Wg Cdr Arthur Gill, OBE, DFC
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Nigel
A fascinating post. Thank you, and my condolences to you and your family.
Almost certainly Air Cdre Graham Pitchfork.
He has written several aviation history books and has been the Telegraph's aviation obituary writer for many years.
A fascinating post. Thank you, and my condolences to you and your family.
I don't know who wrote the Telegraph obituary
He has written several aviation history books and has been the Telegraph's aviation obituary writer for many years.
Hear! Hear! What a splendid first post, and very glad that someone apparently alerted you to this very interesting thread - let's hope that there will be many more posts, especially once that logbook is to hand.
You have every right to be more than a "little proud" of your father.
Jack
You have every right to be more than a "little proud" of your father.
Jack
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Thanks FL
Yes it's been an interesting experience to lose my father. It's only when you irrevocably lose someone that you discover how valuable they are. It's all too easy to take people for granted when they're around. On the other hand my father ticked-off 100 years, so one can hardly complain... and ill-health was demoralising him... he said he was ready to check-out.Whoever wrote the obituary, it was very decent of him/her. A lot of work and probably little in the way of 'thanks'.
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Hear! Hear! What a splendid first post, and very glad that someone apparently alerted you to this very interesting thread - let's hope that there will be many more posts, especially once that logbook is to hand.
You have every right to be more than a "little proud" of your father.
Jack
You have every right to be more than a "little proud" of your father.
Jack
I think he ate it.
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Hi Nigel
Firstly let me apologise for the Escape from Java story ending up on your father's condolences thread.
I went over to the 84 Sqn FB page and managed to upset your sister as well.
Your Dad was hero worshipped and greatly respected by all sqn members past and present, and we hope to see more stories from you.
But we are post-Jimmy Saville now, and blanking things out only leads to further myths & misunderstandings. So with some help I have almost got to the bottom of it.
Having had two other sqn veterans (who I have never met) agree about the story, I am from now on describing it as "Sqn Folklore"
Escape fromJava
Official 84 Sqn History Version (still some gaps & questions)
There were two lifeboats and one was judged to be unseaworthy. OC 84 Sqn, Wg Cdr John Jeudwine had to make the appalling decision on who to put in the seaworthy lifeboat, and who to leave behind. He chose to fill the lifeboat with complete Blenheim crews, a total of 12 aircrew.
Unofficial 84 Sqn Folklore Version
Same as above, but with the unsubstantiated allegation that various "other ranks" were ordered out of the seaworthy lifeboat.
2nd Unsubstantiated ridiculous bit of Folklore
That 84 Sqn were disgraced by this incident and would never be allowed back to the UK - this is a standard bit of folklore that comes around in cycles every now and again, - probably utter rubbish.
Firstly let me apologise for the Escape from Java story ending up on your father's condolences thread.
I went over to the 84 Sqn FB page and managed to upset your sister as well.
Your Dad was hero worshipped and greatly respected by all sqn members past and present, and we hope to see more stories from you.
But we are post-Jimmy Saville now, and blanking things out only leads to further myths & misunderstandings. So with some help I have almost got to the bottom of it.
Having had two other sqn veterans (who I have never met) agree about the story, I am from now on describing it as "Sqn Folklore"
Escape fromJava
Official 84 Sqn History Version (still some gaps & questions)
There were two lifeboats and one was judged to be unseaworthy. OC 84 Sqn, Wg Cdr John Jeudwine had to make the appalling decision on who to put in the seaworthy lifeboat, and who to leave behind. He chose to fill the lifeboat with complete Blenheim crews, a total of 12 aircrew.
Unofficial 84 Sqn Folklore Version
Same as above, but with the unsubstantiated allegation that various "other ranks" were ordered out of the seaworthy lifeboat.
2nd Unsubstantiated ridiculous bit of Folklore
That 84 Sqn were disgraced by this incident and would never be allowed back to the UK - this is a standard bit of folklore that comes around in cycles every now and again, - probably utter rubbish.
Last edited by SirPeterHardingsLovechild; 10th May 2016 at 17:42.
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Confusion Worse Confounded
NigG,
Put this Post in for you (or so I thought). But senile dementia (and natural stupidity) led me to put it in on "Gaining a RAF Pilot's Brevet in WWII" #8570 (where I normally reside) instead. So here it is:
Of course "Pilot's Brevet" (that Best of All Threads - where All is Grist that Comes to the Mill) accepted it (only Union Jack picked up the anomaly of timing); you were welcomed aboard there (although you had never Posted on it); and it is All My Fault, and I apologise most humbly to you and to the Moderators for this monumental cock-up.
Now will get back to my exegesis of your #40 - there is enough meat there to keep us going for quite a while. Meanwhile I have expressed my apolgies to the good folk of "Pilot's Brevet"
In sackcloth and ashes,
Danny.
Put this Post in for you (or so I thought). But senile dementia (and natural stupidity) led me to put it in on "Gaining a RAF Pilot's Brevet in WWII" #8570 (where I normally reside) instead. So here it is:
"NigG,
Welcome to our Old Crewroom in Cyberspace - and well met, Sir !
[In fact, they did continue to operate after the other VV squadrons had been withdrawn. The vertical dive started at about 12000', the aircraft finishing at maybe 200', and the pilot had to aim at the target, so low cloud made it unworkable. However, 84 developed a low level dive, which was less accurate, but still pretty effective.]
This puzzles me. I believe the decision to halt VV operations (on the onset of the '44 monsoon) was a policy one made by "Command" (in our case AHQ, Delhi). As to the exact date the axe fell, I cannot really help, as I was away recuperating from injuries sustained in my forced landing on 24th February, and did not come back until it was all over. Mistaken policy though it was (IMHO), I see no reason why it should not have applied to all the Squadrons.
We had all tried shallow dives (ca 45°) in monsoon weather, but discarded the idea because the famed VV accuracy had gone (the enormous nose of the VV plus the extra AoA from the zero AoI made for very poor forward visibilty) - and in any case the Hurricane and Beaufighter could do the job better, as they could see where they were going, and were much more agile - both important considerations when you are dodging round the jungle hills low level in pouring rain !
To carry out a "standard" VV dive, the drill was to start, as you say, from 10-12,000 AGL. You must be able to see your target from there (the leader above all, as unless he starts his dive absolutely vertically, the rest will be "off" increasingly as they follow him down). Trial and (lethal !) error had shown that if the average chap pulls as hard as he can (to the point of "grey-out") as the altimeter passes 3,500 AGL, he will finish level at 1,000 or so. That sounds a fair margin, but as you were coming down at terminal velocity (300 mph with dive brakes out), it works out at 400 ft/sec - or 2½ seconds leeway. You hadn't a lot to play with ! Of course, you would not pull to be level at 1,000 (making yourself a fine target !). but eased off at the end to get down to the treetops ASAP with most of your 300 mph, you would be very unlucky to be hit then.
[...You question why the VV didn't have more problems with Oscar fighters. In fact, the Allies had nine times the number of squadrons as the Japs, over Burma, in support of the '44/'45 offensive ... definite air superiority! Squadrons of Spits and Hurricanes were doing an excellent job of knocking down enemy aircraft..]
So they were (but not until the Spitfires came on the scene !) And they cannot be everwhere at the same time. But Burma is a big place; there were no "Early Warning" systems; the Vengeance "boxes" on Army Support simply took off to reach target at a time fixed by the Army. Then the troops would close in to 100 yards on the Jap bunker or other strongpoint, ready to fire the mortar smoke bomb onto it when they saw and heard us coming. 24 bombs, four tons of HE, would go into the bunker area in 20 seconds, any surviving Jap would be so dazed by noise and blast that he could offer little resistance when the troops rushed in with grenade, rifle and bayonet to mop up.
[...rarely flew with fighter cover...]
True !
[...So if enemy aircraft were sighted in the target area, the mission would be delayed until it was 'safer' to operate...]
Never heard of that - ever (except in the case of the Jap high level .air raid on Khumbirgram - my Post on "Gaining a RAF Pilot's Brevet in WWII" Thread p.136 #2710 -"Danny loses an Elephant").
Enough ! I must go now, will be off line....I may be gone some time...
Danny42C.
PS: Agree - you Dad should have got the DSO (unless he got the DFC for shooting down the Oscar ?)"
Welcome to our Old Crewroom in Cyberspace - and well met, Sir !
[In fact, they did continue to operate after the other VV squadrons had been withdrawn. The vertical dive started at about 12000', the aircraft finishing at maybe 200', and the pilot had to aim at the target, so low cloud made it unworkable. However, 84 developed a low level dive, which was less accurate, but still pretty effective.]
This puzzles me. I believe the decision to halt VV operations (on the onset of the '44 monsoon) was a policy one made by "Command" (in our case AHQ, Delhi). As to the exact date the axe fell, I cannot really help, as I was away recuperating from injuries sustained in my forced landing on 24th February, and did not come back until it was all over. Mistaken policy though it was (IMHO), I see no reason why it should not have applied to all the Squadrons.
We had all tried shallow dives (ca 45°) in monsoon weather, but discarded the idea because the famed VV accuracy had gone (the enormous nose of the VV plus the extra AoA from the zero AoI made for very poor forward visibilty) - and in any case the Hurricane and Beaufighter could do the job better, as they could see where they were going, and were much more agile - both important considerations when you are dodging round the jungle hills low level in pouring rain !
To carry out a "standard" VV dive, the drill was to start, as you say, from 10-12,000 AGL. You must be able to see your target from there (the leader above all, as unless he starts his dive absolutely vertically, the rest will be "off" increasingly as they follow him down). Trial and (lethal !) error had shown that if the average chap pulls as hard as he can (to the point of "grey-out") as the altimeter passes 3,500 AGL, he will finish level at 1,000 or so. That sounds a fair margin, but as you were coming down at terminal velocity (300 mph with dive brakes out), it works out at 400 ft/sec - or 2½ seconds leeway. You hadn't a lot to play with ! Of course, you would not pull to be level at 1,000 (making yourself a fine target !). but eased off at the end to get down to the treetops ASAP with most of your 300 mph, you would be very unlucky to be hit then.
[...You question why the VV didn't have more problems with Oscar fighters. In fact, the Allies had nine times the number of squadrons as the Japs, over Burma, in support of the '44/'45 offensive ... definite air superiority! Squadrons of Spits and Hurricanes were doing an excellent job of knocking down enemy aircraft..]
So they were (but not until the Spitfires came on the scene !) And they cannot be everwhere at the same time. But Burma is a big place; there were no "Early Warning" systems; the Vengeance "boxes" on Army Support simply took off to reach target at a time fixed by the Army. Then the troops would close in to 100 yards on the Jap bunker or other strongpoint, ready to fire the mortar smoke bomb onto it when they saw and heard us coming. 24 bombs, four tons of HE, would go into the bunker area in 20 seconds, any surviving Jap would be so dazed by noise and blast that he could offer little resistance when the troops rushed in with grenade, rifle and bayonet to mop up.
[...rarely flew with fighter cover...]
True !
[...So if enemy aircraft were sighted in the target area, the mission would be delayed until it was 'safer' to operate...]
Never heard of that - ever (except in the case of the Jap high level .air raid on Khumbirgram - my Post on "Gaining a RAF Pilot's Brevet in WWII" Thread p.136 #2710 -"Danny loses an Elephant").
Enough ! I must go now, will be off line....I may be gone some time...
Danny42C.
PS: Agree - you Dad should have got the DSO (unless he got the DFC for shooting down the Oscar ?)"
Now will get back to my exegesis of your #40 - there is enough meat there to keep us going for quite a while. Meanwhile I have expressed my apolgies to the good folk of "Pilot's Brevet"
In sackcloth and ashes,
Danny.
Last edited by Danny42C; 10th May 2016 at 18:02. Reason: Errors. Box Quotations.
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NigG,
I've had a copy of this excellent reference book for a few years, but only skipped through it at odd times it to use the statistics quoted for VV production and alloction and, for example, to research the history of EZ999, which caused much head-scratching on these Forums over the provenance and identity of the Camden Museum Vengeance.
This time I've set myself to reading the "Operationl" chapters more carefully from Chapter 7 "Fruition" (p.98) to Chapter 11 "Cancellation" (up to p.154). The first thing I found is that many of the confident statements I've made over the years on this and "Pilot's Brevet" thread (on the basis of my own experience - or what I can remember of it) - are contradicted.
I'm glad that I made it clear, very soon after I started in 2012, that I must not be regarded in any way as an Authority on this (or any other) subject !
Anyway, I'll wrap a cold towel round my head, get down to reading it properly and report results as they are relevant to your Posts. Watch this space !
Cheers, Danny.
...There's plenty about this in 'Vengenance The Vultee Vengeance dive bomber' by Peter C Smith'...
This time I've set myself to reading the "Operationl" chapters more carefully from Chapter 7 "Fruition" (p.98) to Chapter 11 "Cancellation" (up to p.154). The first thing I found is that many of the confident statements I've made over the years on this and "Pilot's Brevet" thread (on the basis of my own experience - or what I can remember of it) - are contradicted.
I'm glad that I made it clear, very soon after I started in 2012, that I must not be regarded in any way as an Authority on this (or any other) subject !
Anyway, I'll wrap a cold towel round my head, get down to reading it properly and report results as they are relevant to your Posts. Watch this space !
Cheers, Danny.
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Sir PHL I guessed from your 'tongue-in-cheek' username that being irreverend might be your thing! Anyway, thanks for the modification. I'm probably a bit defensive on the topic of Wg Cdr Jeudwine. I recommend getting hold of Global Warrior, mentioned in my first post. It gives an insight into this guy. He was really solid and a well-respected leader... but not, it seems by the 'powers that be'. After escaping to Australia in the lifeboat, he was posted to the Western Desert where he commanded a Baltimore Squadron. In a letter to my father (congratulating him on being made 84 Sqn commander, in 1943) he advised him to lead the squadron rather than drive it. He said that, as squadron commander, he always trusted that his men would give of their best... and only if someone wasn't playing the game would he get very serious... and have them posted away. He added that he'd been 'posted on' himself, losing his Baltimore squadron because, in the opinion of the higher echelon, he was 'too soft' and should be driving his men harder. It seems that this didn't go against him, however, because when he got back to the UK he was given command of a squadron of Lancs... and went on to be a 'master bomber'. My father reckoned that he would have reached Air rank had he stayed on the the RAF after the war. Unfortunately he killed himself doing aerobatics during his first day of flying a Typhoon. In my opinion he's someone who's worthy of a lot of respect.
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Danny
Thanks for your interesting feedback.
Why 84 continued operating during the monsoon while the other VV squadrons were withdrawn can only have been because they were still doing useful work, despite conditions having deteriorated. The other factor was that all VV squadrons were due to re-equip with Mosquitoes. No point in having squadrons in theatre if they can't locate and attack the target... better to withdraw them and give them superior aircraft that can readily operate beneath low cloud. That's my guess. (In the event, the Mosquito proved to be a disaster in tropical conditions, being made of wood and epoxy resin.)
Re. delaying an op if enemy aircraft were spotted in the target area, which you say you had never heard of... I think the book Vengeance quotes someone who was on an op when Jap fighters turned up. Fortunately they had fighter cover accompanying them and were able to scoot away at deck level, while the escort took on the Japs. It just underlines how vulnerable the VV was without an escort, so no doubt it made perfect sense to be cautious. I think 84 lost only one aircraft during their 5 months in theatre, and that was probably due to AA fire. So, the policy of being cautious when enemy aircraft were around, evidently paid-off.
Re. Arthur not getting the DSO... After the war, my father had lunch with his old boss at 221 Group, under whom he served in Burma. By then Vincent was AVM. He told my father that Gen Slim had put him up for a DSO, partly for his performance when briefing his commanders on the use of the VV in close air support, and for his training of Wingate's Chindits when they were preparing for battle, in Gwalior, and of course for his contribution in the air during the retaking of Burma (for which Slim and his units were profoundly grateful... as the VV squadrons were a decisive factor in the success of the early campaign). Vincent put the recommendation through normal RAF channels, rather than via the Army, along with a good many other recommendations for decorations. These ended up on the desk of Sir Keith Park, who refused most of them. This was in stark contrast to decorations going via Army channels to soldiers. In fact Arthur asked for all of his flight commanders to be decorated, but of the aircrew, only New Zealander Jimmy Hawke, his masterly navigator, was rewarded. People were totally non-plused over Park's miserliness. So many people had excelled. So my father received the DFC and was denied the DSO. It has to be said that one factor may have been his rank... he was an acting Sqn Ldr, substantive Flt Lt. He might have needed to be a substantive Sqn Ldr to be awarded a DSO (unless he'd shown extraordinary valour). Possibly Park was also used to giving decorations to airmen who had served in the European theatre, where, of course, the odds against survival were much higher. So perhaps he felt the chaps flying over Burma had had it relatively easy.
Thanks for your interesting feedback.
Why 84 continued operating during the monsoon while the other VV squadrons were withdrawn can only have been because they were still doing useful work, despite conditions having deteriorated. The other factor was that all VV squadrons were due to re-equip with Mosquitoes. No point in having squadrons in theatre if they can't locate and attack the target... better to withdraw them and give them superior aircraft that can readily operate beneath low cloud. That's my guess. (In the event, the Mosquito proved to be a disaster in tropical conditions, being made of wood and epoxy resin.)
Re. delaying an op if enemy aircraft were spotted in the target area, which you say you had never heard of... I think the book Vengeance quotes someone who was on an op when Jap fighters turned up. Fortunately they had fighter cover accompanying them and were able to scoot away at deck level, while the escort took on the Japs. It just underlines how vulnerable the VV was without an escort, so no doubt it made perfect sense to be cautious. I think 84 lost only one aircraft during their 5 months in theatre, and that was probably due to AA fire. So, the policy of being cautious when enemy aircraft were around, evidently paid-off.
Re. Arthur not getting the DSO... After the war, my father had lunch with his old boss at 221 Group, under whom he served in Burma. By then Vincent was AVM. He told my father that Gen Slim had put him up for a DSO, partly for his performance when briefing his commanders on the use of the VV in close air support, and for his training of Wingate's Chindits when they were preparing for battle, in Gwalior, and of course for his contribution in the air during the retaking of Burma (for which Slim and his units were profoundly grateful... as the VV squadrons were a decisive factor in the success of the early campaign). Vincent put the recommendation through normal RAF channels, rather than via the Army, along with a good many other recommendations for decorations. These ended up on the desk of Sir Keith Park, who refused most of them. This was in stark contrast to decorations going via Army channels to soldiers. In fact Arthur asked for all of his flight commanders to be decorated, but of the aircrew, only New Zealander Jimmy Hawke, his masterly navigator, was rewarded. People were totally non-plused over Park's miserliness. So many people had excelled. So my father received the DFC and was denied the DSO. It has to be said that one factor may have been his rank... he was an acting Sqn Ldr, substantive Flt Lt. He might have needed to be a substantive Sqn Ldr to be awarded a DSO (unless he'd shown extraordinary valour). Possibly Park was also used to giving decorations to airmen who had served in the European theatre, where, of course, the odds against survival were much higher. So perhaps he felt the chaps flying over Burma had had it relatively easy.
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NigG (your #50),
He would've been a War Substantive Flt.Lt.
Smith has a Wg Cdr J.D.Gibbs in the Index, (in the Acknowledgements he has him as "Dennis Gibbs") as commanding 82 Squadron. I think we are talking about a Wg Cdr D.R. Gibbs, DSO. He won his on a Blenheim Squadron, which had been having a hard time doing shipping sweeps and the like in the Channel. So heavy were the losses that he (a mere F/O, or even a P/O) found himself commanding the Squadron (as the senior officer left alive). He did a very good job (as an Actg Wg Cdr. ?) and got the DSO for it. Or so the story went. He was certainly out in India in my time.
So I don't think (if the story be true) that your Dad was a War Sub Flt Lt. would have been a bar to a DSO award. Far more likely is the discreditable fact that the RAF top brass were bent on talking-down the Vengeance (in particular, and dive bombers in general), with the intention of talking them out altogether; restricting awards would fit in with that. Smith has a lot to say about it.
Some of the chaps had it easy ! - the VVs. The Jap Army Commanders in Burma seemed fixed on the idea that their Oscars were supplied for Army Co-Op duty only, and never thought of turning them loose on us. Most of the late 1942 VV pilot intake were straight off a Fighter OTU; but any fool could see that a properly handled pair of Oscars could destroy a whole box-of-six VVs without difficulty (if we stuck together, which was the tactic).
100 m.p.h. faster than a VV, infinitely more agile and more heavily armed, they'd cut us to ribbons. We had to fly with this Sword of Damocles hanging over us all the time, but thankfully it never fell !
Preview: one of the first fruits of my research: the Le-u problem is solved. 84 were at Khumbirgram, not in the Arakan. Khumbirgram to Le-u is only 130-odd miles. A VV could do it easily. The D.Tel. has a lot to answer for.
Danny.
...that one factor may have been his rank... he was an acting Sqn Ldr, substantive Flt Lt. He might have needed to be a substantive Sqn Ldr to be awarded a DSO (unless he'd shown extraordinary valour)...
Smith has a Wg Cdr J.D.Gibbs in the Index, (in the Acknowledgements he has him as "Dennis Gibbs") as commanding 82 Squadron. I think we are talking about a Wg Cdr D.R. Gibbs, DSO. He won his on a Blenheim Squadron, which had been having a hard time doing shipping sweeps and the like in the Channel. So heavy were the losses that he (a mere F/O, or even a P/O) found himself commanding the Squadron (as the senior officer left alive). He did a very good job (as an Actg Wg Cdr. ?) and got the DSO for it. Or so the story went. He was certainly out in India in my time.
So I don't think (if the story be true) that your Dad was a War Sub Flt Lt. would have been a bar to a DSO award. Far more likely is the discreditable fact that the RAF top brass were bent on talking-down the Vengeance (in particular, and dive bombers in general), with the intention of talking them out altogether; restricting awards would fit in with that. Smith has a lot to say about it.
...So perhaps he felt the chaps flying over Burma had had it relatively easy...
100 m.p.h. faster than a VV, infinitely more agile and more heavily armed, they'd cut us to ribbons. We had to fly with this Sword of Damocles hanging over us all the time, but thankfully it never fell !
Preview: one of the first fruits of my research: the Le-u problem is solved. 84 were at Khumbirgram, not in the Arakan. Khumbirgram to Le-u is only 130-odd miles. A VV could do it easily. The D.Tel. has a lot to answer for.
Danny.
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But thanks for the tip... I'll have a read when I'm next in Smiths. 
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Danny
I didn't follow your point about 'war substantive' rank, or Gibbs. Anyway my point about Arthur not being senior enough to earn the DSO is based on the Wikipedia entry for the DSO. It says that the award normally went to those who held the rank of major or above. More junior officers had been awarded it, but that generally indicated that their valour was close to that which merited the VC. Since Arthur was only an acting Sqn Ldr, I reasoned that he was deemed to be one notch too junior to qualify for the DSO. Anyway...
Yes 84 was operating from Khumbirgram. I see from the 84 squadron history (Scorpion's Sting) your squadron (110) was there too... although you, Danny, had personally been evacuated by that time... Both squadrons were subject to a Jap raid which inflicted only very minor damage on their respective aircraft. I see that Arthur led both 84 and 110 as part of a Wing for some ops.
We previously discussed why 84 stayed on in theatre after the monsoon arrived, while the other five Vultee Vengeance squadrons were withdrawn. According to the book, the other squadrons were withdrawn 'for rest and re-equipment'. Presumably 84 stayed on because they had arrived later than the other squadrons... and the weather was making operations less effective using VVs... and the Mosquitoes were about ready to go into service. To 84's credit they often managed to cope with the monsoon, using their low-dive bombing technique, as necessary, and their weather-recce Spitfire to assess conditions.
Amazing days! Who wouldn't want to have been there?!... although at the time, it can't have been much fun. Only the companionship, sense of purpose and adrenalin buzz to compensate for the discomfort and strain... (I guess).
I didn't follow your point about 'war substantive' rank, or Gibbs. Anyway my point about Arthur not being senior enough to earn the DSO is based on the Wikipedia entry for the DSO. It says that the award normally went to those who held the rank of major or above. More junior officers had been awarded it, but that generally indicated that their valour was close to that which merited the VC. Since Arthur was only an acting Sqn Ldr, I reasoned that he was deemed to be one notch too junior to qualify for the DSO. Anyway...
Yes 84 was operating from Khumbirgram. I see from the 84 squadron history (Scorpion's Sting) your squadron (110) was there too... although you, Danny, had personally been evacuated by that time... Both squadrons were subject to a Jap raid which inflicted only very minor damage on their respective aircraft. I see that Arthur led both 84 and 110 as part of a Wing for some ops.
We previously discussed why 84 stayed on in theatre after the monsoon arrived, while the other five Vultee Vengeance squadrons were withdrawn. According to the book, the other squadrons were withdrawn 'for rest and re-equipment'. Presumably 84 stayed on because they had arrived later than the other squadrons... and the weather was making operations less effective using VVs... and the Mosquitoes were about ready to go into service. To 84's credit they often managed to cope with the monsoon, using their low-dive bombing technique, as necessary, and their weather-recce Spitfire to assess conditions.
Amazing days! Who wouldn't want to have been there?!... although at the time, it can't have been much fun. Only the companionship, sense of purpose and adrenalin buzz to compensate for the discomfort and strain... (I guess).
Last edited by NigG; 16th Jun 2016 at 19:00.
I once had the privilege of remounting a DSO group for the son of the recipient. His father won an immediate DSO as a pilot officer, when he was the pilot of a Beaufighter which ditched in the sea off the North Cornish coast. The full story is here
https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?...9267011&type=3
Incidentally the medals are illustrated as I mounted them about 30 years ago. It was my first attempt at court mounting and it took me an age!
A.B.Harvey, as he was always known, was a Cornish boy and post war he opened and ran a gun shop in Falmouth. In many years of being involved in medals I have never seen another DSO to a pilot officer, and the details of Harvey's action would seem to support the idea that it was only awarded to junior officers who had just "missed" a Victoria Cross recommendation.
https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?...9267011&type=3
Incidentally the medals are illustrated as I mounted them about 30 years ago. It was my first attempt at court mounting and it took me an age!
A.B.Harvey, as he was always known, was a Cornish boy and post war he opened and ran a gun shop in Falmouth. In many years of being involved in medals I have never seen another DSO to a pilot officer, and the details of Harvey's action would seem to support the idea that it was only awarded to junior officers who had just "missed" a Victoria Cross recommendation.
Last edited by Tankertrashnav; 12th May 2016 at 08:43.
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Clear as Mud.
NigG (your #53),
The following has been lifted from "RAF Commands Forums":
In practice (as far as I was concerned) it meant that all promotions in wartime were "war substantive", in the sense that when the war ended, so did they. My Commission (and my previous airman service) were in the RAFVR; the position seemed to be that when the war ended, so did the RAFVR and my Commission.
The RAFVR was not reconstituted until 1947 (?), I was commissioned in it a Flying Officer in 1948, and in 1949 was commissioned (as Fg Off) into the RAF on Short Service (8 years active + 4 reserve), and in 1954 transferred into to a Limted Career Permanent Commission (don't ask).
Clear so far ?
The Point is: your Dad would have been a war substantive Flight Lieutenant, Acting Squadron Leader. Supposing the war had ended at that point. His post (and acting rank) would be "gone with the wind", his Flight Lieutenant (w.s.) - in theory - could go, too.
But his award should reflect the rank he held when he earned it, a DSO, AFAIK, is appropriate to a Major or equivalent.
The Wg Cdr Gibbs story is told as an illustration how a Fg Off (A/Wg Cdr) could properly be awarded the DSO (the fact that Smith mixed up two Gibbs is a red herring, and I should not have introduced it).
Danny.
...I didn't follow your point about 'war substantive' rank...
...The main feature of the period of World War Two as regards the administration of the armed forces (British in this case, although generally a universal response) was that for these purposes it was designated as an "emergency" (not to be confused with the later pronouncement that the unpleasantness in Malaya between 1949 and 1960 was deemed to be an emergency, and therefore by definition NOT a war!) Thus the entire establishment of the RAF and all appointments to commisisons and promotions approved during period of the emergency were by nature considered to be of a "temporary" nature. This also, of course, applied equally to all non-commisisoned ranks.
Generally speaking all wartime substantive ranks were designated as "war substantive", or "w.s." for short, I think this is explained in the RAF Lists, and cannot be compared with (normal peacetime) substantive ranks. As has been already mentioned, it took a lot of administrative sweat to work out all the appropriate ranks and seniorities of all remaining wartime individuals still serving in the postwar RAF, based on the approved peacetime establishment and annual running costs. It would be true to say that quite a high proportion of WW2 appointments to fill posts in schools and particularly to leadership posts on operational squadrons were held by lower-ranking officers holding acting rank specific to the appointment, and many of these might have had to drop at least one rank, perhaps two or even three.
Whenever the RAF is operating under "peacetime" conditions of service it is probably correct to say that there were "normal" substative ranks (vast majority of individuals), as well as small proportion of acting ranks (to compensate those individuals of lower rank appointed to posts normally filled by an officer of NCO of the higher rank), and sometimes, in particular situations and for various reasons, there could be temporary ranks. Honorary (unpaid) commissions with rank were held by certain individuals who undertook certain functions and were held in higher esteem, or freely offered their services on a voluntary basis considered of some value to the Crown.
And could somebody please enlighten me as to the fundamental difference (if there is one, apart from the name) between an RAF temporary (wartime) commision and an emergency commission, or was it simply that it replaced the "temorary" with "emergency" at some point? All replies welcome.
David D...
Generally speaking all wartime substantive ranks were designated as "war substantive", or "w.s." for short, I think this is explained in the RAF Lists, and cannot be compared with (normal peacetime) substantive ranks. As has been already mentioned, it took a lot of administrative sweat to work out all the appropriate ranks and seniorities of all remaining wartime individuals still serving in the postwar RAF, based on the approved peacetime establishment and annual running costs. It would be true to say that quite a high proportion of WW2 appointments to fill posts in schools and particularly to leadership posts on operational squadrons were held by lower-ranking officers holding acting rank specific to the appointment, and many of these might have had to drop at least one rank, perhaps two or even three.
Whenever the RAF is operating under "peacetime" conditions of service it is probably correct to say that there were "normal" substative ranks (vast majority of individuals), as well as small proportion of acting ranks (to compensate those individuals of lower rank appointed to posts normally filled by an officer of NCO of the higher rank), and sometimes, in particular situations and for various reasons, there could be temporary ranks. Honorary (unpaid) commissions with rank were held by certain individuals who undertook certain functions and were held in higher esteem, or freely offered their services on a voluntary basis considered of some value to the Crown.
And could somebody please enlighten me as to the fundamental difference (if there is one, apart from the name) between an RAF temporary (wartime) commision and an emergency commission, or was it simply that it replaced the "temorary" with "emergency" at some point? All replies welcome.
David D...
The RAFVR was not reconstituted until 1947 (?), I was commissioned in it a Flying Officer in 1948, and in 1949 was commissioned (as Fg Off) into the RAF on Short Service (8 years active + 4 reserve), and in 1954 transferred into to a Limted Career Permanent Commission (don't ask).
Clear so far ?
The Point is: your Dad would have been a war substantive Flight Lieutenant, Acting Squadron Leader. Supposing the war had ended at that point. His post (and acting rank) would be "gone with the wind", his Flight Lieutenant (w.s.) - in theory - could go, too.
But his award should reflect the rank he held when he earned it, a DSO, AFAIK, is appropriate to a Major or equivalent.
The Wg Cdr Gibbs story is told as an illustration how a Fg Off (A/Wg Cdr) could properly be awarded the DSO (the fact that Smith mixed up two Gibbs is a red herring, and I should not have introduced it).
Danny.
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NigG (follow-on to above),
Minor damage to an elephant, too. Three airmen killed. Whole story on "Pilot's Brevet" p.135 #2700,
Not exactly "evacuated"! Shanghai'd onto 8 Squadron IAF, more like. The raid was on 11th November, last flew for 110 on 13th.
Danny.
... Both squadrons were subject to a Jap raid which inflicted only very minor damage on their respective aircraft...
...although you, Danny, had personally been evacuated by that time...
Danny.
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Watch this space !
NigG,
In the Index to "Vengeance", Peter C. Smith has no entry for "Chindit(s)", but "Gill, Sqdn Ldr, Arthur M." (pp 69-72), but has nothing relating to the Chindits.
But (p.106) gives:
Gwalior is south of Delhi, a long way West. What happened to the hens is not recorded !
(pp 121-122):
But what were these 'methods of attack' agreed ? Peter C. Smith is infuriatingly silent on the point; we will never know, unless from the Chindit records or 84's ORB.
At first sight, we are in the realms of fantasy. A VV Squadron had 16 aircraft, of which it would be expected to keep 12 serviceable. Perhaps he means "sorties" instead of "machines", and the "sorties" were flown as two separate strikes.
There follows a lengthy description of a VV dive from a Bob Browning RNZAF but he is listed as being on 8 Squadron IAF, and we know where that was then (Arakan) so not relative.
More in a while.
Danny.
In the Index to "Vengeance", Peter C. Smith has no entry for "Chindit(s)", but "Gill, Sqdn Ldr, Arthur M." (pp 69-72), but has nothing relating to the Chindits.
But (p.106) gives:
"Arthur Gill was later to record how: 'By December 1943, 84 Squadron was ready to move forward to the Arakan, even going so far as to advance party to Chittagong where they bought a large brood of hens for the Squadron's Christmas dinner'.
"Two days before we were due to move, however, the A.O.C. No 221 group flew to Ranchi to say that we had been selected to support General Orde Wingate's Long Range Penetration Group (1st Indian Division), the Chindits, and so, on 6th December, 1943, we moved to Maharajpur, Gwalior, to train and exercise with General Wingate's forces."...
"Two days before we were due to move, however, the A.O.C. No 221 group flew to Ranchi to say that we had been selected to support General Orde Wingate's Long Range Penetration Group (1st Indian Division), the Chindits, and so, on 6th December, 1943, we moved to Maharajpur, Gwalior, to train and exercise with General Wingate's forces."...
(pp 121-122):
..."The new penetration by Wingate's troops, coded "Operation Thursday", had been muted as far back as the Quebec Conference, which Wingate himself had secretly attended. Arthur Gill himself described what this involved : We spent two months training and learning to co-operate with these jungle columns. It was in this period that we devised our method of attack, after many arguments on the subject with Wingate himself. Ultimately they got it right with Wingate,and when his column moved off in March 1944, 84 Squadron stood by to co-operate with his demands...
...They moved to Khumbirgram airfield in Assam on 10th February 1944. They were to relieve No.45 Squadron initially, however, and they carried out their first dive bombing attack proper on an enemy occupied village a few days after their arrival in Assam. Le-u was the target on the next conbined attack by the Vengeance Squadrons, both mounting two attacks each this day, with 22 machines from 110 Squadron and 23 from 84 Squadron...
...On the 11th the targets were more diverse, 84 Squadron striking at Gwengu and Nyaungintha, with six planes on each mission, while 110 was hitting Nanbon and Tanga with the same numbers of aircraft. On the 11th the targets were more diverse, 84 striking at Gwengu and Nyaungintha, with six planes on each mission, while 110 was hitting Nanbon and Tanga with the same numbers of aircraft...
More in a while.
Danny.
Max Arthur's excellent book "There shall be Wings" contains an interview with F/Sgt David Russell who was in the second lifeboat. They hit a reef and started to sink. They were actually rescued by Jeudwine. It is a very full account of what really happened.
Danny; I have followed this wonderful thread from day 1 and thank you for your amazing recollections. My dad was on 82 Squadron in India and worked on the VV. He is long dead now but he did not have much good to say about them. I recently found his photo album from that period and I'll see if I can reproduce anything of interest.
Danny; I have followed this wonderful thread from day 1 and thank you for your amazing recollections. My dad was on 82 Squadron in India and worked on the VV. He is long dead now but he did not have much good to say about them. I recently found his photo album from that period and I'll see if I can reproduce anything of interest.
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Helena Handbasket,
Thank you for the kind words ! I don't know if you've strayed much further than this Thread, but if not I can recommend the Finest Thread on PPRuNe Forums - namely "Gaining a RAF Pilot's Brevet in WWII" to you.
My own weary tale starts there on p.114 #2262, and if you want a real belly-laugh, see Geriaviator's p.178 #3558 there and all around are his stories of a small boy's times in Khormaksar.
Danny.
Thank you for the kind words ! I don't know if you've strayed much further than this Thread, but if not I can recommend the Finest Thread on PPRuNe Forums - namely "Gaining a RAF Pilot's Brevet in WWII" to you.
My own weary tale starts there on p.114 #2262, and if you want a real belly-laugh, see Geriaviator's p.178 #3558 there and all around are his stories of a small boy's times in Khormaksar.
Danny.
Last edited by Danny42C; 13th May 2016 at 15:03. Reason: Error
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Danny
Thanks for that. I noticed my father was granted a 'War emergency' commission. Though his rank and commission appear not to have terminated with the end of the war, as you implied it might. He continued as a VR until 1946, when he was granted a permanent commission in the regular RAF. That was good news for me, because he subsequently felt financially secure enough to marry my mother and procreate
Thanks for that. I noticed my father was granted a 'War emergency' commission. Though his rank and commission appear not to have terminated with the end of the war, as you implied it might. He continued as a VR until 1946, when he was granted a permanent commission in the regular RAF. That was good news for me, because he subsequently felt financially secure enough to marry my mother and procreate
Yes of course, Danny. That was the epic thread that I was referring to. After spending a couple of years in the sixties on 84 Sqn in Khormaksar, I don't remember much that I "belly laughed " about. The trips to Eastleigh, New Sarum and Mbabane, well that was a different matter.