Martin Baker to be prosecuted over death of Flt Lt. Sean Cunningham
As Viking is probably reading thus let me make it absolutely clear that I was certainly not sneering at anyone, thats nonsense. Nor am I saying that things were safer in our day, they certainly were not, that was my point. We lost Lightnings at a dreadful rate, mainly reheat fires, the Canberra, a big Jet Provost on two but was a potential killer on one, killing even the Marham (Wyton ?) station commander near the end of its career in an asymmetric accident, to name just two. It gave me two nasty frights with engine failures at critical times, both outside ejection seat limits.
The number of Meteors lost in the '50s too, was truly dreadful, over 800.
A lot more Gnats were lost at Valley than Hawks, in which I have had a couple of flights, including XX310 now a Reds aircraft, Vampire T11s, on which I trained, too. Modern aircraft, civil and military, are vastly safer and more reliable than we had in the 60s but that is no reason to relax safety standards, and certainly not a reason to ignore the hard earned experience of your predecessors. I can still remember many aspects of my own ejection when not everything went exactly to plan.
I don't sneer at anyone and certainly not in a dreadful accident such as this.
But I will make one thing clear. As a former airline air safety officer and a member of the U.K. Flight safety committee, including two years as its Vice Chair, I Absolutely believe that if you are serious about safety you have to be brutally honest, no sacred cows, no, or as little emotion as possible, you need to get at the truth in order to prevent a recurrence.
I have no idea how the current "safety reporting system" works in the modern RAF, it seems to have some problems, but in civil aviation we created a "just culture" system. Creating it was hard work but it has created an incredibly high standard of safety in civil ops. The RAF may well have something to learn from it.
And just for Vikings point , I well know the personal effect of a fatality on families. My wife's sister was killed in an aircraft accident in which her brother in law, the pilot taking off at their farm strip, and their child survived . I have seen first hand the effects on the family, particularly the parents, it was truly dreadful not least because my father in law pulled. His dead daughter from the wreckage. . We are still unsure of the root cause but there are never any reasons not to try and get at the truth, human factors or technical, in order to prevent a recurrence and I know my parents in law shared that view.
So, of course I would hate to be in the situation you suggest, but is my absolutely sincerest wish that Sean' s loss will not be totally in vain if it prevents a recurrence.
The number of Meteors lost in the '50s too, was truly dreadful, over 800.
A lot more Gnats were lost at Valley than Hawks, in which I have had a couple of flights, including XX310 now a Reds aircraft, Vampire T11s, on which I trained, too. Modern aircraft, civil and military, are vastly safer and more reliable than we had in the 60s but that is no reason to relax safety standards, and certainly not a reason to ignore the hard earned experience of your predecessors. I can still remember many aspects of my own ejection when not everything went exactly to plan.
I don't sneer at anyone and certainly not in a dreadful accident such as this.
But I will make one thing clear. As a former airline air safety officer and a member of the U.K. Flight safety committee, including two years as its Vice Chair, I Absolutely believe that if you are serious about safety you have to be brutally honest, no sacred cows, no, or as little emotion as possible, you need to get at the truth in order to prevent a recurrence.
I have no idea how the current "safety reporting system" works in the modern RAF, it seems to have some problems, but in civil aviation we created a "just culture" system. Creating it was hard work but it has created an incredibly high standard of safety in civil ops. The RAF may well have something to learn from it.
And just for Vikings point , I well know the personal effect of a fatality on families. My wife's sister was killed in an aircraft accident in which her brother in law, the pilot taking off at their farm strip, and their child survived . I have seen first hand the effects on the family, particularly the parents, it was truly dreadful not least because my father in law pulled. His dead daughter from the wreckage. . We are still unsure of the root cause but there are never any reasons not to try and get at the truth, human factors or technical, in order to prevent a recurrence and I know my parents in law shared that view.
So, of course I would hate to be in the situation you suggest, but is my absolutely sincerest wish that Sean' s loss will not be totally in vain if it prevents a recurrence.
Last edited by RetiredBA/BY; 23rd Jan 2017 at 08:44.
Mach2number
Others more knowledgeable have answered this same question on other threads. The best answer is, and I paraphrase, what regulations do you think should now be waived? You may be correct about other military aircraft, but that just highlights that for seven years the MAA have been rewriting the regulations, when Hadden-Cave confirmed the problem was lack of implementation. If you keep looking at the final act, the seat cock up, you miss the worst failure of all. No safety case is indefensible.
dervish,
Why don't we just ground everything, no problems then. I would bet in hindsight that no military aircraft from day 1 even to the present would pass the current criteria.
Why don't we just ground everything, no problems then. I would bet in hindsight that no military aircraft from day 1 even to the present would pass the current criteria.
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ask why you never thought to raise a F765X
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F765X is the current form to request an amendment to Aircrew publications. Presumably there were others before it, or other mechanisms to request an amendment to publications?
BV, if I came across as precious or jumpy I apologise. As to being knowledgeable and wise, I'm old that's all, but that has some merit for anyone who's been aircrew in itself. Like overstress, I too was an FSO and was lucky enough to be that it seems at the zenith of the RAF Flight Safety System (merely going by what I have since learned on PPRuNe).
I didn't take BA/BY's post as being anything other than one of commenting on the published findings of the SI. You think that posting that is hurtful for his loved ones. I can only say that the greatest support experienced on other Airworthiness Related Fatal Accident threads has been from families of the deceased. More than anything they wanted others to be spared the pain and suffering they had experienced in losing their loved ones. It was they who castigated MOD apologists trying to shut down debate in their name!
Every tragedy is unique I know, but we cannot hope to avoid further ones unless we consider everything involved. The elephant in this room, and in all the other fatal accident threads, is the UK Military Air Regulator, aka the MAA, aka the MOD. It is fatally compromised and reform is urgent. If you are a UK Military Aviator that must concern you, it certainly does me and I'm retired! I have learned more about Military Air Safety on this forum than I ever did while serving. As an ex Flt Lt pilot, if I can do that so can you. Then you can become "knowledgeable and wise" too!
I didn't take BA/BY's post as being anything other than one of commenting on the published findings of the SI. You think that posting that is hurtful for his loved ones. I can only say that the greatest support experienced on other Airworthiness Related Fatal Accident threads has been from families of the deceased. More than anything they wanted others to be spared the pain and suffering they had experienced in losing their loved ones. It was they who castigated MOD apologists trying to shut down debate in their name!
Every tragedy is unique I know, but we cannot hope to avoid further ones unless we consider everything involved. The elephant in this room, and in all the other fatal accident threads, is the UK Military Air Regulator, aka the MAA, aka the MOD. It is fatally compromised and reform is urgent. If you are a UK Military Aviator that must concern you, it certainly does me and I'm retired! I have learned more about Military Air Safety on this forum than I ever did while serving. As an ex Flt Lt pilot, if I can do that so can you. Then you can become "knowledgeable and wise" too!
Derv, Chug et Al,
I am obviously not knowledgable. I hold no candle for the MAA. Neither would I cite waivers - I have been out of the RAF for 10 years. I merely state my opinions as follows: In the early 1980s, the RAF sought, maybe optimistically, to bring in a system of open reporting, without prejudice. All were encouraged to report incognito, any aviation problems, outside of the 765 system. It started well, but as it happened, some tried to find out who the 'incognito' were. Trust became lost, a period sometimes referred to as 'Flight Safety by Cruxifiction' ensued. Open reports dried up because punishment was possible. So here we are now 30+ years later, the lawyers have taken over the cruxifiction and any quick way of learning aviation lessons, short of accidents, has probably been lost for ever.. Its all very sad. Here endeth my last post on this issue.
I am obviously not knowledgable. I hold no candle for the MAA. Neither would I cite waivers - I have been out of the RAF for 10 years. I merely state my opinions as follows: In the early 1980s, the RAF sought, maybe optimistically, to bring in a system of open reporting, without prejudice. All were encouraged to report incognito, any aviation problems, outside of the 765 system. It started well, but as it happened, some tried to find out who the 'incognito' were. Trust became lost, a period sometimes referred to as 'Flight Safety by Cruxifiction' ensued. Open reports dried up because punishment was possible. So here we are now 30+ years later, the lawyers have taken over the cruxifiction and any quick way of learning aviation lessons, short of accidents, has probably been lost for ever.. Its all very sad. Here endeth my last post on this issue.
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Drustonferp, I (ahem) may have a dusty, mildewed copy of the Hawk aircrew manual somewhere. When I get home from my trip I'll look it up. I do recall some form of wording in the front saying any amendments should be addressed to OC Handling Squadron. It's a good point and I will be interested to see what the chapter on the Mk10 seat had to say in 1997.
overstress and dru. I might have (ahem) a copy of Hastings C Mk1 Pilots Notes. If I did, then the Notes to Users (AL2 May 61) would say that comments and suggestions should be forwarded to OC Handling Squadron, RAF Boscombe Down. But only if I did, you understand...
When I did a refresher course on the Hawk at Valley in 1980, I was briefed very thoroughly about the need to check that the seat firing handle was fully 'down' in its housing when reinserting the pin. Also that this had to be done visually, not by fumble and feel (e.g. the JP guillotine pin).
Same at Chivenor on the first of the new courses; brakes on, engine shut down, then L00K and replace the seat pin, then the canopy pin.
With a zero/zero seat, it would be utter folly to replace the pins with the engine running - should there be a fire, it might be your only way out!
Same at Chivenor on the first of the new courses; brakes on, engine shut down, then L00K and replace the seat pin, then the canopy pin.
With a zero/zero seat, it would be utter folly to replace the pins with the engine running - should there be a fire, it might be your only way out!
mach2number
The use of MF765 (Unsatisfactory Feature Report) is laid down a number of documents, the primary one being the mandated procedural Defence Standard that controls maintenance of the build standard (now cancelled without replacement) – without which the safety case cannot be validated and no Release to Service can be issued. There, gliders in a nutshell.
In the early 1990s, funding to do this was cut by 28% per year, for over 3 years. Direct orders were issued not to use the MF765 (or MF760 fault reporting) systems – part of the “savings at the expense of safety” confirmed by Mr Haddon-Cave; although he dated them to 1998, not 1987, despite the actual documents and directives being submitted to him. There, systemic airworthiness failings in a nutshell.
While some of this work has been resurrected, by no means all – evidenced by the much abbreviated definition of it in the MAA documentation. Plainly, no-one in the MAA has ever managed such work before. There, current problems in a nutshell.
Sorry, to seem a little pedantic, but you mean functional safety, not physical. But you are right – very few are taught how to achieve either. And anyone who doesn’t know what a MF765 is, shouldn’t really be allowed near an aircraft unaccompanied. And anyone who encourages staff not to raise them shouldn’t be in employment. There, MoD’s personnel problems in a nutshell!
The problem not so many years ago was that we were taught procedural safety as a foil to absolute physical safety (which is unachievable). I doubt anyone knew what a F765X was and would probably not have been encouraged to submit one.
In the early 1990s, funding to do this was cut by 28% per year, for over 3 years. Direct orders were issued not to use the MF765 (or MF760 fault reporting) systems – part of the “savings at the expense of safety” confirmed by Mr Haddon-Cave; although he dated them to 1998, not 1987, despite the actual documents and directives being submitted to him. There, systemic airworthiness failings in a nutshell.
While some of this work has been resurrected, by no means all – evidenced by the much abbreviated definition of it in the MAA documentation. Plainly, no-one in the MAA has ever managed such work before. There, current problems in a nutshell.
Sorry, to seem a little pedantic, but you mean functional safety, not physical. But you are right – very few are taught how to achieve either. And anyone who doesn’t know what a MF765 is, shouldn’t really be allowed near an aircraft unaccompanied. And anyone who encourages staff not to raise them shouldn’t be in employment. There, MoD’s personnel problems in a nutshell!
BEagle
I first started flying aircraft with zero/zero bang seats in 2002. At least as far back as that we have been replacing pins on the taxi back. Indeed in certain aircraft we would fully unstrap and have the canopy open.
Should there be a fire the safest thing may be to shut the aircraft down and climb out.
You may now be horrified to hear this but consider how many uncontained engine fires there have been on the ground in this period (none that I am aware of). There have been several rapid egresses though where having the seat safe will have speeded (is this a word?!) up the process and made it more safe.
There have been procedural changes since Sean's accident but I won't go into them here. Please don't shoot the messenger.
BV
Should there be a fire the safest thing may be to shut the aircraft down and climb out.
You may now be horrified to hear this but consider how many uncontained engine fires there have been on the ground in this period (none that I am aware of). There have been several rapid egresses though where having the seat safe will have speeded (is this a word?!) up the process and made it more safe.
There have been procedural changes since Sean's accident but I won't go into them here. Please don't shoot the messenger.
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BV, I started fast jet flying a couple of years before BEagle and from 75 onwards flew 6000 hours on zero/zero ejection seats. If my memory serves me correctly we used the simple principle that if the canopy was down we were strapped in and seats live. If the canopy/canopies were open we were seat safe and unstrapped. On any bang seat it is implicit that the occupant makes the seat SAFE at a time when it can be ensured SAFELY. If it was essential to taxi back with the canopy open (due to excess temperatures) then we stopped for 15 seconds and safed up the seat safely. Yes, and for you younger ones we used to fly jets that did not have AirCon and cockpit temperature could reach 50°C+
Indeed, it must have been positively chilly back in the day. The younger ones will have flown aircraft still without conditioning on the ground, lacking a canopy that could be opened for taxi and temperatures knocking on 50°C just walking out to the aircraft.
But yes, your point is well made - some of the 'norms' that crept in with pins, seat safety and checks did not help matters at all.
But yes, your point is well made - some of the 'norms' that crept in with pins, seat safety and checks did not help matters at all.
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Beagle, D2,
Perhaps SOPs change. I've only ever had back seat trips so, I'm only talking from the perspective of a pax. I have always, on every single trip, been told to put both pins back in as we taxied back. Surely, unstrapping and hoofing it to safety is a better option than pulling the handle!
If it's folly to do so prior to engine shut down Beagle, I'd suggest that the current Hawk community disagree with you.
Perhaps SOPs change. I've only ever had back seat trips so, I'm only talking from the perspective of a pax. I have always, on every single trip, been told to put both pins back in as we taxied back. Surely, unstrapping and hoofing it to safety is a better option than pulling the handle!
If it's folly to do so prior to engine shut down Beagle, I'd suggest that the current Hawk community disagree with you.
On the Tornado we would remove and stow all pins apart from the SPFH on crew-in. The 'live' canopy was lowered shortly after start, with the groundcrew hiding underneath. We would taxi out for a short distance before the remove, show and stow of the seat pins. Seat and canopy pins would be reinserted on the taxi back so that everything would be safe for the winch-back.
As far as I'm concerned, if you fly single seat then its your life and therefore your decision. I was always more comfortable being unstrapped on the taxi back and would justify that by saying it was quicker to egress if there was some kind of problem, but then again I didn't taxi out unstrapped.
In a two seat jet its a crew decision. Of course, when the canopy is down its not always appropriate to arm seats as the aircraft may be in a HAS or shelter.
Aircrew are clever people and spend years in training and IMHO are treated like children now by an organisation that seems to want to have a rule and procedure for everything.
In a two seat jet its a crew decision. Of course, when the canopy is down its not always appropriate to arm seats as the aircraft may be in a HAS or shelter.
Aircrew are clever people and spend years in training and IMHO are treated like children now by an organisation that seems to want to have a rule and procedure for everything.
rule and procedure for everything.