Buccaneer S1
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Buccaneer S1
Was the S1 evaluated by Boscombe before it was accepted for service and why was the aircraft not paŷload limited when it was discovered how poor the aircraft was especially in light of an engine failure?
How many S1 were lost before the Spey powered version was accepted?
How many S1 were lost before the Spey powered version was accepted?
The Buccaneer S1 was of course tested by A&EEE Boscombe Down.
To enable Buccaneer S1 to get airborne with a full weapon load, the fuel load was reduced and buddy buddy tanking was used from other aircraft types to top up after takeoff.
On HMS Eagle, 800 Sqn had a reduced number of Buccaneer S1 (10 instead of 14) and 800B Sqn had 4 x Scimitar F1 for tanking.
On HMS Victorious, Buccaneer S1 of 801 Sqn were tanked by Sea Vixen FAW2 of 893 Sqn.
This site shows a total of 21 (looks like 4 x prototype / pre-production + 17 x S1) Gyron Junior aircraft lost with crew attempting ejection - not all due to engine related problems.
Buccaneer
To enable Buccaneer S1 to get airborne with a full weapon load, the fuel load was reduced and buddy buddy tanking was used from other aircraft types to top up after takeoff.
On HMS Eagle, 800 Sqn had a reduced number of Buccaneer S1 (10 instead of 14) and 800B Sqn had 4 x Scimitar F1 for tanking.
On HMS Victorious, Buccaneer S1 of 801 Sqn were tanked by Sea Vixen FAW2 of 893 Sqn.
This site shows a total of 21 (looks like 4 x prototype / pre-production + 17 x S1) Gyron Junior aircraft lost with crew attempting ejection - not all due to engine related problems.
Buccaneer
Was the S1 evaluated by Boscombe
why was the aircraft not paŷload limited
How many S1 were lost before the Spey powered version was accepted?
HTH ........ LFH
(crossed with young RAF Eng while checking on losses)
.................
By coincidence I just finished the excellent "Up in Harms Way" by Commander R.M. Crosley, and excellent book about Fleet Air Arm testing and aerodynamics. Highly recommended.
Devotes a chapter or two specifically to the early Buccaneers with lots of talk about the engines, engine out issues, airspeed, some of the early crashes, boundary layer control which allowed a much reduced approach speed needed for the smallish UK carriers, carrier trials, carrier/aircraft integration etc. A major issue was the lack of oomph from the catapults of the UK carriers. The stroke length and end speed was just not enough to support the heavy and underpowered S1. The US carriers had quickly adopted to stronger, longer and faster catapults that could accommodate the larger, heavier and faster jets. He has some good paragraph on the differences between the Buccaneer and the Sea Vixen. Yes the speys helped tremendously.
The book also covers his time in WWII, Korea and other testing roles (Wyvern, Sea Vixen, etc)
I also found his take on flying the Phantom, Vigilante, F8 and A-4 very interesting. His experience low and fast in Vigilante led him to the conclusion that the even more so slab sided and forward positioned crew in the TSR.2 would have been in for a very, very rough ride and the aircraft would likely have fatigue issues. I know it may be forbidden to talk smack about the TSR.2 on some forums...but really interesting...
Again a great read. Check it out/order a copy. An e-copy here:
Up in Harm's Way Flying with the Fleet Air Arm R M Crosley The Stunning PDF Here
Devotes a chapter or two specifically to the early Buccaneers with lots of talk about the engines, engine out issues, airspeed, some of the early crashes, boundary layer control which allowed a much reduced approach speed needed for the smallish UK carriers, carrier trials, carrier/aircraft integration etc. A major issue was the lack of oomph from the catapults of the UK carriers. The stroke length and end speed was just not enough to support the heavy and underpowered S1. The US carriers had quickly adopted to stronger, longer and faster catapults that could accommodate the larger, heavier and faster jets. He has some good paragraph on the differences between the Buccaneer and the Sea Vixen. Yes the speys helped tremendously.
The book also covers his time in WWII, Korea and other testing roles (Wyvern, Sea Vixen, etc)
I also found his take on flying the Phantom, Vigilante, F8 and A-4 very interesting. His experience low and fast in Vigilante led him to the conclusion that the even more so slab sided and forward positioned crew in the TSR.2 would have been in for a very, very rough ride and the aircraft would likely have fatigue issues. I know it may be forbidden to talk smack about the TSR.2 on some forums...but really interesting...
Again a great read. Check it out/order a copy. An e-copy here:
Up in Harm's Way Flying with the Fleet Air Arm R M Crosley The Stunning PDF Here
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I see an old Dartmouth buddy in that ejections list linked by RAFEngO74to09. At least he survived the landing, after his Nav had ejected.
Are you here, Tony?
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The S1 in practice was launched with full payload and hardly any fuel, tanking soon after launch as explained previously.
57mm: The S1 used the same fixed probe as the S2, there was a retractable probe designed for the aircraft but flight tests showed the airflow from the nose made the drogue basket bounce around too much to safely engage, so it was never fitted to production machines and the (removable) fixed probe fitted instead.
57mm: The S1 used the same fixed probe as the S2, there was a retractable probe designed for the aircraft but flight tests showed the airflow from the nose made the drogue basket bounce around too much to safely engage, so it was never fitted to production machines and the (removable) fixed probe fitted instead.
Well …. Let's see what I can remember …
The retractable AAR probe very cleverly designed into the S1 proved to be too short for safe flight refuelling. That is to say, by the time you were just about to engage, the airflow over the radome had started to deflect the basket slowly and surreptitiously north east. After a bit of stable deflection it then whipped back on you. Over the top and the chaps might get rapped on the canopy. Underways and it might rap the fuselage just ahead of the nosewheel door - in the vicinity of the crash strips. That realisation brought 801 Squadron re-fuelling trials (in 1963, with 899 Vixens ISTR) to an abrupt halt. Hence the later addition of the much longer, fixed probe which about doubled the distance of the nozzle from the radome.
There was no 'getting airborne and tanking' on the Vic because tho' the embarked Vixens could play tanker, 801 Mk 1s didn't get the fixed probe until some time after late '64 and the retractable probe presented unacceptable risk. Every production machine delivered to 801 (probably 20 airframes up to late '64 at least) had a functioning retractable probe. You couldn't tank, but it looked good cycling. I can't speak for 809 HQ Squadron or 800 - the second frontline Mk 1 mob.
Payload ** – Ashore, it depended on runway length - you loaded it up and let the beast have its head. For deck work, you needed graphs to work out the max catapult weight – that was done upstairs. Depending on wind over the deck which would be 'ships speed only' if it were calm - max weight was based on acceleration after launch – you loaded it up (or unloaded it) until the graph got down (or up) to one knot per second. Tail down, ‘hands-off-stick’ launch and clean up on schedule. I don’t think anyone relied on the cunning ‘select undercarriage up (after tensioning) before launch’ facility but your left hand was holding the throttles open so the undercarriage button was quite close to finger. Bear in mind you came off the end at about 50 ft and 130 kts and single engine safety was 200 ft and 150 kts.
The Mk 2’s regular acceleration after launch was said to be in the region of seven kts per second, which gave rise to an altogether different set of problems.
I claim to have once seen the makers glossy brochure for the Mk 1. I think the Mk 2 probably came somewhere close to Blackburn’s original claims for the Mk 1.
Highly recommend ‘From the Cockpit No 6 - Buccaneer S.1’ by the very recently departed Commander Mike ‘Punchy’ Doust. There’s a photo of the retractable probe on page 18 - part reproduced below. There's about a dozen other good books available including 'Buccaneer Boys' and 'A Passion for Flying.' Both authors spent many years on both Mks.
** The pay wasn’t much either, about £3 4s 8d a day including flying pay, IIRC, but it were grand fun at the time. LFH
....................
The retractable AAR probe very cleverly designed into the S1 proved to be too short for safe flight refuelling. That is to say, by the time you were just about to engage, the airflow over the radome had started to deflect the basket slowly and surreptitiously north east. After a bit of stable deflection it then whipped back on you. Over the top and the chaps might get rapped on the canopy. Underways and it might rap the fuselage just ahead of the nosewheel door - in the vicinity of the crash strips. That realisation brought 801 Squadron re-fuelling trials (in 1963, with 899 Vixens ISTR) to an abrupt halt. Hence the later addition of the much longer, fixed probe which about doubled the distance of the nozzle from the radome.
There was no 'getting airborne and tanking' on the Vic because tho' the embarked Vixens could play tanker, 801 Mk 1s didn't get the fixed probe until some time after late '64 and the retractable probe presented unacceptable risk. Every production machine delivered to 801 (probably 20 airframes up to late '64 at least) had a functioning retractable probe. You couldn't tank, but it looked good cycling. I can't speak for 809 HQ Squadron or 800 - the second frontline Mk 1 mob.
Payload ** – Ashore, it depended on runway length - you loaded it up and let the beast have its head. For deck work, you needed graphs to work out the max catapult weight – that was done upstairs. Depending on wind over the deck which would be 'ships speed only' if it were calm - max weight was based on acceleration after launch – you loaded it up (or unloaded it) until the graph got down (or up) to one knot per second. Tail down, ‘hands-off-stick’ launch and clean up on schedule. I don’t think anyone relied on the cunning ‘select undercarriage up (after tensioning) before launch’ facility but your left hand was holding the throttles open so the undercarriage button was quite close to finger. Bear in mind you came off the end at about 50 ft and 130 kts and single engine safety was 200 ft and 150 kts.
The Mk 2’s regular acceleration after launch was said to be in the region of seven kts per second, which gave rise to an altogether different set of problems.
I claim to have once seen the makers glossy brochure for the Mk 1. I think the Mk 2 probably came somewhere close to Blackburn’s original claims for the Mk 1.
Highly recommend ‘From the Cockpit No 6 - Buccaneer S.1’ by the very recently departed Commander Mike ‘Punchy’ Doust. There’s a photo of the retractable probe on page 18 - part reproduced below. There's about a dozen other good books available including 'Buccaneer Boys' and 'A Passion for Flying.' Both authors spent many years on both Mks.
** The pay wasn’t much either, about £3 4s 8d a day including flying pay, IIRC, but it were grand fun at the time. LFH
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Last edited by Lordflasheart; 19th Sep 2016 at 17:56.
I recall reading a couple of incidents concerning early Bucc AAR:
One naval aviator was pottering about in an S1 at a reasonable rate of knots when he noticed a switch. But couldn't remember what it was for - he assumed it was for screen washing. So he operated it, there was a rumbling noise and to his surprise the retracted probe appeared, wobbled briefly, then bent round and departed the fix....
Another chap decided to have a go with the newly-fitted fixed probe. He found an agreeable tanker, went astern and was cleared for contact. Which he achieved fairly easily. The tanker duly announced 'fuel flowing', but the Bucc's looker didn't see any of the fuel gauges increasing. So they assumed something was U/S, disconnected and returned to land; the looker grumbling that the radar wasn't working. After they'd handed the cab back to the groundcrew, the chap folding the radome found it almost impossible to move. But he persevered and duly folded it - whereupon a couple of hundred pounds or so of fuel gushed out. It seems that the probe had been fitted, but the mod. had yet to be completed, so it hadn't been connected to the fuel system - hence the Blue Parrot had been treated to a kerosene bath....
One naval aviator was pottering about in an S1 at a reasonable rate of knots when he noticed a switch. But couldn't remember what it was for - he assumed it was for screen washing. So he operated it, there was a rumbling noise and to his surprise the retracted probe appeared, wobbled briefly, then bent round and departed the fix....
Another chap decided to have a go with the newly-fitted fixed probe. He found an agreeable tanker, went astern and was cleared for contact. Which he achieved fairly easily. The tanker duly announced 'fuel flowing', but the Bucc's looker didn't see any of the fuel gauges increasing. So they assumed something was U/S, disconnected and returned to land; the looker grumbling that the radar wasn't working. After they'd handed the cab back to the groundcrew, the chap folding the radome found it almost impossible to move. But he persevered and duly folded it - whereupon a couple of hundred pounds or so of fuel gushed out. It seems that the probe had been fitted, but the mod. had yet to be completed, so it hadn't been connected to the fuel system - hence the Blue Parrot had been treated to a kerosene bath....
"Up in Harm's Way" is indeed a cracking read of RN aviation. Surprised to find that in all the detail of carrier ops developments, not a single mention of Capt Eric "Winkle" Brown was made.
Came across this on Facebook. Thought it might be appreciated here.
Embedding doesn't seem to work, so here's the link:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jXLBhBz_2tE
Embedding doesn't seem to work, so here's the link:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jXLBhBz_2tE
Last edited by Senior Pilot; 14th Nov 2016 at 02:49. Reason: fix YouTube link. Don't put the url in the YouTube shortcut!!!
"Up in Harm's Way" is indeed a cracking read of RN aviation. Surprised to find that in all the detail of carrier ops developments, not a single mention of Capt Eric "Winkle" Brown was made.
