan and Iraq reinforce this. However, the SHAR cannot employ the missile in the same way as an F-15 or F-16. As I say, I believe that AMRAAM is a loss for the fleet, the SHAR is not.
Regards,
M2
I stand corrected!
"However, the SHAR cannot employ the missile in the same way as an F-15 or F-16." Don't tell me (no, really, don't tell me) another half-arsed Tornado F3 '******'s muddle' half-arsed integration?
Then there's AMRAAM reliability in UK service....
"However, the SHAR cannot employ the missile in the same way as an F-15 or F-16." Don't tell me (no, really, don't tell me) another half-arsed Tornado F3 '******'s muddle' half-arsed integration?
Then there's AMRAAM reliability in UK service....
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The only thing we learn from history is that we learn nothing from history. I don’t know who first said that, but many people here are trying to prove it.
“1) It's a rarely needed capability which can be provided effectively using land based air power and/or allied assets” from Jacko (not picking on you especially, just you gave a succinct post that illustrates my point above very easily).
Anyone heard this argument before? Remember how half-arsed it turned out to be then? You’d have to move Australia a little more than the 300 miles the RAF moved it for the F-111 proposal to persuade anyone that the F3 could cover the globe. Allied assets is another argument advanced then that held no water. War is the time when you realise how few real allies you have, and who does not want to get involved.
“2) It's increasingly irrelevant to post Cold War and littoral operations”
This is not even an argument, until there are no Styx/Silkworm missiles out there in the hands of unstable governments, no potential enemies with air attack capabilities. Remember Falklands. Remember Nott. We thought that then. Felt like idiots when not only did the impossible happen, it was our cutbacks and plans for more that precipitated it.
“3) The capability gap you're whining about will be exceptionally brief”
No need to insult if your arguments are coherent. The gap had not even developed in the Falklands and the capability was needed. There was very little warning. What is the relevance of the gap length, then?
All your arguments were those discussed in the Dartmouth History of Naval Aviation syllabus, they are almost identical to the arguments advanced 30 or so years ago for giving up carrier aviation. The history lecturers at Dartmouth may both have been tending towards being nerds, but they knew their naval history.
“1) It's a rarely needed capability which can be provided effectively using land based air power and/or allied assets” from Jacko (not picking on you especially, just you gave a succinct post that illustrates my point above very easily).
Anyone heard this argument before? Remember how half-arsed it turned out to be then? You’d have to move Australia a little more than the 300 miles the RAF moved it for the F-111 proposal to persuade anyone that the F3 could cover the globe. Allied assets is another argument advanced then that held no water. War is the time when you realise how few real allies you have, and who does not want to get involved.
“2) It's increasingly irrelevant to post Cold War and littoral operations”
This is not even an argument, until there are no Styx/Silkworm missiles out there in the hands of unstable governments, no potential enemies with air attack capabilities. Remember Falklands. Remember Nott. We thought that then. Felt like idiots when not only did the impossible happen, it was our cutbacks and plans for more that precipitated it.
“3) The capability gap you're whining about will be exceptionally brief”
No need to insult if your arguments are coherent. The gap had not even developed in the Falklands and the capability was needed. There was very little warning. What is the relevance of the gap length, then?
All your arguments were those discussed in the Dartmouth History of Naval Aviation syllabus, they are almost identical to the arguments advanced 30 or so years ago for giving up carrier aviation. The history lecturers at Dartmouth may both have been tending towards being nerds, but they knew their naval history.
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Well said sir.
You never know what is around the corner and you can never rely on host nation support for your shiny light blue jets. Thats why Carrier Aviation is so critical. If it wasnt why would Uncle Sam spend billions of dollars maintaining and expanding their carrier aviation capability?
Oggin
You never know what is around the corner and you can never rely on host nation support for your shiny light blue jets. Thats why Carrier Aviation is so critical. If it wasnt why would Uncle Sam spend billions of dollars maintaining and expanding their carrier aviation capability?
Oggin
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
The case for eliminating the carrier force was far more complicated than you make out, but eventually came down to the fact we couldn't afford the three that would have been required.
The situation in today is similar. The situation is not that a case cannot be made made for the SHAR, it can. It is that better cases can be made for other capabilities.
If you wish to find the money to refurbish and retain the SHAR, the money must be found from eslewhere in the RN budget. Please explain where. Because, in the present climate, you will not get extra from the treasury.
And if I were you, I'd start worrying about where they plan to find the extra £3 billion for the new carriers as well. Now about those SSN boats and their reactors........
The situation in today is similar. The situation is not that a case cannot be made made for the SHAR, it can. It is that better cases can be made for other capabilities.
If you wish to find the money to refurbish and retain the SHAR, the money must be found from eslewhere in the RN budget. Please explain where. Because, in the present climate, you will not get extra from the treasury.
And if I were you, I'd start worrying about where they plan to find the extra £3 billion for the new carriers as well. Now about those SSN boats and their reactors........