Operation Mikado
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
There was also Op Fingent - the deployment of 1ACC's T259 radar to Balmaceda Airport - Al C******y as one of the controllers IIRC?
http://www.pprune.org/military-aviat...le-1982-a.html
http://www.pprune.org/military-aviat...le-1982-a.html
Wen and Shack,Albert was fitted with a low-speed basket,and used `tobogganing` if we were not able to maintain speed with another tanker or receiver.A selection of `wigs` could also be attached to the basket ,as an `incentive` to a prodder finding it difficult to `get it in`...!
Herc tankers are used regularly to refuel helos,probably around 130-150 kts...It was early days,but I`m sure it could have been sorted.....just neede a bit of `lateral `thinking...
Herc tankers are used regularly to refuel helos,probably around 130-150 kts...It was early days,but I`m sure it could have been sorted.....just neede a bit of `lateral `thinking...
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Wensleydale is correct - big difference between trying to regain your own territory and attacking another country
We never went to war with Argentina in a legal sense - it was more a "police action"
Plus our American allies would have been really p***** off and it wouldn't have done much with the other S American nations who were either on our side (Chile) or neutral-ish (Brazil)
Special Forces attacks over long distances can work (Entebbe, perhaps the best example) but they can also go wrong (US hostage rescue in Iran). They decided it wasn't worth the risk - especially once we were onshore
We never went to war with Argentina in a legal sense - it was more a "police action"
Plus our American allies would have been really p***** off and it wouldn't have done much with the other S American nations who were either on our side (Chile) or neutral-ish (Brazil)
Special Forces attacks over long distances can work (Entebbe, perhaps the best example) but they can also go wrong (US hostage rescue in Iran). They decided it wasn't worth the risk - especially once we were onshore
I strongly recommend to read "Exocet Falklands" by Ewen Southby Tailyour, about SF ops to destroy the SuE / Exocet.
There was three DA missions ordered:
Plum Duff, a DA / Recce mission against Rio Grande. It was aborted early.
Mikado, a DA mission against Rio Grande. Plum Duff was prerequisite of Mikado, so Mikado never started.
Kettledrum, a DA mission against Puerto Deseado.
Also, a recce mission, called Shutter was executed. The idea is boots on the ground to report departures from Comodoro Rivadavia, Rio Gallegos and Rio Grande.
I´ve never heard about a strike from the carriers to the mainland. It was a risky mission, putting in jeopardy the entire operation (lost a carrier and Corporate was off). However, recently desclassified files shows Vulcan missions against the mainland were analyzed and prepared.
Regards!
There was three DA missions ordered:
Plum Duff, a DA / Recce mission against Rio Grande. It was aborted early.
Mikado, a DA mission against Rio Grande. Plum Duff was prerequisite of Mikado, so Mikado never started.
Kettledrum, a DA mission against Puerto Deseado.
Also, a recce mission, called Shutter was executed. The idea is boots on the ground to report departures from Comodoro Rivadavia, Rio Gallegos and Rio Grande.
I´ve never heard about a strike from the carriers to the mainland. It was a risky mission, putting in jeopardy the entire operation (lost a carrier and Corporate was off). However, recently desclassified files shows Vulcan missions against the mainland were analyzed and prepared.
Regards!
One of the interesting things Ewen ST touches on, but doesn't expand, is the other operations going on in Chile at the time (UKSF, - both SAS and SBS were mentioned, C-130 - the Nimrod R1 ops from San Felix are menioned). Presumably the C130 was related to Operation Fingent.
I was half expecting you to pop up Mario. Hope you are keeping well. Complements of the season to you.
Drag
Drag
Presumably the C130 was related to Operation Fingent.
Regards!
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Data Library - Interview with Fernando Matthei The whole interview is there in Spanish, but only portions are translated into English. The English portions are copied below. Someone else can translate the Spanish if they wish, some covers the Nimrods and the C-130s, which also transmitted via Easter Island.
During October 2007, I was sent this transcript of an interview given by Chilean Air Force General, Mr. Fernando Matthei on July 1999 who was C-in-C of the Chilean Air Force (FACH) and member of the Military Junta that ruled Chile between September 1973 until March 1990. It was originally published in a Chilean local newspaper 'La Tercera'. I have included the original Spainish text and English translation (in italics) for most of the interview.
What is the origin of this help and what was your role?
In first place I have to say that this war was a surprise to everybody. I learned myself reading "El Mercurio" (Chilean Newspaper). We knew there was a chance this war might materialize but I never thought the Argentineans were that crazy. Years after the war, I spoke with a friend, former C in C of the Argentianian Air Force, Mr Omar Grafina Rubens, and he didn't know about it as well. He just retired and his successor was Mr. Arturo Basilio Lami Dozo. Even in a meeting where he did participate they kept him aside. I have to admit that was a very well kept secret. Nobody knew about it. They took the British by surprise and to us Chileans as well.
What was yours and the goverment's reaction?
Take notice of it and remain alert. Two days later my chief of intelligence, General Vicente Rodriguez, told me an English officer sent by the RAF would like to meet me. I told him I was ok. It was Wing Commander Sidney Edwards, a character that didn't look Englishman at all and spoke perfect Spanish.
Can you describe this gentleman?
He was a young man, around 35-40 years old. Very active and nervous, he was full of adrenaline. He came with a letter from Sir David Great, C in C of the RAF asking if we could help them. He was fully empowered to coordinate anything that we could do together. This sounded very interesting to me. Their main interest was to gather intelligence information. The British never worried about Argentina; they knew everything about the Soviet Union but they knew nothing about Argentina. Edwards asked me if we could help them. I told him I couldn't act on my own and I would discuss with General Pinochet (member of the military junta and de facto head of state).
Did you talk with Pinochet about this "offer"?
I spoke with him in very general terms, telling him we had a great opportunity here. We didn't care if the Argentineans were at war with British because then, as Galtieri said, we would be the next ones. We were just digesting the speech given at Plaza de Mayo where in front of the people he mentioned Malvinas will be just the start. He looked like Mussolini.
Were you worried about this speech?
We worried that after the islands they would attack us. After all, they believed some of our territories belonged to them. In principle, Pinochet agreed I worked with them but nobody should know. We wouldn't even mention this to our foreign office.
Did the Navy or Army got a similar request?
No
Why do you think the British choose the Air Force?
Good question. They knew me because I was Air Force attaché in UK between December 1971 and January 1974.
They took advantage of the personal relationship then?
I visited their industries of war material and I had contact with British senior officers. While I was there, I signed contracts to buy six Hawker Hunter and six Vampires. They knew me, we had a fluid relationship. Been at London, I went to the Soviet Union, I gave the British a copy of the visit's report I gave to the FACH. They knew I was their friend, although Chile, ruled at that time by a socialist government, was considered by them a member of the "East block".
What did you do after meeting Pinochet?
We agreed to keep it secret and then I met Sidney Edwards again telling him I was fully empowered on this subject and we would operate under my criteria. Edwards told me that British Embassy nor the navy attaché should know about his existence. Edwards went to England then to discuss what they could do with us. Upon his return, he asked for intelligence.
What would Chile get in return?
They will sell us, at one pound, Hawker Hunters. These would arrive by plane immediately. Also a long range radar, air-air misiles, and aerial recon Canberra aircraft. This material was very important, especially the Canberras because we didn't have any before. They fly very high, like the Americans U-2 and they have huge cameras. Also, they would send us a 'Moondrop', specialized in intelligence, communications and electronic espionage. It was very much like a passenger 707 but modified.
And the Argentinean spies?
There were no Argentinean spies and we didn't have spies in Argentina either. With this plane we did high altitude flights over Chilean Territory, getting signals from the other side. Ours, because of the Andes and type of plane, couldn't fly that high in order to gather signals.
Who piloted the plane?
The British, although we had our observers on board. They gave us the necessary information about the Argentineans but nothing we didn't know before. This flight didn't help us, but was done, so for the story, is good to know. The British were impressed for what they saw thru our systems in the south and the long range radar we had in Punta Arenas.
You spied with that radar to the other side?
This one was bought to France and had a range of 200 miles. We installed it in a little hill. On the ground we had numerous listening posts to check all radio communications in Argentina. We also had, from before, an underground command post close to Punta Arenas. All the information arrived there in a very graphic format, like a cinema. It is there where Sydney Edwards remained.
How did Edwards send the information to his senior officers?
He had satellite communications directly with the Royal Navy central command in Northwood, close to London. What happened here the British knew immediately.
The British couldn't get a better ally?
Impossible. We told them, for example, that four planes left a specific base, in which direction and that because of their speed, they were Mirage apparently. One hour before they arrived, the British knew already.
How long did it last?
The whole war. At the end, we kept the plane, radars, misiles and planes. They [the British] got on-time information and everybody was satisfied.
'Thank you and goodbye'?
Of course. And Sidney Albert Edwards was fired the next day for personal reasons. Later I learned he was involved in arms contraband with Croatia.
British Commandos in Punta Arenas
The only tangible proof that Chile had to do something with England during the conflict, was the chapter of a Helicopter that had an emergency landing close to Punta Arenas and its crew was rescued by Chilean Police.
One day Sidney Edwards came to confess that a British chopper landed in Chilean territory. I asked him what happened, in lieu of our agreement that they will not make any military operation to Argentina from Chilean territory and that no plane operated against Argentina would land in Chile. That was the fundamental agreement we had.
What happened?
They organize an operation, not from commandos but "ultra" commandos, to destroy the Super Etendard planes of the Argentinean Navy who where capable to operate Exocet. The British knew Argentinean had six Exocet and they already corroborated their capabilities: with just one of them they sunk the Sheffield one day after they sunk the Belgrano. But the commandos got lost and they didn't find anything better that land in Chile. They did it west of Punta Arenas, close to a road in an opening in the woods. As soon as they touched ground they burned the chopper and although nobody saw them land, the smoke alerted the police.
What happened to the commandos?
After burning the aircraft they alerted Sidney Edwards on the radio in order to see what to do. I answered that they had to go to our air base where a Chilean intelligence officer would meet them. They would be given plainclothes and they would be flown to Santiago in a commercial flight. That was exactly what happened. They should've been interned in Chile because that is the law but I did offer them another alternative. This is why Ms. Thatcher also mentioned about saving human life.
Did the Argentineans learn about the incident?
Yes and we had to give them lengthy explanations, swearing that we didn't know anything about it. I don't know if they did believe us or not but honestly I got angered about this issue and I had to face Pinochet telling him "look what these stupid did". The General had to alert the our Foreign Office and give explanations.
General Matthei also gave a TV interview to Chile's National Channel along similar lines in September 2005 - see Chilean General Did Everything to Help the British Win in 1982 (external link)
During October 2007, I was sent this transcript of an interview given by Chilean Air Force General, Mr. Fernando Matthei on July 1999 who was C-in-C of the Chilean Air Force (FACH) and member of the Military Junta that ruled Chile between September 1973 until March 1990. It was originally published in a Chilean local newspaper 'La Tercera'. I have included the original Spainish text and English translation (in italics) for most of the interview.
What is the origin of this help and what was your role?
In first place I have to say that this war was a surprise to everybody. I learned myself reading "El Mercurio" (Chilean Newspaper). We knew there was a chance this war might materialize but I never thought the Argentineans were that crazy. Years after the war, I spoke with a friend, former C in C of the Argentianian Air Force, Mr Omar Grafina Rubens, and he didn't know about it as well. He just retired and his successor was Mr. Arturo Basilio Lami Dozo. Even in a meeting where he did participate they kept him aside. I have to admit that was a very well kept secret. Nobody knew about it. They took the British by surprise and to us Chileans as well.
What was yours and the goverment's reaction?
Take notice of it and remain alert. Two days later my chief of intelligence, General Vicente Rodriguez, told me an English officer sent by the RAF would like to meet me. I told him I was ok. It was Wing Commander Sidney Edwards, a character that didn't look Englishman at all and spoke perfect Spanish.
Can you describe this gentleman?
He was a young man, around 35-40 years old. Very active and nervous, he was full of adrenaline. He came with a letter from Sir David Great, C in C of the RAF asking if we could help them. He was fully empowered to coordinate anything that we could do together. This sounded very interesting to me. Their main interest was to gather intelligence information. The British never worried about Argentina; they knew everything about the Soviet Union but they knew nothing about Argentina. Edwards asked me if we could help them. I told him I couldn't act on my own and I would discuss with General Pinochet (member of the military junta and de facto head of state).
Did you talk with Pinochet about this "offer"?
I spoke with him in very general terms, telling him we had a great opportunity here. We didn't care if the Argentineans were at war with British because then, as Galtieri said, we would be the next ones. We were just digesting the speech given at Plaza de Mayo where in front of the people he mentioned Malvinas will be just the start. He looked like Mussolini.
Were you worried about this speech?
We worried that after the islands they would attack us. After all, they believed some of our territories belonged to them. In principle, Pinochet agreed I worked with them but nobody should know. We wouldn't even mention this to our foreign office.
Did the Navy or Army got a similar request?
No
Why do you think the British choose the Air Force?
Good question. They knew me because I was Air Force attaché in UK between December 1971 and January 1974.
They took advantage of the personal relationship then?
I visited their industries of war material and I had contact with British senior officers. While I was there, I signed contracts to buy six Hawker Hunter and six Vampires. They knew me, we had a fluid relationship. Been at London, I went to the Soviet Union, I gave the British a copy of the visit's report I gave to the FACH. They knew I was their friend, although Chile, ruled at that time by a socialist government, was considered by them a member of the "East block".
What did you do after meeting Pinochet?
We agreed to keep it secret and then I met Sidney Edwards again telling him I was fully empowered on this subject and we would operate under my criteria. Edwards told me that British Embassy nor the navy attaché should know about his existence. Edwards went to England then to discuss what they could do with us. Upon his return, he asked for intelligence.
What would Chile get in return?
They will sell us, at one pound, Hawker Hunters. These would arrive by plane immediately. Also a long range radar, air-air misiles, and aerial recon Canberra aircraft. This material was very important, especially the Canberras because we didn't have any before. They fly very high, like the Americans U-2 and they have huge cameras. Also, they would send us a 'Moondrop', specialized in intelligence, communications and electronic espionage. It was very much like a passenger 707 but modified.
And the Argentinean spies?
There were no Argentinean spies and we didn't have spies in Argentina either. With this plane we did high altitude flights over Chilean Territory, getting signals from the other side. Ours, because of the Andes and type of plane, couldn't fly that high in order to gather signals.
Who piloted the plane?
The British, although we had our observers on board. They gave us the necessary information about the Argentineans but nothing we didn't know before. This flight didn't help us, but was done, so for the story, is good to know. The British were impressed for what they saw thru our systems in the south and the long range radar we had in Punta Arenas.
You spied with that radar to the other side?
This one was bought to France and had a range of 200 miles. We installed it in a little hill. On the ground we had numerous listening posts to check all radio communications in Argentina. We also had, from before, an underground command post close to Punta Arenas. All the information arrived there in a very graphic format, like a cinema. It is there where Sydney Edwards remained.
How did Edwards send the information to his senior officers?
He had satellite communications directly with the Royal Navy central command in Northwood, close to London. What happened here the British knew immediately.
The British couldn't get a better ally?
Impossible. We told them, for example, that four planes left a specific base, in which direction and that because of their speed, they were Mirage apparently. One hour before they arrived, the British knew already.
How long did it last?
The whole war. At the end, we kept the plane, radars, misiles and planes. They [the British] got on-time information and everybody was satisfied.
'Thank you and goodbye'?
Of course. And Sidney Albert Edwards was fired the next day for personal reasons. Later I learned he was involved in arms contraband with Croatia.
British Commandos in Punta Arenas
The only tangible proof that Chile had to do something with England during the conflict, was the chapter of a Helicopter that had an emergency landing close to Punta Arenas and its crew was rescued by Chilean Police.
One day Sidney Edwards came to confess that a British chopper landed in Chilean territory. I asked him what happened, in lieu of our agreement that they will not make any military operation to Argentina from Chilean territory and that no plane operated against Argentina would land in Chile. That was the fundamental agreement we had.
What happened?
They organize an operation, not from commandos but "ultra" commandos, to destroy the Super Etendard planes of the Argentinean Navy who where capable to operate Exocet. The British knew Argentinean had six Exocet and they already corroborated their capabilities: with just one of them they sunk the Sheffield one day after they sunk the Belgrano. But the commandos got lost and they didn't find anything better that land in Chile. They did it west of Punta Arenas, close to a road in an opening in the woods. As soon as they touched ground they burned the chopper and although nobody saw them land, the smoke alerted the police.
What happened to the commandos?
After burning the aircraft they alerted Sidney Edwards on the radio in order to see what to do. I answered that they had to go to our air base where a Chilean intelligence officer would meet them. They would be given plainclothes and they would be flown to Santiago in a commercial flight. That was exactly what happened. They should've been interned in Chile because that is the law but I did offer them another alternative. This is why Ms. Thatcher also mentioned about saving human life.
Did the Argentineans learn about the incident?
Yes and we had to give them lengthy explanations, swearing that we didn't know anything about it. I don't know if they did believe us or not but honestly I got angered about this issue and I had to face Pinochet telling him "look what these stupid did". The General had to alert the our Foreign Office and give explanations.
General Matthei also gave a TV interview to Chile's National Channel along similar lines in September 2005 - see Chilean General Did Everything to Help the British Win in 1982 (external link)
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Shackman, there was also a high speed drogue gun assisted parachute trial for the V-Force around 1972 over the Akrotiri Salt Lake with the Shack at 300 it's.
AAR wise I seem to recall another problem besides AVGAS and that was the unpressurized fuel system, gravity refueling?
And another probably would have been lack of Avgas at ASI.
AAR wise I seem to recall another problem besides AVGAS and that was the unpressurized fuel system, gravity refueling?
And another probably would have been lack of Avgas at ASI.
Interesting stuff, thanks. I remember the wrongly spelt C130 being mentioned in the aviation 'spotting' magazines at the time (I was but a schoolboy in 1982) but I don't think anyone had a photograph of it.
I think I´ve posted this one in another thread, but the image shows the early warning assests of the fleet, covering Rio Grande Naval Air Base (home of SuE / Exocet and others Argentine Navy and AAF units) and Rio Gallegos Naval Air Base on late May 1982.
So you have:
- A Chilean Thomson CSF radar near Punta Arenas.
- HMS Valiant and HMS Spartan on EW picket duty
- At least a couple of "boots on the ground" patrol covering the airports (Op Shutter)
The fleet has 40 minutes of early warning. Yep, better having a Gannet of Shackleton on task, but worst is nothing...
The Op Fingent radar was much further nort.
Regards!
ExRAFRadar: What was the point of the single Sea Harrier launch against the Mainland and putting the Invincible in harm's way?
Show we could do it?
I would have thought the Argie Air Planners could see we could do it
Show we could do it?
I would have thought the Argie Air Planners could see we could do it
Ex RAF, in Chapter 28 of Sharkey's book, he indicates that the plan for 5 June was for Invincible to proceed in darkness to the south of the Southern tip of West Falkland and launch a Sea Harrier CAP as close to 80 miles of the coast of Argentina to "virtually challenge the enemy fighters to come out and play". The plan was for 3 harriers to launch in intervals to maintain a single ship CAP. There had also been intelligence that Argentine C-130's were still doing supply runs under the cover of darkness. Sharkey complained abut SAR coverage and reduced the station to 120 miles from the ship. Sharkey was the first to launch and said he could clearly see the coastline on his radar, and exhaust plumes from plants on the shore. The third aircraft was recalled early as fog set in. After the final recovery the 3 ships sprinted back east.
Reference: Ward, Sea Harrier over the Falklands, pages 249-252
Ex RAF, in Chapter 28 of Sharkey's book, he indicates that the plan for 5 June was for Invincible to proceed in darkness to the south of the Southern tip of West Falkland and launch a Sea Harrier CAP as close to 80 miles of the coast of Argentina to "virtually challenge the enemy fighters to come out and play". The plan was for 3 harriers to launch in intervals to maintain a single ship CAP. There had also been intelligence that Argentine C-130's were still doing supply runs under the cover of darkness. Sharkey complained abut SAR coverage and reduced the station to 120 miles from the ship. Sharkey was the first to launch and said he could clearly see the coastline on his radar, and exhaust plumes from plants on the shore. The third aircraft was recalled early as fog set in. After the final recovery the 3 ships sprinted back east. Reference: Ward, Sea Harrier over the Falklands, pages 249-252
(From Invincible´s War Diary - and to avoid any comment, yes, I´ve stole it from Adm. Woodward´s safe)
I strongly recommend to read "Exocet Falklands" by Ewen Southby Tailyour, about SF ops to destroy the SuE / Exocet.
There was three DA missions ordered:
Plum Duff, a DA / Recce mission against Rio Grande. It was aborted early.
Mikado, a DA mission against Rio Grande. Plum Duff was prerequisite of Mikado, so Mikado never started.
Kettledrum, a DA mission against Puerto Deseado.
Also, a recce mission, called Shutter was executed. The idea is boots on the ground to report departures from Comodoro Rivadavia, Rio Gallegos and Rio Grande.
I´ve never heard about a strike from the carriers to the mainland. It was a risky mission, putting in jeopardy the entire operation (lost a carrier and Corporate was off). However, recently desclassified files shows Vulcan missions against the mainland were analyzed and prepared.
Regards!
There was three DA missions ordered:
Plum Duff, a DA / Recce mission against Rio Grande. It was aborted early.
Mikado, a DA mission against Rio Grande. Plum Duff was prerequisite of Mikado, so Mikado never started.
Kettledrum, a DA mission against Puerto Deseado.
Also, a recce mission, called Shutter was executed. The idea is boots on the ground to report departures from Comodoro Rivadavia, Rio Gallegos and Rio Grande.
I´ve never heard about a strike from the carriers to the mainland. It was a risky mission, putting in jeopardy the entire operation (lost a carrier and Corporate was off). However, recently desclassified files shows Vulcan missions against the mainland were analyzed and prepared.
Regards!
Yes, according to the book they take a Chilean Secret Service BE350 down to somewhere south, then borrow a Chilean Huey to recce Rio Grande from the air and take some photos.
I can't personally vouch for that particular episode but some of the later events overlapped with my experience, and they check out.
I can't personally vouch for that particular episode but some of the later events overlapped with my experience, and they check out.
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Reaching FIEZ
Wensleydale will also confirm that there was a 'serious' question asked of 8 Sqn on whether it could reach the FIEZ and how long it could remain on task. Once off task the plan was to ditch near the TF. While this might have given a useful, albeit very short, time on task the best that could be achieved was 4 or 5 shots before writing off the sqn.
With hindsight, for we were told nothing else, the question might have been in relation to either the initial Black Buck raid or of the initial landings on East Falklands rather than guessing when to launch. Under that assumption the question was not as daft as it seemed. Certainly there was pressure within light blue on trying to get a piece of the action.
With hindsight, for we were told nothing else, the question might have been in relation to either the initial Black Buck raid or of the initial landings on East Falklands rather than guessing when to launch. Under that assumption the question was not as daft as it seemed. Certainly there was pressure within light blue on trying to get a piece of the action.
The question asked of me at HQSTC, while I was the desk officer for AEW at the time was, 'How long can a Shackleton stay on task 2000nm from Ascension". The conversation went like this:
GMP: Oh, about 15 minutes, which allowing for plan of a 20kt headwind would be as long as it would take to splash down out of fuel.
Astonished WgCdr AD: But the bl**dy things fly for hours!
GMP: Yes we do, but at 180kts range speed we don't actually go very far.
Even more astonished Wg Cdr AD: Pause of silence, obviously thinking something like 'How do I tell the RN that!' then departed down the corridor at high speed.
To help, I then wrote a paper proposing cutting the radars out of the Shack to put them in ISO containers to get them installed as ground stations on FI. For all manner of practical considerations it didn't come off...I suspect much to the disappointment of a large proportion of 8 Sqn.
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Did the RN have any submarines with a capability to deliver some kind of missile into the Argentine military airfields? Less risky than aircraft?
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I remember a plan for the Buccaneers around Cape Horn. It would have been interesting to say the least. But think what we could have done with conventional carriers (cat & trap) Buccs and F4s!