On Thin Ice: UK Defence in the Arctic
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
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On Thin Ice: UK Defence in the Arctic
https://publications.parliament.uk/p.../388/38802.htmAir
89.In addition to maritime surface and sub-surface assets being committed to anti-submarine warfare, the ability to locate and track a heightened level of submarine activity over such a wide area places great importance on airborne anti-submarine warfare capability. Before 2011 the UK’s long range fixed-wing airborne ASW capability was sustained by the fleet of Nimrod MR2 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). The Nimrod MR2s were due to have their service lives extended by being upgraded to the Nimrod MRA4 variant, but after lengthy and costly delays this project was cancelled in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). All Nimrods were withdrawn from service in 2011, leaving the UK with a capability gap in MPA. Our predecessor Committee strongly criticised this decision in its 2010 report following the SDSR.230 The Lords Arctic Committee, anticipating the 2015 SDSR, singled out the capability gap in MPA as a particularly serious deficiency in terms of maintaining both military and search and rescue capability:
The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review must give urgent consideration to reintroducing a maritime patrol capability for the UK. This is needed for both defence and search and rescue operations.231
Professor Grove told us “The loss of the maritime patrol aircraft cannot be overestimated as a blow to our anti-submarine warfare capabilities.”232
90.As well as lowering awareness of potentially hostile submarines entering the North Atlantic, reduced maritime surveillance presents a particular risk to the security of the UK’s nuclear deterrent based at HM Naval Base Clyde in Faslane, Scotland. From 2010 several media reports suggested that the Russian submarines were making repeated attempts to record the distinctive acoustic signatures of the UK’s Vanguard class ballistic missile submarines as they entered and exited Faslane. Successfully recording these signatures could allow the Vanguard class submarines to be more easily detected, identified and tracked at sea. These reports also suggested that the UK was having to place heavy reliance on other NATO allies to conduct maritime surveillance.233
91.In the 2015 SDSR it was announced that the UK’s MPA capability would be regenerated with the purchase of nine Boeing P-8A Poseidon aircraft from the United States, due to come into service in 2019. These aircraft would be based at RAF Lossiemouth in Scotland and manned by crews who had sustained their skills in airborne ASW by being embedded with the US Navy.234 In 2017 the UK signed a Statement of Intent with the US and Norway to enhance co-operation in maritime security in the North Atlantic, based on their common operation of the P-8A platform.235
92.While this move to address part of the capability gap that had been created is welcome, James Gray MP questioned whether the numbers of P-8A aircraft the UK is buying were sufficient.236 In the course of our recent inquiry ahead of the Modernising Defence Programme, we received detailed written evidence from former RAF officers with extensive experience of ASW operations who argued that the intended aircraft and crew provision for the MPA force was too low to fulfil the range of tasks under its responsibility, particularly in light of the fact that the RAF had over 40 Nimrod MPA in the 1970s. They believed that unrealistic assumptions had been made about the ability of NATO allies to contribute to MPA provision and that at least 16 aircraft and a higher crewing requirement was needed to attain the necessary coverage.237 Written submissions to this inquiry have also noted the P-8As being purchased configured to the US Navy’s requirements in terms of manned-unmanned teaming and air-to-air refuelling. The latter issue is a particular problem as the P-8A aircraft are not compatible with the air-to-air refuelling system used by the RAF’s Voyager tankers and will significantly limit their operational range if it is not addressed.238 When the Minister for the Armed Forces was asked whether he thought that nine P-8As would be sufficient, he said:
“I think our contribution of nine to the wider NATO force is a very reasonable one, yes. We are working closely with both our Norwegian and US allies, and I think collectively the NATO force is sufficient”.239
93.A 2016 report from the NATO Joint Air Competence Centre on airborne ASW noted a dramatic decline since the end of the Cold War in airborne ASW capability across the Alliance. This report notes a range of deficiencies in the numbers and availability of MPA platforms, the levels of training and exercising, interoperability, doctrine, command and control structures, and ground infrastructure. The report also makes recommendations on how several of these issues might be addressed to bring NATO’s ASW capability back towards its former level of effectiveness.240
94.We have received substantial evidence that nine Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft are not enough for the UK to provide sufficient anti-submarine warfare coverage in the North Atlantic. The extent of the current threat is openly acknowledged by Ministers and airborne anti-submarine warfare capability is a crucial part of the response. The Department should provide the Committee with a detailed justification of the planned maritime patrol aircraft establishment.
95.In 2017 work began to restore the Remote Radar Head facility at RAF Saxa Vord in the Shetland Islands which had been closed in 2006.241 According to the Government the station has been re-established “to provide early warning of Russian military activity on NATO’s northern flank”.242 Reports accompanying the announcement that the facility reaching its Initial Operational Capacity indicated that the RAF has been required to launch 69 Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) operations over the previous five years in response to military aircraft nearing UK airspace.243 Saxa Vord is due to reach full operating capacity by the end of 2018.244
96.Group Captain Clive Blount RAF (Rtd), an officer with extensive experience of the High North, gave us some indication of the practical difficulties of air operations in the region:
“The issue with air is that it is about range. In the High North, we are talking massively long distances to have any sort of effect. We have gradually become an increasingly short-range Air Force in my view. The F-35 variant we are selecting is not the longest range by a long means. The Norwegians have realised that in their selection of the F-35, which is a longer-range version, they are going to need tankers. I have a feeling that we have had a push towards a far more tactical range Air Force than we used to have, and that causes issues when we are operating in the High North, primarily because there is a paucity of basing and areas to operate”.245
97.Group Captain Blount went on to discuss the challenges of operating in low temperatures and the need to have regard to environmental operating boundaries of equipment. As well as temperature, there are additional environmental considerations which have to be taken into account in the higher latitudes. Due to many satellites holding equatorial geostationary orbits, communication or navigation equipment reliant on satellites such as GPS will be adversely affected. Space weather also has a greater impact when operating in proximity to the magnetic pole.246
98.The Department should provide reassurance that air platforms have the range and resilience to sustain operations in the High North, and give evidence that proper testing has taken place of the capability of equipment in cold temperatures and at high latitudes.
89.In addition to maritime surface and sub-surface assets being committed to anti-submarine warfare, the ability to locate and track a heightened level of submarine activity over such a wide area places great importance on airborne anti-submarine warfare capability. Before 2011 the UK’s long range fixed-wing airborne ASW capability was sustained by the fleet of Nimrod MR2 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). The Nimrod MR2s were due to have their service lives extended by being upgraded to the Nimrod MRA4 variant, but after lengthy and costly delays this project was cancelled in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). All Nimrods were withdrawn from service in 2011, leaving the UK with a capability gap in MPA. Our predecessor Committee strongly criticised this decision in its 2010 report following the SDSR.230 The Lords Arctic Committee, anticipating the 2015 SDSR, singled out the capability gap in MPA as a particularly serious deficiency in terms of maintaining both military and search and rescue capability:
The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review must give urgent consideration to reintroducing a maritime patrol capability for the UK. This is needed for both defence and search and rescue operations.231
Professor Grove told us “The loss of the maritime patrol aircraft cannot be overestimated as a blow to our anti-submarine warfare capabilities.”232
90.As well as lowering awareness of potentially hostile submarines entering the North Atlantic, reduced maritime surveillance presents a particular risk to the security of the UK’s nuclear deterrent based at HM Naval Base Clyde in Faslane, Scotland. From 2010 several media reports suggested that the Russian submarines were making repeated attempts to record the distinctive acoustic signatures of the UK’s Vanguard class ballistic missile submarines as they entered and exited Faslane. Successfully recording these signatures could allow the Vanguard class submarines to be more easily detected, identified and tracked at sea. These reports also suggested that the UK was having to place heavy reliance on other NATO allies to conduct maritime surveillance.233
91.In the 2015 SDSR it was announced that the UK’s MPA capability would be regenerated with the purchase of nine Boeing P-8A Poseidon aircraft from the United States, due to come into service in 2019. These aircraft would be based at RAF Lossiemouth in Scotland and manned by crews who had sustained their skills in airborne ASW by being embedded with the US Navy.234 In 2017 the UK signed a Statement of Intent with the US and Norway to enhance co-operation in maritime security in the North Atlantic, based on their common operation of the P-8A platform.235
92.While this move to address part of the capability gap that had been created is welcome, James Gray MP questioned whether the numbers of P-8A aircraft the UK is buying were sufficient.236 In the course of our recent inquiry ahead of the Modernising Defence Programme, we received detailed written evidence from former RAF officers with extensive experience of ASW operations who argued that the intended aircraft and crew provision for the MPA force was too low to fulfil the range of tasks under its responsibility, particularly in light of the fact that the RAF had over 40 Nimrod MPA in the 1970s. They believed that unrealistic assumptions had been made about the ability of NATO allies to contribute to MPA provision and that at least 16 aircraft and a higher crewing requirement was needed to attain the necessary coverage.237 Written submissions to this inquiry have also noted the P-8As being purchased configured to the US Navy’s requirements in terms of manned-unmanned teaming and air-to-air refuelling. The latter issue is a particular problem as the P-8A aircraft are not compatible with the air-to-air refuelling system used by the RAF’s Voyager tankers and will significantly limit their operational range if it is not addressed.238 When the Minister for the Armed Forces was asked whether he thought that nine P-8As would be sufficient, he said:
“I think our contribution of nine to the wider NATO force is a very reasonable one, yes. We are working closely with both our Norwegian and US allies, and I think collectively the NATO force is sufficient”.239
93.A 2016 report from the NATO Joint Air Competence Centre on airborne ASW noted a dramatic decline since the end of the Cold War in airborne ASW capability across the Alliance. This report notes a range of deficiencies in the numbers and availability of MPA platforms, the levels of training and exercising, interoperability, doctrine, command and control structures, and ground infrastructure. The report also makes recommendations on how several of these issues might be addressed to bring NATO’s ASW capability back towards its former level of effectiveness.240
94.We have received substantial evidence that nine Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft are not enough for the UK to provide sufficient anti-submarine warfare coverage in the North Atlantic. The extent of the current threat is openly acknowledged by Ministers and airborne anti-submarine warfare capability is a crucial part of the response. The Department should provide the Committee with a detailed justification of the planned maritime patrol aircraft establishment.
95.In 2017 work began to restore the Remote Radar Head facility at RAF Saxa Vord in the Shetland Islands which had been closed in 2006.241 According to the Government the station has been re-established “to provide early warning of Russian military activity on NATO’s northern flank”.242 Reports accompanying the announcement that the facility reaching its Initial Operational Capacity indicated that the RAF has been required to launch 69 Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) operations over the previous five years in response to military aircraft nearing UK airspace.243 Saxa Vord is due to reach full operating capacity by the end of 2018.244
96.Group Captain Clive Blount RAF (Rtd), an officer with extensive experience of the High North, gave us some indication of the practical difficulties of air operations in the region:
“The issue with air is that it is about range. In the High North, we are talking massively long distances to have any sort of effect. We have gradually become an increasingly short-range Air Force in my view. The F-35 variant we are selecting is not the longest range by a long means. The Norwegians have realised that in their selection of the F-35, which is a longer-range version, they are going to need tankers. I have a feeling that we have had a push towards a far more tactical range Air Force than we used to have, and that causes issues when we are operating in the High North, primarily because there is a paucity of basing and areas to operate”.245
97.Group Captain Blount went on to discuss the challenges of operating in low temperatures and the need to have regard to environmental operating boundaries of equipment. As well as temperature, there are additional environmental considerations which have to be taken into account in the higher latitudes. Due to many satellites holding equatorial geostationary orbits, communication or navigation equipment reliant on satellites such as GPS will be adversely affected. Space weather also has a greater impact when operating in proximity to the magnetic pole.246
98.The Department should provide reassurance that air platforms have the range and resilience to sustain operations in the High North, and give evidence that proper testing has taken place of the capability of equipment in cold temperatures and at high latitudes.
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All very true and difficult to argue with ... except they aren't responsible for saying where the cash will come from................
also Grp Cpt Blount seems to be thinking any UK F-35's will be operating from fixed bases whereas surely they'll be operating off our carriers?
also Grp Cpt Blount seems to be thinking any UK F-35's will be operating from fixed bases whereas surely they'll be operating off our carriers?
AAR used to be known as a 'force multiplier'.
A bit difficult to multiply its small 9 ac P-8A fleet if the RAF doesn't have a tanker able to do so. Nor can the RAF refuel its own RC-135 fleet. If the E-7A is acquired to replace the E-3D, I doubt very much whether it will be probe-equipped either.
Although the F-35B will often be embarked, it takes an aircraft carrier task force quite a while to move about the globe - and such movement provides clear warning of potential F-35B deployment to any potential enemy.
A bit difficult to multiply its small 9 ac P-8A fleet if the RAF doesn't have a tanker able to do so. Nor can the RAF refuel its own RC-135 fleet. If the E-7A is acquired to replace the E-3D, I doubt very much whether it will be probe-equipped either.
Although the F-35B will often be embarked, it takes an aircraft carrier task force quite a while to move about the globe - and such movement provides clear warning of potential F-35B deployment to any potential enemy.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
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The full report raises questions on the capability of the Astute submarine force to operate in the area, and the lack of a proper operational concept for carriers to do the same - as well as a failure for the conditions to be taken into account in their design.
Taking into account their scarcity, tasking in other maritime areas including the wider North Atlantic, and the threat of the Russian submarine and ASW air threat, it would be imprudent to depend on a handful of carrier based F-35s and Merlins to fulfill the role.
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And i would suggets a small fleet of say 6 conventional subs for work in the defence of the UK, N Sea, N Cape, Baltic and the Med. Plus it has the benefit of not taking up an Astute for Perisher work and general submarine training.
The recent slide of Sterling against the green back suggests that those nine are going cost about the same as would have bought ten.
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slightly O/T
When I was first posted to the squadron, the tech library was full of bloody interesting AP's about operating aircraft and supporting equipment in the "high north". And other, more nasty stuff...
When the mighty F3 took over, lock stock and barrel, these detailed publications were swiftly got rid of by the new management...
I'd be surprised if anyone in the Air Force has a clue nowadays.
When the mighty F3 took over, lock stock and barrel, these detailed publications were swiftly got rid of by the new management...
I'd be surprised if anyone in the Air Force has a clue nowadays.
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The first three Astutes cost £ 1.3 Bn apiece approx
All very true and difficult to argue with ... except they aren't responsible for saying where the cash will come from................
also Grp Cpt Blount seems to be thinking any UK F-35's will be operating from fixed bases whereas surely they'll be operating off our carriers?
also Grp Cpt Blount seems to be thinking any UK F-35's will be operating from fixed bases whereas surely they'll be operating off our carriers?
FB
Last edited by Finningley Boy; 16th Aug 2018 at 20:51. Reason: UPDATE
