Ownership of risk

[Aurora Australis]

Hi,
As a Falkland Islands resident, I am interested in trying to understand the reasons for what seems to be a significant change in the operating rules for fixed wing operations into Mt Pleasant Airport over the last year or so.

Some background info for those unfamiliar with the location -
Mt Pleasant Airport was opened in 1985 as a military airfield, and is also the Islands only International airport. It was built in a location that generally has the best weather on East Falkland with respect to cloud base and visibility. The 2000' East-West range of hills just to the North of the field shelter it from low cloud and fog that often affect the North and Northeast coast. The most frequent strong winds are westerly, however the next most common direction is Northerly, and this often results in what is referred to as "rotor streaming", with associated moderate to severe turbulence, and potentially limiting crosswinds.

For thirty years, this did not seem to cause major issues with the regularity of the international flights to the islands. (There are two MoD flights a week from UK via Ascension Island, and one a week from Punta Arenas, Chile, plus various other charter flights). There were occasional delays when extreme Northerlies were forecast, but as far as I understand it, the decision to operate a specific flight was a crew decision.

For about a year or so, the airfield has regularly and frequently been officially closed to all fixed wing traffic whenever there is any turbulence forecast (including P30 Tempo) and the forecasts also seem to have become far more cautious, with the forecast turbulence often not actually appearing.
This has caused significant delays on an almost weekly basis, and has been applied on a very rigid basis, apparently purely on the forecast rather than the actual.

I can understand not departing Ascension for an 8 hour sector with limited alternates if doubt exists. However, I find it surprising that, for instance, the LanChile flight has been refused due to airfield closure rather than allowing it to make its own judgement based on actual at time of arrival (including one time when they were turned back with only about 20 minutes to run). Also, the Oil exploration charter flight was on more than one occasion barred from departing MPA due to airfield closure based on forecast, when the actuals were absolutely fine.

I have heard that the change in rules has something to do with a change in the military rules on "Ownership of risk" (an expression I had not heard before), and that the Ownership used to rest with the aircraft crew, but now rests with the Commander Air Wing, or Station Commander of the military airfield.
MPA cannot be the only airfield affected by such turbulence. At other such locations, are things handled differently? Is this a difference between Civ and Mil, or a difference between Falklands and everywhere else?

There must be a lot of people here who have operated these routes - would you be glad/relieved that the decision is taken out of your hands, or would you want to have the option to make your own decision?

[NutLoose]

bump anyone?

[Basil]

I have heard that the change in rules has something to do with a change in the military rules on "Ownership of risk"

Don't know but you could be right:

https://www.gov.uk/government/public...k-risk-to-life

Glad I'm not an Airship who has to read and comply with all this stuff!

p.s. Anyone inferring that the foregoing would apply in wartime would be very misguided to base their actions upon that misconception

[Sandy Parts]

Sounds like a chat with your 'liaison officer' might be in order. There must be someone in the FI Govt who meets regularly with the Station Executive (including OC Ops who will be the person interpreting the rules on behalf of the Stn Cdr).

[Arty Fufkin]

An encounter with severe turbulence and rotors on take off or approach / landing is a dangerous event in my book.

Prob 30 tempo; a 30% chance that it will be there 50% of the time. Not far off the odds you get playing Russian roulette. As for the actual, you won't know it's there or how bad it is until you're in it.

Better to arrive late than dead in my book, I'd say sensible rather than risk averse........

[Lordflasheart]

MPADAM

From the good book - 8.20

"Warning: Moderate to severe turbulence due to rotor activity when wind from North (indicated by 56/// group in the Terminal Area Forecast). No Fixed-Wing operations will be allowed without the consent of the AO or his nominated deputy during periods of forecast rotor activity."

HTH - LFH

[glad rag]

As has been stated above, thats just for your girly Ascots, I have launched F3's from the housey where even the breeze through the opening for the APU stopped the lid coming down due to it's rotation [the canopy not the APU] thank heavens on being able to fall back to RAFG experience; launched the cab and was treated to the finest display of airmanship and flying skill [what else from a QFI] as the crew turned short under the hill, sideslip held whilst flying at an angle in the turn, gaining a minute on the interception.

One of the few moments where the groundies stood in the storm winds and lashing rain, 8 foot tall shouting their heads off [cos we ain't sepitcs, it's a bit unusual, to say the least].

[fergineer]

Glad me old chum, when you were launched in your F3, if it was anything like when the F4 were there we in the Herc tanker were right behind them but them was when we was needing them not feeding them.

Rotors were not a nice thing to have to put up with if you didn't need too.

[ExAscoteer]

Girly Acots? Oh DO **** off!

Without us you would have been particularly ****** in your useless 'flicknife'. :rolleyeyes:

[Aurora Australis]

Thanks for the bump NutLoose, before it faded into oblivion without comment!

Thanks for the link Basil, I had not thought to search the expression. Interesting reading, and I do not claim to have studied it in detail (yet).

I understand the concept and the reasons for Risk Assessment, but wonder if it can be a rather blunt instrument at times. In this case, it has been identified that a risk exists, during certain met conditions, of turbulence worse than might be obvious, that could result in an aircraft accident. The chosen solution seems to be that during any period that the turbulence is forecast, the airfield will be closed, regardless of the actual conditions (thanks LFH for the chapter and verse on that).

Arty, I fully agree that encounters with severe turbulence and rotors are dangerous, and I am not suggesting ignoring the risk. However, is "Risk Assessment" not what our job as professional pilots mainly consists of? We have our individual training, our company/organisation Ops Manuals with all their limitations to guide us. I am interested in how the "Ownership of risk" has migrated from the aircraft crew/airline/operator to the Airfield operator. Are the conditions found at MPA so unique that the decision must be taken away from the crew? How are decisions made at other international airports that suffer similar weather issues - is it an airfield decision or an operator decision. Is this a difference between Civ And Mil?
LanChile regularly operate into very challenging destinations, such as Ushuaia. I am sure there are turbulent conditions when aircraft stop operating, but is it the Airport that decides? (Maybe it is, I do not know).
I agree that with rotors, you cannot predict exactly when they will hit if it is already blowing 350/30-40, but when the forecaster has forecast 330/15-20, Tempo 340/25g35 530003, P30 tempo vrb05 560003, it does not go from 15 kts to 560003 in an instant. It has often been the case during the past year, since the rules changed, that aircraft have been prevented from contemplating a departure based on actual conditions, because the airfield is closed based on what might happen rather than what is actually happening.

Sandy Parts, appreciate your suggestion of a chat to the Liaison Officer, however as a lowly individual (albeit with an aviation background), I don't think I would get much out of it - I suspect from various conversations I have had that there are people representing various operators (Hi-Fly oil charter?, LanChile?), and the FI government who don't seem to be able to get any review of the rules considered.

[Dan Winterland]

It's not new. The Tri-star wasn't cleared for flight in severe turbulence and at least two air-bridges were delayed as a result to my own knowledge - and disgust!

[Aurora Australis]

Hi Dan,
Yes, Tristars were occasionally delayed, but the past year has been totally unlike previously. I have been up and down the UK-FI route in the region of 100 times over the past 30 years. Prior to this year, I can remember maybe five or six times that I had weather related delays. During 2015 I had three consecutive flights with more than 24 hours delay due to airfield closures. Something has definitely changed.
Maybe the way the Met Office processes information has changed. I do not recall when they started using the 5///// turbulence group in the TAFs - my impression is that it is only in the last couple of years. Out of interest, do any of you with wider international experience recall seeing this group being used anywhere other than the Falklands?

[Lordflasheart]

The new style "Defence Aerodrome Manual" originates centrally from the MAA in skeleton form, for local completion. Its purpose is "... to provide a mechanism to inform both military and civilian operators of accurate aerodrome data."

The new manuals were first published in late 2014 which might explain the time frame of the OP's perception of certain changes in procedure. That also coincides nicely with Basil's "RA 1210 - Ownership and Management of Operating Risk (Risk to Life)" and the multitude of other RAs that have recently appeared from the MoD.

The MAA was established in 2010 as "..... an independent organisation responsible for regulating air safety across defence." However, in 2015 the MAA became part of the Defence Safety Authority, which -

"..... was launched on 1 Apr 2015 and is headed by Air Vice Marshal [now Air Marshal] Richard Garwood. The DSA brings together the Defence Safety and Environment Authority (DSEA), Military Aviation Authority (MAA) and Defence Fire Safety Regulator (DFSR), to form a single common managed organization under the leadership of a 3-star Director General (DG) - DG DSA."

Back to the original question. I had to search all over for an explanation of the mysterious "56/// group" quoted in theMPA aerodrome manual para 8.20. It seems it's intended to refer to the six-symbol turbulence forecast group in the TAF, that follows the cloud group. Not to be confused with the similar five-symbol 'pressure tendency group' in the RMK section of a METAR, where presumably plain language reports of actual turbulence would also reside.

That the OP referred in passing (but correctly) to 5///// would not therefore seem to be accidental. Thus it might be that a small correction is required in order for MPA's 8.20 to make sense.

TAF Turbulence Group decodes as - First digit 5 indicates Turbulence is forecast.
Second digit indicates both intensity and frequency, on a 0 - 9 scale plus X for Extreme.
The remaining four symbols indicate height, or show as //// to complete the group if no height info is available.

Intensity level 6 - is 'Severe Turbulence in clear air, occasional' while 7 indicates 'Severe turbulence in clear air, frequent.' Moderate versions of the above are indicated by 2 and 3

So the example group 56/// in 8.20 refers solely to "Severe turbulence in clear air, occasional" and is only one of four possible intensities of CAT implied by the accompanying text – viz "Moderate to severe ..." which would if encoded correctly, range from 52//// to 57//// with four slashes, plus 5X//// if it were forecast to be extreme.

As for TAF - I was brought up to understand that the A in TAF stood for Aerodrome, rather than "Area" as used in 8.20.

If the AO decides to shut MPA to fixed-wing operations iaw 8.20, how is that promulgated on the basis of a forecast ? By publicly declaring "Aerodrome Colour State Black" (for a period of time in the future) ? - Or by a longer form of words, perhaps only addressed to prospective operators ? And are rotary-wing crew left to decide for themselves ?

It is possible that MPA's 'Annex HH: Thunderstorm & Strong Wind Procedures' explains some of the above 'anomalies' but I could not find it.

In respect of other stations with known turbulence problems, I could only think of Gibraltar. While not playing down potential weather hazards, there is currently nothing as strong as "No Fixed-Wing operations will be allowed without the consent of the AO ...." in the RAF Gibraltar Aerodrome Manual – even in their Annex HH. Maybe it's because they don't have the power to actually close Gib airfield.

As for asking around, have you tried talking to FIGAS pilots or the Erics ? They should have a much better explanation, extensive local knowledge, and their own independent views, that might be willingly imparted - in private - over a couple of wets.

HTH - LFH

[Aurora Australis]

Thanks for the reply LFH.
I did consider explaining all the codes in my original post, so sorry you had trouble in finding them.

I assume your information at post#6 is verbatim from the book. If so, you are correct that they have got it wrong, on two counts - first that it should be a 6 character group, and second that it states "moderate to severe turbulence....indicated by 56/// group..." where 56 specifically only refers to "severe turbulence in clear air, occasional".

Also, your excerpt states "turbulence due to rotor activity indicated by 56/// group". In my view that is not strictly correct - those codes say nothing about the cause of the turbulence. There will be turbulence to some degree any time the wind at MPA is from the North, but the clue to the fact that it is rotor streaming is not in the 560003 alone, but the fact that it is accompanied by (e.g.)VRB05 - for someone not familiar with the phenomenon, they could be fooled into thinking that the TEMPO VRB05 meant the occasional relief from the bad turbulence of northerly 45kts, whereas it is exactly the opposite - it is when the rotors break off the hill and stream down over the airfield that the wind comes from all directions and is at its most turbulent.

I am very aware of the independent views of the local non-military operators (and the international non-military operators) - it is a subject that has been discussed at length, and no-one I have spoken with understands or agrees with the current policy.
(Incidentally, you are showing your age with your reference to Erics - Bristow have not been the military contractors at MPA since 1998 when British International won the contract, although Bristow have been operating out of Stanley for the past year on the Oil Support contract)

[Aurora Australis]

I started this thread in 2016 in frustration at the way that the military arbitrarily close Mount Pleasant Airport to all fixed-wing movements under certain Met conditions (detailed in the posts above).

However, the thread faded away without really getting to the answer to some of my questions.

This weekend has seen yet another highly disruptive delay to the LATAM connection from Santiago via Punta Arenas, including a 24 hour delay due to turbulence forecast yesterday afternoon (when during the whole period, the strongest wind reported was 18 kts with no gusts), followed by turning the re-scheduled aircraft back when it had only about 25 minutes to run today, due to an updated TAF forecasting the turbulence (this time the actuals being 29 kts with no gusts reported). Todays crew requested over the radio to continue, and assess the conditions for themselves, but were prohibited and turned back.

I would like to try again, and repeat a couple of the questions I asked previously (in bold, below).

"Maybe the way the Met Office processes information has changed. I do not recall when they started using the 5///// turbulence group in the TAFs - my impression is that it is only in the last couple of years. Out of interest, do any of you with wider international experience recall seeing this group being used anywhere other than the Falklands?"

"I am interested in how the "Ownership of risk" has migrated from the aircraft crew/airline/operator to the Airfield operator. Are the conditions found at MPA so unique that the decision must be taken away from the crew? How are decisions made at other international airports that suffer similar weather issues - is it an airfield decision or an operator decision. Is this a difference between Civ And Mil?"

Lordflasheart kindly responded with a comment (above) that he could only come up with Gibraltar, where despite severe turbulence issues, the decision is still not mandated by the Airfield Operator, but (presumably) left to the airline/crew to decide.

I know that LATAM regularly operate through Ushauia, which can be extremely turbulent, but as far as I know, the airfield is not prohibited to traffic by the Airport authority.

I am aware that Madeira suffers from extreme turbulence - how is the decision making done there?

[Cows getting bigger]

Madeira. Firstly they have crew 'qualifying' criteria:

Crew requirements

1. Initial experience To operate at Madeira Airport, the Pilot-in-command must have a minimum of 200 flying hours as Captain on the concerned type of aircraft, before completing the initial training.
2. Recent experience To operate at Madeira Airport, the Pilot-in-command must have performed there, on the last six months:
   • one landing and take-off or,
   • a flight simulator training comprising a landing and take-off on each runway, on a simulated adverse weather condition or,
   • a line training flight to Madeira Airport, comprising a landing and take-off, assisted by a qualified instructor occupying the right-hand seat.
3. The Pilot-in-Command is authorized to operate to Madeira Airport (LPMA) for a period of six months starting from the date of issue.

Minimum training requirements

In order to operate at Madeira Airport, the operator must establish and accomplish beforehand a training program concerning the type of aircraft to be used. This training, if performed on local flights, must include at least, landings and take-off by day and night in both directions, emphasising:

1. the TKOF flight path to runway 23,
2. the TKOF flight path to runway 05,
3. the balked landing (go-around initiated in landing configuration from very low height) on both directions,
4. the let down and approach to both runways,
5. the operation effect on runway slope and dimensions and associated safety margins.

If the flight is to be performed in a flight simulator, the following procedures must be included in the training program, for each runway:

1. take-off with engine failure after V1,
2. relight after engine failure,
3. VOR approach,
4. balked landing and go-around,
5. visual approach,
6. landing,
7. weather conditions: wind - the maximums as indicated in paragraph 2.3. Severe turbulence, Windshear and up and down drafts, must be included in the different approaches,
8. one landing at night must be executed for each runway.

Line training

No line training is required if the flight simulator used is level D. If level C flight simulator is used, line training must be performed with one landing and take-off in Madeira Airport, with an instructor occupying the right-hand seat.

They then have very specific wind criteria:

Wind Limitations

1. When landing

1. Maximum of two minutes mean Wind Speed Values indicated by the Touchdown anemometer:

• In the sector 300° to 010° MAG (clockwise) - 15KT, with the maximum Wind Gust of 25KT
• In the sector 020° to 040° MAG (clockwise) - 20KT, with the maximum Wind Gust of 30KT
• In the sector 120° to 190° MAG (clockwise), and if Runway in use is 05 - 20KT with a maximum Wind Gust of 30KT, and if Runway in use is 23 - 15KT, subject also to maximum Wind Gust of 25KT as indicated by MID Anemometer.

2. Maximum of two minutes mean Wind Speed Values,including Gust indicated by the MID or ROSÁRIO Anemometers

• In the Sector 200° to 230° MAG (clockwise) - 25KT.

b. When Taking-off

• 1. Maximum of two minutes mean Wind Speed Values indicated by the MID anemometer:

• In the sector 300° to 010° MAG (clockwise) - 20KT with no Gust limitations
• In the sector 020° to 040° MAG (clockwise) - 25KT with no Gust limitations
• In the sector 120° to 190° MAG (clockwise) and if Runway in use is 05 - 25KT with no Gust limitations, and if Runway in use is 23 - 20KT, also with no Gust limitations

NOTE: The limitations above do not supersede any Operators or Aircraft Operations Manual (AOM) limitations if these are more restrictive

Having operated in MPA (albeit the late 80s) and more recently Madeira and the Azores (you want to try Horta or San Jorge with a stonking Northerly!), I'm pretty confident that MPA is a relative walk in the park. I think the real issue is the (non) education of the relatively new military beast, the DDH. Now that people have absolute clarity regarding their personal responsibilities, we're seeing a weakness in teaching and understanding of Risk Management. Consequently, DDHs may be (are?) being overly risk averse. Obviously a very difficult subject but it is my perception that Total Safety has just left kindergarten for Reception and there's still some way to go.

[Aurora Australis]

Thanks for that. Interesting that the specific wind criteria seem to only refer to Actual reported conditions, not Forecasts.

The frustration that many of us (professional pilots who have operated in the Falklands for 30 or more years, albeit not of large fixed-wing aircraft types) have is that the Operators at MPA close the airport based on TAFs, not METARs.
I would have no issue with them delaying or cancelling their own operations based on issues such as logistic/cost problems if an 11 hour flight from Cape Verde (since Ascension is no longer used) ends up having to divert to Montevideo, but it is a different matter for a 2 hour commercial flight from Punta Arenas to be turned around on a forecast when 20 minutes out with no signs of the forecast turbulence actually happening, or a departure being cancelled in similar circumstances when the airfield is flat calm, which has happened on many occasions.

I don't have the figures to hand, but I would estimate that over the last three or four years, something approaching 20% of all international flights to MPA have been delayed by 24 hrs or more.

[SASless]

Good thing no one ever wanted to go to war down there!

[India Four Two]

I missed this thread first time around. I had a quick look at GE and see there are some 500 m hills about 6 nm NW of MPA. Are these the hills generating the "rotors"?

I have extensive experience of flying (in light aircraft, as well as an airline passenger) in the area immediately downwind of the Canadian Rockies. Closing airports in Alberta (or Colorado, Wyoming and Montana, for that matter) on the basis of forecast turbulence would cripple commercial air transport.

The description of the closure criteria at Maderia based on actuals seems eminently sensible.

Consequently, DDHs may be (are?) being overly risk averse.

It looks like a classic case of CYA.

Todays crew requested over the radio to continue, and assess the conditions for themselves, but were prohibited and turned back.

I wonder if the crew were tempted to declare a PAN based on "fluctuating oil-pressure"?

[flighthappens]

Originally Posted by Aurora Australis

Thanks for that. Interesting that the specific wind criteria seem to only refer to Actual reported conditions, not Forecasts.

The frustration that many of us (professional pilots who have operated in the Falklands for 30 or more years, albeit not of large fixed-wing aircraft types) have is that the Operators at MPA close the airport based on TAFs, not METARs.
I would have no issue with them delaying or cancelling their own operations based on issues such as logistic/cost problems if an 11 hour flight from Cape Verde (since Ascension is no longer used) ends up having to divert to Montevideo, but it is a different matter for a 2 hour commercial flight from Punta Arenas to be turned around on a forecast when 20 minutes out with no signs of the forecast turbulence actually happening, or a departure being cancelled in similar circumstances when the airfield is flat calm, which has happened on many occasions.

I don't have the figures to hand, but I would estimate that over the last three or four years, something approaching 20% of all international flights to MPA have been delayed by 24 hrs or more.

There is definitely a case for UK met bureau to move to issuing a TTF at mil airfields.